Paths through meaning and form

Festschrift offered to Klaus von Heusinger on the occasion of his 60th birthday

Paths through meaning and form

Festschrift offered to Klaus von Heusinger on the occasion of his 60th birthday

Chiara Gianollo
Łukasz Jędrzejowski
Sofiana I. Lindemann
(eds.)

Table of contents / Inhaltsverzeichnis / Índice

Preface

This collection of essays is dedicated to Klaus von Heusinger on the occasion of his 60th birthday.

Over the years, thanks to his relentless academic activity, Klaus has created and given impulse to numerous formal and informal networks of scientists, working in linguistics and neighbouring disciplines all over the world. In many cases, these scientific collaborations developed into lasting friendships.

In planning this volume, we wanted it to reflect the range of research topics, languages, and methodologies addressed by Klaus and his colleagues, but also the richness of personal relations that emerged through these collaborations and were cemented by a genuine, evergreen curiosity in the mechanisms of human communication. We believe that the promptness of the contributors to this volume to be our accomplices in preparing this collection for Klaus was instrumental in attaining our initial goal: Klaus' research interests are richly represented in this volume, as well as his role as a trustworthy colleague and mentor.

With this Festschrift, we want to thank Klaus for what he means to us as his students, colleagues and friends. We have good reasons to hope that he will enjoy reading the various contributions: they are 60, like the years of his life we are celebrating today; they are listed alphabetically, but they quite naturally fall into thematic clusters in which Klaus' influence and inspiration can be clearly perceived. We are grateful to Klaus for the generosity which he constantly demonstrates us in sharing his ideas, concerning all aspects of academic life.

The tradition of having a Festschrift to celebrate the 60th birthday of a distinguished scholar relies on the presupposition that at that age most scientific milestones will have been achieved, most ideas will have been developed, most collaborations will have been established. In Klaus' case, this presupposition must be explicitly rejected: we would not be surprised at all in seeing him starting completely new lines of research in the next years, and creating new networks, exploring the landscape of linguistic studies in further countries, investigating new languages and new phenomena. Actually, we expect no less from him in the coming years!

We would like to thank Katja Halassy, Stephan Henn, and Raphael Thiele for their advice, their help in planning this volume, and their support during the editing process. Thanks also go to the authors for their interesting and diverse contributions, and for their prompt responses and detailed comments during the editing process. Our student assistants Antonia Braun, Alina Yehorova and Robert Voigt provided invaluable support with typesetting. We would also like to thank Marta Corcotoi for bringing the Festschrift into such a beautiful cover design, and the Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln for giving us the opportunity to publish this collection on the platform 'Open Monograph Press'.

Cologne / September 2022

Chiara Gianollo, Łukasz Jędrzejowski and Sofiana I. Lindemann

Definitud en lenguas indígenas habladas en México: una investigación bibliográfica

Ana Aguilar Guevara, Francisco Javier Morales Rodríguez, Paola Nayabel Reyes Peralta,
Alonso Sandoval Ávila – Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
anaaguilar@filos.unam.mx

La definitud es uno de los temas que más investigación ha desencadenado entre los estudiosos del significado de las expresiones en lengua natural. Como ejemplo de ello, esta la vasta obra de Klaus von Heusinger (como von Heusinger 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2013). Sus contribuciones han expandido nuestro entendimiento de las frases definidas, sobre todo en su dimensión pragmática y discursiva.

Como sabemos, la gran mayoría de los estudios sobre definitud se han llevado a cabo tomando como punto de partida el inglés, y a penas otras lenguas indoeuropeas. Afortunadamente, desde hace algunos años también se han desarrollado trabajos con una perspectiva tipológica mucho más amplia, que permite entender mejor las posibilidades de la lengua natural y enriquecer la teoría semántica (como Dryer 2013, 2014; Schwarz 2013, 2019; Aguilar Guevara, Pozas Loyo & Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado 2019). Una de las preguntas centrales que se aborda en estos estudios es con qué mecanismos morfosintácticos se expresa la definitud en las lenguas del mundo. Para contribuir a responder esta interrogante, a continuacion resumimos una investigación realizada en lenguas indígenas habladas en México. El estudio completo esta disponible en el sitio web *Definitud en lenguas indígenas habladas en México*.[1]

En esta investigacion, se revisaron gramáticas generales de 50 lenguas pertenecientes a 9 de las 11 familias lingüísticas indígenas habladas en México: Chontal de Oaxaca, Cochimí-Yumana, Huave, Maya, Mixe-Zoque, Oto-Mangue, Seri, Totonaco-Tepehua y Yuto-Nahua. De cada lengua se extrajo y sistematizó toda la información relacionada con la estructura y componentes de su frase nominal; crucialmente, se identificaron las estrategias específicas de cada lengua para referir a entidades definidas. Desafortunadamente, la gran mayoría de los materiales consultados no aclara qué presuponen por definitud y generalmente su criterio (implícito) para establecer si una frase nominal es definida es si se puede traducir al español o al inglés con una frase con artículo definido. Esto, como apuntan Matthewson (2004) y Tonhauser and Matthewson (2015), constituye una deficiencia metodológica importante, que se traduce en que nuestra investigación tiene limitaciones (explicadas en el sitio web). A pesar de ello, este trabajo tiene el valor de proporcionar un panorama general inicial para quien esté interesado en estudiar la forma y significado del dominio nominal en las lenguas consideradas.

El resultado principal de este estudio es la identificación de cuatro estrategias generales para marcar definitud: i) determinantes, ii) (re)uso de demostrativos, iii) afijos, y iv) sustantivos escuetos; en el sitio web se listan todas las lenguas estudiadas y las estrategias que presentan. Estas cuatro posibilidades son las mismas ya identificadas en muchas otras lenguas del mundo (cf. Dryer 2013).

La primera estrategia consiste en la utilización de una palabra especializada, independiente, que acompaña a los sustantivos de forma análoga a como sucede con los artículos definidos del español. A continuación se muestra un ejemplo del tzeltal de Oxchuc:[2]

---

[1] https://sites.google.com/view/definitudenlenguasdemexico/lenguas-agrupadas-por-familia.

[2] Abreviaturas presentes en los ejemplos: AG = agente, ABS = absolutivo, AN = animado, FUT = futuro, INESP = inespecífico, PERF = perfecto, PFV = perfectivo, PL = plural, STAT = estativo, VR = verbalizador. Las reproducciones de los ejemplos se apegan lo mas posible a las versiones originales.

(1)   laj-em   yo'tik te kerem
       Morir-PERF   hoy   el muchach
       'Hoy esta muerto el muchacho.' (Polian 2013: 400)

La segunda estrategia es el uso (presuntamente, sin valor deíctico) de un demostrativo. En los siguientes ejemplos del mixteco del norte de Tlaxiaco se muestra la doble función de la forma *yun*, como demostrativo regular (2) y como marcador de definitud (3):

(2)   Kaxtno'o mastru   sa'an   xtila   nuu   suchi   yun
       enseña   maestro idioma castellano   cara   niño   aquel
       'El maestro le enseña español a aquel niño' (Gittlen 2016: 66)

(3)   Tee   yun
       hombre el
       'El hombre' (Gittlen 2016: 64)

La tercera estrategia consiste en un afijo que se adjunta a un sustantivo. Por ejemplo, en el tepehuano del norte el morfema se presenta como un prefijo (4), mientras que en el mazateco de Mazatlán de Villa Flores, como un sufijo (5).

(4)   go-giikai
       el-arado
       'El arado' (Bascom 2003: 23)

(5)   Natsiee-ba´
       Conejos-los
       'Los conejos' (Carrera Guzmán 2011: 86)

La cuarta y ultima estrategia consiste en la utilización de sustantivos escuetos, es decir, que aparecen sin ningún tipo de determinante o marca extra. Dicha estrategia presenta dos patrones relacionados con la forma en la que las lenguas refieren a entidades indefinidas en oposición a las definidas.[3] En el primer patrón, la indefinitud se diferencia de la definitud por la utilización de una marca en el sustantivo, como ocurre con *te* (INESPECÍFICO) en el náhuatl de la Huasteca:

(6)   ten-tok-eh   tlaka-meh   i-pan   saka-tl
       sentado-STAT-PL hombre-AN:pl   su-lugar pasto-ABS
       'Los hombres están sentados en el pasto.' (Beller and Beller 1979: 214)

(7)   Ki-neki   eli-s   seh   te-pah-tih-ke-tl
       eso-querer ser-FUT   uno   INESP-medicina-VR-AG-ABS
       'Él quiere ser un doctor.' (Beller and Beller 1979: 214)

En el segundo patrón, no hay diferencias entre las expresiones definidas e indefinidas; en consecuencia, la distincion debe basarse en la información contextual, como sucede en el guarijío del sur:

---

[3] Los materiales consultados tampoco brindan detalles sobre cómo determinan que una frase nominal es indefinida. Se presume que el criterio es si las frases son traducidas al inglés o al español con artículo indefinido.

(8) waní čikó-re kawái
Juan robar-PFV caballo
'Juan se robó un caballo/caballos/el caballo/los caballos.' (Armendariz 2006: 78)

Las cuatro estrategias de marcación de definitud identificadas no son mutuamente excluyentes y llegan a concurrir en algunas lenguas, como en el triqui de San Juan Copala (Hollenbach 2008), el amuzgo de Xochistlahuaca (Buck 2015), el chontal de Tabasco (Keller 1997) y el mixteco de Tezoatlán (Ferguson de Williams 2007). Por ejemplo, en esta última, la definitud se puede marcar con un artículo definido (9) – sólo para entidades plurales –, un demostrativo (10) o un sustantivo escueto (11).

(9) ¿a ndin nduú na̱ ndusaa?
¿? los dos ellos regresarán
'¿Van a regresar las dos personas?' (Ferguson de Williams 2007: 39)

(10) dá ni̱ seí na pastel ñoó
entonces comieron ellos pastel aquel
'Entonces se comieron el pastel.' (Ferguson de Williams 2007: 39)

(11) ni̱ kana chéli
cantó gallo
'El gallo cantó.' (Ferguson de Williams 2007: 208)

La confluencia de varias estrategias en una misma lengua motiva dos preguntas, a saber, si existen y cómo son las diferencias de significado entre ellas. Schwarz (2013), por ejemplo, ha demostrado que muchas lenguas del mundo distinguen morfosintácticamente entre frases que refieren a entidades familiares y frases que refieren a entidades únicas. En este sentido, también merecen mención trabajos especializados recientes que han respondido estas preguntas para las lenguas indígenas de México: Gómez González (2015, 2019) para el matlatzinca, Herrera Castro (2016) para el huave de San Mateo del Mar, Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado et al. (2018) para el maya yucateco, Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado (2019) para el purépecha, Arrieta Zamudio (2019) para el zapoteco de San Pablo Güilá, Acosta Aguilera (2020) para el otomí del Valle del Mezquital, y Rodríguez Corte (2020) para el náhuatl de San Miguel Canoa.[4]

---

[4] El gran valor de estos estudios también reside en que emplean instrumentos de obtención y análisis de datos especialmente diseñados para una descripción semántica robusta, como el cuestionario de Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado, Gómez González & Rodríguez Corte (2017). Por esto mismo, aunque parezca contraintuitivo, los datos de estos trabajos no fueron incluidos en el presente estudio, pues consideramos que no son equiparables a los que provienen de la gran mayoría de gramáticas con las que abarcamos otras lenguas. Estas dan cuenta de las estructuras de las lenguas de una manera más general, que prioriza el punto de vista morfosintáctico y que sobre todo basa la indentificación de los significados en el método de traducción.

Referencias

Acosta Aguilera, Yolanda. 2020. *Sintaxis y semántica de las frases nominales marcadas con RA y YA en el otomí del Valle del Mezquital*. Master's thesis, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Aguilar Guevara, Ana, Julia Pozas Loyo & Violeta Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado. 2019. *Definiteness across languages*. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Armendáriz, Rolando Félix. 2006. *A grammar of River Warihío*. PhD dissertation, Rice University.

Arrieta Zamudio, Ana Laura. 2019. *La expresión de la cardinalidad definida en español y en zapoteco de San Pablo Güilá*. Master's thesis, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Bascom, Burton 2003. *Gramatica del Tepehuán del Norte*. Instituto Lingüístico de Verano.

Beller, Richard & Patricia Beller. 1979. Huasteca Nahuatl. In Ronald W. Langacker (ed.), *Modern Aztec grammatical sketches,* vol. 2, 199–306. Summer Institute of Linguistics, University of Texas at Arlington.

Buck, Marjorie J. 2015. *Gramática del Amuzgo de Xochistlahuaca*. Instituto Lingüístico de Verano.

Carrera Guzmán, Celso 2011. *Acercamiento gramatical a la lengua mazateca de Mazatlán Villa de Flores*. Instituto Nacional de Lenguas Indígenas.

Dryer, Matthew S. 2013. Definite articles. In Matthew S. Dryer & Martin Haspelmath (ed.), *The world atlas of language structures online*. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology.

Dryer, Matthew S. 2014. Competing methods for uncovering linguistic diversity: The case of definite and indefinite articles (Commentary on Davis, Gillon & Matthewson). *Language* 90(4). e232– e249.

Ferguson de Williams, Judith 2007. *Gramática popular del mixteco del municipio de Tezoatlán, San Andrés Yutatío, Oaxaca*. Instituto Lingüístico de Verano.

Gittlen, Laura. 2016. *Gramática popular: Mixteco del norte de Tlaxiaco*. Instituto Lingüístico de Verano.

Gómez González, Norma Berenice. 2015. *La expresión de la definitud en el matlatzinca de San Francisco Oxtotilpan, Edo. Mex*. Bachelor's thesis.

Gómez González, Norma Berenice. 2019. *Frases numerales definidas, distributivas y partitivas en matlatzinca*. Master's thesis, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México.

Herrera Castro, Samuel. 2016. *Sintaxis y semántica de la frase nominal en Huave de San Mateo del Mar, Oaxaca*. PhD dissertation, El Colegio de México.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 1995. Formal aspects of a pragmatic theory of definiteness. In Per Bærentzen (ed.), *Aspekte der Sprachbeschreibung. Akten des 29. Linguistischen Kolloquiums in Aarhus*, 81–84. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 1996. Definite Kennzeichnungen, Anaphora und Salienz. *Linguistische Berichte* 163. 197–226.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 1997a. Definite descriptions and choice functions. In Seiki Akama (ed.), *Logic, language and computation*, 61–91. Dordrecht: Springer.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 1997b. Salience and definiteness. *The Prague Bulletin of Mathematical Linguistics* 67. 5–23.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2002. Specificity and definiteness in sentence and discourse structure. *Journal of Semantics* 19(3). 245–274.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2003. The double dynamics of definite descriptions. In Jaroslav Peregrin (ed.), *Meaning in the dynamic turn*, vol. 150, 150–168. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2004. Choice functions and the anaphoric semantics of definite NPs. *Research on Language and Computation* 2(3). 309–329.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2006. Salience and anaphoric definite noun phrases. *Acta Linguistica Hafniensia* 38(1). 33–53.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2007a. Accessibility and definite noun phrases. In Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Manfred Consten & Mareile Knees (eds.), *Anaphors in text: Cognitive, formal and applied approaches to anaphoric reference*, vol. 86, 123–144. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2007b. Alternative semantics for definite NPs. In Kerstin Schwabe & Susanne Winkler (eds.), *On information structure, meaning and form. Generalizations across languages*, vol. 100, 485–508. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2013. The salience theory of definiteness. In Alessandro Capone, Francesco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza (eds.), *Perspectives on linguistic pragmatics*, 349–374. Cham: Springer.

Hollenbach, Barbara E. 2008. *Gramática popular del triqui de Copala*. San Juan Copala, Oaxaca. Instituto Lingüístico de Verano.

Keller, Kathryn C. 1997. *Gramática del chontal de Tabasco*. Instituto Lingüístico de Verano.

Matthewson, Lisa. 2004. On the methodology of semantic fieldwork. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 70(4). 369–415.

Polian, Gilles 2013. *Gramática del tseltal de Oxchuc*. PhD dissertation, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social.

Rodríguez Corte, Alaide 2020. *Tipos de referencia nominal en el náhuatl de San Miguel Canoa, Puebla*. PhD dissertation, El Colegio de México.

Schwarz, Florian. 2013. Two kinds of definites cross-linguistically. *Language and Linguistics Compass* 7(10). 534–559.

Schwarz, Florian. 2019. Weak vs. strong definite articles: Meaning and form across languages. In Ana Aguilar Guevara, Julia Pozas Loyo & Violeta Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado (eds.), *Definiteness across languages*. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Tonhauser, Judith & Matthewson, L. 2015. Empirical evidence in research on meaning. Ms.

Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado, Violeta 2019. *Morfosemántica en la fase nominal purépecha*. El Colegio de Mexico.

Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado, Violeta, Josefina García Fajardo, Rodrigo Gutiérrez-Bravo & Julia Pozas Loyo. 2018. The definite article in Yucatec Maya: The case of le... o'. *International Journal of American Linguistics* 84(2). 207–242.

Vázquez-Rojas Maldonado, Violeta, Norma Berenice Gómez González & Alaide Rodríguez Corte. 2017. Cuestionario para identificar frases nominales de referencia definida "simple". Ms.

There is this guy who is obsessed with specificity

Artemis Alexiadou – Humboldt Universität zu Berlin and ZAS
artemis.alexiadou@hu-berlin.de

1 Introduction

English and German have non-canonical uses of demonstratives (Lyons 1999, Ionin 2006, von Heusinger 2011, Deichsel 2015 and references therein), shown in (1) and (2) respectively.

(1) There is this man who lives upstairs from me who is driving me mad because he jumps rope at 2 a.m. every night.   (Maclaran 1982: 85)

(2) Und da war dieser Bauer aus Ostermiething, der schluckte alle Pillen, die er bekommen und die er von anderen einhandeln konnte.
'And there was this farmer from Ostermiething, who swallowed every pill he could get and he could catch from other people.'   (Deichsel 2015: 2)

Ionin argues (2006) that the demonstrative in (1) behaves similarly to an indefinite noun phrase, whereby it has a specific reference. According to Lyons (1999), the referential use of the demonstrative is not very common cross-linguistically, see also Ionin (2006).

   A further non-canonical use of the distal demonstrative is the so-called *recognitional* or *anamnestic* use (Himmelmann 1996, 1997). Von Heusinger, Chiriacescu & Deichsel (2010) and von Heusinger (2011) argue that the recognitional use of the German demonstrative *dies*-should be distinguished from its indefinite one: the recognitional demonstrative alternates with the definite article but not the indefinite one, (3), as the referent is known to the hearer although not prementioned and not present at the current discourse. By contrast, the indefinite demonstrative alternates with the indefinite article, (4), as the referent is not only not prementioned and physically absent, but also new to the hearer.

(3) Was ist eigentlich mit diesem/ dem/ *einem Telefon passiert, das immer in deinem Zimmer war?
'What has actually happened to this/ the/ *a phone which used to be in your room?'

(4) Gestern kam ich in eine Bar und da war dieser/ *der Fremde/ ein Fremder, der mich die ganze Zeit anstarrte.
'Yesterday I walked into a bar and there was this/ a/ *the stranger who stared at me all the time.'
(von Heusinger et al. 2010, ex. (10) and (13))

Recognitional demonstratives point to shared knowledge between the hearer and the speaker (Himmelmann 1996). In this sense, they are unlike specific indefinites, which are known to the speaker but are new to the hearer. According to Himmelmann (1997), the recognitional use of the demonstrative includes an emotive component, which, as Wolter (2006) signals, cannot be used if the referent is not salient and familiar in the context. As Wolter further points out, semantically unique descriptions seem to be acceptable only with this emotive reading, e.g. *That John Smith is a great guy*!

   As far as I know, such usages have not been discussed for Greek, to which I turn in section 2.

2 Greek demonstratives

In Greek, unlike in English, demonstratives embed DPs. In other words, noun phrases introduced by *this* are formally definite:

(5)   afto to vivlio
        this the book

This being the case, perhaps one would not expect to find indefinite uses of the Greek demonstrative, since it co-occurs with a definite noun phrase. Matters are different with respect to the recognitional use though, which should be possible. Indeed, this is possible in Hungarian, another language in which demonstratives embed DPs. This is discussed at length in Molnár (2010), where the example in (6) comes from:

(6)   te   itt   kínlódsz   ezzel   a pár   garas*od*dal, [...]
        you   here   torment.2SG   these.com the couple pennies.POSS2SG.COM
        'You torment yourself about your couple of pennies.'

Molnár further notes that the recognitional use is often strengthened by the presence of attributes.
    Contexts rendering the recognitional and emotive use of the demonstrative can be constructed for Greek as well:

(7)   Aftos o Janis ine poli kalo pedi   *emotive*
        This the John is very good child
        'This John is a great guy.'

As in English, (7) cannot be uttered if there is no emotional solidarity among the discourse participants (Lakoff 1974).
    Moreover, like its recognitional counterparts in English, German and Hungarian, the demonstrative cannot alternate with an indefinite noun phrase:

(8)   Ti epathe afto to tilefono/to tilefono/*ena tilefono pu itan sto domatio su?
        what happened this the phone/the phone/a phone that was in room yours
        'What happened to this phone that was in your room?'

In (9), while the demonstrative may be used, it does not have the same interpretation as the indefinite noun phrase; note that the definite noun phrase can also be used if further information is supplied, and the demonstrative sounds better if the modifier relative clause is included:

(9)   eki pu kathomun irthe enas tipos/aftos o tipos/o tipos pu su elega
        there that sitting   came a guy/this the guy/the guy that   you telling about
        'There where I was sitting came a guy/this guy/the guy I was telling you about.'

In case the indefinite is used, there was no previous mentioning of the person who came. However, when the demonstrative is used, where somehow both the speaker and the hearer are aware of the referent, he/she has already been introduced in the discourse.
    We can thus conclude that Greek allows recognitional uses of the demonstrative, which are related to familiarity. This does not come as a surprise. As mentioned, in Greek demonstratives embed definite DPs. The Dem + DP combination is a doubling structure, according to

Grohmann & Panagiotidis (2015). As has been argued in detail, in Greek doubling constellations in both the verbal and the nominal domain are subject to familiarity. In the former case, we have clitic doubling of a definite argument. In the latter case, we have doubling of the definite determiner in the presence of an adjective, and Dem + DP is a sub-case thereof.

As detailed in Anagnostopoulou (1994), Greek does not permit doubling of specific indefinites, e.g., *tin ida mia gineka pu kathotan sto parko* 'I saw her, a woman sitting in the park', leading us to conclude that indefinite uses of the demonstrative should be excluded. As Anagnostopoulou (1994) shows, a doubled DP in Greek clitic doubling is unambiguously familiar and necessarily denotes old information: doubling suppresses novel readings of definites. A similar observation has been made for doubling of definite articles in the context of modification in the DP by Tsakali (2008) and Alexiadou (2014), building on Tsakali (2008): determiner doubling behaves like clitic doubling in the verbal domain in that it suppresses novel readings of indefinites, as shown in the contrast in (10a–b):

(10) a. O Janis diavase ena vivlio gia ton Arthur Miller enthusiatsike ke thelise na gnorisi ton diasimo sigrafea apo konta
'John read [a book about Arthur Miller$_i$]$_j$, he got enthousiastic, and he wanted to get to know the famous author$_k$.'
the famous author: (i) Arthur Miller himself (k=i) (ii) the author of the book (k related to j)

b. O Janis diavase ena vivlio gia ton Arthur Miller enthusiatsike ke thelise na gnorisi to diasimo to sigrafea apo konta
'John read [a book about Arthur Miller$_i$]$_j$, he got enthousiastic, and he wanted to get to know the famous author$_i$.'
the famous author: necessarily the already established the already established member of discourse

Thus, as Greek employs a doubling structure for demonstratives signaling familiarity, recognitional/emotive uses of the demonstrative are possible.

If Greek does not permit doubling of specific indefinites, are indefinite uses of the demonstrative really excluded? Interestingly, hearer-new uses of the demonstrative emerge if it combines with the conjunction particle *ke* 'and'. Thus, (11b) can be uttered out of the blue, where clearly the information about the pain is hearer-new (courtesy of Despina Oikonomou):

(11) a. Ti   kanis   b. poli dulia. eho ki afto to pono sti plati.
what do.2SG   much work. have.1SG and this the pain on my back.
'How are you doing?'   'Lots of work. I have this pain on my back.'

This instance of the *ke* is what Tsiplakou (2005) labels an 'out-of-the-blue' use, whose function, as she argues, is to add a new assumption/premise to the context. According to Tsiplakou (2005: 300), in all its instances '*ke* is necessarily focalizing and 'presuppositional' in that the constituent(s) over which it takes scope must be interpreted as information which is additional to information that is known or presupposed. Crucially, however, this need not be information that is linguistically encoded or mentioned in the discourse but may be adduced as a contextual assumption necessary for adequate, i.e., optimally relevant, pragmatic interpretation.' It seems that by using *ke* the speaker is adding the referent of Dem + DP to the shared knowledge, i.e., *ke* functions as a means of suggesting mutual knowledge, thus the Dem + DP string is interpreted as familiar. This is perhaps not unlike the function of recognitional demonstratives, discussed in Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2012). The exact ways in which *ke* allows what seem to be indefinite uses of Dem + DP in Greek await further investigation.

Author note

For Klaus; thank you for your friendship and for always asking questions about Greek specific indefinites!

References

Alexiadou, Artemis. 2014. *Multiple determiners and the structure of DPs*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Anagnostopoulou, Elena. 1994. *Clitic dependencies in Modern Greek*. PhD dissertation, University of Salzburg.

Consten, Manfred & Maria Averintseva-Klisch. 2012. Tentative reference acts? 'Recognitional demonstratives' as means of suggesting mutual knowledge- or overriding a lack of it. *Research in Language* 10.3. 257–277.

Deichsel, Annika. 2015. *The semantics and pragmatics of the indefinite demonstrative dieser in German*. PhD dissertation, University of Stuttgart.

Grohmann, Kleanthes and Phoevos Panagiotidis. 2015. Demonstrative doubling in Modern Greek. *Linguistic Analysis* 40. 19–50.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2011. Specificity, referentiality and discourse prominence: German indefinite demonstratives. *Sinn und Bedeutung* 15. 9–30.

von Heusinger, Klaus, Sofiana Chiriacescu & Annika Deichsel. 2010. Two specific indefinite articles in German. Handout, invited lecture at the University of Santa Cruz, California (people.ucsc.edu/~abrsvn/handout_11.pdf).

Himmelmann, Nikolaus. 1996. Demonstratives in narrative discourse: a taxonomy of universal uses. In Barbara Fox (ed.), *Studies in Anaphora*, 205–254. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Himmelmann, Nikolaus. 1997. *Deiktikon, Artikel, Nominalphrase. Zur Emergenz syntaktischer Struktur*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Ionin, Tania. 2006. This is definitely specific: specificity and definiteness in article systems. *Natural Language Semantics* 14. 175–234.

Lakoff, Robin.1974. Remarks on this and that. *Chicago Linguistic Society* 10. 345–356.

Lyons, Christopher. 1999. *Definiteness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maclaran, Rose. 1982. *The semantics and pragmatics of the English demonstratives*. PhD dissertation, Cornell University.

Molnár, Kriztina. 2010. Anamnestische Verwendung der Demonstrativa im Deutschen und im Ungarischen. *Deutsche Sprache* 4(10). 326–344.

Tsakali, Vina. 2008. Similarities in the interpretation of doubling constructions. Paper presented at the 2008 Meeting of the Department of Linguistics of the University of Thessaloniki.

Tsiplakou, Stavroula. 2005. The Greek connective *ke*. A radical pragmatic account. *University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics* 11. 293–303.

Wolter, Lynsey. 2006. *That's that: The semantics and pragmatics of demonstrative noun phrases*. PhD dissertation, University of California Santa Cruz.

Coherence driven prominence and reanalysis: Some outstanding questions

Daniel Altshuler – University of Oxford
daniel.altshuler@ling-phil.ox.ac.uk

1 Discourse reanalysis

Smyth (1994) provided the discourse in (1) to show that a pronoun can be resolved to either the subject or the object of a previous sentence. That is *him* can be understood as picking out Phil or Stanley. In turn, it has been argued based on (1) and related discourses that an antecedent's prominence in a given discourse is correlated with how that discourse coheres. More precisely, it has been argued that the resolution of pronouns and the establishment of a coherence relation are correlated (Hobbs 1979, Kehler et al. 2008) and mutually constraining (Kaiser & Cherqaoui 2016, Stojnić 2016; Stojnić, Stone & Lepore 2017) tasks. For example, if we establish the coherence relation, Result, between the two sentences in (1), then Phil is the salient antecedent: Phil played with Stanley and Liz responded by poking Phil. One the other hand, if we establish the coherence relation, Parallel, between the two sentences in (1), then Stanley is the prominent antecedent: Stanley is whom both Phil and Liz played with. These two readings of (1) are made prominent by the two follow-ups in (1a) and (1b) respectively.

(1)   Phil tickled Stanley. Liz poked him…
         a.   …Phil stopped. Stanley thanked her.
         b.   …They tortured him for a while.

The correlation between prominence and coherence has far reaching consequences if we assume, following Hobbs (1979), Lascarides & Asher (1993) and subsequent work that inferring a coherence relation between two discourse units is non-monotonic. In particular, if we assume that, upon hearing (1), the pronoun is resolved, we are led to the view that the resolution strategy in question can be revised with more content. Altshuler & Haug (2017) call this phenomenon *discourse reanalysis*, following the terminology in the syntax processing literature on garden-path sentences (see e.g. Ferreira & Henderson 1991, Ferreira & Fodor 1998, Ferreira, Christianson & Hollingworth 2001).

As an illustration, let's assume that, given one's world knowledge, Parallel is inferred in (1), thereby leading the hearer to resolve *him* to Stanley. Let's further assume that (1) is followed-up with (1-a). Consequently, the hearer could revise the coherence relation in (1) as being Result and thus the antecedent for *him* would also be revised.

2 Two objections

One may object to the just given characterization of (1) as follows: (1) could not exemplify discourse reanalysis because the intonational contour would force a particular resolution of *him* such that only one of the follow-ups would be felicitous.

Here is another objection to characterizing (1) as involving reanalysis: (1) is not semantically ambiguous, but rather underspecified with respect to two possible readings. After hearing *Liz poked him*, the hearer would not resolve him to a particular antecedent. It's only upon hearing, e.g. (1-a), that the antecedent of the pronoun would be specified. Put differently, it's only when there is enough content in the discourse that an antecedent is deemed prominent enough to be identified with a pronoun.

These objections could, in principle, be generalized, potentially leading to the conclusion that there is no such thing as reanalysis at the discourse level. In §4, I motivate the phenomenon of discourse reanalysis through naturally occurring examples and outline challenges that this phenomenon invokes for a model theoretic analysis of coherence driven prominence. In the next section, I'd like to address the following question: How can we conclusively show that (1) is better analysed as semantic ambiguity vs. a case of underspecification?

3 Two possible experiments

Applying the underspecification approach to (1) would mean that upon hearing a pronoun, the processor has multiple parses available, and yet she waits until she has more evidence about which interpretation seems more reasonable. This means that the processor has to keep the two parses in memory. This process is much like a filler-gap situation. As is well known in the processing literature, the longer the distance between the filler and the gap, the harder it is to process. Hence, one prediction of the underspecification account is that one would get longer reading times in (1) if you lengthen the material that's intervening between the pronoun and the part of the discourse that is disambiguating. If longer times are not observed, then this be would be evidence for the semantic ambiguity approach.

Another potential way to tease these two accounts apart would be to ask participants how they interpret the pronoun in, e.g. (1), and further include confidence ratings. One should see low confidence if underspecification is involved, and higher confidence ratings if semantic ambiguity is involved.[1]

4 A naturally occurring example of discourse reanalysis

Hobbs (1990) argues that Chapter 4 in the novella, *Sylvie*, by Gérard de Nerval, often leads to a particular inference about how events are sequenced that is maintained until Chapter 7, where the reader finds out that the events are actually sequenced in a different way. This is an important realization because it leads the reader to the further realization that the narrator is unreliable – a major theme of the novella.

The first objection in §2 is irrelevant to this example. As for the second objection, note that on an underspecification account, the unreliability of the narrator would not be captured since the reader would be predicted to wait to until Chapter 7 to establish the correct temporal sequencing of events. *Sylvie*, therefore, provides a clear case of discourse reanalysis that involves the resolution of temporal anaphors.

There are, of course, many more examples of this kind, including comedic sketches and mixed-media narratives (e.g., film). The question I would like to pose is this:

(2)   How do we account for discourse reanalysis within a model theoretic framework?

5 A challenge

In order to address (2), one could say that: (i) context sensitive expressions (e.g. pronouns, tenses) are coindexed with their antecedents in the syntactic representation and (ii) such representations are assigned as many LFs as there are coindexation possibilities. On this approach, a reanalysis discourse would be treated as being semantically ambiguous. After hearing the ambiguous discourse unit, the hearer would choose one LF from multiple

---

[1] Thanks to Alex Göbel (p.c.) for discussing this experimental possibility.

possibilities. Upon hearing conflicting information the hearer could then revise this choice, selecting the other LF.

Unfortunately, the coindexation approach faces some non-trivial challenges if we assume (as in § 1) that pronoun resolution and coherence establishment are correlated and mutually constraining tasks. Unless the syntax has access to the discourse structure (which seems dubious), we must generate multiple LFs with different indexations for each context sensitive expression, then try to attach each LF to the previous sentence with the possible coherence relations, and assess the relative plausibility of the combinations. While this is possible to do, it's far from clear whether this is the best way of modeling the phenomenon. But if not this way, what is the best alternative?

References

Altshuler, Daniel & Dag Haug. 2017. The semantics of provisional, temporal anaphors and cataphors. Talk presented at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Sprachwissenschaft, Saarland University, Saarbrücken.

Ferreira, Fernanda, Kiel Christianson & Andrew Hollingworth. 2001. Misinterpretations of garden-path sentences: Implications for models of reanalysis. *Journal of Psycholinguistic Research* 30. 3–20.

Ferreira, Fernanda & Janet Fodor. 1998. *Reanalysis in Sentence Processing*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Ferreira, Fernanda & John M. Henderson. 1991. Recovery from misanalyses of garden-path sentences. *Journal of Memory and Language* 25. 725–745.

Hobbs, Jerry. 1979. Coherence and coreference. *Cognitive Science* 3(1). 67–90.

Hobbs, Jerry. 1990. *Literature and Cognition*. Stanford: CSLI.

Kaiser, Elsi & Boutaina Cherqaoui. 2016. Effects of coherence on anaphor resolution, and viceversa: Evidence from French personal pronouns and anaphoric demonstratives. In Anke Holler & Katja Suckow (eds.), *Empirical perspectives on anaphora resolution*, 51–78. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Kehler, Andrew, Laura Kertz, Hannah Rohde & Jeffrey L. Elman. 2008. Coherence and coreference revisited. *Journal of Semantics* 25(1). 1–44.

Lascarides, Alex & Nicholas Asher. 1993. Temporal interpretation, discourse relations and commonsense entailment. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 16. 437–493.

Smyth, Ron. 1994. Grammatical determinants of ambiguous pronoun resolution. *Journal of Psycholinguistic Research* 23. 197–229.

Stojnić, Una. 2016. *Context-sensitivity in a coherent discourse*. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.

Stojnić, Una, Matthew Stone & Ernie Lepore. 2017. Discourse and logical form: Pronouns, attention and coherence. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 40(5). 519–547.

But argumentative prominence, *though!*

Mira Ariel and John DuBois
Tel Aviv University and UC Santa Barbara
mariel@tauex.tau.ac.il and dubois@ucsb.edu

1 Introduction

According to von Heusinger and Schumacher (2019), relative prominence is a basic organizing principle of discourse, which comes into play when equally-ranked units compete with each other. Ariel (2019) has argued that relative discourse prominence applies to inferred representations as well. An argument that supports an inferred conclusion (pro), when presented side by side with an argument against that conclusion (con), naturally creates a competition between the pro and con arguments, and implicitly between their inferred conclusions. According to Anscombre and Ducrot (1983), a *but*-type counter-argument tends to win out, presumably because *but* marks it as the more prominent argument. Here we compare adversative *but* and concessive *though*, arguing that the former assigns a higher degree of prominence to the counter-argument. Our analysis is based mostly on data from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBC) (DuBois et al. 2000-2005).

2 Prominence of arguments and counter-arguments

Like *but*, *though* is a marker that links twos arguments, each (potentially) supporting an opposite conclusion. Both markers index the counter-argument (con), i.e., the assumption that serves as a basis for the con conclusion, which argues in the opposite direction from the pro conclusion. The argument in (1) is that 'Joanne would like to go (to Nicaragua)' and the *but* counter-argument is 'it's an interesting thing', which serves as a basis for an inferred conclusion against going. The argument and the *though* counter-argument in (2) are quite similar:

(1) JOANNE: I wanna go.
                 ... (H) **But**- -- ((1 Intonation Unit omitted))
                 It's an interesting thing. (SBC: 015)
(2) KEN: I'd like to go,
     JOANNE: It's an interesting thing **though**, (SBC: 015)

The prominence of the counter-argument, however, is different for *but* and *though*, we claim. English *but* often introduces a prominent, winning counter-argument, which defeats the conclusion derived from the argument. *Though* presents a concession, a less prominent, weaker opposition to the conclusion based on the argument (Barth-Weingarten & Couper-Kuhlen 2002, Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 2000, Quirk et al. 1985). In this case, the speaker presents the counter-argument almost as a reluctant counter-claim, a putative side-line, leaving the main line of the argument mostly intact.[1]

The position of the marker is also correlated with how prominent the speaker wishes to construe the divergent argumentation. Placing it at the beginning of the relevant intonation unit (IU), as in (1), the speaker foregrounds her countering stance (DuBois 2007), because her argument is pre-framed as divergent, regardless of its content or strength. Placing the counter-

---

[1] We here focus on *though*. *Even though* manifests a different discourse profile with respect to the prominence of the counter-argument.

argument marker, a sentence adverbial in this case, in non-IU-initial position, as in (2), on the other hand, downgrades the divergent position, for the counter-argument is often interpreted as a nonprominent afterthought. Given the difference in prominence between *but* and *though*, it is not surprising that only a quarter of *but* tokens (426/1839=23.2%) occurred in IU-final position, while the vast majority of *though*'s occur finally (110/125=88%).

Prototypical *but* and *though* are associated with two different discourse profiles, we claim. *But* introduces a prominent counter-argument in IU-initial position, whereas IU-final *though* downplays the prominence of the counter-argument, and hence the potential divergence between argument and counter-argument. We then make two predictions on preferences for prototypical *but*s versus *though*'s. It is socially dispreferred to express a stance that diverges from one's interlocutor (Pomerantz 1984). If we are correct, *but* should favor counter-arguments the speaker directs at herself, where no politeness issue arises, rather than at another interlocutor, which may cause an interactional risk due to a face-threatening action. Since *though* introduces a mitigated counter-argument (less face-threatening), it should preferably be used for countering another interlocutor.

At the same time, face considerations are not necessarily equal for powerful and powerless conversation participants. Powerful speakers may use the more prominently divergent *but* when addressing a powerless addressee, but the opposite should be true for a powerless speaker addressing a powerful addressee. We expect more cross-speaker *but*'s from powerful speakers to powerless ones, and vice versa. An impressionistic examination of the data confirms our predictions, but we here make do with some minimal pair examples.

Consider again the opposite arguments in (1) and (2), both part of the same conversation and involving the same opposite arguments. Note that when Joanne's counter-argument is aimed at herself (1), she uses an IU-initial *but*, but when she counters Ken (2), she reverts to a IU-final *though*. Indeed, when shortly afterwards Joanne again counters Ken's same argument, she chooses *though*:[2]

(3)	KEN:	I would love --
		.. I would love to go:.
	LENORE:	... Yeah.
	JOANNE:	... Yeah?
		... I wanna go too.
		... (TSK) (H) I'd --
		I'd rather go to Mexico **though**. (SBC: 015)

The next excerpt involves Kathy and Nathan, who, like Ken and Joanne, are a couple. But Kathy is tutoring Nathan in math, which makes him the (powerless) novice, and her the (more powerful) expert (see her nonmitigated contradicting response in lines 3–5):

(4)	NATHAN:	.. (H) You know what,	1
		.. I'm just gonna skip this one.	2
	KATHY:	... No you're not,	3
		.. you're gonna do it.	4
		... Now. (4 IUs omitted))	5
	NATHAN:	Well I can do --	6
		find one side by doing that,	7
		can't I?	8

---

[2] Although Joanne's *I'd rather go to Mexico* directly counters her own *I wanna go too*, it more crucially introduces a counter-argument to Ken's *I would love to go*, which is why *though* was preferred.

KATHY:	... Yeah **but**,	9
	why don't you p- .. just put the other – ((11 IUs omitted))	10
NATHAN:	I know what you meant.	11
	... (H) I don't ever remember us doing anything like that **though**. (SBC: 009).	
		12

In line with the power structure in this conversation, Kathy counters Nathan with a *but*, while Nathan counters Kathy with a *though*.[3]

However, and seemingly surprisingly, we do find cases where the speaker introduces her counter-argument with both *but* and *though*. The topic of the following excerpt is whether musicians can make a living performing music. Brett mentions his cello teacher as a case in point, but Melissa counters this with both *but* and *though*:

(5)   BRETT: (H) My cello teacher, ((1 IU omitted))
                          makes his living off of, ((1 IU omitted))
                          playing the cello.
          MELISSA: **But** he's --
                          .. **But** see he's a teacher **though**.
                          .. (H) ... He makes his money teaching. (SBC: 019)

We propose that Melissa's final *though* is an attempt to mitigate the more confrontational *but*, reframing the counter-argument as if it is the less face-threatening concession only.

The next example shows *though*'s mitigating effect even more clearly. B's counter-argument not only supports an opposite argumentative direction, it outright contradicts A's argument itself:[4]

(6)   A: So that would be yours.
                  You started the seventh.
          B: **But** that would be yours **though** wouldn't it? (LSAC)

Such a direct contradiction is clearly a face-threatening act, which B makes an effort to mitigate (note B's tag question).

Still, we note that mitigation is not the only motivation for speakers to combine the two markers. Unlike *but*, *though*, as well as *yet* and *still*, have another function, where it is the counter-expectedness of the counter-argument that is rendered prominent. This provides another motivation for speakers not to make do with a *but*:

(7)   A: But we've done an excellent in insurance **but yet** we **still** lost it
                  though. (LSAC)

3 Conclusions

We have here suggested that speakers make strategic choices when introducing counter-arguments, and these choices are sensitive to the degree of prominence associated with the divergent stances involved. Since IU-initial *but* renders the divergent stance prominent, speakers use it freely in self-directed counter-argumentation. Since non-IU- initial *though* renders the diverging argument less prominent, it is preferred when countering another

---

[3] While this *but* is not IU-initial, it still precedes Kathy's counter-argument in the next IU.

[4] *But* contradictions are normally only indirect, restricted to the conclusions inferred from the argument and the counter-argument.

speaker's argument, reducing the face threat. Similarly, *though* retroactively mitigates an other-directed *but* counter-argument. Face preservation, however, is not necessarily observed when the conversation is between unequals. Indeed, where a powerful speaker chooses *but*, the powerless may opt for *though*.

Author note

References

Anscombre, Jean-Claude & Oswald Ducrot. 1983. *L'argumentation dans la langue*. Brussels: Pierre Mardaga.

Ariel, Mira. 2019. Different prominences for different inferences. *Journal of Pragmatics* 154. 103–116.

Barth-Weingarten, Dagmar & Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen. 2002. On the development of final though: A case of grammaticalization? In Ilse Wische & Gabriele Diewald (eds.), *New reflections on grammaticalization*, 345–361. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth & Sandra A. Thompson. 2000. Concessive patterns in conversation. In Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen & Bernd Kortmann (eds.), *Cause, condition, concession and context: Cognitive and discourse perspectives*, 381–410. Berlin: De Gruyter.

DuBois, John W. 2007. The stance triangle. In Robert Englebretson (ed.), *Stancetaking in discourse: Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction*, 139–182. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

DuBois, John W., Wallace L. Chafe, Charles Meyer, Sandra A. Thompson, Robert Englebretson & Nii Martey. 2000-2005. Santa Barbara corpus of spoken American English, Parts 1–4: Philadelphia: Linguistic Data Consortium.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Petra B. Schumacher. 2019. Introduction to prominence in discourse. *Journal of Pragmatics* 154. 18–21.

Pomerantz, Anita. 1984. Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: Some features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes. In J. Maxwell Atkinson & John Heritage (eds.), *Structures of social action: Studies in conversation analysis*, 57–101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey N. Leech & Jan Svartvik. 1985. *A comprehensive grammar of the English language*. London: Longman.

Who gets mentioned next? The answer depends on the experimental task

Jennifer E. Arnold and Sandra A. Zerkle
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
jarnold@unc.edu

1 Introduction

Where do language processing biases come from? A compelling hypothesis is that people track the statistics of language form, and come to expect frequent patterns (Fine & Jaeger 2013, MacDonald 2013, Tanenhaus & Trueswell 1995, Saffran, Aslin & Newport 1996). While this question has mostly been addressed at the level of sounds, words, and syntactic structures, it also applies at the discourse level. Pronoun comprehension and production exhibit regular biases, for example in *Ana was cleaning with Liz. She …..*, people tend to assign the pronoun to the subject (Ana) more often than to the other character (e.g., Arnold et al. 2000), and when producing discourses like these, speakers tend to use pronouns more for Ana than Liz (e.g., Brennan 1995). It has been hypothesized that this subject bias is related to the fact that subjects tend to get frequently rementioned in discourse (Arnold 1998, Arnold et al. 2018). Relatedly, the probability of referent re-mention has been hypothesized to underlie semantic biases in pronoun comprehension (e.g. Kehler et al. 2008, Kehler & Rohde 2013, Rohde & Kehler 2014) and definite noun phrase comprehension (Frank & Goodman 2012). Yet there are many open questions about how referent re-mention relates to patterns of referential frequency. For example, is the subject bias explained by referential frequency, or just by the topicality of the subject position (cf. Chafe 1976)?

Testing hypotheses about referential frequency requires data on the likelihood of referent re-mention. Here we examine one method frequently used for this purpose: the sentence completion task (inter alia, Arnold 2001, Kehler et al. 2008, Kehler & Rohde 2013, Rohde & Kehler 2014, Brocher, Chiriacescu & von Heusinger 2018, Kaiser, Li & Holsinger 2011, Fukumura & van Gompel 2010, Rosa & Arnold 2017, Stevenson, Crawley & Kleinman 1994). In this task, participants hear or read a fragment, e.g. "Ana was cleaning with Liz", and provide a plausible continuation. Scholars analyze the frequency of responses referring to each character as a measure of re-mention likelihood. For example, if participants tend to mention Ana more than Liz in this context, it would support a subject re-mention bias.

Yet the cognitive processes required for this task notably contrast with those used in natural language production. First, sentence completion stimuli are usually single decontextualized sentences, and participants are usually asked to only add a single line (but see Brocher et al. 2018), which may be perceived as a signal to finish up the story as much as possible in that line. By contrast, real language takes place in a richer context and utterances are often planned within the context of longer discourses. Second, participants are required to invent the content of the continuation, so if the fragment ends with a name (… *Liz.*), they may default to mentioning that person just because the name is currently active. By contrast, real language is usually pre-planned based on the speaker's goals and intentions.

In this paper we test the reliability of the sentence completion task for measuring referent re-mention across different task conditions. We focus on the subject bias in sentences like *Ana was cleaning with Liz*, where two people of the same gender are doing an action together. Does Ana tend to be mentioned more than Liz? Theoretically, the subject is a topical position, and coherent discourses tend to be organized around topics, which predicts they should be frequently re-mentioned (Ariel 1990, Givón 1983, Grosz, Joshi & Weinstein 1995). In support of this, corpus analyses show that subjects do tend to be mentioned more than objects or obliques (Arnold 1998, Arnold et al. 2018). However, Arnold (2001) found that there was no

subject bias in a fragment completion task, but there was in a corpus analysis, suggesting that the method itself may impact estimates of remention bias.

Here we test two questions. First, are remention biases in the sentence completion task consistent across variations in task constraints? Second, if they vary, what drives this variation? We hypothesize that re-mention choices may be driven by: 1) whether participants are asked to provide only a single-sentence continuation or a longer one; and 2) whether participants tend to begin responses with the last-mentioned person more often when the name is the last word in the fragment than when there is an intervening prepositional phrase. We only analyzed the grammatical subject of the first sentence in the response, so our length manipulation does not change the number of opportunities for reference. We also tested whether the tense (present vs. past) of the fragment affects responses.

2 Experiments 1, 2, and 3

Here we describe the basic methods and results; for further details see Arnold & Zerkle (2021) and https://arnoldlab.web.unc.edu/publications/supporting-materials/arnold-zerkle/.

Methods.

88 participants completed the fragment completion task, where they read short one-sentence stories about four characters, who were introduced at the beginning: Ana and Liz (female), and Will and Matt (male). They provided a natural continuation in either the 1-sentence or 3-sentence length conditions. They then answered a meaning-based question, either "what are they doing?" or about who was doing the action. Comprehension answers served as an attention check.

Participants saw 8 critical trials (four in each length condition) and 8 fillers. The critical items always included two characters of the same gender (see Table 1), and were identical across experiments except that Exps. 1 and 2 were in present tense and Exp. 3 in past tense, and Exps. 2 and 3 had a locative prepositional phrase after the second character's name, while Exp. 1 did not.

Table 1: Example stimuli

Exp. 1.	Liz is assembling a bed with Ana.
	Matt is grilling meat with Will.
Exp. 2.	Liz is assembling a bed with Ana on Saturday afternoon
	Matt is grilling meat with Will on the back deck.
Exp. 3.	Liz assembled a bed with Ana on Saturday afternoon.
	Matt grilled meat with Will on the back deck.

Analysis

We analyzed the 397 trials where the participant mentioned one of the two characters in subject position, using a logistic regression. The dependent measure was whether the response began with the subject or object character. Centered predictors were continuation length (1 vs. 3 sentences), tense (present vs. past), presence of end material (yes vs. no), and interactions (length x tense and length x end material. Estimates probed effects for each experiment.

Results

First, we found that participants tended to begin their responses by mentioning the subject character, as indicated by a significantly positive intercept, although estimates reveal that this effect is driven by experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 1, where there was no PP at the end, participants were somewhat more likely to mention the nonsubject. Consistent with this, we

also found that subject mention was significantly higher following a prepositional phrase than when there was no end material. Our second question was whether length modulated re-mention frequencies. Indeed it did, revealed as a main effect that did not interact with end material or length. However, estimates show this effect was driven by experiments 1 and 2. There was no effect of tense.

Figure 1: Rate of subject mentioned first for all three experiments, by continuation length. Bars represent grand means; Error bars represent standard error by subject.

Table 2: Combined model: Critical predictors of subject mentioned first

Effect	Estimate (Standard Error)	t	p
Intercept	0.68 (0.15)	4.49	<.0001
Tense (Present vs. Past Tense)	0.48 (0.43)	1.11	0.2849
End material (PP vs. no PP)	1.69 (0.4)	4.22	0.0005
Length (one vs. three sentences)	-0.84 (0.27)	-3.16	0.0195
Tense x Length	-0.81 (0.61)	-1.33	0.1851
End Material x Length	-0.15 (0.61)	-0.25	0.8064

Table 3: Estimates for continuation length and intercept effects by experiment

Effect	Estimate (Standard Error)	t	p
Length effect Exp. 1	-1.01 (0.44)	-2.32	0.0253
Length effect Exp. 2	-1.16 (0.45)	-2.55	0.0138
Length effect Exp. 3	-0.36 (0.42)	-0.84	0.4083
Intercept effect Exp. 1	-0.35 (0.3)	-1.17	0.2567
Intercept effect Exp. 2	1.34 (0.28)	4.86	<.0001
Intercept effect Exp. 3	0.86 (0.3)	2.92	0.0105

3 Discussion

Our primary finding was that the constraints of the sentence continuation task influence re-mention frequencies. Longer responses elicit more subject mentions in the first sentence than single-sentence responses. This may be due to a desire to wrap up the discourse. The first sentence is "about" the character in the topical subject position, and participants may mention the other character to justify their presence. If there is only one sentence this is the only chance to do so. By contrast, 3-sentence discourses provide time to elaborate on the subject before mentioning the other character. These longer discourses are more similar to real language than short two-sentence stories, where we also observe a general tendency for subject re-mention (e.g., Arnold et al. 2018).

Our second finding was that the design of the stimulus fragment also affects re-mention probabilities. Subject re-mention was more common when a phrase intervened between the nonsubject character's name and their response. We suspect this is a task-specific recency effect. In natural language, speakers plan their utterances based on their intended message (e.g., Levelt 1989), and not based on the temporary activation of the last word they said. The sentence completion task instead imposes the need to generate a story from the fragment; without further context participants may instead rely on a strategy of using the currently active name.

Both of these effects demonstrate the sentence completion task is not a pure measure of next-mention frequency. This highlights the need to compare sentence completion findings with other metrics of re-mention frequency, for example corpus analyses. Our findings also underscore the importance of carefully considering how the task design may impact findings, and supports the use of longer responses, which discourage a recency-based strategy.

References

Ariel, Mira. 1990. *Accessing noun-phrase antecedents*. London: Routledge.

Arnold, Jennifer E. 1998. Reference form and discourse patterns. Doctoral dissertation, Stanford University. *Dissertation Abstracts International* 59. 2950.

Arnold, Jennifer E. 2001. The effect of thematic roles on pronoun use and frequency of reference continuation. *Discourse Processes* 3. 137–162.

Arnold, Jennifer E. & Sandra A. Zerkle. 2021. Additional Methods Analysis Information for "Who gets mentioned next? The answer depends on the experimental task." Technical Report #5. UNC Language Processing Lab, Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Arnold, Jennifer E., Janet G. Eisenband, Sarah Brown-Schmidt & John C. Trueswell. 2000. The rapid use of gender information: Evidence of the time course for pronoun resolution from eyetracking. *Cognition* 76(1). B13–B26.

Arnold, Jennifer E., Iris Strangmann, Heeju Hwang & Sandra A. Zerkle. 2018. Reference frequency: What do speakers tend to talk about? Technical Report #2. UNC Language Processing Lab, Department of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Brennan, Susan E. 1995. Centering attention in discourse. *Language and Cognitive Processes* 102. 137–67.

Brocher, Andreas, Sofiana I. Chiriacescu & Klaus von Heusinger. 2018. Effects of information status and uniqueness status on referent management in discourse comprehension and planning. *Discourse Processes* 55(4). 346–370.

Chafe, Wallace. 1976. Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics, and point of view. In Charles N. Li (ed.), *Subject and Topic*, 25–56. New York: Academic Press.

Fine, Alex B. & Florian T. Jaeger 2013. Evidence for implicit learning in syntactic comprehension. *Cognitive Science* 37(3). 578–591.

Frank, Michael C. & Noah D. Goodman 2012. Predicting pragmatic reasoning in language games. *Science* 336(6084). 998.

Fukumura, Kumiko & Roger P. G. van Gompel. 2010. Choosing anaphoric expressions: Do people take into account likelihood of reference? *Journal of Memory and Language* 62(1). 52–66.

Givón, Talmy. 1983. Topic continuity in discourse: An introduction. In Talmy Givón (ed.), *Topic continuity in discourse: A quantitative cross-language study*, 1–41. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Grosz, Barbara J., Aravind K. Joshi & Scott Weinstein. 1995. Centering: A framework for modeling the local discourse. *Computational* Linguistics 21. 203–225.

Kaiser, Elsi, David C. Li & Edward Holsinger. 2011. Exploring the lexical and acoustic consequences of referential predictability. In Iris Hendrickx, Sobha Lalitha Devi, António Branco & Ruslan Mitkov (eds.) *Anaphora processing and applications, Lecture notes in artificial intelligence*, vol. 7099, 171–183. Heidelberg: Springer.

Kehler, Andrew & Hannah Rohde. 2013. A probabilistic reconciliation of coherence-driven and centering-driven theories of pronoun interpretation. *Theoretical Linguistics* 39. 1–37.

Kehler, Andrew, Laura Kertz, Hannah Rohde & Jeffrey L. Elman. 2008. Coherence and coreference revisited. *Journal of Semantics* 25. 1–44.

Levelt, Willem J. M. 1989. *Speaking: From intention to articulation*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

MacDonald, Maryellen C. 2013. How language production shapes language form and comprehension. *Frontiers in Psychology* 4.

Rohde, Hannah & Andrew Kehler. 2014. Grammatical and information-structural influences on pronoun production. *Language, Cognition and Neuroscience* 29. 912–927.

Rosa, Elise. C. & Jennifer E. Arnold. 2017. Predictability affects production: Thematic roles can affect reference form selection. *Journal of Memory and Language* 94. 43–60.

Saffran, Jennifer R., Richard N. Aslin & Elissa L. Newport. 1996. Statistical learning by 8-month-old infants. *Science* 274. 1926–1928.

Stevenson, Rosemary J., Rosalind A. Crawley & David Kleinman. 1994. Thematic roles, focus and the representation of events. *Language and Cognitive Processes* 9. 519–548.

Tanenhaus, Michael K. & John C. Trueswell. 1995. Sentence comprehension. In Joanne L. Miller & Peter D. Eimas (eds.), *Speech, language, and communication*, 217–262. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Looking back and looking ahead: Some thoughts on the suffix *-ata* in Romance

Martin Becker – Universität zu Köln
martin.becker1@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

With his study of the Italian suffix *-ata*, Klaus von Heusinger (2002, 2005) explored an intriguing research topic in the field of derivational morphology. The more one dives into the intricacies of *-ata*, the more mysterious the suffix becomes. In his seminal study on *-ata*, the author makes the case for an abstract and unified semantics of *-ata*, trying to model the relationship between the suffix and the different readings it systematically produces in interaction with the conceptual properties of the underlying bases.

The suffix *-ata* yields deverbal (e.g. *lavare* → *lavata*, 'washing') as well as denominal (*ombrello* → *ombrellata*, 'blow with an umbrella') derivatives. In order to provide a unified account, Klaus von Heusinger claims that the base for all derivation types contains an event argument (though this does not mean that the base has to be verbal or a virtual verbal base). Following his account, the function of the suffix is to shift the referent argument to the prominent event argument and to profile the single character of the event (i.e. 'single event of or instance of the event').

This approach has its appeal and it has its cruces: most importantly, it provides a unitary (or 'monosemous') account for all derivations of *-ata* by matching relevant conceptual features of the base with the abstract operation(s) ascribed to the suffix. This comes with the price that different specific templates based on particular event predicates have to be spelled out in accordance with the conceptual semantics of the base (see von Heusinger 2002: 122).

For the denominal derivations, the author specifies the following event-like patterns:

Event of hitting with N: *librata* ('with a book')
Event of typically acting as N: *ragazzata* ('as a child')
Capacity that can be carried by/in N: Event of transporting with N: *boccata* ('in/with the mouth')
Meal prepared on the basis of N: Event of preparing with N: *fungata* ('with mushrooms') (formalizations, see in von Heusinger 2002: 123)

2 The functions of *-ata*

In this birthday paper, I want to provide a more complex picture by casting some light on the functions of *-ata* from a comparative and a diachronic perspective. Comparing the Italian *-ata* formations with their equivalents in Spanish, Portuguese (*-ada*) and French (*-ée*), it becomes clear that the functional range of the suffix is quite different across the Romance languages. In addition, the various readings, though they may converge semantically, do not have the same salience within the semantic structure of the derivational category in question. Let's have a closer look at the different *-ata* patterns in Romance. Surprisingly, Grossmann & Rainer (2004: 253f.) deal with the denominal and the deverbal formations in different sections of their comprehensive monograph on Italian word formation. They identify at least three main readings for the Italian denominal derivations with *-ata*, ranking them according to their frequency and salience as follows:

1. A stroke/blow with the instrument N designated by the base: *bastonata* ('with a stick'), *sassata* ('with a stone'), *zampata* ('with a paw');

2. Typical negative act committed by the person N: *stronzata* ('by an idiot'), *bambinata* ('by a child');
3. Quantity contained in the object designated by N: *bicchierata* ('in a glass'), *boccata* ('in the mouth'), *nidiata* ('in a nest');

The remaining readings (or subcategories) are either much less prominent (especially the group 'social events' that revolve around N, e.g. *bicchierata* ('beer'), *chitarrata* ('guitars/ guitar music') or they are no longer productive but only motivated, as is the case for the duration group (*mattinata, nottata, serata*), the 'meals and drinks' reading (e.g. *spaghettata* ('spaghetti meal')), and for the group of collective architectural terms (such as *arcata* ('arcade') and *travata* ('solid girder'). Yet the most productive group in Italian is the deverbal one. This central group is characterized by its typical semelfactive reading referring to 'singole istanziazioni del processo verbale' (Grossmann & Rainer 2004: 340) as in *chiamata* ('a call'), *dormita* ('a nap'), *bevuta* ('a drinking') and *accelerata* ('an acceleration'). These word formations typically combine with light verbs like *dare* (*dare un'ordinata alla casa*, 'to clean up') and *fare (fare una dormita*) (ibid.: 341).

Interestingly, the equivalents of *-ata* in Spanish and Portuguese present quite a different picture. In addition, there are very conspicuous contrasts when it comes to comparisons between the Ibero-Romance languages (irrespective of their typological proximity).

In contrast to Italian, the most prominent *-ada* reading in Spanish turns out to be 'typical negative act committed by the person N', with examples like *bobada* ('stupidity'), *cacicada* ('abuse of power'), *gamberrada* ('unruly behavior') and *bravuconada* ('behavior of a blowhard'). What may have contributed to the centrality of this reading is the extension of its domain to proper names, as in *quijotada* and to ethnic terms, e.g. *andaluzada* and *gringada* ('typical act of Don Quijote', 'of an Andalusian', 'of a gringo').

Only in second place comes the stroke reading – stroke with an instrument N, e.g. *cabezada* ('with the head'), *escobada* ('with a broom'), *tacada* ('with the heel of a shoe') – which nowadays seems to be of minor productivity (see Rainer 1994: 389). The semantic extensions of the pattern may also refer to the body part affected by the blow (*cabezada*, 'blow on the head') or the result of the violent action (*navajada*, 'a knife wound'). In addition, a systematic extension to the political field has taken place which turns *-ada*-formations based on distinguished proper nouns into designations for (failed) coups, as in *carlistada* ('a coup attempted by the traditionalist claimant to the throne Don Carlos and his supporters'), *Sanjuanada* ('coup attempt against Primo de Rivera in the night of Saint John in 1926'), *sanjurjada* ('coup attempt by general Sanjurjo in 1932') (see Rainer 1994: 388). However, this political sub-type fell out of use after the Second World War, the suffix being supplanted by the competing suffix *-azo*, which designates successful political coups such as *bogotazo* ('the military coup in Bogota in 1948'), *pinochetazo* ('Pinochet's coup d'état in 1973'), but also *derechazo* ('punch with the right hand') (see Becker 2003: 103f.). This competing suffix seems to replace *-ada* from the domain of blows and strokes in general.

A further prominent reading, which is clearly lacking in Italian, is the collective reading with animate individuals. Though it referred to herds of animals in Old Spanish (e.g. *manada*, *yeguada*; see also below), it is nowadays particularly prominent when referring to social groups whose members are discriminated against or even outcasts of society, e.g. *indiada*, *negrada*, and *gringada*. Spanish *-ada* also includes the meal pattern ('meal based on the ingredient N'), which – in contrast to Italian – is still very productive (e.g. *ajada, caracolada, garbanzada*, 'with garlic', 'with snails', 'with chickpeas').
Given their fully lexicalized and thus unproductive status, we leave aside the quantity reading (quantity contained in N: *cucharada*) and the duration reading (*invernada*).

A striking contrast in Spanish compared to Italian and also Portuguese (!) is the fact that Spanish *-ada* does not produce deverbal formations like *chiamata* ('call') in Italian or *lida* ('reading event') in Portuguese. Both languages display an impressive list of deverbal items with an event reading, which typically combine with light verbs, yielding expressions like *dar uma lida (no artigo)* ('read the article'), *dar uma martelada (no prego)* ('hammer the nail), *dar uma olhada* ('have a look at'), *dar uma caminhada* ('go for a walk') (see Scher 2006: 31f.).

Interestingly, the picture we have presented so far can be traced back to the linguistic situation in Old Spanish and Old Portuguese. This boils down to the fact that their evolutions display a high degree of continuity over the course of time.

For one thing, both languages shared the most prominent patterns from the very beginning. This can be seen from a query of *-ada* based on the two relevant diachronic corpora (Davies, Corpus del Español and Ferreira & Davies, Corpus do Português), from which emerge the following common patterns relevant in the Middle Ages (13th and 14th century):

- the blow/stroke-group: Span./Ptg. *lançada* ('with a javelin'), Span./Ptg. *espadada* ('with a sword'), Span./Ptg. *pedrada* ('with a stone'), Span./Ptg. *espolada/esporada* ('of the spurs') etc.;
- the collective reading: Span. *celada* ('emboscada de gente de armas', 'ambush'), *manada de cabras*, *manada de ovejas* ('flock of goats, sheep'), *peonada* ('group of auxiliary workers/labourers'), *vacada* ('herd of cows'); Ptg. *boiada* ('herd of oxen'), *assuada* ('group of armed rioters'), *cercada* ('fish corral');
- quantity contained in N/unit of measurement based on N: Ptg. *braçada* (→ 'arm'), *colherada* (→ 'spoon'), *polegada* ('inch'), Span. *yugada* ('el espacio de tierra de labor, que puede arar un par de bueyes en un día', 'yoke'), *pulgada* ('medida que es la duodecima parte de un pie', 'inch');

On the other hand, the contrast in the deverbal domain clearly emerges in the oldest records. While Portuguese displays an important number of deverbal event nominalizations (and might even have been the most prominent pattern at that time), the small number of deverbal formations in Old Spanish emerging from the records are fully lexicalized (e.g. *mirada*, 'a look', *jugada*, 'a move in a game') and *cabalgada* ('the ride')), which means that we are dealing with a completely unproductive pattern. To make a long story short: it seems that, from the outset, Spanish has never had a relevant productive deverbal pattern of *-ada* formations.

Finally, French comes with very different patterns of specialization given that the corresponding suffix *-ée* (lat. *-ata* > *-eδe* > *-ée*) basically presents denominal formations with collective meanings of three different types (Dubois & Dubois-Charlier 1999: 208f.):

1. The first type refers to an ensemble of animate beings, i.e. the unspecified quantity of persons or animals contained in the place N, for example: *la chambrée* ('a room full of people'), *la maisonnée* ('a house full of people'), *la ruchée* ('a beehive (of bees)');

2. The second type is based on container nouns and designates the quantity of substance contained in N, e.g. *une assiettée de soupe* ('a plate (full) of soup'), *une pellettée de terre* ('a shovelful of soil'), *une fournée de pain* ('a batch of bread', lit. 'an oven full of').

Some of these formations have turned into units of measurement, e.g. *la coudée* ('cubit/ell') and *cylindrée* ('cubic capacity').

The blow/stroke reading, highly prominent in other Romance languages, is restricted to some very specific expressions designating a stroke (*la peignée*) or yields synonymous

expressions for the notion of 'a thrashing', for instance *tabassée, rossée, dérouillée* and *pâtée* (all synonyms with the meaning 'a thrashing').

It must be stressed that French *-ée* also yields deverbal nominalizations, though they are not very prominent in the language system. Ferret, Soare & Villoing (2010) list some (rarely used) examples of deverbal *-ée* formations such as *chevauchée* ('the ride', p. 2), *pesée (de l'enfant)* ('weighing (of the baby)', p. 4), *(pendant la) trainée* ('(during) the dragging', p. 5) and *percée (de l'abcès)* ('the bursting (of the abscess)', p. 9). As the authors emphasize, the suffix *-ée* introduces the perfective aspect linked to the feature of 'boundedness'/'global perspective' (Ferret, Soare & Villaloing 2010: 6).

Please note that the suffix *-ade*, which entered the French language via borrowings from Occitan (see Lüdtke 1978: 151, Dubois & Dubois-Charlier 1999: 40f., TLFi: *-ade*[1]), has been competing with *-ée* in the domain of the deverbal event readings (*baignade* ('swimming'), *glissade* ('sliding'), *balade* ('a walk') and the blow/stroke reading (*bastonnade* ('beating, caning')) since the end of the 15th century.

3 Conclusion

In what way do these pieces of comparative and diachronic evidence contribute to the overall *-ata*/*-ada* puzzle?

1. From a synchronic and a diachronic point of view, it becomes clear that *-ata*/*-ada* comes with a robust deverbal event-designating pattern in the derivational system of Italian and, to a minor degree, of Portuguese. In contrast, in the derivational system of French, the deverbal pattern of *-ée* has always been much less productive, while in Spanish deverbal *-ada* turns out to have always been marginal. In the later systems, the collective readings – group of N, quantity contained in N, but also blow/stroke with N – rather constitute the prototypical center of the word formation category. This boils down to the conclusion that the event reading(s) and the collective readings cannot be derived from each other, at least not on the basis of the available diachronic data. Therefore, it is problematic to derive all readings from an underlying event-like pattern in order to provide a unitary and comprehensive analysis.

2. If we want to postulate an overall abstract semantics of all *-ata*/*-ada* formations, the aspectual feature of 'boundedness' (derived from the past participle in Latin and Romance; see Meyer-Lübke 1894, Ferret, Soare & Villoing 2010) and the feature of 'internal plurality' (in line with Collin's etymological analysis of *-ata* as a neuter plural form (see Collin 1918) seem to be paramount. The feature 'internal plurality' accounts for the internal plurality of collective entities and for internal phases of event realizations (but see Gaeta 2000: 211). This description amounts to analyzing *-ata* as a 'portioning' suffix ('a portioner'), which cuts out a unit from a whole.

3. This analysis endorses the idea of an abstract semantics for *-ata* but does not derive the different readings/patterns exclusively from conceptual properties of the base. It lays emphasis on the role of encyclopedic knowledge and the role of analogy which is at work when it comes to coining new lexical units in accordance with prototypical items of each reading group or 'subcategory' of the overall derivative category. The *-ata*/*-ada*/*-ée* formations can thus refer to an instance of an event (with a verbal base), a group of persons or animals (with N designating an animate entity), a quantity contained in N (with 'containers') or a stroke with an appropriate object or body part N. The coherence of each group (or 'subcategory') is ensured by the ties

---

[1] Cf. http://stella.atilf.fr/Dendien/scripts/tlfiv5/visusel.exe?11;s=635106060;r=1;nat=;sol=0;

between the members (their *family resemblance*) and with the prototypical instantiation(s) of the relevant pattern, which foster the creation of new analogical formations and allow for the accommodation of less prototypical items of the group.

The suffix *-ata/-ada* remains an intriguing puzzle in terms of the relationship between the deverbal and denominal readings in synchrony and diachrony. In addition, the fundamental question remains: How can we account for the interpretation of the manifold patterns developed by this productive and complex suffix in Romance?

References

Becker, Martin. 2003. *Die Entwicklung der modernen Wortbildung im Spanischen: Der politische und soziale Wortschatz seit 1869*. Frankfurt: Lang.

Becker, Martin. 2014. O sufixo *-ada* em português: Aspectos semânticos e diacrônicos. In Mário Eduardo Viaro (ed.), *Morfologia histórica*, 118–153. São Paulo: Cortez.

CdE – Davies, Mark. 2002. Corpus del español. 100 million words, 1200s-1900s. https://www.corpusdelespanol.org (<30.05.2021>)

CdP – Davies, Mark & Michael Ferreira. 2006. Corpus do Português. 45 million words, 1300s – 1900s. https://www.corpusdoportugues.org (<02.06.2021>)

Collin, Carl S. 1918. *Étude sur le développement du suffixe* -ata *(it.* -ata*, prov., esp., port.,* -ada*, frz.* ée-*,* -ade*) dans les langues romanes*. Lund: Lindstet.

Dubois, Jean & Françoise Dubois-Charlier. 1999. *La dérivation suffixale en français*. Paris: Nathan.

Ferret, Karen, Elena Soare & Florence Villoing. 2010. Rivalry between French *-age* and *-ée*. The role of grammatical aspect in nominalization. In Maria Aloni, Harald Bastiaanse, Tikitu de Jager & Katrin Schulz (eds.), *Logic, language and meaning. Proceedings of the 17th Amsterdam Colloquium*, 284–294. Berlin & Heidelberg: Sorin.

Gaeta, Livio. 2000. The interaction between morphology and semantics: The Italian suffix -ATA. *Acta Linguistica Hungarica* 47. 205–229.

Gaeta, Livio. 2015. Action nouns in Romance. In Peter O. Müller, Ingeborg Ohnheiser, Susan Olsen & Franz Rainer (eds.), *Word formation* (HSK 40.2), 1209–1229. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Grossmann, Maria & Franz Rainer. 2004. *La formazione delle parole in italiano*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2002. The interface of lexical semantics and conceptual structure: Deverbal and denominal nominalizations. In Ewald Lang & Ilse Zimmermann (eds.), *Nominalisierung* (ZAS Papers in Linguistics: ZASPiL 27), 109–124. Berlin: Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2005. Morphology and the interface between conceptual structure and lexical semantics: The case of Italian nominalization of *-ata*. *Lingua e linguaggio* 4(2). 229–242.

Lüdtke, Jens. 1978. *Prädikative Nominalisierungen mit Suffixen im Französischen, Katalanischen und Spanischen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Meyer-Lübke, Wilhelm. 1894. *Grammatik der Romanischen Sprachen: Formenlehre*, vol. 2. Leipzig: O. R. Reisland.

Rainer, Franz. 1993. *Spanische Wortbildungslehre*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Scher, Ana Paula. 2006. Nominalizações em *-ada* em construções com o verbo leve dar em português brasileiro. *Letras de Hoje, Porto Alegre* 41(1). 29–48.

TLFi. Trésor de la Langue Française informatisée. http://atilf.atilf.fr (<02.06.2021>)

Was ist das für 1 *huk*? A Conchucos Quechua numeral doing curious things

Timo Buchholz – Universitat zu Köln
timo.buchholz@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

The Quechua languages are generally taken to not have articles, or other means of obligatorily marking (in)definiteness on nouns, except for a definite suffix in some Huanca varieties (cf. Parker 1976: 31–32, Adelaar & Muysken 2004: 217). In this paper I present data from South Conchucos Quechua (SCQ) recorded in Huari, Ancash, Peru, on *huk* 'one' that shows an interesting interaction with the categories of (in)definiteness, animacy, and discourse prominence. Nouns in SCQ can be left bare if not modified, and whether they are to be interpreted as definite or indefinite is then mostly retrievable only from the context (1).

(1) *TP03 MT Q 1761*

Tillapa	hawa-n-chaw-cha	ultu	ka-ykaa-n
lightning.bolt	below-3-LOC-ASS	tadpole	COP-PROG-3

'below a/the lightning bolt is a/the tadpole'

From the discourse context of (1), it is clear that *tillapa* denotes an already introduced referent, while *ultu* is mentioned for the first time. Neither is marked by *huk*. However, *huk* can optionally be used when introducing new referents (2).

(2) *HA30 MT Q 0275*

tsay-chaw-mi	tari-nki huk	allqu-ta hana-pa-m	rikachaaku-ykaa-n
dem.DIST-LOC-ASS	find-2 one	dog-OBJ above-GEN-ASS	observe-PROG-3

'there you find a dog staring upwards'

It is not clear what the conditions for this usage are. In Parker (1976), examples similar to both (1) and (2) are attested, but the variable occurrence of *huk* is not commented upon. Weber (1989: 9), on a related variety, only states that *huk* is "only infrequently [...] used as an indefinite article". This leaves many questions unanswered. If *huk* really marks indefiniteness, what about cases like (1)? In the following, I explore some factors that condition the use of *huk* as a prenominal modifier in SCQ.

2 Human referents

One relevant factor seems to be whether the referent introduced is human or not. This result emerges from an inspection of SCQ data by 39 speakers (22f, 17m, age range 15-50, mean age 21.8 years) produced in a picture-naming task[1]. If *huk* really marks indefinites, this should be a good initial place to look for it because the picture-naming task was the first elicitation task participants performed, and thus the first time they saw these pictures (the same pictures later returned in further tasks). As Table 1 shows, the vast majority of nominal expressions (95%)

---

[1] For more details on the elicitation methods, cf. Bendezú Araujo (2021), Buchholz (2021), or the website of the project.

elicited in this way are not produced with huk, so *huk* is clearly not obligatory. However, those expressions that are produced with *huk* nearly all denote human animate referents.

Table 1: Occurrence of *huk* with nominal expressions in a picture-naming task. Data from 39 speakers

	human animate	human inanimate (dead)	non-human animate	inanimate	all
with *huk*	20	1	0	2	23
without *huk*	51	11	123	278	463
all	71	12	123	280	486

The preference for human referents emerges even more clearly when only the data by speakers that produced *huk* at all (15 speakers; 10f, 5m, age 15-50, mean age 21.1 years) is considered (Table 2). There, more than two thirds of all expressions denoting human animate referents occurred with *huk,* while it almost did not occur with any others. Separating the data in this way makes sense because of how the task worked. Many participants presumably understood it to be only about the name of the depicted object and thus produced everything as bare nominals. For comparison, in the Spanish version of the task (all participants here are bilingual and performed all the tasks once in each language), many participants also only produced bare nouns. But those that did not used (indefinite) articles with nearly each nominal expression, as would be expected for Spanish. In conclusion, the (nearly exclusive) occurrence of *huk* with human animate referents likely reflects a true preference.

Table 2: Occurrence of *huk* with nominal expressions in a picture-naming task. Data from only those 15 speakers that produced *huk* at all

	human animate	human inanimate (dead)	non-human animate	inanimate	all
with *huk*	20	1	0	2	23
without *huk*	11	6	44	92	153
all	31	7	44	94	176

3 A marker of discourse prominence?

This broad difference in speaker behaviour is also seen in more complex tasks. In the *map task*, many participants do not use *huk* at all, except as a numeral. Others, like HA30, use it almost without exception when introducing a new referent (regardless of its animacy), and then mark this referent with the distal demonstrative *tsay* in the next utterance. The sequence in (3) from the beginning of their map task is an example in point. Note how the *huk*-marked expression in both cases is part of a presentative construction with the copular verb *ka-*.

(3)   *HA30 MT Q 0013-0080*

hawa-chaw-mi   ka-n   este   huk   hirka
below-LOC-ASS   COP-3   HESIT   one   hill
'at the bottom is a hill'

tsay   hirka-pita-m   subi-nki
DEM.DIST   hill-ABL-ASS   go.up-2
'from that hill you go up'

tsay-chaw-mi	ka-ykaa-n	huk	añas
DEM.DIST-LOC-ASS	COP-PROG-3	one	skunk

'there is a skunk'

The way HA30 uses modifying *huk* (and *tsay*) in this map task is very similar to how Givón (1983) describes the use of indefinites and definites for introducing and continuing topics in discourse. In terms of Grosz, Weinstein & Joshi (1995)'s centering model of discourse structure, *tsay* would mark the backward-looking center, while *huk* marks a high-ranked, or prominent, forward-looking center. It would be interesting to explore whether it is this prominence that connects this observation with the results from the picture-naming task on the preference for human referents. Arguably, it is more plausible that the marking of discourse prominence is the primary function, causing human referents to be preferably *huk*-marked because they are likely to be perceived as more prominent, than the other way round, which would analyze the behavior like that of HA30 by assigning human status to nonhuman referents for some reason (so that then in turn they could be prominent). As a last point, consider this short sequence (4) from an interview with a monolingual SCQ speaker, DC49. The interviewer (GB00) asks a number of questions about DC49's life and the customs in his community. He never uses *huk* to introduce a referent, except here, where the referent is human.

(4)   *GB00&DC49 Condir 11098-11193*

marka-yki-chaw	tsay	Kachichinan-chaw
village-2-LOC	DEM.DIST	place.name-LOC

'in your village, this Kachininan' (GB00)

huk	ruku	wanu-ski-pti-n-qa	tushu-yaa-nki-ku
one	old.person	die-ITER-SUBDIFF-3-TOP	dance-PL-2-Q

'if an old person dies, do you dance?' (GB00)

mana-m	tushu-yaa-n-tsu	ruku	wanu-pti-n
no-ASS	dance-PL-3-NEG	old.person	die-SUBDIFF-3

'they don't dance when an old person dies' (DC49)

Both question and answer are clearly about customs, so the referent denoted by *ruku* 'old person' is in both cases presumably not specific in the sense that either speaker "has a referent in mind" (cf. Heusinger 2011: 1044–1045). In a comparable English, Spanish, or German exchange, the expression denoting the old person would therefore be marked with an indefinite article. Yet here, in the answer, ruku is left bare, and only in the question, when the referent is introduced, is *huk* used. It seems thus that *huk* can be used with both specific and non-specific referents, but only when introducing them.

4 Conclusion

Several important aspects of the use of *huk* could not be touched upon here, including its use to mean 'another' in certain contexts. I suggest that even though *huk* in SCQ is similar to an indefinite article in its discourse function of introducing new referents, it seems (still) quite different in other respects. Naturally, more comprehensive research should explore this further.

Author note

At the moment of writing, I haven't been working with Klaus von Heusinger for much more than three months. Yet this time has sufficed for me to become interested in revisiting material from the previous project I worked on and to look at it from a new perspective inspired by the discussions we have had in Cologne so far. On the occasion of his 60th birthday I wish him all the best and hope that there will be many more joint explorations of these issues in the time to come.

References

Adelaar, Willem F. H. & Pieter Muysken. 2004. *The languages of the Andes.* Cambridge language surveys. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bendezú Araujo, Raúl. 2021. *Identificacion y aserción en la marcación de foco del quechua de conchucos (áncash, perú)*. PhD dissertation, Freie Universitat Berlin.

Bendezú Araujo, Raúl, Timo Buchholz & Uli Reich. 2019. Corpora amerikanischer Sprachen: Interaktive Sprachspiele aus dem mehrsprachigen Lateinamerika (Quechua 1). https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/ 25747.

Bendezú Araujo, Raúl, Timo Buchholz & Uli Reich. 2021. Corpora amerikanischer Sprachen: Interaktive Sprachspiele aus dem mehrsprachigen Lateinamerika (Huari Spanisch 1). https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/ 29497.

Buchholz, Timo. 2021. *Intonation between phrasing and accent: Spanish and Quechua in Huari*. PhD dissertation, Freie Universitat Berlin.

Givón, Talmy. 1983. Topic continuity in discourse: An introduction. In Talmy Givón (ed.), *Topic continuity in discourse*, 1–42. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Grosz, Barbara J., Scott Weinstein & Aravind K. Joshi. 1995. Centering: A framework for modeling the local coherence of discourse. *Computational Linguistics* 21(2). 203–225.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2011. Specificity. In Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger & Paul Portner (eds.), *Semantics. An international handbook of natural language meaning*, vol. 2, 1025–1058. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Parker, Gary. 1976. *Gramática quechua: Ancash-huailas*. Lima: Ministerio de Educación.

Weber, David John. 1989. *A grammar of huallaga (huánuco) quechua*, vol. 112 Linguistics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dative subjects and Differential Object Marking

Miriam Butt – University of Konstanz
miriam.butt@uni-konstanz.de

1 Introduction

The literature on Differential Case Marking (DCM) has been studied from various different perspectives and with respect to a wide range of languages. Klaus von Heusinger has been a central contributor to the discussions, pushing the state of the art with respect to both analyses and languages covered, with a central theme being the underlying semantics governing DCM (e.g., von Heusinger & Kaiser 2011, Klein et al. 2012, von Heusinger 2018, von Heusinger & Tigău 2019, von Heusinger & Sadeghpoor 2020, Caro Reina et al. 2021). One example comes from Turkish, as illustrated in (1) from von Heusinger & Kornfilt (2021: 277) for which they argue in a series of papers (along with several co-authors) that overt accusative marking on indefinites signals epistemic specificity (von Heusinger & Kornfilt 2005, Kornfilt & von Heusinger 2009, von Heusinger & Bamyacı 2017, von Heusinger & Kornfilt 2017, Krause & von Heusinger 2019, von Heusinger et al. 2019), also citing experimental evidence from true partitives.

(1)   a.   Mustafa   bir   sandalye   satın al-dı-∅
            Mustafa   a   chair   buy-PST-3.SG
            'Mustafa bought a chair.'
      b.   Mustafa   bir   sandalye-yi   satın al-dı-∅
            Mustafa   a   chair-ACC   buy-PST-3.SG
            'Mustafa bought (certain) a chair.'

While DCM clearly has semantic underpinnings, a different strand of research has focused mainly on structural factors to explain the distribution of case in a language. Two influential but very different approaches have been formulated in terms of Optimality Theory (OT; Aissen 1999, 2003) and Dependent Case (Baker 2015). Within these two overall approaches, some work has focused specifically on case in Urdu/Hindi, which presents a satisfyingly complex problem.

     This small contribution engages with the papers on Urdu/Hindi case by de Hoop & Narasimhan (2005) and Baker (2021) and focuses on claims made with respect to the interaction of dative subjects and DCM. The position taken in this paper is that while structural factors surely play a role in understanding the distribution of case in a language, they cannot provide a full account. Rather, systematic properties governing the relationship between arguments and the event structure of a predicate play a crucial role.

2 Claims and data

Both the Dependent Case and OT Approach to DCM were originally concerned with accounting for patterns of ergative vs. accusative alignment across languages (see Butt 2006 for a general discussion/overview of case alignment). For both approaches, the rather complex case marking patterns in Urdu/Hindi provide a challenge. In attempting to meet this challenge, de Hoop & Narasimhan (2005) formulate an account in terms of constraints that ensure Distinguishability of two core arguments on the one hand, but also serve the purpose of the Indexing/Identification of types of argument roles and their specific semantic contribution on the other hand. Identificational constraints ensure, for example, that agents are to be

preferentially associated with ergative marking and that prototypical patients are to be associated with accusative case.

While the identificational constraints do refer to systematic semantic factors, they are set up within a fundamentally binary opposition of agents vs. patients, whereby both agents and patients can also have weak (less prominent) or strong (more prominent) characteristics. Baker's system also works in terms of a fundamentally binary opposition between two argument NPs, but the contrast is articulated strictly in terms of a structural relationship (c-command) between two NP arguments by which one argument is assigned overt marking (either accuative or ergative) while the other (dependent) argument remains unmarked.

Urdu/Hindi presents a challenging case for both the OT and Dependent Case approach because it questions this fundamentally binary, mutually dependent view of case organization. Data as in (2) and (3) taken together show that the Differential Object Marking (DOM) found with an unmarked (nominative) vs. accusative (*ko*-marked) opposition appears to be largely independent of whether the subject is ergative or not. The DOM is governed by a number of factors, the two most central ones being: 1) animate objects generally require the *ko*; 2) inanimate *ko* marked objects are to be interpreted as specific – the semantics of this are very close to that argued for for Turkish by von Heusinger and co-authors over the years.

(2) a. yasin=ne   kamputar   xarid-a
         Yassin.M.SG=ERG   computer.M.SG.NOM   buy-PERF.M.SG
         'Yassin bought a/some computer.'
     b. yasin=ne   kamputar=ko   xarid-a
         Yassin.M.SG=ERG   computer.M.SG=ACC   buy-PERF.M.SG
         'Yassin bought a (certain)/the computer.'

(3) a. yasin   kamputar   xarid-e-g-a
         Yassin.M.SG.NOM   computer. M.SG.NOM   buy-3.SG-FUT-M.SG
         'Yassin will buy a/some computer.'
     b. yasin   kamputar=ko   xarid-e-g-a
         Yassin.M.SG.NOM   computer.M.SG=ACC   buy-3.SG-FUT-M.SG
         'Yassin bought a (certain)/the computer.'

For approaches in which the case marking of one argument is taken to be dependent on another, the overt accusative in the presence of an ergative is unexpected. In order to nevertheless account for the Urdu/Hindi data, Baker (2021) proposes to make use of the established idea that objects come in at least two versions, one of which is closer to the verb (within the VP, also termed "weak" object), the other of which may be found outside of the VP (also termed "strong" object). These two types of objects have crosslinguistically been associated with different types of semantics, with the "strong" object associated with definiteness/specificity and greater syntactic mobility within the clause (e.g., Diesing 1992, de Hoop 1996, Ramchand 1997, see also Butt 1993, Bhatt & Anagnostopoulou 1996, Butt & King 1996 on Urdu/Hindi specifically). Baker thus posits an object position outside of the immediate VP to which an originally nominative object can move and receive accusative case – this provides the necessary leeway in his system for both the assignment of ergative due to an original ergative-nominative structural configuration and the additional appearance of an accusative. de Hoop & Narasimhan (2005) similarly appeal to a difference between "weak" and "strong" arguments, building on de Hoop's (1996) original work. In the spirit of that work, they appeal directly to semantics in their OT analysis, for example via the constraint which requires "strong" patients as in both (2b) and (3b) to be marked overtly with *ko*.

Of interest for this paper is that both de Hoop & Narasimhan (2005) and Baker (2021) present data from dative experiencer subjects to bolster their argumentation. As shown in (4) (based on Baker 2021) and (5)–(6) (based on de Hoop & Narasimhan 2005: 329), DOM of the type illustrated by (2) and (3) does not occur in dative subject experiencer clauses. In each case, only the unmarked (nominative) version is acceptable. Example (6) is particularly remarkable because Urdu/Hindi nominative/accusative DOM generally requires animate objects to be marked with *ko*, but this is completely ungrammatical in conjunction with a dative subject.[1]

(4) a. anu=ko   bagʰ=mẽ   gʰaɽi   mil-i
          Anu.F.SG=DAT   garden.M.SG=in   watch.F.SG.NOM   come.upon-PERF.F.SG
          'Anu found a/some watch in the garden.'
     b. *anu=ko   bagʰ=mẽ   gʰaɽi=ko   mil-a
          Anu.F.SG=DAT   garden.M.SG=in   watch.F.SG=ACC   come.upon-PERF.M.SG
          Intended: 'Anu found a (certain)/the watch in the garden.'

(5) a. ram=ko   halva   pasand   hɛ
          Ram.M.SG=DAT   halva.M.SG.NOM   liking.M   be.PRES.3.SG
          'Ram likes halva.'
     b. *ram=ko   halva=ko   pasand   hɛ
          Ram.M.SG=DAT   halva.M.SG=ACC   liking.M   be.PRES.3.SG
          Intended: 'Ram likes halva.'

(6) a. ram=ko   vo   laɽki   pasand   hɛ
          Ram.M.SG=DAT   that.OBL   girl.F.SG=NOM   liking.M   be.PRES.3.SG
          'Ram likes that girl.'
     b. *ram=ko   ʊs   laɽki=ko   pasand   hɛ
          Ram.M.SG=DAT   that.NOM   girl.F.SG=ACC   liking.M   be.PRES.3.SG
          Intended: 'Ram likes that girl.'

De Hoop & Narasimhan (2005) propose that there is a partial dependency between subject and object case marking on the basis of the observation that DOM seems to be allowed only when Differential Subject Marking (DSM) is also possible: The agentive predicates as in (2-b) and (3-b) allow for both ergative and nominative subjects, so DOM can occur correspondingly. However, dative subjects are taken to not engage in DSM so there is no possibility for DOM is posited.

Baker (2021) entertains Davison's (2004) proposal that an explanation can be found in terms of the semantic roles that are involved, but dismisses this by arguing that the right generalization for understanding DOM is in terms of grammatical relations (only pertains to objects), rather than the semantic role of undergoer/patient, which can be found in other contexts such as unaccusatives and does not exhibit DOM there. Rather, Baker (2021) sees the basic pattern of marked dative subject vs. unmarked nominative object as a case in point for the fundamentally binary Dependent Case approach.[2]

However, one does find dative-ergative DSM (contra de Hoop & Narasimhan 2005) and one does find patterns other than the dative-nominative in experiencer predicates (contra Baker

---

[1] Urdu/Hindi *ko* is polysemous and can mark either datives or accusatives. Evidence for these two distinct functions is adduced in Butt & King (2004).

[2] Mohanan (1994) notes that generally Urdu/Hindi disprefers clauses in which two (or more) of the same type of overt case marker co-occur, positing an Obligatory Contour Principle (OCP) for case in Urdu/Hindi. However, Mohanan's Case OCP does not completely rule out two *ko*-marked arguments co-occurring in a clause so we put this perspective aside for the purposes of this paper.

2021). An example of ergative-dative DSM is given in (7), where the choice of case marker is conditioned by the choice of light verb, much as the ergative/nominative DSM above is governed by the tense/aspect of the verb (perfective morphology allows for ergatives).

(7) a. nadya=ne   kahani   yad   k-i
       Nadya.F.SG=ERG   story.F.SG.NOM   memory   do-PERF.F.SG
       'Nadya remembered a/the story.' (lit.: 'Nadya did memory of the story.')
    b. nadya=ko   kahani   yad   a-yi
       Nadya.F.SG=DAT   story.F.SG.NOM   memory   come-PERF.F.SG
       'Nadya remembered a/the story.' (lit.: 'Memory of the story came to Nadya.')

Dative experiencer predicates with a further non-nominative core argument are shown in (8). As can be seen, the comitative *se*[3] can appear on both animate and inanimate arguments in the N-V psych complex predicate 'hate', which is structurally equivalent to the N-V with 'liking' in (6).

(8) a. ram=ko   ʊs   laṛki=se   nafrat hɛ
       Ram.M.SG=DAT   that.OBL   girl.F.SG=COM hate.F   be.PRES.3.SG
       'Ram hates that girl.' (lit. 'Hate of that girl is to Ram.')
    b. ram=ko   sigarət=se   nafrat hɛ
       Ram.M.SG=DAT   cigarette.F=COM   hate.F   be.PRES.3.SG
       'Ram hates cigarettes.'

In seeking an explanation for this phenomenon, it is interesting to note that the agentive versions of (8) do allow for a type of DOM in which the *se* alternates with *ko*, as shown in (9) and (10). However, this DOM is again not available with the dative experiencer version, see (11).

(9) ram   ʊs   laṛki=se/ko   nafrat kar-ta   hɛ
     Ram.M.SG=DAT   that.OBL   girl.F.SG=COM/ACC hate.F   do-IMPF.M.SG   be.PRES.3.SG
     'Ram hates that girl.'

(10) ram   sigarət=se/ko   nafrat kar-ta   hɛ
      Ram.M.SG=DAT   cigarette.F= COM/ACC hate.F   do-IMPF.M.SG   be.PRES.3.SG
      'Ram hates cigarettes.'

(11) a. *ram=ko   ʊs   laṛki=ko   nafrat hɛ
       Ram.M.SG=DAT   that.OBL   girl.F.SG=ACC   hate.F   be.PRES.3.SG
       Intended: 'Ram hates/loves that girl.' (lit. 'Hate of that girl is to Ram.')
    b. *ram=ko   sigarət=ko   nafrat hɛ
       Ram.M.SG=DAT   cigarette.F=ACC   hate.F   be.PRES.3.SG
       Intended: 'Ram hates cigarettes.'

The (necessarily brief) explanation offered in this paper for these patterns is that case marking in Urdu/Hindi results from a combination of structural and semantic factors, as previously argued for in Butt & King (2003, 2004). Ergatives are confined to subjects and are subject to a

---

[3] *se* has a number of functions in Urdu, prominently among them also the instrumental, see Butt & Ahmed (2011) for some discussion.

tense/aspect split, but necessarily express agentive/initiator semantics. Datives are associated with goal or experiencer semantics. Accusatives are confined to objects, but signal a particular type of semantics. We have seen that the accusative DOM is associated with specificity and animacy and I suggest that the unavailability of the *ko*-marked objects in experiencer predicates is not centrally due to a mutual dependence of case marking between core arguments, but due to the ability of the object to be a quantized. Seminal work by Krifka (1992) and Verkuyl (1993) has shown that quantizability of the change undergone by a referent or the progress along a path plays a central role in the interpretation and marking of objects (cf. also the discussion with respect to "strong" vs. "weak" objects above), also leading to telic vs. atelic interpretations of the overall predicate. Butt & Ahmed (2011) show that *ko* alternates with other case markers in Old Urdu to indicate completed paths, indicating an original association with quantizedness in the Krifka/Verkuyl sense that today plays out mostly in terms of specificity (and by extension animacy).

3 Summary

The suggestion made by this contribution is therefore that the absence of DOM in dative experiencer predicates is best explained in terms of the semantics of those predicates. Examples as in (4), (5), (6) and (8) do not allow for *ko*-marked objects because these predicates do not allow for their objects to be interpreted as quantized entities. The perceived mutual dependence between subject and object case marking is thus only an indirect effect due to the overall event semantics, but not the locus of explanation. Rather, the deeper explanation for the complex patterns of case marking that can be observed in languages such as Urdu/Hindi are due to semantic effects, as von Heusinger and his co-authors have been demonstrating with respect to DOM for several different languages over the years. The data from Urdu/Hindi only serves to confirm their findings.

References

Aissen, Judith. 1999. Markedness and subject choice in Optimality Theory. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 17. 673–711.

Aissen, Judith. 2003. Differential object marking: Iconicity vs. economy. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 21. 435–483.

Baker, Mark. 2015. *Case: Its principles and its parameters*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baker, Mark. 2021. On dependent case and the sometimes-independence of ergativity and differential object marking. To appear. In Christina Sevdali et al. (eds), *The place of case in grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bhatt, Rajesh & Elena Anagnostopoulou. 1996. Object shift and specificity: Evidence from *ko*-phrases in Hindi. In Lise Dobrin, Kora Singer & Lisa McNair (eds.), *Papers from the Main Session of the Chicago Linguistics Society* (CLS) 32, 11–22. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Butt, Miriam. 1993. Object specificity and agreement in Hindi/Urdu. In *Papers from the 29th Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society* (CLS), vol. 1, 80–103.

Butt, Miriam. 2006. *Theories of case*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Butt, Miriam & Tafseer Ahmed. 2011. The redevelopment of Indo-Aryan case systems from a lexical semantic perspective. *Morphology* 21(3). 545–572.

Butt, Miriam & Tracy H. King. 1996. Structural topic and focus without movement. In Miriam Butt & Tracy H. King (eds.), *Proceedings of the First LFG Conference*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Butt, Miriam & Tracy Holloway King. 2003. Case systems: Beyond structural distinctions. In Ellen Brandner & Heike Zinsmeister (eds.), *New perspectives on case theory*, 53–87. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Butt, Miriam & Tracy Holloway King. 2004. The status of case. In Veneeta Dayal & Anoop Mahajan (eds.), *Clause structure in South Asian languages*, 153–198. Berlin: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Caro Reina, Javier, Marco García García & Klaus von Heusinger. 2021. Differential Object Marking in Cuban Spanish. In Johannes Kabatek, Philipp Obrist & Albert Wall (eds.), *Differential Object Marking in Romance – The third wave (Beiheft zur Zeitschrift für Romanische Philologie)*, 339–368. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Davison, Alice. 2004. Non-nominative subjects in Hindi-Urdu: VP structure and case parameters. In Peri Bhaskararao & Karumuri Venkata Subbarao (eds.), *Non-nominative subjects*, 141–168. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

de Hoop, Helen & Bhuvana Narasimhan. 2005. Differential case-marking in Hindi. In Mengistu Amberber & Helen de Hoop (eds.), *Competition and variation in natural languages: The case for case*, 321–346. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Diesing, Molly. 1992. *Indefinites*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2018. The diachronic development of Differential Object Marking in Spanish ditransitive constructions. In Ilja A. Seržant, Alena Witzlack-Makarevich & Kelsey Mann (eds.), *Diachrony of differential argument marking*, 315–344. Berlin: Language Science Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Elif Bamyacı. 2017. Specificity effects of Turkish Differential Object Marking. In Leyla Zidani-Eroğlu, Matthew Ciscel & Elena Koulidobrova (eds.), *Proceedings of the 12th Workshop on Altaic Formal Linguistics (WAFL 12)*, 309–319. Cambridge: The MIT Press. http://mitwpl.mit.edu/catalog/mwpl83/.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Georg A. Kaiser. 2011. Affectedness and Differential Object Marking in Spanish. *Morphology* 21(3–4). 593–617.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Jaklin Kornfilt. 2005. The case of the direct object in Turkish: Semantics, syntax and morphology. *Turkic Languages* 9. 3–44. http://www.digizeitschriften. de/dms/img/?PID=PPN666048797_0009%7CLOG_0014.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Jaklin Kornfilt. 2017. Partitivity and case marking in Turkish and related languages. *Glossa* 2(1). 1–40.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Jaklin Kornfilt. 2021. Turkish partitive constructions and (non-)exhaustivity. In Petra Sleeman & Giuliana Giusti (eds.), *Partitive determiners, partitive pronouns and partitive case*, 263–94. Berlin: De Gruyter.

von Heusinger, Klaus, Jaklin Kornfilt & Semra Kizilkaya. 2019. Differential Object Marking, partitivity and specificity in Turkish. In Tanya Bondarenko, Justin Colley, Colin Davis &

Mitya Privoznov (eds.), *Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on Altaic Formal Linguistics* (WAFL 14), 145–156. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Roya Sadeghpoor. 2020. The specificity marker *-e* with indefinite noun phrases in Modern Colloquial Persian. In Kata Balogh, Anja Latrouite & Robert D. Van Valin Jr. (eds.), *Nominal anchoring*, 115–147. Berlin: Language Science Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Alina Tigău. 2019. Clitic doubling and Differential Object Marking in non-specific contexts in Romanian. *Revue Roumaine de Linguistique* LXIV(4). 409–430.

de Hoop, Helen. 1996. *Case configuration and noun phrase interpretation*. New York: Garland.

Klein, Udo, Dolgor Guntsetseg & Klaus von Heusinger. 2012. Case in conflict: Embedded subjects in Mongolian. In Monique Lamers & Peter de Swart (eds.), *Case, word order and prominence. interacting cues in language production and comprehension*, 43–64. Dodrecht: Springer.

Kornfilt, Jaklin & Klaus von Heusinger. 2009. Specificity and partitivity in some Altaic languages. In Ryosuke Shibagaki & Reiko Vermeulen (eds.), *Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Formal Altaic Linguistics* (WAFL 5), 19–40. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Krause, Elif & Klaus von Heusinger. 2019. Gradient effects of animacy on Differential Object Marking in Turkish. *Open Linguistics* 5(1). 171–190.

Krifka, Manfred. 1992. Thematic relations as links between nominal reference and temporal constitution. In Ivan A. Sag & Anna Szabolcsi (eds.), *Lexical matters*, 29–53. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Mohanan, Tara. 1994. Case OCP: A constraint on word order in Hindi. In Miriam Butt, Tracy Holloway King & Gillian Ramchand (eds.), *Theoretical perspectives on word order in South Asian languages*. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Ramchand, Gillian. 1997. *Aspect and predication*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Verkuyl, Henk. 1993. *A theory of aspectuality*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Deflection of personal names in Romanian

Javier Caro Reina – University of Cologne
j.caroreina@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

Proper names can differ from common nouns with respect to phonology, morphosyntax, and graphematics. These formal differences are called dissociations (see Nübling 2005). An example of dissociation at the morphosyntactic level involves inflection. In some languages, proper names and common nouns exhibit distinct case paradigms, as in Sinyar (Boyeldieu 2019). In other languages, proper names display a smaller case paradigm than common nouns, as in German (see Table 1). Interestingly, in Old and Middle High German, personal names and common nouns had the same declension system. In Early New High German, however, personal names underwent deflection, a process which is still ongoing (Nübling 2012, Ackermann 2018). Deflection contributes to the onymic schema constancy, according to which the shape of proper names is preserved in order to enable their recognition and processing (Nübling 2005: 50–51). The need to retain the proper name body had an impact on the morphosyntax and graphematics of German (see Nübling 2017 for a comprehensive overview).

Table 1: Inflection of proper names and common nouns in German (Ackermann 2018: 19)

Case	Personal name			Common noun			
	Feminine	Masculine	Neuter	Feminine	Masculine strong	weak	Neuter
Nominative	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*
Accusative	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-(e)n*	*-Ø*
Dative	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø*	*-Ø, (-e)*	*-(e)n*	*-Ø, (-e)*
Genitive	*-s*	*-s*	*-s*	*-Ø*	*-(e)s*	*-(e)n, -(e)ns*	*-(e)s*

While deflection of proper names has been studied in German historical linguistics, it has not received much attention in Romance historical linguistics although instances of deflection have been described in the literature. For example, Adams (2013: 204–215) observes in non-standard Latin zero marking with foreign names (*Iassucthan*) and the use of the nominative with native names in prepositional phrases (*per Hessucus*). Old French is characterized by two case forms: the nominative (*cas sujet*) for the subject and the oblique (*cas régime*) for the remaining syntactic functions. In Old French, personal names and common nouns share the same declension system, as illustrated in Table 2 with the personal names *Charles* and *Marie* and the common nouns *chevalier* 'knight' and *dame* 'lady' (see Buridant 2000: 63–72 and GGHF 2020: 633–639 for details). The loss of this two-case distinction began in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Interestingly, personal names behave differently from common nouns in two respects. First, there is a tendency for personal names to continue the nominative (*Charles*, *Marie*) and for common nouns to continue the oblique (*chevalier*) (see Smith 2011: 283).[1] Second, personal names underwent deflection earlier than common nouns (Schøsler 2001: 172–176).

---

[1] Note that *dame* 'lady' is invariable in the nominative and oblique singular. This is the case with feminine nouns ending in *-e*. Some of them are homophonous with personal names. However, they are not inflected in the same way. For example, the common noun *rose* 'rose' has *rose* both in the nominative and in the oblique while the personal name *Rose* 'Rose' has *Rose* in the nominative, but *Rosain* in the oblique (see Buridant 2000: 68 for more examples).

Table 2: Inflection of personal names and human common nouns in Old French

Case	Personal name		Human common noun	
	Masculine	**Feminine**	**Masculine**	**Feminine**
Nominative (*cas sujet*)	*Charle-(s)*	*Marie*	*chevalier-s*	*dame*
Oblique (*cas régime*)	*Charl-on*	*Mari-ien*	*chevalier*	*dame*

In Romanian, proper names differ from common nouns with respect to inflection. Tomescu (1998) gives a detailed account of gender, number, and case of proper names. Some reference grammars dedicate a whole chapter to proper names (Miron-Fulea, Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea 2013, Sarlin 2014: 98–105) while others treat proper names and common nouns separately when dealing with the inflection of the definite article (Pop 1948: 135, 138–139, Gönczöl 2021: 45–46, Iliescu & Popovici 2013: 74–76, 85). Notwithstanding, the declension of personal names in Romanian has not been explained in terms of deflection, which gave rise to a dissociation between proper names and common nouns thereby contributing to the onymic schema constancy. The goal of this paper is to give a brief synchronic and diachronic account of deflection of personal names in Romanian.

2 Inflection of proper names and common nouns in Romanian

In order to compare the inflection of proper names and common nouns, I will concentrate on the declension of personal names (*Ion*, *Carmen*) and human common nouns (*băiat* 'boy', *fată* 'girl') in unmodified definite NPs in the singular (see Table 3). Romanian has an enclitic definite article, which agrees in gender, number, and case with the noun. In Romanian there are two case forms: the nominative-accusative and the genitive-dative. Masculine nouns take *-(u)l*, *-le*, or *-a* in the nominative (*băiatul* 'the boy') and *-(u)lui* in the genitive-dative (*băiatului* 'of/to the boy'), while feminine nouns take *-a* or *-ua* in the nominative (*fata* 'the girl') and *-i* in the genitive-dative (*fetei* 'of/to the girl'). The accusative can be formed either with the definite article as in the nominative (*Doctorul examinează băiatul* 'the doctor examines the boy') or without the definite article, but differentially marked and clitic doubled (*Doctorul îl examinează pe băiat* 'the doctor examines the boy').[2]

Table 3: Inflection of personal names and common nouns

Case	Personal name		Human common noun	
	Masculine	**Feminine**	**Masculine**	**Feminine**
Nominative	*Ion*	*Carmen*	*băiat-ul*	*fat-a*
Accusative	*pe Ion*	*pe Carmen*	*băiat-ul ~ pe băiat*	*fat-a ~ pe fată*
Genitive-Dative	*lui Ion*	*lui Carmen*	*băiat-ului*	*fete-i*

Personal names are characterized by the absence of inflectional endings. In the nominative-accusative, the definite article cannot be attached to masculine and feminine personal names (*Ion*, *Carmen*).[3] In the accusative, personal names are differentially marked and clitic doubled (*Doctorul îl examinează pe Ion* 'the doctor examines John'). Personal names, however, can take the definite article when they are employed as common nouns to metonymically designate

---

[2] Note that human definite human direct objects are differentially marked by means of the preposition *pe* 'DOM', as in *pe băiat* 'DOM the boy' and *pe fată* 'DOM the girl', where article-drop in unmodified prepositional phrases applies (Mardale, Dobrovie-Sorin & Giurgea 2013: 536–540). One exception are inherently unique nouns such as *împărat* 'emperor', *rege* 'king', etc., which can optionally occur with the definite article, as in *pe împărat(ul)* 'DOM the emperor', *pe rege(le)* 'DOM the king', etc. (Pop 1948: 149, AR 2008: 77).

[3] One contentious issue is whether the ending *-a* of feminine personal names (*Maria*) and, to a lesser extent, the ending *-u* of masculine personal names (*Radu*) can be viewed as the nominative-accusative form of the definite article (see Miron-Fulea, Dobrovie-Sorin & Giurgea 2013: 721–725 for discussion).

the work of an artist, as illustrated by the personal name *Picasso* in (1) (Miron-Fulea, Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea 2013: 743, Pană Dindelegan 2003: 279–280).

(1)   Metonymic use of the definite article (Pană Dindelegan 2003: 280)
         Piccaso-ul   mi-a   plăc-ut   mult.
         Picasso-DEF   1SG.DAT-3SG.AUX   like-PTCP   much
         'I liked the (painting by) Picasso a lot.'

In the genitive-dative, *lui* (spoken as [luj] or [lu]) is obligatory with masculine personal names (*lui Ion* 'of/to John') and with feminine personal names ending in consonant (*lui Carmen* 'of/to Carmen'). Feminine personal names ending in *-a* (*-ea*, *-ia*) take *lui* in casual style (*lui Maria* 'of/to Maria'), but *-i* in formal style (*Mariei* 'of/to Maria') (Dobrovie-Sorin, Giurgea & Farkas 2013: 13–14, 20, Miron-Fulea, Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea 2013: 724, Pană Dindelegan 2003: 263–265). Interestingly, when feminine personal names ending in *-a* are inflected in the genitive-dative, they do not exhibit the morphophonological alternations typical of common nouns (Graur 1965: 136, Pană Dindelegan 2013: 271). For example, the common nouns *lampă* 'lamp', *seară* 'evening', and *floare* 'flower' show the stem alternation *a/ă*, *ea/e*, *oa/o* in the nominative-accusative and genitive-dative, respectively (see Table 4). This is not the case with the feminine personal names *Sanda*, *Leana*, and *Floarea*, which preserve their stem vowels in the paradigm. The avoidance of morphophonological alternations is in line with the onymic schema constancy.

Table 4: Stem of inflected feminine personal names and common nouns

Case	Personal name	Common noun
Nominative-Accusative	*Sanda, Leana, Floarea*	*lampa, seara, floarea*
Genitive-Dative	*Sandei, Leanei, Floarei*	*lămpii, serii, florii*

The form *lui* has been analysed as a "proprial article" (Dobrovie-Sorin, Giurgea & Farkas 2013: 14, Miron-Fulea, Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea 2013: 725), which is used with personal names, kinship names with and without the suffixal possessive (*lui mama* 'of mom', *lui frate-meu* 'of my brother'), animal names (*lui Rex* 'of Rex'), months (*lui martie* 'of March'), letters (*lui a* 'of a'), and numbers (*lui trei* 'of three') (Dobrovie-Sorin, Giurgea & Farkas 2013: 14, Miron-Fulea, Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea 2013: 725). In this respect, Romanian behaves differently from Istro-Romanian and Megleno-Romanian, where *lu* also occurs with common nouns.[4]

Old Romanian considerably differs from modern Romanian. First, masculine personal names are attested with the suffixed definite article, both in the nominative-accusative (*Radul* 'Radu') and in the genitive-dative (*Radului* 'of Radu') (Pană Dindelegan 2016: 292). As a result of deflection, which began in the sixteenth century, *Radul* and *Radului* gradually became *Radu* and *lui Radu*, respectively. The ending *-u* of personal names such as *Radu* is therefore a remnant of the definite article *-ul*, which is frequently found until the end of the nineteenth century (Pană Dindelegan 2013: 290). Second, the masculine and feminine genitive-dative endings *-lu(i)* and *-ei* (*-ii*) could also appear in proclitic position with personal names and inherently unique nouns such as *împărat* 'emperor', *voievod* 'voivode', etc. Thus, there were originally two proprial articles: *lu(i)* for the masculine (*lu Ștefan*) and *ei* (*ii, i, îi*) for the feminine (*îi Marie*). Coteanu (1969: 122–123) explains the development of the proclitic articles

---

[4] More specifically, in Istro-Romanian, *lu* is employed for the genitive-dative of masculine nouns (*lu omu* 'of/to the man', but *le fete* 'of/to the girl') while in Megleno-Romanian it is employed for the genitive regardless of gender (*lu omu* 'of the man', *lu feata* 'of the girl') (Caragiu Marioțeanu 1975: 197–198, 276).

in terms of a means to preserve the proper name body. Finally, *lu(i)* expanded replacing the feminine form *ei* (see Pană Dindelegan 2016: 293–294 for details).

3 Conclusions

Romanian exhibits morphosyntactic dissociations between proper names and common nouns. More specifically, personal names differ from human common nouns with respect to declension. In the nominative-accusative, personal names are not inflected while in the genitive-dative they take the proprial article *lui*, with the exception of feminine personal names ending in -*a*, which can occur either with the proprial article or with the suffixed definite article depending on style. Inflected feminine personal names ending in -*a* lack morphophonological alternations typical of common nouns. The declension system of personal names began to be shaped in the sixteenth century as a result of deflection. Altogether, deflection and avoidance of morphophonological alternations contribute to the onymic schema constancy in Romanian. The inflection of personal names and human common nouns is summarized in Table 5.

Table 5: Inflection of personal names and human common nouns in Romanian

Case	Personal name		Human common noun	
	Masculine	Feminine	Masculine	Feminine
Nominative	-Ø	-Ø	-(u)l, -le, -a	-a, -ua
Accusative	-Ø	-Ø	(-ul), (-le), (-a)	(-a), (-ua)
Genitive-Dative	-Ø	-Ø, (-i)	-(u)lui	-i

References

Ackermann, Tanja. 2018. *Grammatik der Namen im Wandel. Diachrone Morphosyntax der Personennamen im Deutschen* (Studia Linguistica Germanica 134). Berlin: De Gruyter.

Adams, James N. 2013. *Social variation and the Latin language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

AR = Academia Română (ed.). 2008. *Gramatica limbii române. Volum 1: Cuvântul*. Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Române.

Boyeldieu, Pascal. 2019. Proper names and case markers in Sinyar (Chad/Sudan). *Language Typology and Universals* 72(4). 467–503.

Buridant, Claude. 2000. *Grammaire nouvelle de l'ancien français*. Paris: SEDES.

Caragiu Marioţeanu, Matilda. 1975. *Compendiu de dialectologie română*. Bucureşti: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică.

Coteanu, Ion. 1969. *Morfologia numelui în protoromână (română comună)*. Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România.

Dobrovie-Sorin, Carmen, Ion Giurgea & Donka Farkas. 2013. Introduction: Nominal features and nominal projections. In Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea (eds.), *A reference grammar of Romanian. Volume 1: The noun phrase*, 1–47. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

GGHF = Marchello-Nizia, Christiane, Bernard Combettes, Sophie Prévost & Tobias Scheer. 2020. *Grande grammaire historique du français*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Gönczöl, Ramona. 2021. *Romanian. An essential grammar*. 2nd edn. London: Routledge.

Graur, Alexandru. 1965. *Nume de persoane*. Bucureşti: Editura Stiinţifică.

Iliescu, Maria & Victoria Popovici. 2013. *Rumänische Grammatik*. Hamburg: Buske.

Mardale, Alexandru, Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea. 2013. Adnominal prepositional phrases. In Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea (eds.), *A reference grammar of Romanian. Volume 1: The noun phrase*, 531–564. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Miron-Fulea, Mihaela, Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea. 2013. Proper names. In Carmen Dobrovie-Sorin & Ion Giurgea (eds.), *A reference grammar of Romanian. Volume 1: The noun phrase*, 719–745. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Nübling, Damaris. 2005. Zwischen Syntagmatik und Paradigmatik: Grammatische Eigennamenmarker und ihre Typologie. *Zeitschrift für Germanistische Linguistik* 33(1). 25–56.

Nübling, Damaris. 2012. Auf dem Weg zu Nicht-Flektierbaren: Die Deflexion der deutschen Eigennamen diachron und synchron. In Björn Rothstein (ed.), *Nicht-flektierende Wortarten* (Linguistik - Impulse und Tendenzen 47), 224–246. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Nübling, Damaris. 2017. The growing distance between proper names and common nouns in German: On the way to onymic schema constancy. *Folia Linguistica* 51(2). 341–367.

Pană Dindelegan, Gabriela (ed.). 2013. *The grammar of Romanian*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pană Dindelegan, Gabriela (ed.). 2016. *The syntax of Old Romanian*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pop, Sever. 1948. *Grammaire roumaine*. Bern: Francke.

Sarlin, Mika. 2014. *Romanian grammar*. 2nd edn. Helsinki: Books on Demand Gmbh.

Schøsler, Lene. 2001. From Latin to Modern French: Actualization and markedness. In Henning Andersen (ed.), *Actualization: Linguistic change in progress*, 169–185. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Smith, John Charles. 2011. Change and continuity in form-function relationships. In Martin Maiden, John Charles Smith & Adam Ledgeway (eds.), *The Cambridge history of the Romance languages. Volume 1: Structures*, 268–317. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tomescu, Domniţa. 1998. *Gramatica numelor proprii în limba română*. Bucureşti: All.

Much Virus

Ariel Cohen – Ben Gurion University of the Negev
arikc@bgu.ac.il

1 Introduction

In these days of pandemic, discussions involving the word *virus* are commonplace. In a recent presentation, Klaus von Heusinger (2020) notes a fascinating phenomenon: the word is often used as a mass term, e.g. *much virus*, even though it is clearly a count noun. For example, people sometimes say something like (1), to mean that there were *many* viruses in her throat:

(1)   There was much virus in her throat.

How can this be?

The word *virus* clearly has Latin origins. Therefore, many people are not sure about the correct form of the plural: is it *viruses* or, perhaps, *viri*? One may propose that this is the reason for the use of *much virus*: perhaps people are reluctant to use *many*, which forces them to pluralize the word, and use *much* instead, where the word can remain singular.

To test this possibility, we can turn to a language where the plural of *virus* is clear and unproblematic. One such language is Hebrew: *virus* is a loan word, but its plural is completely regular, using the plural suffix *–im,* resulting in *virusim.* However, in Hebrew, too, one can use the singular *virus*, yet with a count interpretation:

(2)   haya   harbe virus   ba-garon   shella
        there-was much virus-SN   in-the-throat her
        'There was much virus in her throat.'

Therefore, we must conclude that the phenomenon cannot be explained by doubts concerning the pluralization of *virus*.

2 Reference to Kinds

To account for this use of *virus*, von Heusinger points out that when people use the word, they often refer to the kind rather than to individual viruses. Thus, when one talks about *many viruses*, this is often taken to mean 'many kinds of virus'. However, in expressions like (1), what is clearly meant is that there were actually many individual viruses in her throat. Therefore, in order to disambiguate, and make it clear that they refer to individual viruses and not kinds, people use the form in (1) instead.

How does (1) get interpreted? How can the count noun *virus* be treated as if it were mass? An attractive solution is to use Pelletier's (1975) Universal Grinder: an operation that turns a count noun into the "stuff" it is made of. This interpretation of (1) makes perfect sense and is quite convincing. However, there are other cases, for which it doesn't seem to work as well.

3 Predicate Transfer

Consider the following attested example:[1]

(3)   There was (so) much virus in the community.

The most plausible interpretation of (3) is that there were many cases of the *disease* caused by the virus in the community, not many individual viruses. For example, if the virus in question is the corona virus, (3) says that the disease COVID-19 is widespread in the community. Since words for specific diseases are normally mass rather than count nouns, the modification by *much* rather than *many* is naturally explained.

But how is the word *virus* (an organism) interpreted as a disease?

One clear option presents itself: Nunberg's (1995) mechanism of Predicate Transfer. Nunberg discusses a situation in which a customer hands his key to an attendant at a parking lot and says:

(4)   I am parked out back.

Normally, (4) is interpreted as saying that the speaker has a car that is parked out back, not that the speaker herself is parked out back. Crucially, Nunberg demonstrates that it is the predicate whose meaning changes: the sense of the predicate *is parked out* back is transferred from the property of being parked out back to the property of having a car that is parked out back.

Nunberg notes that referring to a microorganism often means referring to the disease that it causes. As an example, he discusses the phrase *Peruvian virus*, which can mean 'virally-caused disease endemic to Peru' (p. 120).

Therefore, we can say that, in (3), the predicate *virus in the community* is transferred to the property *disease caused by a virus in the community*, and the sentence says that there is much of this disease, i.e. it is widespread.

It would seem, then, that we have two ways to derive an interpretation of *much virus*. Sometimes, as in (1), the interpretation is derived by the need to avoid reference to kinds and the use of the Universal Grinder, and at other times, exemplified by (3), by Predicate Transfer. Can we explain in a principled way when one reading is available and when the other one is?

4 Noteworthiness

I suggest that, in fact, there is a principled explanation, and, moreover, it comes from another study carried by Klaus von Heusinger. But to see this, we need to consider another aspect of Predicate Transfer.

Nunberg notes that, in contrast with (4), the sentences in (5) cannot undergo Predicate Transfer.

(5)   a.   * I may not start.
       b.   *I was once driven by Jean Gabin.

These sentences cannot mean that the speaker has a car that may not start or that was once driven by Jean Gabin. To explain this fact, Nunberg proposes that Predicate Transfer is only possible when the property contributed by the new predicate is *noteworthy*. Nunberg does not

---

really define this notion, but says that a noteworthy property 'offers a useful way of classifying its bearer relative to the immediate conversational interests' (p. 114). A paper co-authored by von Heusinger (Featherston, von Heusinger, & Weiland 2011) contains a more thorough analysis of the concept and describes experimental work that demonstrates that the effect of noteworthiness is real.

5 Putting it all together

The notion of noteworthiness can be fruitfully applied to the question at hand. Nunberg notes:

> while the phrase *a rare virus* can have the reading 'disease caused by a rare microorganism', it is harder to get an equivalent reading for the phrase *a tiny virus* to mean 'disease caused by a tiny microorganism'. In the latter case the adjective would have to contribute the property that a disease acquires in virtue of the size of the microorganism that causes it, but this is in fact unlikely to be noteworthy, given folk-etiological assumptions (p. 131n21)

According to Nunberg, then, in the context of a discussion of diseases, the property of being a rare virus is noteworthy, but the property of being a tiny virus is not.

In a similar way, we can note that in the context of discussing how widespread the disease is (i.e., how much COVID-19 there is), the property of being a virus in the community is noteworthy: it directly affects how widespread the disease is. However, the property of being a virus in the throat is not: whether or not the disease is widespread will not depend in whether the virus is in the throat.

Hence, Predicate Transfer applies in (3). However, it cannot apply in (1), because the property does not satisfy the requirement of noteworthiness discussed by Nunberg (1995) and Featherston, von Heusinger, & Weiland (2011); in this case, the mechanism proposed by von Heusinger (2020) applies instead. Thus, Klaus von Heusinger's earlier work complements his more recent work to provide an account of an interesting phenomenon which is particularly relevant these days.

References

Featherston, Sam, Klaus von Heusinger & Hanna Weiland. 2011. I'm leaking oil and looking for a garage: Testing pragmatic conditions on meaning transfer. In Jeff Runner (ed.), *Experiments at the interfaces: Syntax and semantics* 37, 31–65. Bingley: Emerald.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2020. Die Grammatik von Corona – Vom Zählen und Messen des Virus. Invited plenary talk at the Workshop on *Kommunikationsstrategien in der Corona-Krise,* Universität Graz, December 2020.

Nunberg, Geoffrey 1995. Transfers of meaning. *Journal of Semantics* 12(2). 109–132.

Pelletier, Francis J. 1975. Non-singular reference: Some preliminaries. *Philosophia* 5. 451–465. [Reprinted in F. J. Pelletier (ed.), *Mass terms: Some philosophical problems*, 1–14. Dordrecht: Reidel]

Turkish discourse anaphors: *bu* and *o*

Derya Çokal – University of Cologne
dcokal@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

In this study, we conducted a small-scale corpus analysis to examine: (1) accessibility of *bu* and *o* to an earlier and/or an immediately preceding clause; (2) how rhetorical relations *bu* and *o* are used; and (3) the role of type of verbs (i.e., dynamic verbs or stative verbs) in the use of *bu* and o.
Bu (i.e., this) and *o (i.e., that)* are accepted as linguistic/cognitive devices through which the addresser orients the addressee's attention to create joint attention, and through which the addressee constructs and modifies the mental representation of unfolding discourse (e.g., Cornish 2009, Çokal 2010, Webber 1991).

2 Methodology

The data for corpus analysis were retrieved from the METU Turkish Workbench. A total of 7849 paragraphs featuring *bu* were retrieved, as well as 4567 featuring *o*. 68 extracts featuring *o* or *bu* were taken randomly from fiction writing: 34 for *bu* and 34 for *o*. Texts were selected from the narrative genre. The number of words per text was between 22 and 115. The distance of an event or a proposition from *bu* and *o* was handled under two categories: an immediately preceding clause and non-adjacent clause. We used Marcu's (2000) rhetorical relations list. Schuster (1988) claims that the type of antecedent (i.e., events or action) determines the selection of the anaphoric expressions. In this study, stative verbs were annotated as a state or idea, while dynamic verbs were annotated as progressive actions on the part of the subject.

3 Results

Bu refers to the nearest clause itself (i.e., the right frontier; 90%), or a clause that is not adjacent to the clause containing the discourse anaphors (i.e., the left frontier; 10%). The antecedents of *o*, on the other hand, can only be the nearest clause 100%; extracts (1; 2).

Extract 1
> (a) Hak veriyordu karısına; (b) çalışıyordu ve üstelik çok başarılıydı. (c) Zekiydi, (d) **çalışma diyemezdi**, (e) Cahide' yi dört duvar arasına hapsetmek olurdu **bu**.
> (a) He understands his wife; (b) she studies and she is also very successful. (c) She is intelligent; (d) he has no right to tell her not to study. (e) **This** would be to imprison Cahide [between walls].

Extract 2
> (a) Kadın çıldırmış gibi. (b) Belli ki bir yakınına yıldırım çarptı. (c) Kim olduğunu çıkaramıyoruz. (d) **Kadına yardım etmek için gitmek istiyoruz** (e) ama selden geçilecek gibi değil ki. (f) Olanaksız **bu**.
> (a) The woman behaved as if she were mad. (b) Maybe one of her relatives had been struck by lightning. (c) We were not able to find out who she was. (d) We wanted to go to help her, (e) but it was impossible because of the flood. (f) **This** was impossible.

In Extract 1 *bu* refers to the proposition "çalışma diyemezdi/ he has no right to tell her not to study" in the immediately preceding clause. In Extract 2, however, *bu* refers to the proposition

in (d) *"Kadına yardım etmek için gitmek istiyoruz/ We wanted to go to help her"* which is not adjacent to (f).

In Figure 1, both *bu* and *o* are used in interpretation, contrast, and topic-end relations. However, these relations are less frequent than other relations which present significant semantic differences between *bu* and *o* in Turkish (e.g., negative vs. positive topic comment; end of topic, negation, and discourse topic).

Figure 1: The percentage of rhetorical relations in which *bu* and *o* is used

In Extract 3, the writer describes a "Havra", or synagogue. *Bu* is used in a contrast relation with the discourse marker "Ama" to state that though the synagogue was surrounded by high walls and thus was very quiet, this did not affect the magical atmosphere visible on looking through the keyhole. In Extract 4, *o* is also used in a contrast relation, in a manner similar to *bu*. The writer claims that two teams would tie at the end of the game because of the penalty given at the last minute. Another character in the story contradicts that idea, saying "*o* eskidendi ('That was in the past').

Extract 3
(a) Havra, ne de olsa, uzun upuzun duvarlarla çevriliydi. (b) Uçsuz duvarlar. (c) Sessiz (d) Ama **bu**, biz o delikten baktığımızda, içeriden bize renkli ışıltılar süzüldüğünde ortalığı sarıp sarmalayan o büyüyü bozmadı hiç.

(a) The synagogue was surrounded by very high walls. (b) Endless walls. (c) Quiet. (d) However, **that** did not spoil the magical atmosphere with coloured lights all around visible when we looked through the keyhole.

Extract 4
(a) Tutar bir penaltı verir maçın son dakikasında, (b) adam da dengine getirir atar mı , (c) haydi al bakalım sahadan berabere ayrıl **. . .** (d) Yok artık abicim, (e) berabere yok, (f) **o** eskidendi şimdi yeneceğiz, yeniyoruz, yeneriz.

(a) Now, what if the referee were to give a penalty in the last minute? (b) The player would score a goal, (c) then we would draw…. (d) No mate, no draw, (e) **that** was in the past, (f) this time we will win, are winning, are going to win.

While *bu* is mostly used in sentences in which a positive comment on a topic is given, *o* is used in a negative topic comment. In Extract 5, the writer describes the surroundings when the character leaves his/her flat. *Bu* in sentence (e) refers to the proposition in sentence (d), "Bakkal da kapamisti". The sentence with *bu* is a positive comment on the shop being closed.

Extract 5
(a) Giyinip çıktı. (b) Merdivenleri hızla indi. (c) Sokak boştu. (d) Bakkal da kapamıştı , (e) **bu** iyiydi. (f) Ağır ağır yürüdü.

(a) S/he put on his/her clothes and went out. (b) S/he went donwstairs very quickly. (c) The street was quiet. (d) The shop was closed, (e) **this** was good. (f) He walked very slowly.

However, in Extract 6, the sentence with *o* presents a negative topic comment. The writer explains that when a politician loses the trust and love of a society, it is difficult to regain them. S/he provides his/her negative idea about winning back the trust and love of society. *O* is used more specifically in refuting or criticizing a given proposition.

Extract 6
(a) Ama milletin itimadını, milletin güvenini, milletin sevgisini kaybettin mi bir daha kazanamazsın. (b) **O** çok zor.
(a) However, if you lose the trust and love of society, you will never regain it. (b) **That** [regaining that trust and love] is very difficult.

The percentage of *o* is higher than that of *bu* in the use of dynamic verbs (*o*_dynamic verbs: 61%; *o*_stative verbs: 39%: *bu*_dynamic verbs: 50%; *bu*_stative verbs: 50%).

4 Conclusions

Bu and *o* refer to an entity/a proposition given in immediately preceding clause. Only *bu* refers to an entity/a proposition that is not close. However, the use of such cases is highly infrequent. *O* is mostly used in negative sentences and negative topic comment relations, whereas *bu* is preferred in positive topic comments and contrast relations. *Bu* is used more frequently than *o* (roughly twice as often), which indicates that if the writers do not want to give a negative meaning to their discourses, *bu* seems to be preferred over *o*. *Bu* is used to refer to both dynamic and stative verbs. *O* refers to dynamic verbs more frequently than to stative verbs. Larger-Scaled corpus studies need to be conducted to test these findings.

References

Cornish, Francis. 2009. Indexicality by degrees: Deixis, "anadeixis" and discourse anaphora. Paper presented at the Symposium *Quel sens pour la linguistique?* April 2009, Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail.

Çokal, Derya. 2010. The pronominal bu-şu and this-that: Rhetorical structure theory. *Dilbilim Araştırmaları* 1. 15–33.

Marcu, Daniel. 2001. *The theory and practice of discourse parsing and summarization*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Schuster, Ethel. 1988. Anaphoric reference to events and actions: A representation and its advantages. In Vargha Dénes & Eva Hajičová (eds.), *Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Computational Linguistics*, 602–607. Stroudsburg: ACL.

Webber, Bonnie L. 1991. Structure and ostension in the interpretation of discourse deixis. *Language and Cognitive Processes* 6. 107–135.

Between formal semantics and cultural semantics in descriptive linguistics

Gerrit J. Dimmendaal – University of Cologne
gerrit.dimmendaal@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

Linguists interested in the core function of human language, the expression of meaning, have come to divide their research goals into three domains: formal semantics, cognitive semantics, and cultural semantics. Whereas formal semantics provides accounts of what linguistic expressions mean, and how their meanings are derived from the meanings of their parts by using formal tools from logic, cognitive semantics focuses on meaning as it arises from language use, and more specifically from interactive and communicative intent. Less well studied, and therefore less well understood, is the domain of cultural semantics, the branch of linguistics which investigates the relationship between meaning and culture in discourse. These three approaches are briefly compared below, in order to show that they complement – rather than contradict – each other in insightful ways. The basis for this discussion is the completion of a reference grammar of Tima, a language spoken in the Nuba Mountains in Sudan, to be published as Dimmendaal & Schneider-Blum (to appear).

2 Stating the issues

When going through the rich set of themes discussed in the three volumes of *Semantics* edited by Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger, and Paul Portner between 2011 and 2013, one comes across contributions addressing a range of formal-semantic topics that are also of immediate relevance for the production of reference grammars, for example on tense, aspect, modality, and (the scope of) negation. In addition, cognitive-semantic issues such as presupposition or conversational implicatures are discussed in these handbooks. This latter cognitive-semantic domain has also been elaborated upon over the past few years in the *Collaborative Research Centre* 1252 PROMINENCE ON LANGUAGE, directed by Klaus von Heusinger at the University of Cologne. The latter belongs to the domain of "construal", as this property is referred to in cognitive linguistics, along with themes such as specificity, scope, and background.

The investigation of prominence relations in Tima also plays a role in the collaborative research project mentioned above.[1] Different features of this endangered language, which has been the subject of a documentation project initiated in 2006, have been analyzed in a range of publications by various authors. Apart from practical spin-offs such as primers for schools in the Tima area, as well as a Tima-English dictionary, prominence relations and syntactic alignment in Tima are analyzed in Schneider-Blum & Hellwig (2018), while Becker & Schneider-Blum (2020) address focus marking and selective marking in this language.

Tima turns out to be particularly interesting with respect to the formal expression of prominence relations and the focus of attention in a range of syntactic domains, as further discussed in Chapter 11 of the grammar by Dimmendaal & Schneider-Blum (to appear). Prominence in Tima may be accorded to different substructures of an utterance by conceiving situations in alternative ways. One important strategy involves ellipsis, i.e. the omission of morphemes or words expressing tense, aspect, or deictic information, whose properties are assumed to be known to the hearer. The inversion of main predications and secondary

---

[1] https://sfb1252.uni-koeln.de/forschungsprojekte/b02-split-case-marking-and-constituent-order-in-east-africa.

predications is another strategy resulting in slightly different meanings, as illustrated in the following alternative construals of a verb and adjective:

(1) díyʌŋ mèʈɛ́n
     come   close
     'come close!'

(2) (pínʌ) à-mèʈɛ́n   díyʌŋ
     3SG   PRED-close   come
     '(s)he is about to come (lit. she is close in coming)'

But apart from formal-semantic and cognitive-semantic phenomena in Tima, there are issues belonging to the realm of cultural semantics, for example the important construal of the egocentric perspective. Compare the following two examples:

(3) án-cɔ̀ɔ̀   lɔ́ɔ́
     3:PFV2-arrive:HT   LOC-family
     (s)he has/they have arrived at home (speaker is not at home)'

(4) àn-cɔ́ɔ́ŋ   lɔ́ɔ̀
     3:PFV2-arrive:HT.VENT LOC-family
     '(s)he has/they have arrived at home (where the speaker is)'

The presence of ventive marking (i.e. direction towards the speaker or deictic center) in (4) implies that the speaker was present, i.e. did witness the event. Leaving the egocentric marking out (on a verb or in a prepositional construction, depending on the syntactic structure), as in (3), hence triggers the conversational implicature "what isn't said, isn't", thereby implying that the speaker did not witness the event himself/herself. Tima speakers are very "picky" about marking (exact) location (which is also reflected in the nominal morphology of their language), but also about information sources (and therefore evidentiality). In this respect, marking the egocentric perspective may be interpreted as an instance of the co-evolution of grammar and culture.

Cultural semantics has probably received the least attention within semantics over the past decades, with the exception of studies on politeness and impoliteness and intercultural communication. When being socialized in a particular language, we acquire the grammatical rules of that language, but we also learn about the culture-specific conversational implicatures of what is being said. There is ample empirical evidence from language acquisition studies, but also from the creation of new varieties of former colonial languages like the "New Englishes" in different parts of the world, that this tacit knowledge is acquired through a "frames-and-scenarios" model, as it is called in Dimmendaal (2022). This model, inspired by contributions in cognitive linguistics, in particular by the late Charles J. Fillmore, takes speakers' knowledge of situations or contexts (as frames) and corresponding act sequences (scenarios) as its basis.

Let us take an example from an exotic language like German in order to make this model and its relevance for cultural semantics more concrete. Speakers of German may say to you *schönen Tag noch!* 'have a nice day!' as a leave-taking strategy. But depending on the context and the intonation used, they may indeed have your well-being in mind, or, alternatively, exactly the opposite ('go to h*ll!').

3 Conclusion

Truth-conditional semantics attempts to explain the meaning of an utterance by providing the conditions under which it would be true. But in order to be able to account for diverging conversational implicatures it is important to view "truth" and "felicity" as two independent dimensions. The latter concept relates utterances to situations in which they are assumed to be appropriate or felicitous. This is where culture comes in, and from an analytical point of view, cultural semantics. When socializing in a particular speech community, we learn about preferred politeness as well as impoliteness strategies. In the case of German, this involves learning about deliberately inverting the truth value of a statement or command (thereby flouting Grice's conversational maxims). Obviously, this is the most intricate part of analyzing and describing hitherto poorly documented languages.

Hamm, Kamp & van Lambergen (2006) convincingly argue that there is no opposition between formal and cognitive semantics. By extension, it may be argued that these approaches complement the third branch of semantic studies, that of cultural semantics, which requires the additional investigation of culture-specific conversational implicatures, ideally by immersion fieldwork.[2]

Abbreviations
HT = high transitivity   PFV   = perfective
LOC = locative marker   PRED = predicative marker

References

Becker, Laura & Gertrud Schneider-Blum. 2020. Morphological marking of contrast in Tima. *Glossa* 5(1). 125.1–35.

Dimmendaal, Gerrit J. 2022. *Nurturing language: Anthropological linguistics in an African context*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Dimmendaal, Gerrit J. & Gertrud Schneider-Blum. To appear. *A grammar of Tima.* Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Hamm, Fritz, Hans Kamp & Michiel van Lambalgen. 2006. There is no opposition between formal and cognitive semantics. *Theoretical Linguistics* 32(1). 1–40.

von Heusinger, Klaus, Claudia Maienborn, & Paul Portner. 2013. *Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning*, vol. 2. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Langacker, Ronald W. 1991. *Foundations of cognitive grammar*, vol. 2*: Descriptive application.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Maienborn, Claudia, Klaus von Heusinger & Paul Portner. 2011. *Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning*, vol. 1. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Maienborn, Claudia, Klaus von Heusinger & Paul Portner. 2013. *Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning*, vol. 3. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Schneider-Blum, Gertrud & Birgit Hellwig. 2018. Reference tracking in Tima and its interplay with split ergative marking. *Studies in Language* 42(4). 970–993.

---

[2] *In a way these authors hint at this in footnote 20 (p. 29),* where they make reference to what they call "usage-based" approaches.

An enigma of agency

Marta Donazzan – LLING / CNRS & Nantes Université
marta.donazzan@univ-nantes.fr

Wenn ich meinen Arm hebe, *versuche* ich meistens nicht, ihn zu heben.
(L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, Teil 1, 622)

1 The issue

In 1972, the American philosopher Irving Thalberg published a collection of essays addressing different issues in the philosophy of human action that he viewed as "enigmas of agency".[1] Thalberg did not address the most puzzling enigma of agency, which is obviously Klaus himself; and although I have been inspired by this particular enigma in choosing the topic of this squibble, I must follow Thalberg as well and address a less significant puzzle, to which I am more confident to find a solution.

One of the questions raised by Thalberg is why certain actions that require a certain degree of agency of their subjects are still intuitively qualified as non-intentional. More specifically, as suggested by Wittgenstein's quote, one may wonder if it is plausible to count among actions intentionally caused by an agent also those that seem to require just a trivial effort, as suggested by the incongruous use of verbs implying an effort, such as *manage* or *try*. In this brief squibble, I will address this question through the discussion of a special class of intentional actions and their linguistic expression. I will be concerned with a case of action of *yielding control*.

In recent joint work with Klaus (Donazzan, Raffy & von Heusinger 2020), we discussed the semantics of causative verbs that, in different ways, express an act of yielding control from their subject to a (potentially) distinct participant. In the literature on causative verbs, it is well known that languages differ with respect to the lexical field covered by single items, therefore I will consider the English verb *let* to be representative of a family of cognate verbs belonging to this precise causative type, which I will call LET-verbs and whose semantic characterisation is given below.

The main features of LET-verbs are the following. First, as shown by the contrast between (1a) and (b), they seem to subcategorise for animate and thus potentially intentional subjects.[2] Second, LET-predicates imply that the entity to which control is transferred acts intentionally, but, as evidenced by the contrast between (2a) and (b), the action of yielding control can be either deliberative (2c) or non-deliberative (2b) – in other words, Peter must be willing to run downstairs, but Mary may be willing to let Peter run downstairs or not.

(1) a.   Mary let Peter run downstairs.
     b.   #The hole in the ground let Peter run downstairs.

(2) b.   #Mary let Peter run downstairs against his will.
     b.   Mary let Peter run downstairs against her will.
     c.   Upon second thought, Mary let Peter run downstairs.

In Donazzan, Raffy & von Heusinger (2020), we characterised the yielding of control to a rational entity by deliberative action as an act of *authorisation*, and the case where control is yielded non-deliberatively as a failure to prevent the action, which we called the *not-oppose*

---

[1] Thalberg (1972).
[2] One exception, discussed by Donazzan, Raffy & von Heusinger (2020), is that of dispositional causers, which can be interpreted as having a build-in intentionality as well. I will not discuss this case here.

interpretation of LET. Crucially, as evidenced by the contrast in (1), failing to prevent, although non-deliberative, also implies *a certain kind of* intentionality. We may intuitively relate intentionality to the existence of an alternative course of action - by using LET, we attribute to Mary the ability to prevent Peter from running downstairs if she wanted to, but even so, the modifier in the sentence would then express a contradiction. Therefore the puzzle raised by LET-verbs is: if Mary lets Peter run downstairs against her will, in what sense could she intend to let him run? Could we qualify as intentionality the property that opposes unwilling Mary and a hole in the ground?

2 Intentions with(out) control

A possible way to look at the matter is hidden in Wittgenstein's remark. There is a strong intuition that verbs such as *try* imply that the predicates that they further embed denote an intentional action. Thus, Anscombe says that "the primitive sign of wanting is *trying to get*",[3] and this interpretation has been extended to intentional action in general.[4] Intentionality, in this sense, could be used to discriminate between properties and actions, as expressed by predicates denoting, respectively, states and events. To a closer look, however, this characterisation is not perfect either: while it is fine to say that one tries to be happy, it seems less felicitous to say that one tries to be sick, despite the fact that one can equally *want* to be so.

I would like to submit that what seems to be relevant for *try*-verbs is a further inference related to control: we may suppose that most psychological states, like *being happy*, can be understood as being under the control of their holders,[5] while physical states generally resist this interpretation. The difference in acceptability, then, could be explained by supposing that *try* expresses intentionality plus control. If control can be severed from intention, then, we may be able to discriminate also between the two interpretations of LET-verbs: non-deliberative actions of yielding control should imply intention without implying control.

The circumstances under which intentional action does not imply control, however, need to be further specified. One possibility that I would like to explore here is that control is related to intention only if intention is interpreted as goal-oriented. The idea, defended in particular by Michael Bratman as an argument for the distinctiveness of intention (Bratman 1987), is that intentions fall into different categories, and only one of them comprises intentions that are parts of a plan – that is, that are intentions directed towards a goal. One of the examples discussed by Bratman is that of a man who runs a marathon and wears down his sneakers. Suppose that the man knows that running the length of a marathon will wear down his sneakers, and, while he would reasonably prefer to preserve his sneakers, he eventually decides that it is the price to pay. Can we say that he intends to wear down his sneakers? Bratman's answer is that his knowing the consequences that running the marathon has on his sneakers allows us to conclude that he certainly intends to do so, and yet we can't say that having his sneakers worn down was his intention when he was running the marathon (and certainly, we may add, we couldn't say that he tried to wear down his sneakers, in these circumstances). This "weak" intention, while morally and legally significant, is not goal-oriented, because it cannot be considered as an intention which is conceived in order to bring further consequences on its own.

Given this, and our conclusions with respect to the interpretation of *try*-verbs, we would expect the *try*-test to give us a hint in order to discriminate between intentional LET-events. Example (3) is the report of a woman who escaped from a potential shooting in a parking lot.

---

[3] Anscombe (1963: 68).

[4] Cf. Bratman, who remarks that "the 'primitive sign' of an intention to A is trying to A" (Bratman 1987: 121).

[5] Unless they express psychological states, such as being furious or sad, which in commonsense psychology are characterised precisely as episodes of losing control.

(3)   *The driver never spoke to her as he glared at her before getting out of the pick up and getting the rifle from beneath the back seat, she said. That's when she decided to bolt. "I'm not going to sit here and let him shoot me" she remembers thinking. "I took my baby in my arms and rushed toward the store".[6]*

The context provides enough information to infer that the woman pictured the shooting as a consequence of her *not opposing* the driver's action. Embedding the LET-verb under *try* yields an infelicitous sentence - to sit still in her car would have been intentional for the woman (as she could choose between sitting and running away), but obviously it would have not been conceived as an action directed towards the goal of being shot, as the use of *try* in (4), on the contrary, seems to suggest.

(4)   That's when she decided to bolt. #"I'm not going to sit here and try to let him shoot me" she remembers thinking.

Conversely, English *let* can be embedded under *try* when the action of yielding control is understood as both intentional and goal-oriented. In the context of (5), the event of Obama coming to know their proposals is in itself the goal of the activists, which lead to their arrest.

(5)   *The Nashville-based doctor was arrested again [...] two days after President Obama said in his 2010 State of the Union that he would listen to anyone with a "better approach" to reform. "Well, we had a serious set of proposals and tried to let him know", she said of her arrest [...][7]*

To conclude, actions of unwillingly yielding control, and actions that respond to unreflective or spontaneous behaviour such as raising an arm or blinking, probably fall into the same category of *weak* intentions. I must intend, in a weak sense, to raise my arm, but I do not intend to do so as part of a larger plan on its own. As an unreflective and ancillary action, then, raising an arm when fetching the book on the top shelf would not imply control in the relevant sense. In the same sense, Mary may be held responsible of the fact that Peter ran downstairs in (2b), but she did not let him do so with a goal in mind. In this sense, while acting intentionally, she did not control her yielding of control.

References

Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret. 1963. *Intention*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Bratman, Michael E. 1987. *Intention, plans, and practical reason*. Cambridge.: Harvard University Press.
Donazzan, Marta, Clémentine Raffy & Klaus von Heusinger. 2020. Causation and dispositions: Towards a semantic characterization of the French causative verb *laisser*. *Bucharest Working Papers in Linguistics* XXII(2). 55–75.
Thalberg, Irving. 1972. *Enigmas of agency. Studies in the philosophy of human action*. London: Allen & Unwin Ltd.

---

[6] https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article140208923.html
[7] http://www.pnhp.org/news/2017/january/medicare-for-all-a-uniting-call-to-action-in-the-age-of-trump

Klaus ist eine Linguistin, genauer gesagt ein Linguist

Cornelia Ebert und Stefan Hinterwimmer
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt und Bergische Universität Wuppertal
ebert@lingua.uni-frankfurt.de und hinterwimmer@uni-wuppertal.de

1 Das 'generische Maskulinum'

Wir untersuchen die Akzeptabilität generischer (d.h. genderübergreifender) Verwendungen nicht-movierter Berufsbezeichnungen, also des sogenannten ‚generischen Maskulinums'. Konkret untersuchen wir die Hypothese Beckers (2008), der die generische Lesart als semantische Grundbedeutung nicht-movierter Personenbezeichnungen annimmt. Die spezifisch männliche Lesart der nicht-movierten Personenbezeichnungen analysiert Becker als pragmatische Gebrauchsbedeutung, die durch eine konversationelle Implikatur entsteht und autohyponym zur generischen Grundbedeutung ist. Becker argumentiert, dass sich das Wortpaar *Bäcker-Bäckerin* ebenso zueinander verhält wie *Viereck-Quadrat*. Jedes Quadrat ist auch ein Viereck. Somit ist es grundsätzlich also möglich, ein Quadrat auch als Viereck zu bezeichnen. Wenn aber in einem Kontext Quadrate (im Kontrast zu z.B. nicht seitengleichen Vierecken) eine übergeordnete Rolle spielen, dann führt die Verwendung des Ausdrucks *Viereck* zur Implikatur, dass es sich bei dem bezeichneten Objekt nicht um ein Quadrat handelt. Becker nimmt an, dass dasselbe für die nicht-movierte Form einer Personenbezeichnung, also beispielsweise für den Ausdruck *Bäcker*, gilt. Mit dem Ausdruck *Bäcker* können also auch weibliche Vertreterinnen des Berufsstands bezeichnet werden. Spielt aber das Geschlecht eine Rolle im Kontext, wäre die Verwendung der maskulinen, also weniger spezifischen Form, irreführend, wenn nicht (nur) männliche Bäcker gemeint sind. Denn die Verwendung des allgemeineren Ausdrucks (*Bäcker*) löst dann die Implikatur aus, dass es sich nicht um die spezifischere Bedeutung (*Bäckerinnen*) handelt.

Unter der Annahme, dass die Verwendung der nicht-movierten Form generisch ist in der Art, dass sie männliche und weibliche Vertreter:innen der bezeichneten Personengruppe umfassen kann, ergibt sich auch, dass (1) (Beckers (3)) akzeptabel ist, wohingegen (2) (Beckers (4)) völlig inakzeptabel ist.

(1) *In dem Flugzeug waren 5 Amerikaner, darunter eine Frau.*
(2) **In dem Flugzeug waren 5 Männer, darunter eine Frau.*

Wenn der Begriff *Amerikaner* nur männliche Vertreter der genannten Nationalität umfassen würde, bliebe der Unterschied zwischen (1) und (2) unerklärt. Weiterhin erklärt Beckers Hypothese, wie er ausführt, die Tatsache, dass in einem Satz wie

(3) *Frankfurt hat etwa 800.000 Einwohner.*

auch die weiblichen Einwohnerinnen mitgezählt sind, da hier durch den kontextuellen Zusammenhang keine Implikatur ausgelöst wird, dass aber bei einem Satz wie

(4) *Der Student kam zu spät.*

eine solche Implikatur ausgelöst wird. (4) wird also so interpretiert, dass ein männlicher Student zu spät kam. Hier wird nämlich der allgemeinere Begriff (*Student*) verwendet, obwohl man auch den spezifischeren (*Studentin*) hätte verwenden können.

Wenn Becker (2008) mit seiner Analyse richtig liegt, sollten sich nicht-movierte Formen, die generisch zu interpretieren sind und deren spezifisch maskuline Interpretation durch eine konventionelle Implikatur zustande kommt, eben auch wie andere Ausdrücke verhalten, die konventionelle Implikaturen auslösen. Insbesondere ist vorausgesagt, dass eine unter Umständen ausgelöste konventionelle Implikatur auch wieder gelöscht werden kann. In unserem Experiment überprüfen wir, inwiefern die spezifisch männliche Lesart der nicht-movierten Form aufgehoben, d.h. die Implikatur gelöscht werden kann und inwiefern Entsprechendes für die movierte Form und die weibliche Interpretation nicht gilt. Das Experiment untersucht die Akzeptabilität von Aussagen der Form (5a) vs. (5b).

(5) a. [NONMOV-MOV] *In der Expertenkommission der Bundesregierung sitzt auch ein Physiker. Genauer gesagt ist es eine Physikerin.*

   b. [MOV-NONMOV] *In der Expertenkommission der Bundesregierung sitzt auch eine Physikerin. Genauer gesagt ist es ein Physiker.*

Als Kontrolle werden sächliche Ober- und Unterbegriffe (z. B. *Hose – Jeans*) wechselseitig als Hyperonym und Hyponym präsentiert (z. B. *Hose* als Hyperonym zu *Jeans* und umgekehrt).

(6) a. [HYPERONYM- HYPONYM] *Der Hingucker auf dem Mailänder Catwalk ist dieses Jahr eine Hose. Genauer gesagt ist es eine Jeans.*

   b. [HYPONYM-HYPERONYM] *Der Hingucker auf dem Mailänder Catwalk ist dieses Jahr eine Jeans. Genauer gesagt ist es eine Hose.*

Wir machen hier die folgende Voraussage: Die nicht-movierte Form sollte gemäß Becker (2008) akzeptabler als Hyperonym für die movierte Form verwendet werden können als umgekehrt, wenn die nicht-movierte Form wirklich den Oberbegriff für beide Formen bildet. Bei den sächlichen Beispielen sollte das korrekte Hyperonym-Hyponym-Paar (z.B. *Hose – Jeans*) deutlich besser bewertet werden als das inkorrekte (z. B. *Jeans – Hose*), weil die Items so konstruiert sind, dass ein Unterbegriff erwartet wird.

2 Eine experimentelle Studie

Design. Das Experiment wurde als Akzeptabilitätsstudie durchgeführt. Die Items wurden im Latin Square Design auf verschiedene Listen aufgeteilt und in zwei TARGET-Bedingungen präsentiert: NONMOV-MOV, also erst die nicht-movierte Form, dann die movierte bzw. erst Hyperonym, dann Hyponym, und MOV-NONMOV, also erst die movierte und dann die nicht-movierte Form bzw. erst Hyponym, dann Hyperonym. Es wurden weiterhin drei verschiedene MODI verwendet: nämlich stereotyp weibliche, männliche und neutrale Berufsbezeichnungen. Die Einordnung erfolgte auf Basis der Daten von Gabriel et al. (2008). Die Versuchspersonen wurden dazu aufgefordert, intuitiv zu bewerten, wie passend sie den *letzten* Satz im Kontext des ersten empfinden. Dazu stand ihnen eine 5-Punkte-Skala zur Verfügung, deren Außenpunkte mit 1 = „vollkommen unpassend" und 5 = „vollkommend passend" gelabelt waren. Es gab 12 experimentelle Items (4 stereotyp männliche Berufsbezeichnungen, 4 stereotyp weibliche und 4 neutrale Berufsbezeichnungen). Weiterhin 6 Kontrollitems mit echten Hyponym-Hyperonym-Paaren.

Das Experiment wurde zusammen mit einem anderen Experiment zu gendergerechter Sprache durchgeführt, dessen Targets als Filleritems dienten. Es wurde online auf *Qualtrics* erstellt und Versuchspersonen wurden über *Prolific* rekrutiert. Die Versuchspersonen sind registrierte Mitglieder auf *Prolific* und deutsche Muttersprachler:innen (Prescreening auf

Prolific & Überprüfung im Fragebogen). Bilingual aufgewachsene Muttersprachler:innen wurden zugelassen, Nicht-Muttersprachler:innen ausgeschlossen. Die Versuchspersonen mussten während des Experiments 18 Aufmerksamkeitsfragen beantwortet, die sich auf den Inhalt einiger Filleritems bezogen. Versuchspersonen, die mehr als 20% der Aufmerksamkeitsfragen falsch beantwortet haben, wurden von der Analyse ausgeschlossen. Vor Beginn des Experiments wurden zwei Beispiele und eine Aufmerksamkeitsfrage präsentiert. Die Durchführung des Experiments dauerte etwa 20 Minuten und die Versuchspersonen erhielten 1,88 £ (7,52 £/h) Aufwandsentschädigung. Es nahmen 20 Personen am Experiment teil.

Resultate. Alle 20 Vpn erfüllten das Kriterium und wurden in die Analyse einbezogen. Eine erste Analyse verglich die experimentellen Items, gemittelt über die drei Modi, mit den Kontrollitems. Beide Haupteffekte wurden signifikant [TARGET: $F_{1,19} = 49,7$, $p < .001$; MODUS: $F_{1,19} = 57,9$, $p < .001$]. Es zeigte sich jedoch eine Interaktion zwischen TARGET und MODUS [$F_{1,19} = 34,1$, $p < .001$]. Wie *Abbildung 1* zeigt, war der TARGET-Effekt für die Kontrollbedingung deutlich stärker als für die Experimentalitems. Die Interaktion basiert im Wesentlichen darauf, dass die Reihenfolge NON-MOV vor MOV grundsätzlich wesentlich schlechter bewertet wurde als Hyperonym vor Hyponym. In einer weiteren Analyse haben wir nur noch die Experimentalitems untereinander verglichen. Unter den Experimentalitems fand sich weiterhin ein TARGET-Effekt [TARGET: $F_{1,19} = 5,8$, $p < .05$], jedoch weder ein MODUS-Haupteffekt noch eine TARGET-MODUS-Interaktion [beide $F < 1$]. Wie aus *Abbildung 1* ersichtlich, wurde die Reihenfolge NONMOV- MOV besser bewertet als die umgekehrte.

Abbildung 1: Target: 1 = NONMOV-MOV; 2 = MOV-NONMOV)
Modus = ctrl: echte Über- / Unterbegriffe (z.B. Hose – Jeans)

Diskussion. Die Hypothese konnte teilweise bestätigt werden. Wenn erst die nicht-movierte Form präsentiert wird und dann die movierte, wird dies von den Versuchspersonen besser bewertet als umgekehrt. Dies entspricht der Erwartung gemäß Beckers Hypothese. Handelt es sich bei der nicht-movierten Form tatsächlich um einen Überbegriff und kommt der Schluss darauf, dass männliche Vertreter einer Gruppe gemeint sind, durch eine Implikatur zustande, so sollte diese aufhebbar sein. Im umgekehrten Fall – erst moviert, also spezifisch, dann nicht-moviert, also generisch – sollte sich in den gegebenen Kontexten ein Widerspruch ergeben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen jedoch einen deutlichen Unterschied in der Bewertung von Targetitems und Kontrollitems. Dieser ist nicht erwartet, wenn das Verhältnis von nicht-moviert zu moviert

tatsächlich wie Ober- zu Unterbegriff wäre. Eine mögliche Erklärung wäre die Folgende: Beckers (2008) Theorie entspricht tatsächlich dem ursprünglichen Verhältnis von nicht-movierter zu movierter Form und die maskuline Lesart ergab sich als Implikatur. Dieser Prozess befindet sich jedoch derzeit im Wandel und die Implikatur hat sich mittlerweile teilweise grammatikalisiert. Wir erwarten daher insbesondere bei jüngeren Sprecher:innen eine schlechtere Bewertung in beiden Bedingungen. Um diese Voraussage zu überprüfen, planen wir ein Folgeexperiment.

Literatur

Becker, Thomas. 2008. Zum generischen Maskulinum: Bedeutung und Gebrauch der nicht-movierten Personenbezeichnungen im Deutschen. *Linguistische Berichte* 213. 65–75.

Gabriel, Ute, Pascal Gygax, Oriane Sarrasin, Alan Garnham & Jane Oakhill. 2008. Au pairs are rarely male: Norms on the gender perception of role names across English, French, and German. *Behavior Research Methods* 40(1). 206–212.

Lack of Agreement as Indicating Specificity

Betul Erbasi – University of Southern California
erbasi@usc.edu

1 Introduction

Interpretation in the nominal domain is complicated due to heavily-influential discourse factors. It is a challenge to disentangle the syntactic-semantic properties from discourse properties. This is a challenge due to many reasons including the overt-marking of various interpretational properties of nominals, indicating syntactic relevance, while still being heavily discourse-oriented. The main contribution of this paper is to present novel data from Turkish that show that specificity, an interpretation-related concept in main focus here, can be marked with dropping of the agreement marker in the nominal domain, a novel way of marking of this concept. These data have been discussed in the literature before (e.g. Öztürk & Taylan 2016, Erbasi 2019), but not in relation to specificity marking per se. The second part of the challenge is that not only are there many different concepts used to account for the complications in the interpretation in the nominal domain, but there are also many ways to interpret a single concept. This paper addresses the latter issue with a focus on the concept of *specificity* while following the definition in von Heusinger 2002.

Definiteness and specificity are closely related concepts, so a brief discussion of the two together is in order. Traditionally, definiteness requires both existence and uniqueness (Heim 1991, Ko, Ionin & Wexler 2010). Heim (1991) defines definiteness as in (1a) and it can be translated for nominals as in (1b) (see von Heusinger 2002 for a definition of definiteness as more related to familiarity).

(1)   a.   Definiteness (Sentence)

A sentence of the form [def α] ζ *presupposes* that there exists at least one individual which is αand that there exists at most one individual which is α, and it *asserts* that the unique individual which is α is also ζ.

   b.   Definiteness (Nominals with two Nouns)

A nominal of the form [ζ-Genitive α] *presupposes* that there exists at least one individual which is αand that there exists at most one individual which is α, and it asserts that the unique individual which is α is related to ζ.

Specificity was originally argued to be the counterpart of 'referentiality in definite NPs' in indefinite NPs (Quine 1960), NPs that assert that there is at least one individual that matches the description in the NP (so, existence requirement with no uniqueness requirement). However, it has proved to be a more complicated concept due to a few reasons. One reason is that it is difficult to define what it exactly means. Some proposals so far have been that it reflects the 'certainty of the speaker about the identity of the referent'; it means that 'the referent is fixed' or that it can be 'paraphrased by 'a certain' (von Heusinger 2002: 2). Another reason is that, as opposed to existing definite articles, Indo-European languages do not have specificity articles (von Heusinger 2002). Rather, languages mark specificity in other, more various ways. For example, Turkish accusative (2) and genitive (3) indicate specificity (von Heusinger 2002 and references therein; von Heusinger & Kornfilt 2005) (*bir* marks indefiniteness):

(2) a. (Ben)   kitap   oku-du-m
         I   book   read-PST-1S
         'I did book-reading'
     b. (Ben)   kitab-*ı*   oku-du-m
         I   book-ACC   read-PST-1S
         'I read the book'
     c. (Ben)   **bir** kitap oku-du-m
         I   a   book   read-PST-1S
         'I read a book'
     d. (Ben)   **bir** kitab-*ı*   oku-du-m
         I   a   book-ACC   read-PST-1S
         'I read a certain book'

(3) a. Köy-ü   haydut   bas-tığ-ın-ı   duy-du-m
         village-ACC   robber raid-NMLZ-3S-ACC   hear-PST-1S
         'I heard that robbers raided the village'
     b. Köy-ü   **bir** haydut-un   bas-tığ-ın-ı   duy-du-m
         village-ACC   a   robber-3GEN   raid-NMLZ-3S-ACC   hear-PST-1S
         'I heard that a certain robber raided the village'

As stated before, the main goal of this paper is to highlight another way languages can mark specificity, a way which has not been discussed before. While doing that, I will follow the definition of specificity in von Heusinger (2002) such that it is the referential property of NPs, which means that the expression in the NP is referentially anchored to an object in the discourse. This definition cuts across definite and indefinite NPs, challenging the traditional assumptions about the concept. This definition makes the specific NP independent from the matrix predicate or other operators such as modal verbs and also accounts for the discourserelated properties of such NPs in a neat way. By following this definition and showing that it is applicable to Turkish data, I support it that specificity cuts across definite and indefinite NPs.

2 Data

I will focus on two types of possession structures in Turkish: The one in (4a) is the regular genitive phrase, which both has a genitive marker and an agreement marker on the head (i.e. the rightmost) noun. The second in (4b) lacks the agreement marker:

(4) a. çocuğ-un   kitab-ı
         child-3GEN   book-3S
         'the book of the child'
     b. çocuğ-un   kitap
         child-3GEN   book
         'the book of the child'

It turns out that only the first of these accept indefinite marking, so the one without agreement has to be definite, i.e. it must refer to a unique entity that must also be familiar to the speaker and the hearer:

(5) a. Çocuğ-un   **bir**   kitab-ı-nı   bul-du-m
       child-3SGEN   a   book-3S-ACC   find-PST-1S
       'I found a book of the child'

    b. *Çocuğ-un   **bir**   kitab-ı   bul-du-m
       child-3SGEN   a   book-ACC   find-PST-1S
       'Intended: I found a book of the child'

Not only that, the possession structure without the agreement marker must be specific too, as it is incompatible with a context that indicates the knowledge on the exact identity of the referent of the NP (6b):

(6) a. Bu   yazar-ın   son   kitab-ı   oku-muş-tu-m.
       this   author-3GEN   last   book-ACC   read-INDPST-PST-1S
       Adı 'Yolda'ydı
       Its title was 'On the Road'
       'I had read the last book by this author. Its title was 'On the Road''
    b. *Bu   yazar-ın   son   kitab-ı   oku-muş-tu-m.
       this   author-3GEN   last   book-ACC   read-INDPST-PST-1S
       Ama adını hatırlamıyorum
       But I do not remember its title
       'I had read the last book by this author. But I do not remember its title.'

This contrasts with regular possession structures, which are acceptable in non-specific contexts:

(7) a. Bu   yazar-ın   son   kitab-ı-nı   oku-muş-tu-m.
       this   author-3GEN   last   book-3S-ACC   read-INDPST-PST-1S
       Adı 'Yolda'ydı
       Its title was 'On the Road'
       'I had read the last book by this author. Its title was 'On the Road''
    b. Bu   yazar-ın   son   kitab-ı-nı   oku-muş-tu-m.
       this   author-3GEN   last   book-3S-ACC   read-INDPST-PST-1S
       Ama adını hatırlamıyorum
       But I do not remember its title
       'I had read the last book by this author. But I do not remember its title.'

Given that both regular and agreementless possession structures occur in definite contexts but only the latter must occur in specific contexts, I suggest that agreement drop indicates specificity in Turkish possession structures, where specificity means the expression in the NP is referentially anchored to an object in the discourse (von Heusinger 2002).

3 Discussion and conclusion

We can conclude from the data in the previous section that possession structures without the agreement marker indicate specificity, where specificity is defined as the referential property of NPs (von Heusinger 2002). I suggested therefore that agreement-drop in Turkish is an indicator of specificity in possession structures. This is novel data as an example of grammatical indicators of specificity, the major contribution of this paper. This paper also supports the given definition of specificity and shows that it is not a property of indefinite NPs

only (contra Quine 1960), supporting von Heusinger (2002) in that it suggests that specificity is not a sub-class of indefinite NPs. Further research is needed to unravel other syntactico-semantic properties of agreement-drop and specificity such as the restriction of specificity to sentence domain in von Heusinger (2002), which has not been observed here.

References

Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1960. *Word and object*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Erbasi, Betul. 2019. Definiteness, structure and agreement in Turkish possessives. In Paloma Jeretič & Yağmur Sağ (eds.), *Proceedings of the Workshop on Turkic and Languages in Contact with Turkic*, vol. 4, 41–52.

Heim, Irene. 1991. Articles and definiteness. In Arnim von Stechow & Dieter Wunderlich (eds.), *Semantics: An international handbook of contemporary research*, 487–535. Berlin: De Gruyter.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2002. Specificity and definiteness in sentence and discourse structure. *Journal of Semantics* 19(3). 245–274.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Jaklin Kornfilt. 2005. The case of the direct object in Turkish: Semantics, syntax and morphology. *Turkic Languages* 9. 3–44.

Ko, Heejeong, Tania Ionin & Ken Wexler. 2010. The role of presuppositionality in the second language acquisition of English articles. *Linguistic Inquiry* 41(2). 213–254.

Öztürk, Balkız & Eser Erguvanlı Taylan. 2016. Possessive constructions in Turkish. *Lingua* 182. 88–108.

A note on the so-called Romance partitive clitic *ne*

M. Teresa Espinal – Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
teresa.espinal@uab.cat

1 Introduction

It is widely claimed in the literature that the Romance clitic *en*, found in Catalan (Martí-Girbau 1995, 2010, and others), French (Kayne 1975, and others) and Italian (Cordin 1988, Giusti 1992, and others), is associated with a partitive case and/or a partitive meaning. The main justification for this claim appears to be the fact that *en* seems to correlate with the presence of objects, either dislocated complements, as in the Catalan and Italian examples in (1) and (3), or in situ complements, as in the French example in (2), always preceded by the so-called partitive preposition *de*.

(1) a. De mitjons, *en* tinc molts.
     DE socks   EN have many
     'I have many socks.'
   b. D'aigua, te'*n*   portaré   de   seguida.
     DE.water you.EN   bring   immediately
     'I'll bring you water immediately.'
      (Martí-Girbau 1995: 252)

(2) Elle a *des*   soeurs. Elle *en* a.
   she has DE.PL sisters she EN have
   'She has sisters. She has some.'
   (Kayne 1975: 118)

(3) *Di* sedie, *ne* abbiamo portate molte nel   magazzino.
   DE chairs EN have   brought many into.the store
   'We brought many chairs into the store.'
   (Benincà 1988: 165)

From a syntactic perspective *en* has been claimed to be associated with a partitive case, distinct from the accusative case of other clitic pronouns such as *els* 'them' and *la* 'it', illustrated in (4) only for Catalan.

(4) a. *Els*   mitjons,   *els* tinc guardats   al   calaix.
     the   socks   them have stored   in.the drawer
     'I keep the socks stored in the drawer.'
   b. *L*'aigua, te   *la*   portaré   de seguida.
     the.water you it   bring   immediately
     'I'll bring you the water immediately.'

2 Main section

In syntactic terms, the partitive case has been postulated to emerge from a structure in which indefinite nominals are assigned a QP structure that selects a KP whose head is partitive. Thus, with special reference to Catalan, in Martí-Girbau (1995: 257) it is hypothesized that *de* is the

overt manifestation of a partitive case (head of K) and that the clitic *en*, also partitive, is the instantiation of the lowest NP, as represented in (5).

(5)   [$_{QP}$ [$_{KP}$ [$_K$ *de*] [$_{NumP}$ [$_{NP}$ *en*]]]]

Martí-Girbau (1995) also hypothesizes that the head *de* is the instantiation of K unless N moves to K; that is, *de* is overt when there is no N in complement position of Q. By contrast, the clitic *en* that corresponds to NP is claimed to move through specifiers on its way out of the QP; that is, the clitic *en* is related to a dislocated phrase which is part of a projection selected by a Q.

   According to Kayne (1975: 118) the motivation for this supposed partitivity comes from the fact that in (2) and (6) the structures would take the form [$_{NP}$ Y' des soeurs] and [$_{NP}$ Y'' du vin], where "one might take Y' and Y'' to be elements like *une partie*".

(6)   *Du*   vin,   j'*en*   ai   qui   vient   d'Amérique.
        DE   wine   I.EN   have   that   comes of America
        'I have some wine that comes from America.'
        (Kayne 1975: 119, footnote 69)

However, it should be noted that, from a semantic perspective, *de* phrases and their clitic correlate *en* in the above examples do not express any part-whole relationship that appears to be characteristic of canonical partitives ("partitive nominal phrases have in their extension only *proper* subparts of the entity denoted by the NP object of the partitive *of*", Barker 1998: 680). By contrast, in the above examples *de* phrases and the clitic *en* are the expression of indefiniteness (Carlier et al. 2013, Carlier & Lamiroy 2014, Espinal & Cyrino 2021; and others).[1] Therefore, in what remains I argue that the meaning of the Romance clitic *ne* is one that corresponds to a property-type anaphora (Espinal & McNally 2007, 2011, Ihsane 2008, Laca 2013), while the nominal it replaces denotes a property-type expression and the associated *de* phrase is an indefinite DP. The arguments come from Catalan.

The first argument shows that bare plurals are not complements of any null Q. Consider the contrast between (7a) and (7b).

(7) a.   Aquest   escriptor   a   casa   té   *molts   diccionaris.*
          this   writer   at   home   has   many   dictionaries
          {*Els*   té,   *en*   té   *molts*} a   la   seva   biblioteca.
          them   have   EN   have   many   in   the   his   library
          'This writer has many dictionaries at home. He {has them, has many} in his
          library.'

---

[1] There are other uses of the clitic *en* that are beyond the scope of this article: those that introduce an anaphoric relationship with an adjective introduced by *de* (i), those that introduce an anaphoric relationship with a verbal complement introduced by the preposition *de* (ii), and those that apparently introduce an anaphoric relationship with the DP complement of a partitive part-whole relationship introduced by *de* (iii).

(i)   *De*   pobre,   no   *n*'és.
        DE   poor   not   EN is
        '(S)he is not poor.'

(ii)   No   es   recorda   *de*   res.   No   se'*n*   recorda.
        not   CL   remember   of   anything   not   CL.EN   remember
        '(S)he does not remember anything. (S)he doesn't remember it.'

(iii)   Visitarà   alguns   *de*ls   malalts   de   COVID. *En*   visitarà   alguns.
        visit   some   of.the   patients of   COVID EN   visit   some
        '(S)he will visit some of the COVID patients. (S)he will visit some of them.'

b. Aquest   escriptor   a   casa té   *diccionaris.*
   this   writer   at   home has   dictionaries
   {**Els*   té,   *en* té}   a   la   seva   biblioteca.
     them   have   EN   have   in   the   his   library
   'This writer has dictionaries at home. They are in his library.'

In (7a) an overt QP occurs in object position of the verb. The following sentence shows two possible forms of clitic resumption: either the accusative clitic *els* that resumes the whole QP or the clitic *en* that only resumes the indefinite complement of the Q *molts*, which remains overt in postverbal position. In (7b) it is shown that QP resumption by means of the accusative clitic *els* is impossible, while the NP anaphora *en* (a Pro-NP in Déchaine & Wiltschko's 2002 terms) is the only available option.

The second argument comes from so-called bare singulars in object position of *have*-predicates (Espinal & McNally 2007, 2011). Consider the example in (8), the first sentence of which is taken from Espinal (2010: 999–1000).

(8) a. Els   ametllers   tenen   flor. *En*   tenen des del   February
       the   almond.trees   have   flower EN   have   from   febrer.
       'The almond trees have bloomed. They have had flower(s) since February.'
    b. L'ametller   té   flor. *En*   té   des del   febrer.
       the almond tree has   flower EN   has   from   February
       'The almond tree has bloomed. It has had flower(s) since February.'

These examples show that the meaning of the bare nominal *flor* 'flower' is not dependent on the number of the DP in subject position. Bare nominals in object position allow either a plural or a singular interpretation, but have neither a dependent plural reading nor a dependent singular reading. This is due to the fact that bare nominals denote properties of kinds, and therefore should not be assigned a NumP structure. In both examples the antecedent of the clitic *en* is the bare nominal unspecified for Number. As argued elsewhere (Espinal 2010, Borik & Espinal 2015, Cyrino & Espinal 2015), only when a NumP is present does the Realization operator corresponding to Number turn properties of kinds into properties of objects, in such a way that the nominal expression specified for singular number refers to singular atoms whereas the nominal expression specified for plural number refers to sums of atoms.

The third argument in support of the hypothesis that neither the clitic *en* nor the antecedent *de* phrase has a partitive meaning comes from examples of the sort illustrated in (9).

(9) a. *De*   vestit, només *en*   porto els   diumenges.
       DE   dress   only   EN   wear   the   Sundays
       'I only wear a dress on Sundays.'
    b. *De* secadora,   no   *en*   vull.
       DE dryer   not   EN   want
       'I don't want a dryer.'

Note that in these examples the antecedent of the clitic *en* is a bare nominal preceded by the *de* marker. Being the dislocated nominal unspecified for Number, as is characteristic of bare nominal objects in *have*-predicates, the clitic *en* can be claimed to convey not a partitive meaning but rather only an indefinite one. Catalan is interesting because it shows that, even in the case of left-dislocated bare nominal objects in *have*-predicates, a marker of indefiniteness (i.e., *de*) is required, with the corresponding indefinite clitic *en* affixed to the verb. Crucially, no subset-superset relationship is involved. Therefore, no partitivity should be postulated in

these examples for the Romance clitic *en* and its antecedent *de* phrase, and *de* is merely the instantiation of an abstract indefinite operator (Espinal & Cyrino 2021).

The fourth argument appears in (10). This sort of example is well-known in the literature for licensing both a *de dicto* and a *de re* reading for the indefinite QP expression (von Heusinger 2011). What I would like to point out is that, under a *de dicto* reading an anaphoric relationship is expected with a property-type anaphora such as the clitic *en* (10b), whereas under a *de re* reading the expected anaphoric relationship is established with an entity-type anaphora such as *la* 'her' (10c).

(10) a. Busco *una* doctoranda que sàpiga grec.
       Look for a PhD student that knows Greek
       'I'm looking for a PhD student that speaks Greek.'
     b. *En* busco una per al nou projecte.
        EN look for one for the new project
        'I'm looking for one for the new project.'
     c. *La* t robaré al Departament de Filologia Clàssica.
        her find at the department of philology classical
        'I'll find her at the Department of Classical Philology.'

3 Conclusion

In this brief article I have argued that the clitic *en* should not be associated with structural Number, should not be associated with the presence of quantification, and should not be assigned a partitive meaning. *En* is a property-type anaphora overtly associated with an indefinite nominal expression headed by *de*, an indefinite operator.

Author note
I am happy to contribute to this 'surprise' *Festschrift for Klaus von Heusinger*. I feel much obliged to him and to Georg Kaiser for having invited me to participate in the regular meetings of the NEREUS workshop, and for having shown that sharing linguistics is much more than just sharing data, corpora and analyses.

References

Barker, Chris. 1998. Partitives, double genitives, and anti-uniqueness. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 16(4). 679–717.
Benincà, Paola. 1988. L'ordine degli elementi della frase e le construzioni marcate. In Lorenzo Renzo (ed.), *Grande Grammatica Italiana di Consultazione*, 115–225. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Borik, Olga & M. Teresa Espinal. 2015. Reference to kinds and to other generic expressions in Spanish: Definiteness and number. *The Linguistic Review* 32(2). 167–225.
Carlier, Anne. 2013. Grammaticalization in progress in Old French: Indefinite articles. In Deborah L. Arteaga (ed.), *Research on Old French: The state of the art*, 45–60. Dordrecht: Springer.
Carlier, Anne & Béatrice Lamiroy. 2014. The grammaticalization of the prepositional partitive in Romance. In Silvia Luraghi & Tuomas Huumo (eds.), *Partitive cases and related categories*, 477–518. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Cordin, Patrizia. 1988. Il clitico *ne*. In Lorenzo Renzi (ed.), *Grande grammatica italiana di consultazione*, 633–641. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Cyrino, Sonia & M. Teresa Espinal. 2015. Bare nominals in Brazilian Portuguese: More on the DP/NP analysis. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 33. 471–521.

Déchaine, Rose-Marie & Martina Wiltschko. 2002. Decomposing pronouns. *Linguistic Inquiry* 33. 409–442.

Espinal, M. Teresa. 2010. Bare nominals in Catalan and Spanish. Their structure and meaning. *Lingua* 120. 984–1009.

Espinal, M. Teresa & Louise McNally. 2007. Bare singular nominals and incorporating verbs. In Georg Kaiser & Manuel Leonetti (eds.), *Proceedings of the III NEREUS International Workshop. Definiteness, specificity and animacy in Ibero-Romance Languages.* Arbeitspapier 122: 45–62. Universität Konstanz.

Espinal, M. Teresa & Louise McNally. 2011. Bare nominals and incorporating verbs in Catalan and Spanish. *Journal of Linguistics* 47. 87–128.

Espinal, M. Teresa & Sonia Cyrino. 2021. A syntactically-driven approach to indefiniteness, specificity and anti-specificity in Romance. *Journal of Linguistics*, First View, 1–36.

Giusti, Giuliana. 1992. *La sintassi dei sintagma quantificati*. Ph.D. dissertation, Università di Venezia.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2011. Specificity. In Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn & Paul Portner (eds.), *Semantics. An international handbook of natural language meaning*, vol. 2, 1025–1058. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Ihsane, Tabea. 2008. *The layered DP. Form and meaning of French indefinites*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Kayne, Richard S. 1975. *French syntax: The transformational cycle*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Laca, Brenda. 2013. Spanish bare plurals and topicalization. In Johannes Kabatek & Albert Wall (eds.), *New perspectives on bare noun phrases in Romance and beyond*, 95–120. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Martí-Girbau, Núria. 1995. *De* in Catalan elliptical nominals: A partitive case marker. *Catalan Working Papers in Linguistics* 4(2). 243–265.

Martí-Girbau, Núria. 2010. *The syntax of partitives*. Ph.D. dissertation, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Successful referring using different morphosyntactic patterns
in the course of time

Susann Fischer – Universität Hamburg
susann.fischer@uni-hamburg.de

1 Introduction

One of the most important components of speaking or writing texts is the ability of referring. Successful referring forces the speaker to choose between different types of referents. In order to decide which expression to choose multiple factors are involved. Silverstein's (1976: 113) "hierarchy of inherent lexical content" is the first scalar representation of referring expressions or types of referents that are ranked according to their deictic, semantic, and or discourse-pragmatic properties, and as such the first attempt to explain the decisions that are made by speakers in order to successfully refer (for an overview see e.g. Arnold 2010). Nowadays the different features are often ranked in sub-hierarchies like the definiteness scale, animacy scale, accessibility scale, discourse prominence etc. This has the advantage that the various scales are logically independent, despite of being closely linked, e.g. animate, especially human referents are more likely to be discourse-prominent, and hence to be referred to by a pronoun, as thus they are more accessible than a definite description. In order to explain this interaction of the independent scales, a combination of the scales by harmonic alignment (borrowed from Optimality Theory) has been proposed, which was argued to be appropriate if e.g. a two-part scale with a many part scale with similar orientation or markedness are combined (von Heusinger & Kaiser 2003: 63), seeking to lessen the complex interaction. Irrespective of how the hierarchies are represented, the idea that such hierarchies can explain morpho-syntactic patterns has been widely accepted (cf. e.g. von Heusinger 2007, 2011, 2013, 2019, Haude & Witzlack-Makarevich 2016). One of the most interesting issues in this respect is how languages change the morpho-syntactic patterns for referring. This directly leads to the non-trivial matter of how to uncloak why speakers use which morphosyntactic pattern in which grammatical context, and more precisely to the question of why they should change successful patterns over time: in other words, to the interaction between successful referring and syntactical issues.

2 Changing patterns

One very famous example of a morpho-syntactic pattern expressing referring properties is clitic doubling (CLD), which has been thoroughly investigated also with respect to the Romance languages (e.g. von Heusinger 2018, von Heusinger & Kaiser 2003, 2005, von Heusinger, Romero & Kaiser 2016, von Heusinger & Tigău 2019). CLD is said to depend on syntactic, morphological, pragmatic and semantic factors, like definiteness, specificity, animacy, CASE, and on the use of the preposition "a", i.e. differential object marking (for a discussion see von Heusinger & Kaiser 2003). Thus, the morpho-syntactic pattern of CLD of the modern Romance languages clearly depends on the interaction of several scales, several grammatical levels.

Briefly capitulating the diachronic development of CLD in Spanish and Catalan based on written texts, it becomes immediately obvious that CLD was not always part of the two languages. CLD has been analysed as a cyclic process, since it has developed in a systematic manner and direction (cf. Fischer, Navarro & Vega Vilanova 2019). In Latin and Proto-Romance CLD is not attested (stage 1), in Old Spanish and Old Catalan CLD emerges with full pronouns, but is still optional (stage 2). Only from the 16th century onwards doubling was obligatory with full pronouns and optionally started with [+definite, +specific] indirect nominal objects (stage 3), since only personal pronouns and nominal indirect objects are doubled during

this period, all instances of doubling are [+animate] (Fischer, Navarro & Vega Vilanova 2019: 57). In Buenos Aires Spanish, Judeo-Spanish and other contact varieties we find CLD with direct objects. Beginning with the doubling of [+animate, +definite] direct objects (stage 4) and going on to CLD with inanimate objects, see examples in (1).

(1) a. Patagonian Spanish:
        Lo   tomé   el   colectivo.
        it.ACC.MASC   took.1SG   the.SG.MASC   bus.SG.MASC
        'I took the bus.'

     b. Andean Spanish:
        Eso   también lo   mata   a   las   lantas.
        that   too   it.ACC.MASC kills.3SG. to the.PL.FEM plants.PL.FEM
        'That too kills the plants.'

(Fischer, Navarro & Vega Vilanova 2019: 69)

The end of this cyclic process is reached when the clitic no longer agrees with the direct object in phi-features (stage 5), as illustrated in (1b). One could propose that at this stage it is no longer clitic doubling what we observe, but agreement on the verb. Thus, CLD in this stage no longer depends on discourse-pragmatic or semantic properties, but merely on grammatical function.

The interesting question is why CLD has undergone this cyclic process. Why did it evolve in Spanish and Catalan and why did the discourse pragmatic properties of CLD change over time? It has been argued that CLD directly depends on the categorial status of the clitic (Fontana 1993), i.e. as long as clitics are phrases, doubling was not possible. Only with clitics becoming heads CLD appeared. The spread of CLD from full pronouns, to datives and finally to accusative objects has been explained with the accessibility hierarchy (Fischer & Rinke 2013, Leonetti 2008). However, when correlating the different stages of CLD with the categorial status of clitics and the accessibility hierarchy of objects, it becomes obvious that something additional must have played a role in this cyclic process.

The change from Old Romance to Modern Romance has often been called a change from a topic prominent to subject-prominent languages (Lehmann 1976: 455, Givón 1979: 109). Topic prominent languages are commonly analysed in generative grammar with additional functional material in the left periphery, which among other things can be seen in how high the verb moves, i.e. where in a sentence the verb appears. In Verb-Second languages like German the verb moves as high as C°, thereby generating an A'-position in its Spec,CP, where not only subjects, but also objects, or adverbs etc. can appear. In Creole languages the verb with some exceptions, does not leave the VP, thus showing a strict SVO language. In Old Spanish and Old Catalan several additional functional categories for the verb to move into were available (Fischer 2002, 2010), allowing in their Spec-positions the most accessible DPs. When these positions were lost, accessible objects could no longer be marked by word-order but had to be marked by CLD.

Figure 1: The CLD cycle (Fischer, Navarro & Vega Vilanova 2019: 66)

Thus, what we perceive concerning the CLD-cycle is the interaction of three factors: the categorial status of the clitic, how high the verbs move, and by this defining what is in need to be marked for accessibility (Fig. 1). The more positions in the left periphery of the sentence – hosting accessible DPs – were lost, the more CLD was extended: first to accessible but after some time also to less accessible objects with respect to the accessibility hierarchy (Fischer, Navarro & Vega Vilanova 2019: 66) by this of course showing effects concerning the definiteness scale, animacy, and DOM (vgl. Von Heusinger & Kaiser 2003, 2005, von Heusinger, Romero & Kaiser 2016 etc.).

3 Conclusion

The interaction of the three factors (Fig. 1) seems like a good explanation for the evolution of clitic doubling and its spread to accusatives. Open for further research is the question of the apparent optionality concerning dative clitic doubling, which might be even more interesting to investigate, since it seems to be even more diverse in the varieties of Spanish and Catalan (von Heusinger & Kaiser 2003, 2005, Fischer et al. to appear).

Author Note

Without the invitation to a workshop on specificity at the University of Konstanz in 2003, and without the abundant research of Klaus (and his colleagues) concerning all different aspects of referring: definiteness, accessibility, indefiniteness, specificity in DOM and CLD constructions, we (Mario Navarro, Jorge Vega Vilanova and myself) might have not carried out this thorough diachronic investigation of clitic doubling in Spanish and Catalan (DFG-project FI 875, 3-1, 3-2).

References

Ariel, Mira. 1991. The function of accessibility in a theory of grammar. *Journal of Pragmatics* 16. 443–463.

Arnold, Jennifer E. 2010. How speakers refer. The role of accessibility. *Language and Linguistic Compass* 4/4. 187–203.

Fischer, Susann. 2002. *The Catalan clitic system. A diachronic perspective on its phonology and syntax*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Fischer, Susann. 2010. *Word-order change as a source of grammaticalization*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Fischer, Susann & Esther Rinke. 2013. Explaining the variability in clitic doubling across Romance: A diachronic account. *Linguistische Berichte* 236. 455–472.

Fischer, Susann, Mario Navarro, Jorge Vega Vilanova. 2019. The clitic doubling parameter: Development and distribution of a cyclic change. In Miriam Bouzouita, Anne Breitbarth, Lieven Danckaert & Elisabeth Witzenhausen (eds.), *Cycles in language change*, 50–71. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Susann, Mario Navarro, Jorge Vega Vilanova. To appear. Testing an optional phenomenon. The limitations of GJTs. In Mihaela Dogaru et al. (eds.), *Current Insights into linguistic communicative behaviour*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Fontana, Josep. 1993. *Phrase structure and the syntax of clitics in the history of Spanish*. Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania.

Givón, Talmy. 1979. From discourse to syntax: Grammar as a processing strategy. In Talmy Givón (ed.), *Syntax and semantics*, vol. 1: *Discourse and Syntax*, 81–112. New York: Academic Press.

Haude, Katharina & Alena Witzlack-Makarevich. 2016. Referential hierarchies and alignment. An overview. *Linguistics* 54(3). 433–441.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2007. Accessibility and definite noun phrases. In Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Manfred Consten & Mareile Knees (eds.), *Anaphors in text. Cognitive, formal and applied approaches to anaphoric reference*, 123–144. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2011. Specificity. In Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn & Paul Portner (eds.), *Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning*, vol. 2, 1025–1058. Berlin: De Gruyter.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2013. The salience theory of definiteness. In Alessandro Capone, Francesco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza (eds.), *Perspectives on linguistic pragmatics*, 349–374. Berlin: Springer.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2018. The diachronic development of differential object marking in Spanish ditransitive constructions. In Ilja A. Seržant, Alena Witzlac-Makarevich & Kelsey Mann (eds.). Diachrony of differential argument marking, 315–244. Berlin: Language Science Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2019. Indefiniteness and specificity. In Jeanette Gundel & Barbara Abbott (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of reference*. 146–167. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Georg Kaiser. 2003. The interaction of animacy, definiteness and specificity in Spanish. In Klaus von Heusinger & Georg Kaiser (eds.), *Semantic and syntactic aspects of specificity in Romance languages*. Arbeitspapier 113, 41–65. Konstanz: Universität Konstanz.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Georg Kaiser. 2005. The evolution of differential object marking in Spanisch. In Klaus von Heusinger, Georg Kaiser, Elisabeth Stark (eds), *Specificity and the evolution / emergence of nominal determination systems in Romance*. Arbeitspapier 119, 18–33. Konstanz: Universität Konstanz.

von Heusinger Klaus, Diego Romero, Georg Kaiser. 2016. Differential object marking in Spanish ditransitive constructions. An empirical approach. In Susann Fischer & Mario Navarro (eds.), *Proceedings of the VII Nereus International Workshop "Clitic Doubling and other issues of the syntax/semantic interface in Romance DPs"*. Arbeitspapier 128, 43–64. Konstanz: Universität Konstanz.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Edgar Onea. 2008. Triggering and blocking effects in the diachronic development of DOM in Romanian. *Probus* 20(1). 67–110.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Alina Tigău. 2019. Clitic doubling and differential object marking in non-specific contexts in Romanian. *Revue Roumaine de Linguistique* LXIV(4). 409–430.

Lehmann, Winfried P. 1976. From topic to subject in Indo-European. In Charles N. Li (ed.), *Subject and Topic*, 445–457. New York: Academic Press.

Leonetti, Manuel. 2008. Specificity in clitic doubling and in differential object marking. *Probus* 20(1). 33–66.

Silverstein, Michael. 1976. Hierarchy of features and ergativity. In R. M. W. Dixon (ed.), *Grammatical categories in Australian languages*, 112–171. Canberra: Australian National University.

Weak definites are in the direct care of the verb

Werner Frey – Senior Researcher ZAS
w_frey@gmx.de

1 Introduction

Weak definites are not only special in their semantics, they are also unusual in their syntactic behaviour. They are maximal phrases which saturate an argument position of the verb, but syntactically behave partly rather differently from regular arguments, partly the same as them. These findings are on the one hand reminiscent of phenomena of complex predicate formation, and on the other hand they point to the status of weak definites as XPs. The following notes point to a way of reconciling these two supposedly contradictory observations by means of a new understanding of the category VP and of the handling of regular arguments.

2 Main section

As is well known, one of Klaus' interests is in the semantics and anaphoric potential of so-called weak definites (WDs) in various languages. In the following, I would like to make a proposal for the syntax of WDs in German, hoping that Klaus will find it tolerably reasonable.

German WDs show some syntactic peculiarities compared to standard definite arguments, cf. the sentence pairs in (1)–(4).

(1) a. *Hans fühlt sich unwohl, aber er will zum Arzt
     Hans feels REFL unwell but he wants to-the doctor
     nicht gehen.
     not to-go

  b. Hans fühlt sich unwohl, aber er will beim Hausarzt
     Hans feels REFL unwell but he wants at-the GP
     nicht anrufen.
     not call
     'Hans feels unwell, but he does not want to call the GP.'

(2) a. *Bald wird er gehen zum Arzt.
     soon will he go to-the doctor

  b. Bald wird er anrufen beim Hausarzt.
     soon will he call at-the GP
     'Soon he will call the GP.'

(3) a *Gehen sollte er bald zum Arzt.
     go should he soon to-the doctor

  b. Anrufen sollte er bald beim Hausarzt.
     'He should call his GP soon.'

(4) a. Er war gerade am Zum-Arzt-Gehen, als …
     he was just at-the-to-the-doctor-going when
     'He was about to go to the doctor when ...'

  b. *Er war gerade am Beim-Hausarzt-Anrufen, als …

In contrast to a regular verbal argument, a WD cannot precede sentence negation, (1a) vs. (1b); it cannot be extraposed, (2a) vs. (2b); it cannot be left behind when its licensing verb is moved to the prefield, (3a) vs. (3b); on the other hand, however, it can be part of certain word formation processes, (4a) vs. (4b).

Importantly, these characteristics cannot just be reduced to the inability of WDs to scramble. This is immediately obvious for the possibility to be part of word formation. But also the impossibility of being extraposed is hardly connected to the impossibility of being scrambled. There is evidence that in German extraposed elements are base-generated in their surface position (cf. e.g. Haider 2010). However, even authors who propose a movement analysis for extraposition do not relate it to scrambling, since extraposition also occurs in non-scrambling languages. But the properties illustrated in (1) and (3) also show that it is not the scrambling resistance which makes WDs special. So-called non-specific w-indefinites do not like to scramble, cf. (5a). Nevertheless, in German they may appear in front of sentence negation, (5b), and they may be left behind when the licensing verb is moved to the prefield, (5c).

(5) a.   *Er   hat   wen$_1$ heute t$_1$ beleidigt
            he   has   someone   today   insulted
            (, aber   ich   weiß   nicht, wer   es   war).
             but   I   know   not   who   it   was
     b.   Er hat heute wen nicht begrüßt (, aber ich weiß nicht, wer es war).
           'He didn't greet someone today (but I don't know who it was).'
     c.   Beleidigt hat er heute wen (, aber ich weiß nicht, wer es war).
           'He insulted someone today (but I don't know who it was).'

We can also observe that a WD has to follow a restitutively interpreted *wieder* ('again'). In (6a), the elliptical sentence can have a sloppy reading, an important indication that the definite noun phrase is weak. The elliptical sentence in (6b) does not have the sloppy interpretation. The definite cannot be interpreted as a WD anymore. Note that restitutive *wieder* has a very low base position, lower than the base position of regular objects (cf. e.g. Pittner 2003).

(6) a.   Otto   hat   wieder   das   Krankenhaus verlassen,
            Otto   has   again   the   hospital   left
            und   Maria   auch.
            and   Maria   too
     b.   Otto hat das Krankenhaus wieder verlassen, und Maria auch.
           'Otto has left the hospital again, and so has Maria.'

Thus we see that in contrast to regular arguments, WDs are generated and stay very close to the verbs whose arguments they are. How is this special closeness structurally implemented? Complex predicate formation by adjunction of a head to another head would provide a very close connection. However, WDs are not heads. In addition to the noun they exhibit at least the weak determiner. Furthermore, they are good candidates for filling the prefield of a German verb-second clause, (7), a position which is thought to be reserved for maximal projections.

(7) Zum   Arzt   ist   er   heute gegangen.
     to-the   doctor   is   he   today gone

Thus, WDs are not adjoined to the verb. However, I think there is a promising possibility for the syntactic handling of WDs. In recent years, a trend has emerged in syntactic research on argument structure that mirrors the semantic Neo-Davidsonian approach in syntax. In a highly influential work, Castañeda (1967) argued that the thematic arguments should be separated from the verb. A sentence like (8a) should be represented in logical form as in (8b), where thematic relations are independent two-place predicates.

(8) a.   Jones buttered the toast
     b. $\exists e$ [buttering (e) & Agent (e, Jones) & Theme (e, the toast)]

Different authors, e.g., Schein (1993), Borer (2005: Ch. 2), Ramchand (2008), Bowers (2010) and Lohndal (2014) argue that we find something similar in syntax. They propose the claim in (9) (albeit with significant differences in their approaches).

(9) External arguments as well as internal arguments are severed from the verbal core and are complements of functional projections above V^0.

Schein (1993) bases this claim mainly on possible interpretations of clauses containing a set denoting argument and a distributive quantifier and of clauses containing reciprocals. Borer (2005) claims that lexical flexibility is so pervasive that argument structure should not be lexically specified. Ramchand's (2008) starting point is the claim that the syntactic projection of arguments is based on event structure and that the syntactic structure has a specific semantic interpretation. Bowers (2010) argues that satisfactory analyses of English passives and of the alternation between prepositional dative and the double object construction speak in favour (9). As an empirical argument Lohndal (2014) adds the behaviour of adjectival passives. Note also that Krifka (1992) argues for thematic roles as primitive relations between events and objects in his model-theoretic account of cumulativity and quantization for object and event predicates.
     From our perspective it is now tempting to slightly revise (9).

(10) Regular arguments do not appear as complements of V^0, but as complements of functional projections above V^0.

In addition, we add the claim in (11).

(11) WDs belong to the class of non-regular arguments. Non-regular arguments are arguments which are not referentially closed. They and only they are generated as complements of V^0.

It could be shown that, e.g., resultative XPs including directional PPs, inner arguments of light verb constructions, separable verbal prefixes which are movable to the prefield, bare singulars which are movable to the prefield and objects of verbs of creation belong to the class of non-regular arguments. They show the properties which are illustrated in (1)–(4) and (7) for WDs. Furthermore they are referentially non-closed.
     The distinguished syntactic configuration VP, in which the non-closed argument XP in (12) appears, can be considered a kind of complex predicate. It is the VP which contains all and only the arguments which do not have reference independent from the verb.

(12) (…) [$_{FP}$ ZP F^0 (…) [$_{VP}$ XP V^0]…]

We can assume that a complex predicate may be assigned a non-compositional meaning. This is why, for example, the combination of the WD and the verb gets a conventionalized interpretation. There is mutual semantic impact between the verb and the WD. The WD restricts the possible meaning of the verb, the verb determines the special interpretation of the WD.
     It seems possible to relate the different syntactic properties of WDs and standard definites observed in (1)–(4) and (7) in a rather natural way to their different base positions depicted in

(12). For example, scrambling and extraposition would destroy the special structural relationship in the right headed VP necessary for complex predicate formation. In contrast, movement to the prefield is reconstructed for most syntactic and interpretative needs. Furthermore, the verb cannot move to the prefield without an accompanying XP since it does not constitute a maximal projection, but it can be moved without an accompanying ZP. Furthermore sentence negation and restitutive *wieder* can be naturally assumed to be base-generated adjoined to the VP in (12).

A semantics for WDs that fits with the structural proposal made here is the dependent definite approach developed in Krifka & Modarresi (2016), according to which a WD denotes a function which applies to the Davidsonian event argument introduced by the verb and yields the unique element of this event which satisfies the description of the WD ('uniqueness in respect of an event'). Existential closure applies over the verbal predicate. According to this approach a weak definite introduces a discourse referent, but this discourse referent is less accessible for pronoun resolution than discourse referents that are not embedded under an event. (Krifka & Modarresi 2016, Brocher, Weeber, Hoek & von Heusinger 2020). Brocher, Weeber, Hoek & von Heusinger (2020) take the results of their visual world eye tracking experiment to be very compatible with the dependent definite analysis: indefinite noun phrases are significantly better accessible than WDs, but WDs do introduce referents that are accessible in principle. Brocher, Weeber, Hoek & von Heusinger (2020) conclude that a WD introduces a discourse referent that is embedded in an event created by the verb expressing a stereotypical meaning.

In the literature on the syntax of noun phrases it is a quite common assumption that above NP there are different functional projections with DP being the highest (e.g. Ihsane & Puskas 2001, Schwarz 2013). Ihsane & Puskas (2001) were among the first ones that argued that one should keep uniqueness apart from specificity by different functional projections. Regarding the internal syntax of German WDs, we can assume that the article of a WD only realizes the functional projection encoding the status of definiteness. In contrast, the article of a standard definite moves further to realise also specificity located in D^0.

3 Summary

This contribution first presents some syntactic peculiarities of WDs in German. It then outlines a proposal for their handling in clausal syntax. This outline builds on approaches that reflect the Neo-Davidsonian semantic treatment of regular arguments in their syntactic treatment. According to these, regular arguments are all complements of functional projections above VP. The contribution extends such approaches by proposing that within the VP all non-regular arguments of the verb are generated. Non-regular arguments are arguments that are not referentially closed. WDs are among these. It is indicated how this structural proposal can capture the syntactic peculiarities of WDs.

References

Borer, Hagit. 2005. *Structuring tense: Vol. II: The normal course of events*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bowers, John. 2010. *Arguments as relations*. Cambridge, MIT Press.
Brocher, Andreas, Frederike Weeber, Jet Hoek & Klaus von Heusinger. 2020. Referent management in discourse: The accessibility of weak definites. In Stephanie Denison, Michael Mack, Yang Xu & Blair C. Armstrong (eds.), *Proceedings of the 42nd Annual*

Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 2829–2835. Toronto: Cognitive Science Society.

Castañeda, Hector-Neri. 1967. Comments. In Nicholas Resher (ed.), *The logic of decision and action*, 104–112. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Haider, Hubert. 2010. *The syntax of German*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ihsane, Tabea & Genoveva Puskas. 2001. Specific is not definite. *Generative Grammar in Geneva* 2: 39–54.

Krifka, Manfred. 1992. Thematic relations as links between nominal reference and temporal constitution. In Ivan Sag & Anna Szabolcsi (eds.), *Lexical matters*, 29–53. Stanford: CSLI.

Krifka, Manfred & Fereshteh Modarresi. 2016. Number neutrality and anaphoric update of pseudo-incorporated nominals in Persian (and weak definites in English). *Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT)* 26. 874–891.

Lohndal, Terje. 2014. *Phrase structure and argument structure – A case study of the syntax-semantics interface*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pittner, Karin. 2003. Process, eventuality and *wieder* 'again'. In Cathrine Fabricius-Hansen, Ewald Lang & Claudia Maienborn (eds.), *Modifying Adjuncts*. 365–391. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Ramchand, Gillian. 2008. *Verb meaning and the lexicon: A first-phase syntax*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schein, Barry. 1993. *Plurals and events*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Schwarz, Florian. 2013. Two kinds of definites crosslinguistically. *Language and Linguistics Compass* 7(10). 534–559.

Affiziertheit, Agentivität und DOM

Marco García García – Universität zu Köln
marco.garcia@uni-koeln.de

1 Einleitung

In zahlreichen Sprachen werden nur einige direkte Objekte morphologisch markiert, während andere unmarkiert bleiben, wofür sich seit Bossong (1982) der Terminus der Differentiellen Objektmarkierung (DOM) etabliert hat. Nach allgemeiner Auffassung wird DOM von nominalen Faktoren wie Belebtheit und Referenzialität sowie von der informations-strukturellen Eigenschaft Topikalität determiniert (vgl. u.a. Aissen 2003, Witzlack-Makarevich & Seržant 2018). Darüber hinaus spielen auch verbal-semantische Faktoren wie Agentivität und Affiziertheit eine wichtige Rolle (vgl. Mürmann 2021, Kizilkaya 2021). Klaus von Heusinger hat ganz wesentlich zur Klärung von DOM beigetragen, auch im Hinblick auf die letztgenannten verbalen Faktoren (vgl. u.a. von Heusinger 2008, von Heusinger & Kaiser 2011), und dabei zahlreiche Menschen zur weiteren Beschäftigung mit dem Thema inspiriert. Der vorliegende Beitrag greift eine Frage auf, die sich in Auseinandersetzungen und Gesprächen mit ihm immer wieder gestellt hat, aber noch immer auf eine zufriedenstellende Klärung wartet. Es geht um die paradoxe Beobachtung, dass DOM zumindest im Spanischen sowohl von der Agentivität als auch der Affiziertheit des direkten Objekts beeinflusst zu werden scheint.

2 Affiziertheit, Agentivität oder beides?

2.1 Affiziertheit und DOM

Affiziertheit ist eine verbal determinierte Eigenschaft von Patiensargumenten, die von wesentlicher Bedeutung für die Charakterisierung der Patiensrolle sowie für die Argumentselektion und Kasusmarkierung ist (vgl. u.a. Dowty 1991, Næss 2007). Im Kern geht es um die Frage, ob bzw. wie stark ein Argument von der Verbalhandlung betroffen ist und als solches eine Zustandsveränderung erfährt (zu Einzelheiten und mitunter divergierenden Auffassungen vgl. u.a. Beavers 2011, Croft 2003, Kizilkaya 2021). Dass Affiziertheit auch einen Einfluss auf DOM hat, ist in Bezug auf unterschiedliche Sprachen beobachtet worden, insbesondere für Spanisch und Türkisch. Für das Spanische konnte Romero Heredero (2022) im Rahmen einer Korpusanalyse nachweisen, dass belebte, indefinite direkte Objekte in Kombination mit Verben wie etwa *arrollar* 'überfahren' (1), die ein affiziertes Objekt selegieren, in 84 % (167/200) der Fälle mit DOM attestiert sind, während entsprechende Belege mit Verben wie *ver* 'sehen' (2), die ein nicht-affiziertes Objekt implizieren, nur in 56 % (112/200) der Fälle mit DOM vorkommen. Diese Ergebnisse werden auch durch eine experimentelle Studie sowie diachrone Korpusuntersuchungen gestützt (vgl. von Heusinger & Kaiser 2011, Romero Heredero 2022).

(1) Klaus   arroll-ó   **a/^{??}∅**   un peatón   en la calle.
     Klaus   überfahren.PST-3.SG   DOM/∅   ein Fußgänger auf der Straße
     'Klaus überfuhr einen Fußgänger auf der Straße.'

(2) Klaus   vió   **a/∅**   un peatón   en la calle.
     Klaus   sehen.PST-3.SG   DOM/∅   ein Fußgänger auf der Straße
     'Klaus sah einen Fußgänger auf der Straße.'

Ähnliche Ergebnisse liegen für das Türkische vor, für das Kizilkaya (2021: 160) im Rahmen einer experimentellen Studie zeigen konnte, dass indefinite direkte Objekte, die affiziert sind, signifikant häufiger mit DOM vorkommen als solche, die nicht-affiziert sind (83% vs. 60%). Bislang wurde für das Türkische v.a. die nominale Dimension der Referenzialität als wesentlich für DOM erachtet. Kizilkayas (2021) Studie zeigt unter Berücksichtigung weiterer nominaler Faktoren, dass im Türkischen auch Belebtheit einen kleinen, aber signifikanten Effekt auf DOM hat (vgl. auch Krause & von Heusinger 2019). Für das Spanische und zahlreiche andere Sprachen ist Belebtheit von zentraler Relevanz für DOM.

Von einigen Autor*innen wird Belebtheit ebenso wie andere nominale Individuierungs-eigenschaften wie etwa Definitheit als Merkmal (stark) affizierter bzw. typischer Patiensargumente betrachtet (vgl. Næss 2004, 2007, Hopper & Thompson 1980). Die Begründung für diese Auffassung ist dabei keine semantische, sondern eine allgemein kognitive, nach der Effekte auf belebte Partizipanten als *salienter* als die auf unbelebte Partizipanten zu betrachten seien: 'An effect on a human participant is more likely to impinge directly on the lives of both the human in question and those surrounding him than an effect on an inanimate object; the situation described by *Peter killed John* is far more likely to have profound effects on all parties involved than, say, *Peter broke the pot*' (Næss 2004: 1202). Diese der Indexierungshypothese (Hopper & Thompson 1980: 291) nahestehenden Auffassung mündet bei Næss in die Hypothese, dass DOM letztlich auf Affiziertheit zurückzuführen sei: 'In other words, the objects that get case-marking in a DOM system do so not because they are definite and animate, but because they are affected' (Næss 2004: 1202).

2.2 Agentivität und DOM

Næss (2004) Auffassung läuft der vorherrschenden Sichtweise zuwider, Belebtheit als typische Eigenschaft von Agensargumenten anzusehen (vgl. u.a. Comrie 1989, Dahl 2008, Primus 2012). Letztere Ansicht lässt sich rollensemantisch dadurch untermauern, dass drei der fünf von Dowty (1991) postulierten Proto-Agenseigenschaften, nämlich *volition, movement* und *sentience*, die Belebtheit des entsprechenden Arguments implizieren; für Proto-Patienseigenschaften wie etwa *change of state, incremental theme* oder *causally affected* gelten hingegen keine entsprechenden Belebtheitsimplikationen. So ist etwa der Erstaktant eines Verbs wie *bauen* nicht nur ein volitionaler, physisch aktiver Partizipant, der eine visuelle Wahrnehmung hat, sondern zugleich auch einer, der notwendigerweise belebt ist, was für den Zweitaktanten nicht gilt. Diese rollensemantischen Überlegungen haben dazu geführt, den für zahlreiche Sprachen relevanten Einfluss von Belebtheit auf DOM eher mit Agentivität als mit Affiziertheit zu assoziieren (vgl. u.a. García García, Primus & Himmelmann 2018). Die Grundidee ist hierbei, belebte direkte Objekte als potentiell agentivische Argumente zu betrachten, die als solche mit dem Ko-Argument eines transitiven Verbs um die Subjektrolle konkurrieren.

Für die Relevanz des Faktors Agentivität für DOM sprechen ferner eine Reihe von i.e.S. verbaldeterminierten Belegen, von denen hier nur zwei genannt werden sollen. Im Spanischen müssen in Kombination mit reversiblen Lesarten von Verben wie *sustituir, reemplazar* 'ersetzen' oder *preceder* 'vorausgehen' nicht nur belebte, sondern auch unbelebte direkte Objekte mit DOM markiert werden (Bsp. *La presentación del libro precede* **a**/*Ø *la fiesta* 'Die Vorstellung des Buchs geht der Feier voraus'). Diese Verben zeichnen sich u.a. dadurch aus, dass Subjekt und direktes Objekt kausal voneinander unabhängig sind, wonach sie Primus (2006) zufolge beide als Agensargumente zu klassifizieren sind, auch wenn keines der beiden Ko-Argumente charakteristische Proto-Agenseigenschaften wie *volition* oder *sentience* aufweist. Demnach lassen sich Subjekt und direktes Objekt dieser Verben beide als schwache

Agensargumente charakterisieren, wobei keines agentivischer als das andere ist. Damit geht einher, dass es sich bei den mit DOM zu markierenden direkten Objekten dieser Verben eindeutig um nicht-affizierte Argumente handelt (García García 2014).

Weitere Evidenz für den Einfluss des Faktors Agentivität für DOM liefern im Spanischen und anderen Sprachen eine Reihe von Verben, deren direktes Objekt in unterschiedlicher Hinsicht eine agentivische Interpretation nahelegt. Das sind u.a. auditive Wahrnehmungs-verben wie etwa *oír* 'hören', die anders als visuelle Wahrnehmungsverben wie etwa *ver* 'sehen' ein physisch aktives Wahrnehmungsobjekt präsupponieren, das sowohl in Korpus-untersuchungen als auch experimentellen Studien merklich häufiger mit DOM attestiert ist (vgl. u.a. von Heusinger & Kaiser 2011, Enghels 2013) und in etwa genauso oft mit DOM belegt ist, wie affizierte Objekte von Verben wie etwa *arrastrar* 'ziehen' (vgl. Romero Heredero 2022). Des Weiteren sind auch sog. Interaktionsverben (Blume 1998) wie *saludar* 'grüßen' oder *llamar* 'rufen' zu nennen, deren direkte Objekte einen ähnlichen Agentivitätsgrad wie die entsprechenden Subjektargumente aufweisen (Cassarà & Mürmann 2021, Mürmann 2021). Mit diesen Verben ist DOM in Verbindung mit belebten indefiniten direkten Objekten der Regelfall; bei Verben wie *llamar* 'rufen' ist DOM auch in Kombination mit unbelebten definiten direkten Objekten wie in *llamar al ascensor* 'den Aufzug holen' geläufig.

3 Schlussfolgerung und Diskussion

Zusammenfassend lässt sich festhalten, dass es Evidenz für Beides gibt: Sowohl die Affiziertheit als auch die Agentivität des direkten Objekts scheinen einen merklichen Einfluss auf DOM zu haben. Um diesen paradoxen Befund zu interpretieren, kommen aus meiner Sicht drei Interpretationsmöglichkeiten in Frage. Erstens kann man in Erwägung ziehen, Agentivität und Affiziertheit unter das allgemeinere Konzept der Prominenz zu subsumieren. In diesem Zusammenhang ist vorgeschlagen worden, dass sowohl Agentivität als auch Affiziertheit zur Prominenz eines verbalen Arguments beitragen können, wenn auch auf unterschiedliche, komplementäre Weise (vgl. de Hoop 2015, Kizilkaya 2021, Romero Heredero 2022). Zweitens lässt sich, entgegen des letzteren Vorschlags, daran festhalten, dass Agentivität und Affiziertheit gegensätzliche Begriffe sind, die nicht unter ein allgemeineres Konzept wie etwa das der Prominenz subsumiert werden können. Folglich wäre DOM in Sprachen wie Spanisch als ein multifaktorielles Phänomen aufzufassen, das von verschiedenen Faktoren beeinflusst wird, darunter einige, die konträr sind oder miteinander konkurrieren, wie z. B. Affiziertheit und Agentivität. Drittens bietet sich die Möglichkeit an, die paradoxen Befunde im Rahmen einer feinkörnigen rollensemantischen Analyse zugunsten einer agentivitätsbasierten Dinstinktivitätshypothese zu interpretieren (vgl. Mürmann 2021). In diesem Zusammenhang ließen sich Verben wie etwa *vencer* 'besiegen', die meist unter die Klasse der Prädikate gefasst werden, die affizierte Objekte selegieren, aber auch solche wie etwa *oír* 'hören', die ein nicht-affiziertes Objekt enthalten, beide als Verben klassifizieren, die ein agentivisches direktes Objekt präsupponieren. Dies würde nahelegen, dass DOM eher durch Agentivität als durch Affiziertheit bestimmt wird. Während der erste und der letztgenannte Vorschlag auf eine multifaktorielle, aber einheitliche Motivation für DOM auf Grundlage von Prominenz bzw. einer rollensemantischen Distinktheit bezüglich Agentivität abzielen, läuft der zweite Vorschlag auf eine multifaktorielle Erklärung hinaus, die keine einheitliche Motivation für DOM postuliert. Die weitere Diskussion muss zeigen, welcher dieser drei Vorschläge am weitesten trägt oder ob sich andere nicht bedachte attraktivere Erklärungen finden.

Literatur

Aissen, Judith. 2003. Differential object marking: Iconicity vs. economy. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory* 21(3). 435–483.

Beavers, John. 2011. On affectedness. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory* 29(2). 335–370.

Blume, Kerstin. 1998. A contrastive analysis of interaction verbs with dative complements. *Linguistics* 6(2). 253–280.

Bossong, Georg. 1982. Historische Sprachwissenschaft und empirische Universalienforschung. *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 33. 17–51.

Cassarà, Alessia & Sophie Mürmann. 2021. Role-semantic parameters for DOM in Italian. In Johannes Kabatek, Philipp Obrist & Albert Wall (Hrsg.), *Differential Object Marking in Romance. The third wave*, 65–102. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Comrie, Bernard. 1989. *Language universals and linguistic typology. Syntax and morphology.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Croft, William A. 2003. *Typology and universals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, Östen. 2008. Animacy and egophoricity: Grammar, ontology and phylogeny. *Lingua* 118(2). 141–150.

de Hoop, Helen. 2015. Against affectedness. In Sander Lestrade, Peter de Swart & Lotte Hogeweg (Hrsg.), *Addenda: Artikelen voor Ad Foolen*, 169–176. Nijmegen: Radboud University.

Dowty, David. 1991. Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. *Language* 67(3). 547–619.

Enghels, Renata. 2013. Transitivity of Spanish perception verbs: A gradual category? *Borealis* 2(1). 35–56.

García García, Marco. 2014. *Differentielle Objektmarkierung bei unbelebten Objekten im Spanischen*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

García García, Marco, Beatrice Primus & Nikolaus P. Himmelmann. 2018. Shifting from animacy to agentivity. *Theoretical Linguistics* 44(1–2). 25–39.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2008. Verbal semantics and the diachronic development of DOM in Spanish. *Probus* 20(1). 1–31.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Georg A. Kaiser. 2011. Affectedness and differential object marking in Spanish. *Morphology* 21(3–4). 593–617.

Hopper, Paul J. & Sandra A. Thompson. 1980. Transitivity in grammar and discourse. *Language* 56(2). 251–299.

Kizilkaya, Semra. 2021. *Marking changes. Affectedness at the morphosyntax-semantics interface*. Köln: Universität zu Köln.

Krause, Elif & Klaus von Heusinger. 2019. Gradient effects of animacy on differential object marking in Turkish. *Open Linguistics* 5(1). 171–190.

Mürmann, Sophie. 2021. *Differential Object Marking and role semantics in Romance*. Köln: Universität zu Köln.

Næss, Åshild. 2004. What markedness marks: The markedness problem with direct objects. *Lingua* 114. 1186–1212.

Næss, Åshild. 2007. *Prototypical transitivity*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Primus, Beatrice. 2006. Hierarchy mismatches and the dimensions of role semantics. In Ina Bornkessel, Matthias Schlesewsky, Bernard Comrie & Angela D. Friederici (Hrsg.), *Semantic role universals and argument linking. Theoretical, typological and psycholinguistic perspectives*, 53–88. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Primus, Beatrice. 2012. Animacy, generalized semantic roles and differential object marking. In Monique Lamers & Peter de Swart (Hrsg.), *Case, word order, and prominence: Interacting cues in language production and comprehension*, 65–90. Dordrecht: Springer.

Romero Heredero, Diego. 2022. *Marcado diferencial de objeto y semántica verbal en español*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Witzlack-Makarevich, Alena & Ilja A. Seržant. 2018. Differential argument marking: Patterns of variation. In Ilja A. Seržant & Alena Witzlack-Makarevich (Hrsg.), *Diachrony of differential argument marking*, 1–40. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Jenseits der Individuenreferenz: sekundäre NP-Verwendungen

Ljudmila Geist – Universität Stuttgart
Ljudmila.Geist@ling.uni-stuttgart.de

1 Einleitung

Die nominale Referenz ist eine der spannendsten Themen in der Linguistik. Diesem Thema sind auch zahlreiche Arbeiten von Klaus von Heusinger mit Fokus auf Indefinitheit, Spezifizität und Semantik von Eigennamen gewidmet. Seine Arbeiten zu indefinit verwendeten Eigennamen (von Heusinger 2010 und von Heusinger & Wespel 2007) zeigen, dass die Untersuchung von sekundären Verwendungsweisen von Nominalphrasen wichtige Erkenntnisse über die Möglichkeiten der nominalen Referenz liefern kann. Eigennamen, die im Gegensatz zu Gattungsnamen in ihrer primären Verwendung artikellos stehen, referieren auf ihren Namensträger. In ihrer sekundären Verwendung, in der Kombination mit einem indefiniten Artikel, ändert sich ihr Referenzpotential: Entweder führen sie ein neues Individuum ein, das in einer Relation zum Namensträger steht, oder sie nehmen Bezug auf eine Manifestation oder einen Aspekt des Namensträgers.

In diesem Beitrag konzentriere ich mich nicht auf Eigennamen, sondern auf Gattungsnamen. Im Fokus steht eine sekundäre Verwendungsweise von Gattungsnamen – die prädikative Verwendung. In ihrer primären Verwendung, zu der ich die Verwendung in einer Argumentposition wie Subjekt oder Objekt zähle, brauchen zählbare Gattungsnamen einen definiten oder indefiniten Artikel. Neben der Markierung der Definitheit oder Indefinitheit zeigt der Artikel auch Kasus (neben Numerus und Genus) an und ist nicht weglassbar, vgl. (1).

(1) a. Ich habe mit *dem/einem Arzt* gesprochen.
    b. *Ich habe mit *Arzt* gesprochen.

In der prädikativen Verwendung verhalten sich Gattungsnamen jedoch anders. Was mich an dieser Verwendung seit meiner Dissertation (Geist 2006) interessiert, ist die Beobachtung, dass in diesem Fall der Artikel weggelassen werden kann. Darin ähneln Nomina in der prädikativen Verwendung den Abstrakta und Kontinuativa, die keinen Artikel benötigen und größtenteils nicht-zählbar sind (Geist 2021a). In diesem Beitrag möchte ich einen Überblick über Artikellosigkeit bei Prädikatsnomina geben und neben schon bekannten auch weniger bekannte, jedoch nicht weniger interessante Typen vorstellen, um weitere Forschung in diesem Bereich anzuregen.

2 Artikellose Prädikatsnomina

Den ersten viel untersuchten Typ der artikellosen Verwendung von Prädikatsnomina stellen Nomina dar, die sozial etablierte Rollen bezeichnen (Duden-Grammatik 2005: 339).

Typ 1: Sozial etablierte Rollen

(2) Klaus ist *Linguist*.
    Klaus war von 2003 bis 2012 *Professor* an der Universität Stuttgart.

Weitere Rollenbezeichnungen wären z.B. *Student*in, Ingenieur*in, Katholik*in, Italiener*in, Choleriker*in, Raucher*in.*

Dass die Rollen nicht immer institutionell festgelegt sein müssen, machen Nomina wie *Diabetiker*in* und *Optimist*in* deutlich, die ebenfalls artikellos verwendbar sind. Möglicherweise würde der Begriff ‚capacity' als kulturell etabliertes Konzept – der Begriff, der von de Swart, Winter & Zwarts (2007) für ein ähnliches Phänomen im Niederländischen eingeführt wurde – solche Nomina besser erfassen.

Sätze in (2) gehören zu den prädizierenden Kopulasätzen, die sich von anderen Kopulasatztypen dadurch unterscheiden, dass die Kopula einen Prädikatsausdruck, in diesem Fall eine prädikative Nominalphrase, selegiert (Geist 2013). Diese Phrase führt keinen Referenten ein, sondern bezeichnet eine Eigenschaft. Die Besonderheit der artikellosen Verwendung in (2) besteht darin, dass hier ein Individuum in Bezug auf sozial etablierte Parameter wie Beruf, Nationalität, Religionszugehörigkeit usw. spezifiziert wird (Geist 2019). Es wird nicht über das Individuum als solches, sondern über einen sozialen Parameter des Individuums prädiziert. Das erinnert an eine Gebrauchsweise der indefiniten Eigennamen, die oft eine Manifestation des Namensträgers und nicht das Individuum selbst spezifizieren (von Heusinger 2010). Artikellose Prädikatsnomina haben eine Bedeutung, die in der Pragmatik als institutionalisiert, angereichert oder stereotypisiert bezeichnet wird (Levinson 2000). Die stereotypische Bedeutung ist unmarkiert, weil sie auf festen kulturell etablierten Mustern beruht, während die nicht-stereotypisierte Bedeutung, die vage und kontextabhängig ist, als markiert gilt. So haben z.B. Berufsbezeichnungen eine unmarkierte Bedeutung. Die Verwendung des Artikels führt hier in vielen Fällen zu Mehrdeutigkeit (3) oder zur Bedeutungsverschiebung von einer etablierten Rolle hin zu einer charakterisierenden Beschreibung (4):

(3)   Peter ist *ein guter Architekt* (Beruf oder charakterisierende Beschreibung).
(4)   Goethe schreibt einen fließenden Stil. Schiller ist *ein Architekt* der Sprache.
        [Cosmas: U12/FEB.04049]

Der Wegfall des Artikels bei *Architekt* in (4) würde eine stereotypische Interpretation „Beruf" auslösen und ist hier unzulässig.

Das Phänomen, dass der Artikel bei Bezeichnungen von sozialen Rollen weggelassen werden kann, wurde in der Literatur nicht nur zum Deutschen (Hallab 2011, Geist 2019), sondern auch zu anderen germanischen und romanischen Sprachen diskutiert (de Swart, Winter & Zwarts 2007 zum Niederländischen; Borten 2003 zum Norwegischen; Roy 2013 zum Französischen). Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Untersuchungen könnte nun der Eindruck entstehen, dass der indefinite Artikel bei prädikativen NPn immer nur dann weggelassen werden kann, wenn sie sozial etablierte Rollen bezeichnen. Das wäre aber zu kurzsichtig. Es gibt mindestens zwei weitere prädikative Verwendungsweisen, in denen der indefinite Artikel systematisch wegfällt. Anders als bei Typ 1 kann bei diesen Verwendungen der Artikellosigkeit nicht mit sozialer Etabliertheit der Rolle erklärt werden.

Typ 2: Nomina, die einen Teil eines Ganzen bezeichnen
Diese Nomina sind in ihrer Bedeutung auf die Bezeichnung eines Teils eines Ganzen festgelegt, haben also partitive Semantik.

(5)   Klaus ist *Mitglied* des Kölner Zentrums Sprachwissenschaften (CCLS).
(6)   Das Schreiben über Politik ist *Bestandteil* der Politik. [Cosmas: Z12/AUG.00185]
        Weitere Nomina wären *Teil, Mitglied, Anhänger, Beteiligter, Mitarbeiter*.

Der indefinite Artikel wird zwar weggelassen, kann aber ohne Bedeutungsveränderung eingesetzt werden.

Typ 3: Metaphorische und abstrakte Bezeichnungen
Den dritten Typ bilden Nomina, die eine abstrakte Bedeutung haben. Manche von ihnen haben auch Entsprechungen mit konkreter Bedeutung.

(7)   Der Stuttgarter SFB „Inkrementelle Spezifikation im Kontext" ist *Vergangenheit*.
        Weitere Nomina in dieser Gruppe sind: *Glückssache, Schlusslicht, Pflicht, Vergangenheit, Dauerbrenner, Realität, Wahnsinn*.

Dass Abstrakta im Deutschen in Argumentpositionen generell ohne Artikel vorkommen, ist bekannt. Offensichtlich tun sie das auch in der prädikativen Position.

Bisher habe ich drei Typen von Nomina identifiziert, die in der prädikativen Position artikellos vorkommen, potentiell in dieser Position, zumindest in einigen Fällen, aber auch mit einem indefiniten Artikel stehen können. Der indefinite Artikel würde dann explizit Nicht-Einzigkeit signalisieren und bei Typ 1 zusätzlich eine Stereotypisierung auslösen. Im zweiten Teil dieses Aufsatzes möchte ich eine weitere artikellose prädikative Verwendung vorstellen, in der jedoch eher der definite und nicht der indefinite Artikel weggelassen wird.

Typ 4: unikale Rollen
Bei diesen Nomina handelt es sich um unikale Rollen und abstrakte unikale Attribute von Objekten – zwei Typen, die aufgrund ihrer Ähnlichkeit zusammen analysiert werden können.

(8)   Klaus war *Sprecher* des Kölner SFB „Prominence in Language".
        Weitere Nomina: *Präsident*in, Abteilungsleiter*in, Direktor*in, Mutter, Vater, Gewinner*in, Besitzer*in*

Typ 5: unikale Parameter von Ereignissen und Objekten

(9)   Der 60. Geburtstag von Klaus ist *Anlass* für diesen Sammelband.
        Weitere Nomina: *Ziel, Problem, Auslöser, Thema, Ursache, Schwerpunkt, Grund*

In Geist (2021) gebe ich eine einheitliche Analyse für die Typen 4 und 5 an. Ich nehme an, dass artikellos verwendete Nomina von beiden Typen funktionale Konzepte bezeichnen. Nach Löbner (2011) wird der potentielle Referent solcher funktionaler Konzepte durch eine eindeutige Zuordnung zu einem Bezugsobjekt definiert, d.h. funktionale Nomina sind inhärent definit (einzig) und relational (vgl. Geist 2021b zu funktionalen Nomina). So ist *Anlass* in (9) in der NP *Anlass für diesen Sammelband* ein funktionales Konzept, da die Relation zwischen Anlass in einer eins-zu-eins-Relation zu seinem Bezugsnomen *Sammelband* steht: ein Sammelband hat i.d.R. nur einen einzigen Anlass (und nicht mehrere). Auch *Sprecher* in (8) ist ein funktionales Konzept: Der Referent von Sprecher steht in einer eins-zu-eins-Relation zum Bezugsobjekt *der Kölner SFB*, da ein Sonderforschungsbereich in einer bestimmten Zeit i.d.R. nur einen Sprecher hat.

Die Weglassbarkeit des definiten Artikels bei Typ 4- und 5-Nomina kann nun wie folgt erklärt werden: Während der definite Artikel bei NPn in Argumentpositionen Einzigkeit und Existenzpräsupposition signalisiert und Prädikatsnomina nicht-referenziell sind, kann der definite Artikel bei Prädikatsnomina nur die Einzigkeit ohne Referenz (d.h. ohne Existenz)

signalisieren (Coppock & Beaver 2015). Funktionale Nomina (Nomina von Typ 4 und Typ 5) sind aber schon inhärent einzig. Der definite Artikel bei diesen Nomina wäre aus semantisch-pragmatischen Gründen redundant. Gegen die Redundanz könnte sprechen, dass der Artikel im Deutschen Träger von Kasusmerkmalen ist und aus diesem Grund grammatisch nicht redundant sein kann. Die Besonderheit der Kopulasätze mit Prädikatsnomina besteht aber darin, dass die Kopula ihnen keinen Kasus zuweist und sie in ihrer Nennform stehen, die mit der Nominativ-Form ausgedrückt wird. Somit entfällt die Aufgabe für einen Artikel, Kasus zu markieren.

3 Schluss

Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass außer sozial etablierten Rollen, deren Artikellosigkeit in der Literatur viel diskutiert wurde, noch mindestens vier weitere Typen der artikellosen Verwendung von Prädikatsnomina identifiziert werden können. Während für Typ 1, 4 und 5 detaillierte semantische Analysen vorliegen, wurden Typ 2 und 3 meines Wissens nach formal noch nicht analysiert. Aber auch anhand der existierenden Einzelanalysen für Typ 1, 4 und 5 lässt sich noch keine einheitliche Erklärung für alle Typen ableiten. Es stellt sich nun die Frage, ob eine einheitliche Erklärung der Artikellosigkeit für alle Typen der Prädikatsnomina möglich ist, oder ob wir von einer Art Familienähnlichkeit ausgehen müssen. Dieser Frage möchte ich in meiner weiteren Forschung nachgehen.

Author note
Für die Diskussion zu diesem Artikel möchte ich Elisabeth Löbel herzlich danken.

Quellen:

COSMAS (newspaper corpus) http://www.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2/
[Cosmas: Z12/AUG.00185]: Die Zeit 16.08.2012
[Cosmas U12/FEB.04049]: Süddeutsche Zeitung 27.02.2012

Literatur

Borten, Kaja. 2003. *Norwegian bare singulars.* PhD dissertation, University of Trondheim.
Coppock, Elisabeth & David Beaver. 2015. Definiteness and determinacy. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 38. 377–435.
Duden: Die Grammatik. 2005. Mannheim: Dudenverlag.
Geist, Ljudmila. 2006. *Die Kopula und ihre Komplemente. Zur Kompositionalität in Kopulasätzen.* Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Geist, Ljudmila. 2013. Prädikativsätze. In Jürg Meibauer, Markus Steinbach, Hans Altmann (Hrsg.), *Satztypen,* 482–500. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Geist, Ljudmila. 2019. Predication over aspects of human individuals. *Linguistics* 57(6). 1305–1336.
Geist, Ljudmila. 2021a. Artikel „Abstraktum“, „funktionales Nomen“, „Indefiniter Determinativ“, „Konkretum“, „Individuativ“, „Prädikativkomplementsatz“, „Relationales Nomen“, in Schierholz, Stefan & Herbert. E. Wiegand (Hrsg.), *Fachwörterbuch* Grammatik. Bd 1.1 Formenlehre. (Wörterbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikations-wissenschaft“ (WSK)). De Gruyter Online.
Geist, Ljudmila. 2021b. Definiteness without determiners. In Carla Bombi & Radek Šimík (Hrsg.), *Definiteness and referentiality. Glossa*, special collection.

Hallab, Amina Christine. 2011. *Referenzialität, Prädikation und die Struktur der Nominalphrase.* Hamburg: Kovač.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2010. Zur Grammatik indefiniter Eigennamen. *Zeitschrift für Germanistische Linguistik* 38(2). 88–120.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Johannes Wespel. 2007. Indefinite proper names and quantification over manifestations. In Estela Puig-Waldmüller (Hrsg.), *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung* 11, 332–345. Barcelona: Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. *Presumptive meanings. The theory of generalized conversational implicatures.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Löbner, Sebastian. 2011. Concept types and determination. *Journal of Semantics* 28. 279–333.

Roy, Isabelle. 2013. *Nonverbal predication. Copular sentences and syntax-semantix interface.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

de Swart, Henriette, Yoad Winter & Joost Zwarts. 2007. Bare nominals and reference to capacities. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 25(1). 195–222.

Ways to 'save'

Chiara Gianollo – Università di Bologna
chiara.gianollo@unibo.it

1 Introduction

In contemporary Italian it is possible to find the preposition *salvo* with two apparently contrasting meanings: 'except' (cf. 1) and 'provided', 'subject to' (cf. 2):[1]

(1) I lavori si concluderanno a fine marzo o aprile, **salvo** maltempo e covid.
'Construction work will be concluded at the end of March or April, except in case of bad weather and covid.'
source: https://www.comune.pordenone.it/it/comune/comunicazione/comune-informa/notizie/villanova-a-pieno- regime-i-lavori-per-la-nuova-area-della-festa-in-piassa

(2) Il finanziamento verrà concesso **salvo** approvazione della finanziaria in relazione alla sussistenza dei requisiti richiesti da quest'ultima.
'The financing will be granted subject to approval of the budgetary law, in consideration of the existence of the requisites demanded by the latter.'
source: https://www.cartucceplotter.it/it/452/nav/finanziamenti/servizi-finanziari.aspx

The meaning of *salvo* = 'except' in (1) corresponds to the English preposition *save* (which came to English through *sauf*, the Old French cognate of Italian *salvo*) and can be roughly paraphrased by means of a sentence introduced by 'if not': 'Construction will be concluded…if bad weather and covid do not happen'. The meaning of *salvo* = 'provided', 'subject to' in (2) can be roughly paraphrased by means of a sentence introduced by 'if': 'The financing will be granted if the budgetary law is approved'. That is, the same element can introduce a negative or a positive condition. Speakers are aware of this apparent ambiguity, discussed at the academic level (Bambi 2016 for the Crusca Academy) but also in informal blogs (cf. 3):

(3) From the blog 'Cruscate – Discussion board on the Italian language'
«In sintesi il messaggio è "Ti diamo quest'oggetto e puoi pagarlo in comode rate etc etc... salvo approvazione finanziariaditurno". Per me avrebbe più senso "salvo *dis*approvazione". Cioè, ti diamo questo servizio a meno che non ci sia una disapprovazione da parte della finanziaria. Interpreto il "salvo" come "a meno di" "a meno che".»
'Put simply the message is "We give you this object and you can comfortably pay in instalments etc etc…*salvo* approval of the yearly budgetary law. For me it would make more sense "*salvo dis*approval". That is, we give you this service unless there is a disapproval on the part of the budgetary law. I interpret "salvo" as "unless".'
source: https://www.achyra.org/cruscate/viewtopic.php?t=3543

Although ambiguity is intrinsic to the functioning of language systems, what is interesting in the case of Italian *salvo* is that the diachronic development yielding ambiguity seems to have reached a tipping point, with speakers consciously reacting to it. In what follows, I will try to reconstruct how this point was reached, and show that the use in (1), which is nowadays prevalent, arose as an innovation in the diachronic development from Latin to Italian, whereas

---

[1] Examples taken from the web and from the CORIS and KiParla corpora have been slightly adapted with respect to orthographical conventions.

the use in (2) combines a conservative semantics with an innovative form. The case of Italian *salvo* is yet another witness to the theoretical and diachronic interest of exceptive constructions (cf. Traugott 1997, Breitbarth 2015, Jędrzejowski 2021).

2 The Latin origin of Italian *salvo*

The origin of Italian *salvo* is the Latin adjective *salvus* 'safe', 'secure', 'preserved'. The Latin noun *salus* 'safety', 'health', the Latin verb *salvere* and *salutare* 'to salute', 'to greet', as well as the English verb *save* (through Old French) derive from the same root. Already in Latin, the adjective *salvus* is used in ablative absolute constructions, which express adverbial circumstantial modification by means of a reduced clause where the predicate can be an adjective or a participle (according to the traditional analysis, here a copula is left unrealized).

(4)   idem illam proscriptionem capitis mei contra salutem rei publicae, sed [**salvis**$_{ABL.N.PL}$ auspiciis$_{ABL.N.PL}$] rogatam esse dicebant (Cic. *prov*. 45)
        'but they also declared that the outlawry of myself, although it injured the interests of the State, was proposed without any infringement of the auspices.' ('the auspices (being) preserved')

(5)   tamen [me$_{ABL.M.SG}$ **salvo**$_{ABL.M.SG}$] cito aquam liberam gustabunt (Petr. 71.1)
        'however, if I am [= my will is] preserved, soon they [the slaves] will taste free water'.

In this construction the adjective maintains its original meaning, and agrees in case, gender and number with the element it refers to (its subject). The meaning can be paraphrased as: 'saving', 'preserving', hence 'without violation of'.

Already in Latin, the construction tends to become idiomatic in technical registers: besides *salvis auspiciis* in (4), we routinely find *salva lege* 'respecting the law', *salvo officio* 'respecting the duty', *salvo iure* 'preserving the rights' ('without prejudice to one's rights', Fellmeth & Horwitz 2011, s.v.). In later legal language, it is found in the combination *salvo eo, ut…*, meaning 'with this reservation or proviso that', which introduces a condition that must be respected. This original Latin use is continued in idioms still attested in technical registers of modern languages, like *salva veritate* 'preserving the truth value', *salvo errore* 'errors excepted' (German: *Irrtum vorbehalten* 'subject to errors'). The latter foreshadows the origin of the innovative meaning 'except' seen in (1): the highly elliptical idiom means 'preserving the possibility of errors'; it introduces a proviso according to which what has been said or written could inadvertently contain errors, hence it is valid *excluding* those errors.

The 'provided', 'subject to' meaning seen in (2) for Italian hence derives from the conditional interpretation of the Latin circumstantial ablative absolute construction (cf. 5), whose meaning was underspecified as for the adverbial modification conveyed (temporal, causal, concessive, conditional). The meaning in (2) is confusing for a contemporary Italian speaker (cf. 3), but is closer to the original Latin one. However, while in Latin we find it with an agreeing adjective, we will see in Section 3 that in Italian the situation is more complicated.

The conditional interpretation of the ablative absolute construction containing *salvus* amounts to setting a limit to the validity of the situation described in the main clause. Applying the Lewis / Kratzer / Heim restrictor analysis of conditionals, I treat the conditional ablative absolute clause as expressing the restriction of a (covertly) quantified statement: thus for (5) 'all the situations in which my will is preserved are situations in which the slaves will be free'; and for Italian (2) 'all the situations in which the budgetary law is approved are situations in which the financing will be granted'.

3 Meaning change with *salvo*

Contemporary Italian continues the adjective *salvo* with the meaning 'safe', 'preserved' (6). As an adjective, *salvo* can still occur, in formal legal language, in conservative absolute participial constructions on the model of the Latin ones seen in (4)–(5). In this use, it agrees in gender and number with its associated noun (7) and it means 'provided', as in the Latin conditional interpretation.

(6) La polizia ci ha comunicato che gli ostaggi sono **salvi**
     'The police told us that the hostages are safe.'

(7) I beni appartenenti agli enti pubblici non territoriali sono soggetti alle regole del presente codice, **salve**$_{F.PL}$ le $_{F.PL}$ disposizioni $_{F.PL}$ delle leggi speciali (art. 830 cod. civile)
     'The goods belonging to non-regional public authorities are subject to the regulations of the present code, provided the dispositions by special laws are respected.' (from Bambi 2016)

Much more frequent, however, is a prepositional use of *salvo*, diachronically deriving from the Latin ablative singular masculine / neuter form, which becomes grammaticalized as a preposition.[2] In this use the preponderant meaning is 'except', 'unless', as in (1). Also this use is found in formal legal language (8), but it is not exclusive to it, differently from the absolute construction seen in (7). It is current in colloquial Italian as well (cf. 9).

(8) **Salvo**$_{INVARIANT}$ diverse$_{F.PL}$ norme$_{F.PL}$ di legge, la locazione non può stipularsi per un tempo eccedente i trenta anni (art. 1573 cod. civile) (from Bambi 2016)
     'Unless other legal norms apply, the lease cannot be stipulated for a time that exceeds 30 years.'

(9) mentre invece la Jugoslavia // eh otteneva diciamo così la Dalmazia // **salvo**$_{INVARIANT}$ la$_{F.PL}$ città$_{F.PL}$ di Zara // a maggioranza linguistica italiana (KiParla_TOD1017)
     'whereas Jugoslavia obtained, so to say, Dalmatia, except the town of Zara, with an Italian linguistic majority.'

The conservative absolute adjectival use 'provided' in (7) is attested in Italian since the medieval documents; nowadays it is residual and belongs to the technical register of legal language. Under the restrictor analysis, we can paraphrase (7) as: 'All the situations in which dispositions by special laws are preserved are situations in which the rules in the present code (that is, the general civil code) apply'. In (7) we see how we can reach the innovative interpretation 'except' by way of pragmatic inferencing: the rules of the general civil code apply *unless* they are blocked by more specific special laws, that is: 'All the situations except the situations covered by special laws are situations in which the general civil code applies'. Put differently, the condition in (7) requires compatibility between the general civil code and

---

[2] The analysis as preposition is probably over-simplifying, considering that English *except*-phrases are best analyzed as elliptical clausal constituents, as shown by Vostrikova (2021). Italian has an additional use of *salvo* as complementizer followed by an infinitival verb, or element of a complex complementizer *salvo che* 'except that', *salvo quando* 'except when' followed by a finite verb form (i), which is interesting on its own right but which I will leave aside here:

(i) ci ha sempre trattato con freddezza, **salvo quando** ha avuto bisogno di qualcosa (CORIS1980_2000_STAMPA)
     'He always treated us with coldness, except when he needed something.'

the special laws. An inference is licensed that if special laws apply, the general civil code will not apply, in order to preserve compatibility. Hence, compatibility requires exclusion.

By moving from potential compatibility to actual subtraction by way of pragmatic inferencing, the diachronically innovative exceptive meaning in (1) and (8)–(9) is obtained. According to the semantics of exceptive conditionals under the restrictor analysis (von Fintel 1992, 1993), the *salvo*-phrase restricts the quantification over the state of affairs in the main clause, by subtracting a set of situations from the domain of quantification. Hence (1) can be paraphrased as: 'all the situations except those in which there is bad weather and covid are situations in which construction work ends by March/April'.

Exceptive 'salvo' is an early innovation: it is already found in Medieval documents, especially as the complex complementizer *salvo che* (rendering Latin *salvo eo, ut…* seen above), but also as preposition (e.g. with masculine singular: *salvo messer Iacopo Gabrielli* 'except sir Iacopo Gabrielli', Matteo Villani, Cronica, 4.13.1; with masculine plural: *salvo dì sollepni* 'except on religious festivities', Breve di Villa di Chiesa 1.6; examples from OVI). Further corpus research will have to assess the specific details of this historical development.

As seen in Section 1, prepositional *salvo* is additionally found in a sort of 'blended' construction, exemplified by *salvo approvazione* 'subject to approval' in (2), in which it has an invariant non-agreeing form (*approvazione*, a feminine noun, would have *salva* as an agreeing form), but, at the same time, it requires the non-exceptive interpretation of the adjectival (agreeing) absolute construction seen in (7). This conservative meaning is required also by idiomatic expressions of legal and financial language such as *salvo buon fine* 'subject to successful outcome', *salvo incasso* 'subject to collection'. The latter two cases, however, are syntactically ambiguous between an adjectival (agreeing) interpretation and a prepositional (invariant) one, since they involve masculine singular nouns. This ambiguity may well have triggered a diachronic reanalysis, from an agreeing adjective to an invariant preposition. The construction blend derives its old meaning from fossilized absolute adjectival constructions, but innovates the form, by treating *salvo* as an invariant preposition. The possibility of coexistence of the two contradictory meanings 'provided' and 'except' for prepositional *salvo* is to be explained by the noticeable sociolinguistic difference in the registers that allow them: while the exceptive meaning is current in colloquial language, the 'provided' meaning is restricted to idiomatic expressions of technical registers.

References

Bambi, Federigo. 2016. *Salvo*. Consulenza linguistica, Accademia della Crusca, https://accademiadellacrusca.it/it/consulenza/salvo/1053

Breitbarth, Anne. 2015. Exceptive negation in Middle Low German. In Ellen Brandner, Anna Czypionka, Constantin Freitag & Andreas Trotzke (eds.), *Charting the landscape of linguistics: On the scope of Josef Bayer's work*, 11–15. Konstanz: University of Konstanz.

Fellmeth, Aaron & Maurice Horwitz. 2011. *Guide to Latin in international law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

von Fintel, Kai. 1992. Exceptive conditionals: The meaning of *unless*. *Proceedings of the North East Linguistics Society* 22. 135–151.

von Fintel, Kai. 1993. Exceptive constructions. *Natural Language Semantics* 1(2). 123–148.

Jędrzejowski, Łukasz. 2021. On the synchrony, variation and diachrony of adverbial exceptive clauses in Polish. *Glossa* 6(1): 150. 1–41.

Traugott, Elizabeth C. 1997. *Unless* and *but* conditionals: A historical perspective. In Angeliki Athanasiadou & René Dirven (eds.), *On conditionals again*, 145–167. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Vostrikova, Ekaterina. 2021. Conditional analysis of clausal exceptives. *Natural Language Semantics* 29. 159–227

The different functions of the Khalkha-Mongolian demonstrative *nögöö*

Dolgor Guntsetseg – Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich
dolgor.guntsetseg@lmu.de

1 Introduction

Khalkha-Mongolian, an agglutinative SOV language without an article or gender system, has two basic demonstratives: *ene* 'this' and *ter* 'that' that are used for spatial deixis as well as for intra-discourse deixis, both as pronominal and adnominal.[1] There is one more demonstrative pair, *önöö* and *nögöö,* which has received very little attention in relevant Mongolian grammars (cf. Poppe 1951, OCM 2004 among others), although particularly *nögöö* is found in several pragmatic functions. The difference between *önöö* and *nögöö* is visible within temporal adverb pairs such as **önöö**dör 'today' vs. **nögöö**dör 'the day after tomorrow', indicating that *önöö* refers to temporally proximal and *nögöö* to temporally distal deixis. Note, however, that *önöö* should be classified as archaic or literary as it is barely used in the spoken language. If used, it almost exclusively occurs before temporal nouns such as *önöö šönö* 'upcoming night/tonight', *önöö üje* 'this era/nowadays', etc. For this reason, this contribution focuses on *nögöö* in a first attempt to sketch its different pragmatic functions.

2 Different pragmatic functions of demonstrative *nögöö*

In the monolingual Dictionary of Mongolian[2], *nögöö* is explained as a word that a) refers to one of two different entities, or b) expresses the meaning *öör* 'different', *busad* 'other(PL)'. In Mongolian grammar studies (Byambasan 1975: 101, Unurbayan 1994: 215, OCM 2004: 178, Munkh-Amgalan & Kan Shin 2014: 288), *nögöö* and words like *bügd* 'all, every', *zarim* 'some, certain', etc. are defined as 'differentiating pronouns' (Kh.-Mong. *jalgax tölöönij üg*) that refer to entities as a group or by separating them into different groups. The examples in (1) and (2) largely confirm the definitions above.

(1)   *... neg   čix-eer-ee   sons-ood   **nögöö**   **čix-eer**-ee   gar-ga-dag ...*
     one   ear-INSTR-RFL hear-CV.PRF   DEM   ear-INSTR-RFL get.out-CAUS-PC.HAB
     '(There are many people that) hear (what other people are saying) with one ear and let (it) out through the other ear (= to ignore)' (INT[3])

(2)   *... gež   neg-ees   **nögöö-d**   damž-san   jaria*
     COMP   one-ABL   DEM-DLOC   pass-PC.PST   talk
     'a rumor saying "…" that passed from one to the other' (LTT)

In (2), *nögöö* serves as an indefinite pronoun and in (1) as a determiner referring to the second of two things. For the latter use, though, (3) shows that it rather refers to a second subset of a set of two and the two subsets do not need to contain an equal amount of individual entities.[4]

---

[1] Khalkha-Mongolian exhibits an extensive demonstrative system based on the *e-/t-* stems that refer not only to entities but also to location, direction, amount etc. In addition to these speaker-centered demonstratives, there are also the addressee-centered demonstrative stems, namely: *naa-* 'this near you' and *caa-* 'that behind you', used mainly for spatial deixis but also, in some special cases, for intra-discourse reference.

[2] https://mongoltoli.mn/dictionary/detail/63375, Accessed on 10.01.2022.

[3] http://nclp.mn/content/120, Accessed on 10.01.2022.

[4] In this use, *nögöö* has to be differentiated from *busad* 'other(PL)' that only refers to the remainder of a set, whereas *nögöö* can refer to both, a second subset and to the remainder.

(3)   *Ter*   *xüü*   *gol*   *gatal-snaa*   **nögöö xojor-oos-oo**   *tasra-n*
         DEM   boy   river   cross-CV.SUCC   DEM   two-ABL-RFL   separate-CV.MOD
         gol   *ögsö-v.*
         river   ascend-PRF
         'After the boy crossed the river, (he) went up alongside the river, separating from the other two.' (DN)

As an interim summary, we can state that *nögöö* can serve as an indefinite pronoun expressing the meaning 'other' and as a determiner referring to a subset relation expressing the meaning 'the other'. In the latter function, *nögöö* often occurs with possessive markers like the 3rd person possessive *n'* or reflexive-possessive suffixes as in (3) in order to exclusively express the part-of relation to a greater set.

     Having outlined the basic understanding of *nögöö* in Mongolian grammars, I will now turn to the anaphoric function of *nögöö,* i.e. to pick out a referent introduced in the previous discourse (cf. Lyons 1999: 113, Diessel 1999: 95ff.) In this function, even its counterpart *önöö* shows up, if mainly in the written texts. In the spoken language, anaphoric *önöö* can hardly be found, while anaphoric *nögöö* is more frequent.

(4)   *Bügd*   *nom-oo*   *ög-nö.*   ***Nögöö nom-yg***   *n'*   *nee-xe-d*
         all   book-RFL   give-NPST   DEM   book-ACC   3POSS   open-PC.FUT-DLOC
         xamgijn   *gojo*   *üg-s-ijg*   *bič-sen*   *baj-na.*   *Ger-t-ee*
         most   nice   word-PL-ACC   write-PST   be-NPST   home-DLOC-RFL
         xar-iad   ***nögöö***   ***nom-oo***   *unši-na.*
         return-CV.PRF   DEM   book-RFL   read-NPST
         'All (the authors) give me their books. When (I) open those books, (they) wrote the most beautiful words. When (I) get home, (I) read those books.' (INT[5])

(5)   *Bi*   *ug_n'*   *neg*   *nom-ny*   *talaar*   *biči-x*   *jumsan*
         I   actually   a/one   book-GEN   about   write-FUT   PRT
         gež   *ix*   *bodo-x*   *jum*   *daan_č*   *(...)*   ***önöö***   ***nom-oo***
         COMP   much   think-FUT   PRT   unfortunately   DEM   book-RFL
         unši-ž   *duusa-x-güj*   *l*   *baj-na.*
         read-CV.IMPF   end-PC.FUT-NEG   PRT   be-NPST
         'Actually, I think a lot about writing about a book, but unfortunately (…) I still haven't finished reading this book yet.' (INT[6])

The difference between *önöö* and *nögöö* in the anaphoric use is not obvious, except for the fact that in (4) *nögöö* can be replaced by *önöö*, but in (5) *önöö* cannot be replaced by *nögöö*. Besides, since the demonstratives *ene/ter* 'this/that' basically serves an anaphoric function in Khalkha-Mongolian, it is not clear when speakers use *önöö/nögöö* in the anaphoric function, a question which I must partially leave open to future research. A clear functional difference can nevertheless be shown in contexts with two potential antecedents in the preceding discourse. Following Comrie (1997), Diessel (1999: 96) has pointed out that in German the third person pronoun *er* is used for a topic referent (i.e. topic-continuing), whereas the anaphoric demonstrative *der* refers to the non-topical referent in the previous discourse indicating topic-shift, providing the example in (6):

---

[5] http://baabar.mn/article/407, Access on 10.01.2022
[6] http://ezorgil.blogspot.com/2007/11/, Access on 10.01.2022

(6)   *Der Anwalt*$_i$ *sprach mit einem Klienten*$_j$. *Da er*$_i$/*der*$_j$ *nicht viel Zeit hatte, vereinbarten sie ein weiteres Gespräch nächste Woche.*
'The lawyer talked to a client. Since he didn't have much time, they agreed to have another meeting next week.' (Diessel 1999: 96, ex. (5))

In the Khalkha-Mongolian adaption in (7), the demonstrative *ter*, which also serves as 3rd person pronoun, is used to refer to *ömgöölögč* 'lawyer', whereas *nögöödöx* (the pronominal form of *nögöö*) refers to *üjlčlüülegč* 'client'. This can be explained from the original function of *nögöö*, i.e. referring to the second subset of a set.

(7)   *Ömgöölögč*$_i$ *önöödör*   *üjlčlüülegč*$_j$*-tei-gee*   *uulza-x*   *baj-san*
        lawyer   today   client-COM-RFL   meet-PC.FUT   be-PC.PST
        bolovč   ***ter***$_i$ /   ***nögöödöx***$_j$ ***n'***   *zav-güj*   *bol-son*
        although   DEM   DEM   3POSS   time-NEG   become-PC.PST
        tul   *uulzalt-aa*   *xojšl-uul-žee.*
        because   meeting-RFL   postpone-CAUS-DIR.EVD.PST
        'The lawyer$_i$ had planned to meet with his client$_j$ today, but because **he**$_{i/j}$ was busy, (they) postponed the meeting.'

Interestingly, the pronominal *nögöödöx n'* can be replaced by *önöödöx n'* without any difference in meaning. However, if one were to use the adnominal form instead, one would have to say *önöö üjlčlüülegč*, while *nögöö üjlčlüülegč* would barely be acceptable. The fact that *nögöö* can easily be replaced by *önöö*, but not vice versa, may be explained from the fact that *nögöö* has, in contrast to *önöö*, the basic meaning 'other/the other'. Most commonly, however, *nögöö* is used as a recognitional demonstrative, as has been mentioned in von Heusinger (2012: 446) and Guntsetseg (2016: 38). In the following, I will discuss this function in more detail.

According to the definitions of the recognitional use of demonstratives in the literature (cf. Himmelmann 1997: 61, Diessel 1999: 105, and references therein), the respective demonstratives are used to introduce a new referent into the discourse that both speaker and hearer are familiar with, or that at least the speaker assumes the hearer is able to identify based on their specific shared knowledge. Ahrenholz (2007: 350) has pointed out, based on his study on German recognitional *dies-*, that it can also be used to reactivate a referent, which has already been introduced into the discourse. Khalkha-Mongolian *nögöö* serves both uses. In the recognitional use, the *nögöö*-phrase often occurs with more descriptive materials such as attributives and relative clauses, as in (8) and (9), a pattern that Himmelmann (1996: 61) observed for recognitional demonstratives in other languages, too.

(8)   ***Nögöö***   *devxreg*   *Itgelt-ijn-d*   *zara-gda-ž*   *baj-san*
        DEM   hopper   Itgelt-GEN-DLOC   serve-PASS-CV.IMPF   be-PC.PST
        Erdene.
        '(It is) that Erdene who was working as a servant for "grasshopper" Itgelt.' (LTT)

(9) *türüün* **nögöö, nögöö**, *ene   šatan deer   suu-ž   baj-san   nögöö*
    early   DEM   DEM   this   stairs   on   sit-CV.IMPF   be-PC.PST   DEM
    neg   övgön   ene   baj-na   šd
    a/one   old_man   this   be-NPST   PRT
    'This is, indeed, that one old man that was sitting on the stairs in the earlier [picture].'
    (SCOPIC[7])

(10) **Nögöö   nöxör** *ene   üü?*   **Nögöö xüüxed   n'   ijm   bol-čix-son.**
    DEM   man   this   Q   DEM   child   3POSS   so   become-INT-PST
    'Is this that guy (we know him from other pictures, we have seen earlier)? That
    child of his became so (=grew up).' (SCOPIC)

Diessel (1999: 106) characterizes the specific shared knowledge of the interlocutors, which the recognitional demonstratives are based on, as 'private' and distinguishes it from cultural knowledge of a particular speech community. As for *nögöö*, it is not restricted to private knowledge of the speech act participants, but on the contrary, it is often used to recall shared community knowledge, e.g. when the speaker is not able to recall the word for a particular entity/concept or expresses her/his uncertainty about the name of that entity/concept, as in (11)–(12).

(11) **Nögöö   xan_borgocoj** *biš   üü?*
    DEM   pineapple   NEG   Q
    'Isn't it that [thing that people call] "pineapple"?'(SCOPIC)

(12) *Ene   **nögöö** juu   n'   ene   lager-yn   **nögöö süüdrevč**   bajšin l*
    this   DEM   what   3POSS   this   vacation-GEN   DEM   pavillon   house   PRT
    baj-san   baj-na   l   daa   ene.
    be-PST   be-NPST   PRT   PRT   this
    'This must have been that, what (was it), that summer-pavillon-house.' (SCOPIC)

3 Conclusion

In spoken Khalkha, speakers use *nögöö* incessantly in the different uses described above, but most frequently in the recognitional use, sometimes referring to the shared knowledge of the interlocutors and sometimes to recall their own and the interlocutors' knowledge about the respective entity. Considering this fact, the pair *nögöö* and *önöö* can perhaps be discussed within the concept of 'cognitive proximity' introduced by Consten & Averintseva-Klisch (2012: 274), who define it as "specific mental closeness relations between speakers and referents" and subsume German recognitional demonstrative *dies-* under this notion. Similarly, Khalkha-Mongolian *nögöö* and *önöö* can be further investigated whether they had been developed to cognitive proximal and distal demonstratives, and how this function of *nögöö* was affected once *önöö* dropped out of use.

---

[7] SCOPIC: The "Social Cognition Parallax Interview Corpus" is a naturalistic and cross-linguistically-matched corpus with enriched annotations of grammatical categories relevant to social cognition. For more information, see https://scopicproject.wordpress.com.

References

Ahrenholz, Bernt. 2007. *Verweise mit Demonstrativa im gesprochenen Deutsch. Grammatik, Zweitspracherwerb und Deutsch als Fremdsprache*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Byambasan, P. 1975. *Orčin cagijn mongol xelnij ügijn bütec, ner ügsijn ajmag* [The morphological structure of contemporary Mongolian and nouns as a wordclass]. Ulaanbaatar.

Comrie, Bernard. 2000. Pragmatic binding: Demonstratives as anaphors in Dutch. In Matthew L. Juge & Jeri L. Moxley (eds.), *Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society (1997)*, 50–61. Berkeley: Berkeley Linguistics Society.

Consten, Manfred & Maria Averintseva-Klisch. 2012. Tentative reference acts? Recognitional demonstratives as means of suggesting mutual knowledge – or overriding a lack of it. *Research in Language* 10(3). 257–277.

Diessel, Holger. 1999. *Demonstratives: Form, function, and grammaticalization*. (Typological Studies in Language 42). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Guntsetseg, Dolgor. 2016. *Differential case marking in Mongolian*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2012. Referentialität, Spezifizität, und Diskursprominenz im Sprachvergleich. In Lutz Gunkel & Gisela Zifonum (eds.), *Deutsch im Sprachvergleich – Grammatische Kontraste und Konvergenzen*, 417–456. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Himmelmann, Nikolaus P. 1996. Demonstratives in narrative discourse. In Barbara Fox (ed.), *Studies in anaphora*, 205–254. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Himmelmann, Nikolaus P. 1997. *Deiktikon, Artikel, Nominalphrase: Zur Emergenz syntaktischer Struktur*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Lyons, Christopher. 1999. *Definiteness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Munkh-Amgalan, Yumjirijn & Kan Shin. 2014. *Orčin cagijn mongol xelnij büteever sudlal* [The morphology of modern Mongolian]. Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo Printing.

OCM 2004. *Orčin cagijn mongol xel* [Contemporary Mongolian]. Ulaanbaatar: MUBIS, Department of Mongolian Linguistics.

Poppe, Nikolaus. 1951. *Khalkha-Mongolische Grammatik*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.

Unurbayan, Tsedev. 1994. *Orčin cagijn mongol xelnij ügzüj* [Contemporary Mongolian morphology]. Ulaanbaatar: MUBIS, Department of Mongolian Linguistics.

Primary sources

DN   D. Namdag. Cag törijn üjmeen.
LTT   Ch. Lodoidamba. Tungalag Tamir.

Affirmative Demonstratives

Daniel Gutzmann – University of Bochum
mail@danielgutzmann.com

1 A new kind of demonstrative use

It has been well studied that demonstratives have other uses besides the standard uses as demonstratives. In this contribution, I want to study a different use of the demonstrative in English and German, one that recently got some traction in social media especially on Twitter or Facebook (and arguably can be attested in many other languages). The following screenshots illustrate the phenomenon:

(1)

(2)

This use of *this*, while clearly being demonstrative (as indicated by the frequently used pointingfinger emoji), is special in its own rights. There are four important aspects that I will highlight in this short contribution: First, it is a stand-alone use of the demonstrative which, I argue, is not elliptical as other seemingly stand-alone uses of the demonstrative are. Secondly, while the demonstrative always has an utterance or, more precisely, some kind of "post" as its target, it does not refer to the post itself but to its content. Hence, this use of the demonstrative has some kind of propositional reference. Thirdly, the use of the demonstrative is what I like to call *affirmative* or "endorsing" as it invariably seems to convey some kind of agreement with the content of the demonstratum. Finally, the affirmation itself is expressive. As a last point, I will distinguish two different types of affirmative *this* depending on whether it is used as a simple comment or together with a "repost".

2 Affirmative *this* is not elliptical

Of course, ordinary uses of demonstratives can also seem to occur as stand-alone utterances. However, these uses are always elliptical: They can only be used in contexts in which the demonstrative can be integrated into a contextually recoverable host utterance; for instance, when it is used as an elliptical answer to an (explicit or implicit) question or if it is used to pose a (recoverable) clarification question.

(3) A: Which movie should we watch?
     B: [Pointing to A New Hope]
         This. ("We should watch this movie.")

(4) A: Would you pass me the bottle?
     B: [Pointing to bottle of water]
         This? ("Should I pass you this bottle?")

In contrast, affirmative *this* can be used without any contextual factors that would determine a corresponding host clause for the demonstratives. While one can, of course, try to reconstruct utterances like (1) or (2); but given that it is not possible to decide between various suitable expansions, like "I agree with this", "This is correct" or something more elaborate like "This is the best way to express a thought that I share", assuming affirmative *this*-utterances to be derived by ellipsis seems to be very unlikely. At least, the burden would be on an elliptical account to provide evidence for such a claim. Furthermore, an affirmative *this*-utterance has a certain expressive character to it and shares some properties with genuine expressive language (as discussed below). For instance, one cannot really directly reject an affirmative *this*, even though it is of course possible to discuss the content that is endorsed by it. But the fact that the speaker (or poster) agrees with the demonstrated content does not become at-issue. This would be unexpected, if the affirmative demonstratives would just be elliptical versions of ordinary descriptive utterances.

3 Affirmative *this* refers to propositions

While affirmative *this* is usually presented with some demonstrative target (e.g. a (re)tweet or (re)post), it does not refer to the post itself but to the content itself and hence affirmative *this* involves propositional reference and not reference to individuals. This can be shown by the fact that it is possible to react to affirmative demonstratives with another affirmative utterance.

(5)   A: This.
      B: Yeah, totally!!!

4 Affirmative *this* is ... affirmative

The most characteristic and maybe most surprising property of the affirmative use of demonstratives is its name-giving property: Instead of just referring to the content of the demonstratum – which in of its own may be an expected behavior – the use of affirmative *this* expresses the speaker's agreement, affirmation or endorsement of some sort of the content. In this sense, affirmative *this* is not just referential but also propositional as it expresses a speaker attitude on its own. This leads to the question of whether this attitude is expressed in addition to the (propositional) reference (the content of the demonstratum) or whether the entire utterance just expresses an affirmation without any additional reference (while the reference of course provides the object of the speaker's endorsement). I will come back to this momentarily.

5 Affirmative *this* is expressive

I am assuming here that the affirmative content is rather expressive and not really descriptive content that is at-issue. This is inline with other non-sentential constructions that can be used to express attitudes, for instance the meme-like "that moment when" construction (Gutzmann & Turgay 2019). However, this is again hard to test, since affirmative *this* does not interact with other content and therefore, it cannot be checked if it would escape semantic embedding or not (e.g. under negation, propositional attitude or conditionals). Hence, tests by direct manipulations are indecisive. However, we can nevertheless try to test the at-issueness of *this*-affirmations by checking how it can be reacted to and how it can be used in discourse. First, let us observe that affirmative *this* cannot be used to answer a question. If one answers a question with *this* plus a demonstratum, when we do not really get the affirmative interpretation but rather an interpretation as an elliptical answer and the affirmative meaning gets lost.

(6) A: What excited you today?
     B: This.
         ⤳ "This excited me today."

Going into the other discourse direction, we can observe that one cannot really react to the affirmation itself. Of course, other speakers may agree or disagree with the content of the demonstration that is endorsed by affirmative this, but they cannot directly target the affirmation of the speaker.

(7) A: This.
     B1: No, this is not correct.
     B2: # No, you do not endorse this.

This leads me to conclude, that the affirmative meaning of *this* is expressive and that the referential meaning is just part of the attitude, because if it would be expressed independently, it should be to answer a question with it, while retaining the affirmative attitude as just shown above.

6 Two kinds of uses of affirmative *this*

There are two kinds of uses of affirmative *this*. One is discourse initial. The speaker (re)produces a post or tweet with a certain content and then refers to this content and affirms it by the use of *this*. That is, the speaker (re)produces the demonstratum together with demonstrative (and demonstration). The second use is reactive. Here the speaker affirms another post or tweet by replying to it with the use of affirmative *this*. In this case, the speaker only produces the demonstrative (and demonstration), while the demonstratum is not (re)produced but exists independently of the speaker's utterance. The examples in (1) and (2) are instances of the former kind, while the following examples illustrate the latter kind.

(8)

(9)

References

Gutzmann, Daniel & Katharina Turgay. 2019. Der Moment, wenn dir klar wird, dass es expressive Nebensätze gibt. In Franz d'Avis & Rita Finkbeiner (eds.), *Expressivität im Deutschen*, 261–291. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Conversational priming through repeating responses as a factor in inflectional change

Eugen Hill – Universität zu Köln
eugen.hill@uni-koeln.de

1 Change in language

All known human societies are fundamentally shaped by the use of one or several language systems. The core-function of language in a human society is transmitting information, which is encoded and decoded by means of lexicon and grammar. Ideally, a code should be uniform and consistent in time. Yet, it is an empirical observation that all languages change.

Change is omnipresent in language, constantly generating variation at all its levels, including grammar. It is observed that in different languages change in grammar may operate in different ways and proceed at different pace. In recent decades a consensus among linguists has emerged according to which explanatory theories of language and language use not referring to change are impossible. This is valid independently of whether language change is assumed to target particular synchronic states (cf. Haspelmath 2019) or, conversely, typologically common synchronic states are seen as merely reflecting properties of change (cf. Cristofaro 2013, 2014, 2019, 2021). It follows that in order to understand grammar we need a deeper understanding of the principles underlying grammatical change.

2 Change in grammar: causes and principles

In recent years a considerable progress has been achieved in our understanding of these principles. In the domain of inflection, several relevant factors have been identified. Cf. the three-partite model of change in inflection (developed in Hill 2007, 2020, cf. Garret 2008, Fertig 2013, 2015). In this model, three sets of potentially different factors are distinguished: (a) triggers of change, which make the inherited word-form inconvenient and/or prone to replacement, (b) pre-existing encoding patterns, which provide a range of possible models for replacement of the inherited word-form by a new one, (c) selectors, which are responsible for the choice of one particular model-pattern. Similar models have been suggested for change in syntax, see Mithun (2003), Fischer (2007), and Seiler (2015) among many others.

These and similar models of change in grammar provide a theoretical frame-work for describing and partially explaining numerous instances of change in different languages. What remains to be understood is how the innovations, once emerged, are implemented in the grammar of a language. Since language use presupposes the existence of a language system in the minds of speakers, any grammatical innovation necessarily starts with an individual speaker. However, languages are typically used by communities of speakers to which hundreds, thousands or even millions of individuals (of varying age and varying degree of competence in the relevant language) may belong. It follows that understanding grammatical change presupposes a model of how grammatical innovations, such as new past tense forms of verbs or new case forms of nouns, spread among the individual speakers and become the new norm in a language community.

This problem has been traditionally approached in different ways, depending on which part of a language community is assumed to generate the innovations (cf. Croft 2000: 42–78, Drinka 2010, Luraghi 2010). A family of theories attribute grammatical change to juvenile speakers and their incomplete learning of their first language. Another family of theories sees the locus of grammatical change in adult learners using the language in question as their second or third language system. Both positions presuppose that grammatical innovations are capable of spreading from innovating to more conservative speakers, being ultimately adopted also by the

latter. But why does this happen? What is the mechanism by which a conservative speaker of a language might adopt and use a new grammatical form as an admissible variant or, ultimately, a substitute of the inherited form (s)he used before?

3 The role of repeating responses in inflectional change

A very recent idea attributes the transfer of new grammatical forms from innovating to conservative speakers to a phenomenon which may be called conversational priming through repeating responses (cf. Gipper 2020). The potential relevance of psychological priming for language change has been repeatedly discussed in the field (cf. Loebell & Bock 2003, Jäger & Rosenbach 2008, Eckardt 2008, Traugott 2008, Garrod & Pickering 2013, Nilsson 2015, Kootstra & Şahin 2018). However, the specific role of repeating responses as a mechanism potentially propagating grammatical innovations is a very recent insight.

Repeating responses most typically occur as a reaction to the so-called polar questions (cf. Holmberg 2016, Enfield et al. 2019). In many languages polar questions are either answered with yes/no or, quite often, by repeating a part of the question. This phenomenon is well documented for numerous languages spoken in different parts of the world (cf. Ishikawa 1991, Stivers 2005, Bolden 2009, Gipper 2020). Cf. (1) for contemporary colloquial Russian.

(1)	Repeating responses in Russian			
a.	Na ulice **xolodno**?	-	**Xolodno**.	/	Ne **xolodno**.
	Is it cold outside?		Yes.		No.
b.	Maša **sdala** ėkzamen?	-	**Sdala**.	/	Ne **sdala**.
	Did Masha pass the exam?		Yes.		No.

It can be assumed that highly conventionalized repeating responses as given in (1) are a factor responsible for spreading of new grammatical forms from innovating to more conservative speakers. Having to verbatim repeat a part of the question in order to give an answer, a conservative speaker is not merely passively exposed to new grammatical forms in the speech of others but has to actively use such forms in her or his own utterances. Using new forms in one's own speech may greatly facilitate their integration into one's own grammatical system as admissible variants which can ultimately replace their inherited predecessors.

4 In search of diachronic evidence

This hypothesis is already supported by some synchronic evidence (cf. Nilsson 2015 for Swedish in Northern Europe, Gipper 2020 for Yurakaré in South America). What remains to be done is to test whether the effect can be demonstrated on long-term diachronic data. This can probably be achieved by investigating the implications of the hypothesis for particular types of grammatical constructions. By their very nature, repeating responses can be expected to yield asymmetrical behaviour of particular grammatical forms. It can be assumed that the role of repeating responses in propagating innovations may become especially visible in those parts of grammar which are affected by such asymmetries.

Asymmetries generated by repeating responses might be partly universal, i.e. potentially present in all languages, and partly specific for languages with particular grammatical properties. A potentially universal asymmetry is, for instance, the difference between verb-forms in the 1st and 2nd persons of the singular on the one hand and the rest of the inflectional paradigm on the other. For obvious reasons, the former are never repeated as such in repeating responses (but have to substitute each other), whereas all other paradigmatic forms may and/or have to be repeated (cf. 2 for Russian).

(2)	Potentially universal asymmetry in repeating responses (Russian)				
a.	Ty **letiš'** v Pariž?	-	**Leču**.	/	Ne **leču**.
	Will you fly to Paris?		Yes.		No.
b.	Ja **leču** v Pariž?	-	**Letiš'**.	/	Ne **letiš'**.
	Will I fly to Paris?		Yes.		No.
c.	Maša **letit** v Pariž?	-	**Letit**.	-	Ne **letit**.
	Will Masha fly to Paris?		Yes.		No.

A language specific asymmetry is, for instance, the difference between tense forms of verbs in languages possessing a past or future tense with auxiliary verbs. In such a language, questions in present tense require repeating responses containing the same verb-form, whereas in the past or future tenses often only the auxiliary is repeated (cf. 3a and b for German). A further language specific asymmetry pertains to the difference between the simple and compounded verbs (cf. 3c and d for dialectal Lithuanian, similarly in Svan according to Harris & Campbell 1995: 94–95).

(3)	Language specific asymmetries in repeating responses (German and dialectal Lithuanian)			
a.	**Darf** er das fragen?		Er **darf**.	**Darf** er nicht.
	Is he allowed to ask that?		Yes.	No.
b.	**Hat** er das fragen **dürfen**?	-	**Hat** er. -	**Hat** er nicht.
	Was he allowed to ask that?		Yes.	No
c.	Ar Jonas **valgė**?	-	Jis **valgė**.	
	Did Jonas eat?		Yes.	
d.	Ar Jonas **su-valgė**?	-	**Su**.	
	Did Jonas eat up?		Yes.	

The hypothesis of repeating responses facilitating the propagation of grammatical innovations in language communities implies that such asymmetries should have an observable effect on the speed of change in different parts of grammar. The universal asymmetry between the 1st/2nd singular of verbs and the rest of the inflectional paradigm (illustrated for Russian in 2) seems to imply that these particular verb forms should be universally less prone to change and/or changing slower. The language specific asymmetries (given in 3) imply more inclination toward change and/or a faster pace of change respectively in the present and simple past tense of German or English verbs (as opposed to their periphrastic past tense) and in Lithuanian simple verbs (as opposed to their compounded counterparts).

5 Corroborating observations and future prospects

As is probably always the case with hypotheses of the given kind, some corroborating evidence is easily found. It is widely known that in English such verbs as *to help*, *swell* etc. adopted the more regular 'weak' inflection (*helped*, *swelled*) in the simple past centuries earlier than in the periphrastic past perfect (*has holpen*, *swollen*, cf. Jespersen 1954: 71–75). In the archaic Lithuanian dialect island of Lazūnai the inherited present tense 3rd person *aic* 'goes' (reflecting Old Lith *eiti*) seems to be much better preserved in compounds (such as *at-aic* 'approaches, comes') than in the simple verb where it is most often replaced by *aima* (cf. Vidugiris 2014: 198–200).

Whether such scattered observations are just random artifacts of change in particular languages or, rather, reveal a diachronic trend due to priming by repeating responses, can only

be established in large-scale investigations of the relevant corpora. This remains a task for the future.

References

Bolden, Galina B. 2009. Beyond answering: Repeat-prefaced responses in conversation. *Communication Monographs* 76(2). 121–143.

Cristofaro, Sonia. 2013. The referential hierarchy: Reviewing the evidence in diachronic perspective. In Bakker Dik & Martin Haspelmath (eds.), *Language across boundaries. Studies in memory of Anna Siewierska*, 69–93. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Cristofaro, Sonia. 2014. Competing motivation models and diachrony: What evidence for what motivations? In Brian MacWhinney, Andrej Malchukov & Edith Moravcsik (eds.), *Competing motivations in grammar and usage*, 282–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cristofaro, Sonia. 2019. Taking diachronic evidence seriously: Result-oriented vs. source-oriented explanations of typological universals. In Karsten Schmidtke-Bode, Natalia Levshina, Susanne M. Michaelis & Ilja A. Seržant (eds.), *Explanation in typology. Diachronic sources, functional motivations and the nature of the evidence*, 25–46. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Cristofaro, Sonia. 2021. Towards a source-oriented approach to typological universals. In Peter Arkadiev, Jurgis Pakerys, Inesa Šeškauskienė, Vaiva Žeimantienė (eds.), Studies in Baltic and other languages. A Festschrift for Axel Holvoet on the occasion of his 65th birthday, 97–117. Vilnius: Vilnius University Press.

Croft, William. 2000. *Explaining language change: An evolutionary approach*. London: Longman.

Drinka, Bridget. 2010. Language contact. In Silvia Luraghi & Vit Bubenik (eds.), *Continuum companion to historical linguistics*, 325–345. London: Continuum

Eckardt, Regine. 2008. Concept priming in language change. *Theoretical Linguistics* 34(2). 123–133.

Enfield, Nicholas J., Penelope Brown, Christina Englert & Tanya Stivers. 2019. Polar answers. *Journal of Linguistics* 55(2). 277–304.

Fertig, David. 2013. *Analogy and morphological change*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Fertig, David. 2015. Analogy and morphophonological change. In Patrick Honeybone & Joseph Salmons (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of historical phonology*, 205–218. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Olga. 2007. *Morphosyntactic change: Functional and formal perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Garrett, Andrew. 2008. Paradigmatic uniformity and markedness: Historical convergence and universal grammar. In Jeff Good (ed.), *Linguistic universals and language change*, 125–143. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Garrod, Simon & Martin J. Pickering. 2013. Dialogue: Interactive alignment and its implications for language learning and language change. In P.-M. Binder & K. Smith (eds.), *The language phenomenon. Human communication from milliseconds to millennia*, 47–64. Berlin: Springer.

Gipper, Sonja. 2020. Repeating responses as a conversational affordance for linguistic transmission: Evidence from Yurakaré conversations. *Studies in Language* 44(2). 281–326.

Harris, Alice C. & Lyle Campbell. 1995. *Historical syntax in cross-linguistic perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haspelmath, Martin. 2019. Can cross-linguistic regularities be explained by constraints on change? In Karsten Schmidtke-Bode, Natalia Levshina, Susanne M. Michaelis & Ilja A. Seržant (eds.), *Explanation in typology. Diachronic sources, functional motivations and the nature of the evidence*, 1–24. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Hill, Eugen. 2007. Proportionale Analogie, paradigmatischer Ausgleich und Formerweiterung: Ein Beitrag zur Typologie des morphologischen Wandels. *Diachronica* 24(1). 81–118.

Hill, Eugen. 2020. Morphological analogy: Modification or whole word replacement? *Language* 96(1). e38–e58.

Holmberg, Anders. 2016. *The syntax of yes and no*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ishikawa, Minako. 1991. Iconicity in discourse. The case of repetition. *Text* 11(4). 553–580.

Jespersen, Otto. 1954. *A Modern English grammar on historical principles. Part VI. Morphology*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Jäger, Gerhard & Annette Rosenbach. 2008. Priming and unidirectional language change. *Theoretical Linguistics* 34(2). 85–113.

Kootstra, Gerrit J. & Hülya Şahin. 2018. Crosslinguistic structural priming as a mechanism of contact-induced language change: Evidence from Papiamento-Dutch bilinguals in Aruba and the Netherlands. *Language* 94(4). 902–930.

Loebell, Helga & Kathryn Bock. 2003. Structural priming across languages. *Linguistics* 41(5). 791–824.

Luraghi, Silvia. 2010. Causes of language change. In Silvia Luraghi & Vit Bubenik (eds.), *Continuum companion to historical linguistics*, 358–370. London: Continuum.

Mithun, Marianne. 2003. Functional perspectives on syntactic change. In Richard Janda & Brian Joseph (eds.), *Handbook of historical linguistics*, 552–572. Oxford: Blackwell.

Nilsson, Jenny. 2015. Dialect accommodation in interaction: Explaining dialect change and stability. *Language & Communication* 41. 6–16.

Seiler, Guido. 2015. Syntactization, analogy and the distinction between proximate and evolutionary causations. In Aria Adli, Marco García García & Göz Kaufmann (eds.), *Variation in language: System- and usage-based approaches*, 239–263. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Stivers, Tanya. 2005. Modified repeats: One method for asserting primary rights from second position. *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 38. 131–158.

Traugott, Elizabeth C. 2008. Testing the hypothesis that priming is a motivation for change. *Theoretical Linguistics* 34(2). 135–142.

Vidugiris, Aloyzas. 2014. *Lazūnų šnekta*. Vilnius: Lietuvių kalbos institutas.

Referentiality in German Left Dislocation

Stefan Hinterwimmer and Sophie Repp
Bergische Universität Wuppertal and Universität zu Köln
hinterwimmer@uni-wuppertal.de and sophie.repp@uni-koeln.de

1 German left dislocation and topicality

For many languages it has been claimed that they have structural positions that are reserved for (aboutness) topics, e.g. Hungarian (Szabolsci 1997, Kiss 1994, 2002), Chinese (Chafe 1976), German (Altmann 1981, Frey 2004a, 2004b, 2005), Italian (Rizzi 1997). Whether the respective positions can indeed be occupied only by topics and whether topics need to occur in that position in some cases is a matter of dispute. For German, Fanselow (2006) argued against the existence of the dedicated topic position in the middle field suggested by Frey (2004a, cf. Repp 2017). In this paper, we are taking a closer look at another German construction which has been classified as topic-marking: German left dislocation, GLD (Frey 2004b, 2005, Endriss & Hinterwimmer 2009). We will show that GLD does not mark topics but separates referential or quasi-referential expressions from the remainder of the clause independently of information structure, and serves a non-specified highlighting function.

In GLD, a DP (PP/CP/AdjP) occurs at the left periphery of the clause which is taken up by a resumptive d-pronoun[1] (d-RP) with the same case, number and person features. The d-RP typically is adjacent to the dislocated phrase, as in (1), but can also occur lower in the clause (2). GLD further shows connectivity effects in its binding behaviour, as shown in (3) (Frey 2004b).

(1) Den   Fritz,   den   sieht   man   oft   auf   Parties.
     the.ACC   Fritz   d-RP.ACC   sees   one   often   on   parties
     'Fritz, you often see him at parties.'

(2) Den   Fritz,   wo   sieht   man   den   oft?
     the.ACC   Fritz   where   sees   one   d-RP.ACC   often
     'Fritz, where do you see him often?'

(3) Sein$_i$ neues   iPhone,   das   vergisst   keiner$_i$ im   Biergarten.
     his   new   iPhone   d-RP   forgets   no-one in.the   beer garden
     'No one forgets his new iPhone in the beer garden.'

The proposal that GLD encodes topicality is based inter alia on the observation that only a limited class of DPs is acceptable in left-dislocated position (Frey 2004b, 2005, Endriss & Hinterwimmer 2009): DPs that either are referential (1)–(3), or quasi-referential (indefinites with unmodified determiners; see Endriss 2009), as in (4). Clearly quantificational expressions like indefinites with modified determiners are unacceptable (5).

(4) Zwei   Themen, die   haben die Deutschen   diesen Sommer beschäftigt.
     two   topics   d-RP   have   the Germans   this   summer moved
     'Two topics have moved the Germans this summer.'

---

[1] Personal pronoun for first and second person pronouns.

(5) *{Weniger   als   drei / mindestens   zwei} Themen,   die   haben ...
     less   than   three / at.least   two   topics   d-RP   have
     'Less than three topics/at least two topics have moved the Germans this summer.'

Frey (2004b, 2005) and Endriss & Hinterwimmer (2009) derive the referentiality constraint as a direct consequence of Reinhart's (1981) assumption that topics serve as addresses for information storage in the common ground.

2 Referentiality without topicality

In the following, we show that the referentiality constraint on GLD is independent of topicality: it also holds in cases where the left-dislocated constituent is clearly not a topic. First, the left-dislocated phrase can be a narrow focus in an answer to a question, as shown in (6), where '\' indicates a falling accent. Frey (2004b) suggests that examples like (6) have a 'contrastive flavour' and analyzes them as involving a contrastive topic. However, it is unclear what the function of topicality should be. Contrastive topics are usually thought to indicate that there is a larger discourse involving at least two contrastive topics (Büring 2016 for an overview). Examples like (6) need not occur in such discourses. We propose that they simply involve focus – possibly contrastive focus where the notion of contrast is linked to notions like mirativity or noteworthiness (see Cruschina 2021 for types of contrastive focus).

(6) Q: Whom did Paula introduce to the president?   (Frey 2004b: ex. 24)
     Den   \KARL,   \DEN hat   Paula dem   Präsidenten   vorgestellt.
     the.ACC K.   d-RP has   Paula the.DAT president.DAT   introduced
     'Karl, Paula introduced him to the president.'

Second, the left-dislocated phrase can be a narrow focus associated with a focus-sensitive operator (7):

(7) Hardly anybody understands Inquisitive Semantics straightaway.
     Nur   der   Andreas,   der   hat's   natürlich   sofort   gecheckt.
     only   the.NOM Andreas   d-RP   has-it   of.course   straightaway got
     'Only Andreas, he got it straightaway, of course.'

Finally, the left-dislocated phrase can be used as a 'groundholding' device, or serve as a bridge to link the subsequent discourse segment: (8) shows that nothing has to be said in the subsequent discourse about the referent denoted by the GLD-ed phrase. In other words, there clearly is no topicality involved.

(8) An ongoing conversation about snakes
     'N   Freund   von   mir,   der   hat   'ne   Freundin,
     a   friend   of   me   d-RP   has   a   friend.FEM
     die   hat   'ne   Boa   als   Haustier.
     RELP   has   a   boa   as   pet
     Boas sind keine Giftschlangen, können einen aber erwürgen.
     'A friend of mine, he has a friend that has a boa as a pet. Boas are not poisonous but they can strangle you.'

Now, as (9a) vs. (9b) show, the referentiality constraint holds in non-topical uses of GLD, too. Hence, it cannot be derived from the topic status of the left-dislocated phrase.

(9)   Welche Pferde haben Peter gestern gut gefallen?
      'Which horses did Peter like yesterday?'

      a.   Drei   Berberstuten, die   haben ihm   gut   gefallen.
           three   Berber.mares   d-RP   have   him   good   like
           'Three Berber mares, he liked them.'

      b.   *Weniger/mehr als   drei   Berberstuten,
           Less/more   than   three   Berber.mares
           die   haben ihm   gut   gefallen.
           d-RP   have   him   good   like
           'Less than three Berber mares, he liked them.'

3 Analysis

Our analysis of the referentiality constraint builds on two observations: (i) GLD is compatible with generic and adverbial quantification (10) (Endriss & Hinterwimmer 2009); (ii) Modified indefinites, i.e. clearly non-referential expressions, cannot be interpreted in the restrictor of adverbial quantifiers, (11a) vs. (11b). The reason is that adverbial quantifiers quantify over minimal situations satisfying the restrictor (von Fintel 1994): a minimal situation containing less than three kids (11a) is a situation with no kids at all, which is nonsensical. Hence the infelicity of (11a).

(10) Ein   Torwart,   der   hat   meistens   gute   Nerven.
      a   goalie   d-RP   has   mostly   good   nerves
      'Usually, a goalie has strong nerves.'

(11) A survey of vaccination records in schools last year revealed:
      a.   (??)Weniger   als   drei   Kinder   sind meistens   geimpft.
               less   than   three   kids   are   mostly   vaccinated
           'Less than three kids are usually vaccinated.'
      b.   Meistens sind   weniger   als   drei   Kinder   geimpft.
           mostly   are   less   than   three   kids   vaccinated
           'Usually, less than three kids are vaccinated.'

For GLD we propose that these structures contain a covert (existential/generic) or an overt adverbial quantifier over situations, which takes the left-dislocated phrase as its first argument (= restrictor) and the remainder of the sentence as its second argument. Due to minimality, the left-dislocated phrase needs to be quasi-referential. The interpretation proceeds in 'two steps'. First, a (class of) situation(s) is introduced that contains the referent denoted by the left-dislocated phase. Attention is drawn to that referent: it is made prominent. Then something is said about the referent.

The presence of the adverbial quantifier in GLD is a result of the syntactic structure of GLD sentences. We assume that there is an operator in the C position licensing the occurrence of the d-pronoun, the dislocation and the occurrence of the quantifier (details omitted for space reasons). The restriction to the particular structure is important because sentences without GLD

or other dislocation structures are not subject to the referentiality constraint (e.g., hanging topics, Frey 2004b, 2005, Repp 2011).

To conclude, we have argued that GLD is not a topic-marking construction. Rather, it separates referential or quasi-referential expressions from the remainder of the clause independently of information structure, and serves a non-specified highlighting function.

References

Altmann, Hans. 1981. *Formen der 'Herausstellung' im Deutschen.* Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Büring, Daniel. 2016. (Contrastive topic). In Caroline Fery & Shinichiro Ishihara (eds.), *The Oxford handbook of information structure*, 64–85. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chafe, Wallace. 1976. Giveness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics, and point of view. In Charles N. Li (ed.), *Subject and topic,* 25–56. New York: Academic Press.

Cruschina, Silvio. 2021. The greater the contrast, the greater the potential: On the effects of focus in syntax. *Glossa* 6(1). 3.

Endriss, Cornelia. 2009. *Quantificational topics – A scopal treatment of exceptional wide scope phenomena.* Berlin: Springer.

Endriss, Cornelia & Stefan Hinterwimmer. 2009. Indefinites as direct and indirect aboutness topics. In Caroline Fery & Malte Zimmermann (eds.), *Information Structure,* 89–115. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

von Fintel, Kai U. 1994. *Restrictions on quantifier domains.* PhD dissertation, University of Massachusetts.

Kiss, Katalin É. 1994. Sentence structure and word order. In Ferenc Kiefer & Katalin É. Kiss (eds.), *The syntactic structure of Hungarian,* 1–90. San Diego: Academic Press.

Kiss, Katalin É. 2002. *Syntax of Hungarian.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanselow, Gisbert. 2006. On pure syntax (uncontaminated by information structure). In Patrick Brandt & Eric Fuss (eds.), *Form, structure and grammar,* 137–158. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Frey, Werner. 2004a. A medial topic position for German. *Linguistische Berichte* 199. 153–190.

Frey, Werner. 2004b. The grammar-pragmatics interface and the German prefield. *Sprache und Pragmatik* 52. 1–39.

Frey, Werner. 2005. Pragmatic properties of certain German and English left peripheral constructions. *Linguistics* 43. 89–129.

Reinhart, Tanya. 1981. Pragmatics and linguistics: An analysis of sentence topics. *Philosophica* 27. 53–94.

Repp, Sophie. 2011. Relevance topics. In Ingo Reich, Eva Horch & Dennis Pauly (eds.), *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung* 15, 483–498. Saarbrücken: Universaar – Saarland University Press.

Repp, Sophie. 2017. Structural topic marking: Evidence from the processing of grammatical and ungrammatical sentences with adverbs. *Lingua* 188. 53–90.

Rizzi, Luigi. 1997. The fine structure of the left periphery. In Liliane Haegeman (ed.), *Elements of grammar*, 281–337. Dordrecht: Springer.

Szabolcsi, Anna. 1997. Strategies for scope taking. In Anna Szabolcsi (ed.), *Ways of scope taking,* 109–154. Amsterdam: Kluwer.

The role of sentences in discourse

Jet Hoek – Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
jet.hoek@ru.nl

1 Sentences: why would they matter?

While almost everyone will have some understanding of what a sentence is, giving an exact definition has proven to be less than straightforward. Allerton (1969) states that "a purely descriptive definition of the sentence [...] can only be in terms of the conventionalized written language, i.e. as a sequence of words (or morphs) lying between utterance-beginning or a full stop on the one side, and (utterance-end or) a full stop on the other" (p. 27); other descriptive characteristics of sentences (e.g., being able to meaningfully occur in isolation), appear to be neither sufficient nor obligatory for a sequence of words to appear as a sentence. In addition, it has been questioned whether two clauses that are coordinated (e.g., *Klaus von Heusinger is a linguist and he works at the University of Cologne)* are fundamentally different from two clauses that appear as two independent sentences (e.g., *Klaus von Heusinger is a linguist. He works at the University of Cologne).* Despite the lack of an airtight definition, the sentence, along with the grammatical clause, is often used as the basis for segmenting and analyzing discourse (e.g., Hoek, Evers-Vermeul & Sanders 2018) – a guideline usually unproblematic to implement, as most discourse analyses have focused on written language. However, this decision often appears to be arbitrary (although it will make intuitive sense to most). Is there evidence to suggest that the sentence is a meaningful unit in discourse?

2 Discourse relations between clauses vs. sentences

Although the difference between, for instance, two clauses appearing in a single complex sentence and two clauses appearing as separate sentences may seem small, as in the examples above, there appears to be a relationship between the syntactic configuration of a relation and the types of coherence relations that can be inferred. Even though *and* is a highly general connective that allows for the inference of much more specific types of relations, a relation in which the two segments are coordinated by *and* does not seem to be able to express all relations that can be conveyed using a juxtaposition of two segments, and vice versa (Carston 2002, Crible & Demberg 2018). Backward causal relations (prototypically signaled by *because*), for example, can be expressed by juxtaposed sentences, but not by a construction in which two clauses are connected by and. Similarly, the range of coherence relations that can be inferred between a matrix clause and a free adjunct is not equal to the range of relations inferable between two juxtaposed sentences (Kortmann 1991, Reid 2016). For example, juxtaposed sentences can express relations involving some form of contrast between the segments, but this option does not seem to be available for free adjunct constructions (or only very marginally). So even if two clauses are joined in the same sentence without a very explicit cue as to which coherence relation should be inferred between them, the fact that they do appear in a single sentence seems to affect the interpretation of the discourse.

3 Coreference and sentence boundaries

Another discourse-level phenomenon that appears to be influenced by sentence boundaries is coreference. The forced-choice pronoun interpretation task reported in Hoek (2020) compares the interpretations of ambiguous pronouns that can refer to a referent mentioned in the preceding clause or to a referent mentioned in the clause before that. The ambiguous pronoun

functions as the subject of a sentence containing a nonce verb, so that the meaning of that sentence does not provide any disambiguating or biasing information. The two potential referents for the pronoun appear either in a single sentence consisting of a main clause and a subordinate clause, as in (1a), a complex sentence consisting of two main clauses, as in (1b), or as two separate sentences, as in (1c). Although the one-sentence conditions contain a connective while the two-sentence condition does not, the coherence relation between the two clauses is held constant.

(1)   a.   Nadja hat vegane Burger gekauft, weil Sabine kein Fleisch isst.
          b.   Nadja hat vegane Burger gekauft, denn Sabine isst kein Fleisch.
          c.   Nadja hat vegane Burger gekauft. Sabine isst kein Fleisch.
          Sie daupte.

Participants were asked who the ambiguous pronoun refers to *(Wer daupte?)*. Results show that the proportion of pronouns resolved to the referent mentioned in the first clause, i.e., *Nadja* in (1), is significantly higher in the one-sentence conditions (main-sub: 61%, main-main: 54%) than in the two-sentence condition (22%). This suggests that coreference is highly sensitive to sentence boundaries.

    A self-paced reading experiment by Wilke, Hoek & Rohde (in prep) supports this finding. Participants were asked to read short passages containing the ambiguous pronoun *it*. The pronoun was followed by information that specified whether *it* referred to the first or second clause of the discourse. Those first two clauses either appeared in a single sentence, as in (2a) or as two separate sentences, as in (2b).

(2)   a.   My nephew was playing Monopoly with his best friend, who always carries her favorite book around.
          b.   My nephew was playing Monopoly with his best friend. She always carries her favorite book around.
      [**It** is] [a board game they often play together.]$_{target}$ [My nephew usually wins.]$_{spillover}$

Reading times indicate that disambiguating information that revealed that the pronoun referred to the first clause of the discourse (i.e., the target region) was read faster in the one-sentence condition than in the two-sentence condition, see Figure 1. In addition to the presence of a sentence boundary, the two conditions in this experiment differ in that the 'intervening' clause is a subordinate clause in the one-sentence condition and a main clause in the two-sentence condition. However, the Hoek (2020) study suggests that the effect of syntactic subordination on coreference is much smaller than the effect of sentence boundaries. The self-paced reading experiment by Wilke, Hoek & Rohde (in prep) therefore seems to lend additional support for the idea that sentence boundaries matter for coreference resolution, also in real-time discourse processing.

Figure 1: Residual reading times for all three regions in Wilke, Hoek & Rohde (in prep), per condition (in ms)

4 Conclusion

The sentence thus appears to be a meaningful unit in discourse, since effects of sentence boundaries on discourse-level phenomena such as coherence relations and coreference can be distinguished from effects of clause boundaries. However, if it is difficult to give an exact definition of the sentence as a linguistic unit, the findings reported above may actually be due to something else that is closely correlated to what is commonly understood to constitute a sentence: The above effects could for instance arise mainly because of what the units of meaning are understood to be. Since the apparent sentence-boundary effects appear to be quite strong, the exact mechanism behind these effects seems like a valuable topic to explore in future research. In the meantime, however, it seems wise to continue using the sentence as a unit of analysis when studying discourse.

References

Allerton, David J. 1969. The sentence as a linguistic unit. *Lingua* 22. 27–46.

Carston, Robyn. 2002. *Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication.* Malden: Blackwell.

Crible, Ludivine & Vera Demberg. 2018. Disambiguating discourse relations with or without a connective: Does "and" really say nothing? In *TextLink2018-Final Action Conference,* 24–28.

Hoek, Jet. 2020. Syntactic coordination and the prominence of discourse referents. Talk presented at *RED-2020: Prominent Inferences.* Online workshop.

Hoek, Jet, Jacqueline Evers-Vermeul & Ted JM Sanders. 2018. Segmenting discourse: Incorporating interpretation into segmentation? *Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Theory* 14(2). 357–386.

Kortmann, Bernd. 1991. *Free adjuncts and absolutes in English.* London: Routledge.

Reid, James M. 2016. *Free adjuncts and temporal coherence.* Unpublished manuscript.

Wilke, Hans, Jet Hoek & Hannah Rohde. (in prep). Attachment Issues: When clause type and position influence at-issueness and attachment biases.

Prominenz im Kompositum?

Anke Holler – Universität Göttingen
anke.holler@phil.uni-goettingen.de

Sonntage mit einem *Tatort* ausklingen zu lassen, kann entspannend und lehrreich sein, auch für Linguisten. Denn das erfolgreichste Krimi-Format des deutschen Fernsehens gibt nicht nur Einblicke in die Kultur- und Mentalitätsgeschichte des Landes (vgl. Hißnauer, Scherer & Stockinger 2014), sondern ist zugleich eine Fundgrube für dessen sprachliche Vielfalt. So fragt im Tatort „Der scheidende Lupo", ausgestrahlt von der ARD am 5.2.2017, die Kriminalkommissarin Kira Dorn den Polizisten Ludwig Maria Pohl, genannt Lupo, in der Minute 09:27: „Lupo, kannst du dir vorstellen, dass jemand die Bombe in deinem Garten vergraben hat?" Er antwortet: „Ein Rosenhasser? Die tun doch niemandem was." Wenngleich auch Rosenhasser vermutlich harmlose Zeitgenossen sind, so ist doch eher gemeint, dass Rosen niemandem etwas zu Leide tun. Mit anderen Worten nimmt das Demonstrativpronomen *die* das Erstglied des N+N-Kompositums, i.e. *Rosen*, anaphorisch wieder auf. Dieses wird einen in Anaphorik geschulten Linguisten zunächst irritieren, denn das Erstglied sollte für ein koreferentielles Pronomen nicht ohne Weiteres zugänglich sein, zumindest wenn die klassische Annahme von Postal (1969), dass Wörter anaphorische Inseln bilden, zutrifft. Um den Inselstatus zu illustrieren, werden in der Regel Sätze wie (1) und (2) kontrastiert. In (1) kann auf das Erstglied *Geburtstag* im Nominalkompositum *Geburtstagstorte* syntaktisch nicht zugegriffen werden, obwohl das selbständige Nomen *Geburtstag* in (2) problemlos als Kopf eines Relativsatzes fungieren kann.

(1)   *Jetzt wird die Geburtstagstorte angeschnitten, der gebührend gefeiert werden soll.
(2)   Jetzt wird die Torte für den Geburtstag angeschnitten, der gebührend gefeiert werden soll.

Die Inakzeptabilität von (1) im Gegensatz zu (2) wird üblicherweise mit einer Verletzung der lexikalischen Integrität begründet, vgl. u.a. Wunderlich (1986), Di Sciullo & Williams (1987), Spencer (1991), Anderson (1992) oder neuerlich Lieber & Stekauer (2009). Dabei handelt es sich um eine Eigenschaft, die meistens herangezogen wird, um die morphologische und die syntaktische Strukturbildung voneinander abzugrenzen. Auch wenn nach wie vor kontrovers diskutiert wird, ob die Syntax tatsächlich nur auf vollständigen Wörtern operiert (vgl. z.B. Ackema & Neeleman 2002), und obgleich typologische Evidenz eher für eine schwächere Form der lexikalischen Integrität spricht, ist die syntaktische Autonomie der Wortstruktur, zumindest in lexikalistisch orientierten Ansätzen, bis heute die maßgebliche Erklärungsfigur für den Grammatikalitätsunterschied zwischen (1) und (2). Im Zusammenhang damit ist auch ein weiteres Argument für die anaphorische Unzugänglichkeit des Erstgliedes in Nominalkomposita gängig, das den morphosyntaktischen Status des N_1 betrifft. Das Erstglied verhalte sich grundsätzlich nicht wie eine Nominalphrase, da weder Flexionsmerkmale vorhanden noch Determination oder Modifikation möglich seien. Beispielsweise existiert der *Vogelkäfig* nicht als **Vögelkäfig* oder **Vogelskäfig*, und auch ein *trillernder Vogelkäfig* drückt das Gewünschte nicht aus, **ein der-Vogelkäfig* ist sogar vollkommen inakzeptabel. Unabhängig davon, dass Klammerparadoxien wie *eine gekochte Schinkenplatte* (Sternefeld 2003), Phrasenkomposita wie *die Der-schöne-Rheingau-Laberei* (Meibauer 2003) und unregelmäßige Pluralformen des Erstgliedes wie *Wortliste* vs. *Wörterliste* (Clahsen et el. 2015) diesem Argument schon entgegenstehen, ist mit dem Hinweis auf den fehlenden Phrasenstatus allein noch nicht zu beantworten, warum im Falle des Rosenhassers die Wortstruktur für anaphorische Prozesse durchlässig ist.

Eine zu den genannten morpho-syntaktisch ausgerichteten Erklärungsversuchen alternative Herangehensweise bezieht Bedeutungsaspekte mit ein. Beispielsweise werden Fälle wie (3) und (4), in denen ebenfalls ein anaphorischer Bezug auf ein Kompositumserstglied erfolgt, rein semantisch begründet: Die vermeintliche anaphorische Insel ist dann erreichbar, wenn das Erstglied referentiell verwendet wird, was auf Eigennamen wie Picasso und Merkel zweifelsfrei zutrifft.

(3)   Was Picasso$_i$-Fans so alles veranstalten, wenn sie ihn$_i$ verehren.   (Wunderlich 1986)
(4)   die Merkel$_i$-Pläne, die sie$_i$ scharf verteidigt.   (Schlücker 2013)

Entsprechend wird der Inselstatus von Nominalkomposita wie (1) damit erklärt, dass das Erstglied nicht referentiell interpretiert werden kann, vgl. u.a. Sproat (1985), Wunderlich (1986), Booij (2009), Olsen (2012). Bauer (2006) argumentiert ergänzend, dass Komposita Benennungseinheiten für etablierte Konzepte bildeten und das Erstglied der Identifizierung der Subklassen des vom Kopf denotierten Konzepts dient. Zifonuns Beobachtung, dass auch Eigennamen unzugänglich werden, wenn das N_1 ein abstraktes Konzept denotiert, das sich auf ein entsprechendes Individuum bezieht, scheint diese Annahme zusätzlich zu stützen:

(5)   *das Einsteinhirn$_i$, auf das er$_i$ stolz war   (Zifonun 2010)

Aber auch eine solche semantische Erklärung wird Lupos Antwort noch nicht vollkommen gerecht, denn die Rosen sind für das anaphorische Pronomen offenbar als Antezedens zugänglich, obwohl sie nicht referentiell gebraucht werden.

Das Rosenhasser-Beispiel weist interessante Parallelen zu Beispiel (6) auf, das von Härtl (2015) in Anlehnung an Lieber (1992) als ein Fall pragmatisch lizenzierter sublexikaler Bindung eingestuft wird.

(6)   Tom ist Porsche$_i$fahrer und sein Sohn will später auch einmal einen$_i$ haben.

(Härtl 2015)

Härtl (2015) argumentiert, dass scheinbare Verletzungen des Prinzips der lexikalischen Integrität wie in (6) durch Bridging lizenziert und damit pragmatisch motiviert sind. Dies ist kompatibel mit frühen Beobachtungen von Ward, Sproat & McKoon (1991), die das Phänomen anhand von Beispielen wie (7) bereits diskursstrukturell einordnen und pragmatische Inferenzprozesse als Erklärung für die Zugänglichkeit von Erstgliedern in Komposita angeben.

(7)   Officials in the Danish capital believe that they've found a way to stop bicycle$_i$
        thefts – let people use them$_i$ for free.   (Ward, Sproat & McKoon 1991)

Ward et al. (1991) vertreten sogar die starke Hypothese, dass keine grammatischen Prinzipien existieren, die ausschließen, dass wortinterne Konstituenten pronominal wieder aufgenommen werden. Demnach gibt es auch keine anaphorischen Inseln im Postalschen Sinne, sondern die Bezugnahme auf Wortteile unterliegt pragmatischen Faktoren und wird nur durch den Diskurskontext restringiert. Mit den Grundannahmen von Ward et al. (1991) und Härtl (2015) kommt genaugenommen die Diskursrepräsentation ins Spiel und damit die dynamische Interpretation anaphorischer Prozesse. Mit anderen Worten, eine erfolgreiche anaphorische Bezugnahme setzt einen zugänglichen Diskursreferenten in der Repräsentation voraus. Wieso aber führt das N_1 *Rosen* im Kompositum *Rosenhasser* offenbar einen Diskursreferenten in die Repräsentation ein, der anaphorisch resolviert werden kann, das N_1 *Rosen* in *Rosenbeet* jedoch nicht, wie der Kontrast zwischen (8) und (9) belegt?

(8)   Ein Rosenhasser? Die tun doch niemandem was.
(9)   *Ein Rosenbeet? Die tun doch niemandem was.

Beide Komposita sind transparent, aber hinsichtlich ihrer internen Struktur unterschiedlich gebaut. Bei *Rosenhasser* handelt es sich um ein Rektionskompositum, d.h. *Rosen* fungiert als Argument des nominalisierten Verbs *hassen* und ist damit thetamarkiert. Zwischen den beiden Konstituenten *Rosen* und *Beet* im Wurzelkompositum *Rosenbeet* hingegen besteht keine solche Selektionsbeziehung, allerdings eine semantische Relation zwischen den Denotaten der beiden Wortkonstituenten, die z.B. als ein Beet *für* Rosen oder ein Beet *aus* Rosen paraphrasiert werden kann. Es versteht sich von selbst, dass die prinzipielle Analysierbarkeit eines Kompositums eine notwendige Bedingung für die anaphorische Bezugnahme ist. Daher steht in psycholinguistischen (z.B. McKoon, Ward, Ratcliff & Sproat 1993, Zwitserlood 1994, Gagné & Shoben 1997, Libben, Gibson, Yoon & Sandra 2003, Libben 2007, 2010, Gagné 2009, Gagné & Spalding 2007, 2016, Klos 2011) und korpuslinguistischen (z.B. Reddy, McCarthy & Manandhar 2011, Schäfer 2013, Schäfer & Bell 2016) Studien zum Thema der Einfluss des Transparenz-Niveaus auf die Zugänglichkeit der Kompositaglieder im Vordergrund der Untersuchung. Semantische Transparenz für beide Komposita in (8) und (9) vorausgesetzt, bleibt aber das Problem, dass das N_1 *Rosen* nur in (8), nicht aber in (9) wiederaufgenommen werden kann. Erste Ergebnisse von Blickbewegungsstudien (vgl. Rößler, Weskott & Holler 2017, Rößler 2018) stützen die Vermutung, dass der unterschiedliche morphosyntaktische Strukturaufbau beider Komposita doch relevant für die Durchlässigkeit der Wortstruktur ist, denn bei der Anaphernresolution konnte ein früher Effekt – unseres Wissens erstmalig – im Zusammenhang mit einem strukturellen Faktor gezeigt werden. Die hierfür einschlägigen Maße (Total Reading Time, First Path Fixation Duration) zeigten, dass der anaphorische Bezug auf das N_1 bei Rektionskomposita leichter zu etablieren war als bei Wurzelkomposita. Aber warum ist dies der Fall?

Im Zuge eines rein morpho-syntaktischen Ansatzes wäre eine Analyse denkbar, wonach die Wurzel *Rosen* als Wortkonstituente in *Rosenhasser* einen anderen kategorialen Status aufweist als in *Rosenbeet*. Um als internes Argument des nominalisierten Verbs *hassen* fungieren zu können, muss es mindestens als Nomen kategorisiert sein, so eine mögliche Annahme. Dieselbe Anforderung bestünde in *Rosenbeet* nicht. Ein solcher grammatisch getriebener Ansatz würde den Kontrast zwischen (8) und (9) erfassen, wenn man zugleich annimmt, dass das N_1 in (8) aufgrund der internen Struktur des Kompositums einen Diskursreferenten in die Repräsentation einführt, nicht jedoch in (9). Selbst wenn der morpho-syntaktische Strukturaufbau in der beschriebenen Weise restringierte, ob Erstglieder in Komposita anaphorisch erreichbar sind, so kann diese Modellierung noch keine befriedigende Erklärung für den generellen Befund liefern, dass die Zugänglichkeit von Wortkonstituenten bestimmten graduellen Abstufungen unterliegt. An dieser Stelle wird offenbar einmal mehr das aktuelle Arbeitsfeld des Jubilars relevant, denn es spricht – die Transparenz des Kompositums vorausgesetzt – einiges dafür, dass der Prominenzstatus des Diskursreferenten, der durch das Erstglied eines Rektionskompositums eingeführt wird, den Grad seiner Zugänglichkeit beeinflusst. Mit der Hypothese, dass Prominenz als diskurspragmatisches und für die Diskursrepräsentation strukturbildendes Prinzip auch die anaphorische Bezugnahme auf Wortkonstituenten lizenziert, eröffnet sich aber eine neue empirische und theoretische Problemlage, die hiermit statt Geburtstagstorte überbracht sei, denn es wäre erst noch zu zeigen, ob und wenn ja, in welcher Weise Prominenz mit dem grammatischen Strukturaufbau von Komposita interagiert.

Herzlichen Glückwunsch zum Sechzigsten und allzeit produktives Forschen!

Referenzen

Ackema, Peter & Ad Neeleman. 2002. Syntactic atomicity. *The Journal of Comparative Germanic Linguistics* 6(2). 93–128.

Anderson, Stephen R. 1992. *A-Morphous Morphology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bauer, Laurie. 2006. Compound. In Keith Brown (Hrsg.), *Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics*, 719–726. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Booij, Geert. 2009. Compounding and construction morphology. In Rochelle Lieber & Štekauer, Pavol (Hrsg.), *The Oxford Handbook of Compounding*, 201–216. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clahsen, Harald, et al. 2015. Morphology constrains native and non-native word formation in different ways: Evidence from plurals inside compounds. *The Mental Lexicon* 10(1). 53–87.

Di Sciullo, Anna-Maria & Edwin Williams. 1987. *On the Definition of Word*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Gagné, Christina L. 2009. Psycholinguistic perspectives. In Rochelle Lieber & Štekauer, Pavol (Hrsg.), *The Oxford Handbook of Compounding*, 255–271. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gagné, Christina L. & Edward J. Shoben. 1997. Influence of thematic relations on the comprehension of modifier–noun combinations. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 23(1). 71–87.

Gagné, Christina L. & Thomas L. Spalding. 2006. Conceptual combination: Implications for the mental lexicon. In: Gary Libben & Gonia Jarema (Hrsg.), *The Representation and Processing of Compound Words*, 145–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gagné, Christina L. & Thomas L. Spalding. 2016. Effects of morphology and semantic transparency on typing latencies in English compound and pseudo-compound words. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition* 42(9). 1489–1495.

Härtl, Holden. 2015. Situationsargumente von Nicht-Köpfen: Verb-Nomen-Komposita im Zusammenspiel von Morphologie, Syntax und Pragmatik. In Christian Fortmann, Anja Lübbe, Irene Rapp (Hrsg.), *Situationsargumente im Nominalbereich*, 159–184. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Hißnauer, Christian, Stefan Scherer & Claudia Stockinger. 2014. Die Einheit der ARD-Reihe Tatort im historischen Verlauf. In Brill Fink (Hrsg.), *Föderalismus in Serie*, Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink.

Klos, Verena. 2011. *Komposition und Kompositionalität. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der semantischen Dekodierung von Substantivkomposita*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Libben, Gary. 2007. Why study compound processing? An overview of the issues. In Libben Gary & Gonia Jarema (Hrsg.), *The Representation and Processing of Compound Words*, 1–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Libben, Gary. 2010. Compound words, semantic transparency, and morphological transcendence. *Linguistische Berichte Sonderheft* 17. 317–330.

Libben, Gary, Martha Gibson, Yea Bom Yoon & Dominiek Sandra. 2003. Compound fracture: The role of semantic transparency and morphological headedness. *Brain and Language* 84(1). 50–64.

Lieber, Rochelle. 1992. *Deconstructing Morphology. Word Formation in Syntactic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lieber, Rochelle & Pavol Stekauer. 2009. Status and definition of compounding. In Rochelle Lieber & Pavol Stekauer (Hrsg.), *The Oxford Handbook of Compounding*, 3–18. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McKoon, Gail; Gregory Ward, Roger Ratcliff & Richard Sproat. 1993. Morphosyntactic and pragmatic factors affecting the accessibility of discourse entities. *Journal of Memory and Language* 32(1). 56–75.

Meibauer, Jörg. 2003. Phrasenkomposita zwischen Wortsyntax und Lexikon. *Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft* 22(2). 153–188.

Olsen, Susan. 2012. Der Einfluss des Mentalen Lexikons auf die Interpretation von Komposita. In Gaeta, Livio & Barbara Schlücker (Hrsg.), *Das Deutsche als kompositionsfreudige Sprache*, 135–170. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Postal, Paul M. 1969. Anaphoric islands. In Robert Binnick, Alice Davidson, Georgia Green & Jerry Morgan (Hrsg.), *Papers from the 5th Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*, 209–239. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.

Reddy, Siva, Diana McCarthy & Suresh Manandhar. 2011. An empirical study on compositionality in compound nouns. In *Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Natural Language Processing*, 210–218. Chiang Mai, Thailand.

Rößler, Stefanie, Thomas Weskott & Anke Holler. 2017. N1-accessibility as a matter of compound processing. In *Talk presented at the 39th Annual Conference of the German Linguistic Society*, Saarbrücken.

Rößler, Stefanie. 2018. *Komposita-Erstglieder. Untersuchungen zur anaphorischen Zugänglichkeit*. PhD dissertation, Universität Göttingen.

Schäfer, Martin. 2013. Semantic transparency and anaphoric sslands. In Pius Ten Hacken & Claire Thomas (Hrsg.), *The Semantics of Word Formation and Lexicalization*, 140–160. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Schäfer, Martin & Melanie J. Bell. 2016. Modelling semantic transparency. *Morphology* 26(2). 157–199.

Schlücker, Barbara. 2013. Non-classifying compounds in German. *Folia Linguistica* 47(2). 449–480.

Spencer, Andrew. 1991. Morphological theory: An introduction to word structure in generative grammar. *Journal of Linguistics* 28(2). 509–512.

Sproat, Richard William. 1985. *On deriving the lexicon*. PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Sternefeld, Wolfgang. 2003. *Klammerparadoxien: Gibt es sie wirklich?* Vortrag, Universität Leipzig. URL: https://www.sternefeld.info (Letzter Abruf: 31.8.2021).

Ward, Gregory; Richard Sproat & Gail McKoon. 1991. A pragmatic analysis of so-called anaphoric islands. *Language and Cognitive Processes* 67(3). 439–474.

Wunderlich, Dieter. 1986. Probleme der Wortstruktur. *Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft* 5(2). 209–252.

Zifonun, Gisela. 2010. Von Bush administration zu Kohl-Regierung: Englische Einflüsse auf deutsche Nominalkonstruktionen? In Carmen Scherer & Anke Holler (Hrsg.), *Strategien der Integration und Isolation nicht-nativer Einheiten und Strukturen*, 165–182. Berlin: De Gruyter

Zwitserlood, Pinie. 1994. The role of semantic transparency in the processing and representation of Dutch compounds. *Language and Cognitive Processes* 9(3). 341–368.

Some notes on the scope of *one* indefinites

Tania Ionin – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
tionin@illinois.edu

1 Indefinites and scopal specificity

This paper provides an overview of experimental findings on the interpretation of *one* indefinites and *a* indefinites in scopally ambiguous English sentences. This line of inquiry is related to the work of Klaus von Heusinger in at least two ways. On the one hand, von Heusinger (2002, 2011) discusses several different kinds of specificity, including scopal specificity, our focus here. On the other hand, von Heusinger and colleagues have investigated the behavior of indefinite articles derived from the numeral *one*, including *ein* indefinites (in comparison to *dieser* 'this' indefinites) in German (Deichsel & von Heusinger 2011) and *bir* and *bitta* indefinites in Uzbek (von Heusinger & Klein 2013).

Here, we focus on English *one* indefinites, and how they differ from *a* indefinites with regard to scopal specificity. It is well-known that simple English sentences containing an indefinite quantifier and a universal quantifier in subject vs. object positions, as in (1)–(2), are ambiguous. On the surface-scope reading, the subject takes wide scope over the object, as in (1a) and (2a); on the inverse-scope reading, the subject quantifier takes narrow scope relative to the object quantifier, as in (1b) and (2b). Assuming the classical view that indefinites are quantifiers (Barwise & Cooper 1981), both readings are derived through quantifier raising (QR): on the surface-scope reading, the subject scopes over the object at LF, while the opposite is the case on the inverse-scope reading (May 1985).

(1)   Every boy fed a/one bird.
     a. *surface-scope (every>a/one)*: Every boy fed at least one bird (the birds are potentially different).
     b. *inverse-scope (a/one>every)*: There is one specific bird such that all the boys fed it.

(2)   A/one boy fed every bird.
     a. *surface-scope (a/one>every)*: There is one specific boy who fed all the birds.
     b. *inverse-scope (every>a/one)*: For every bird, there is at least one boy who fed it (the boys are potentially different).

However, the view of indefinites as quantificational has been challenged by the observation that indefinites, unlike quantifiers, are able to escape syntactic islands, such as relative clauses and antecedents of a conditional (Farkas 1981; Fodor & Sag 1982; and much subsequent literature). This is illustrated in (3), where the indefinite *a/one child* is inside a relative clause. If indefinites were restricted to local scope inside a relative clause, we should only obtain the reading in (3a); yet the reading in (3b), on which the indefinite escapes the island and scopes over the universal quantifier, is also possible.

(3)   The teacher put away every toy that a/one child played with.
     a. *surface-scope (every>a/one) = local scope*: The teacher put away every toy that was played with by at least one child (the children are potentially different).
     b. *inverse-scope (a/one>every) = LD scope*: There is one specific child such that the teacher put away all the toys that this child played with.

There have been many different accounts of such long-distance (LD) readings of indefinites, some of which have tied LD scope to some form of specificity or referentiality (see, among others, Fodor & Sag 1982; Reinhart 1997; Winter 1997; Kratzer 1998; Schwarzschild 2002; for overviews, see von Heusinger 2002, 2011).

In English, as in many other languages, the indefinite article is derived from the numeral *one*. As discussed in von Heusinger & Klein (2013), in reference to Uzbek, indefinites go through a series of stages as *one* develops into an article (Heine 1997); during the earlier stages, the *one* indefinite is used to introduce specific referents. Even in languages in which *one* has been fully grammaticalized as an indefinite article, as in the case of *ein* 'a/one' in German, there may still be a distinction between specific and non-specific forms of the article. Endriss (2009) proposed that indefinites with stress on *ein* are topical and scopally specific.

In this paper, we provide an overview of experimental studies from the past decade which examine whether *a* and *one* indefinites differ in their compatibility with scopal (non-) specificity.

2 Experimental findings on *one* vs. *a* indefinites

Two recent experimental studies (Scontras et al. 2014; Ionin & Luchkina 2019) examined native English speakers' judgments of simple double-quantifier sentences such as (1)–(2). Scontras et al. compared the scope possibilities of English to those of Chinese, while Ionin and Luchkina compared English and Russian. Both studies used (modified) truth-value judgment tasks, in which participants listened to a sentence in the context of a picture and had to judge whether the sentence is true/matching or false/non-matching given the picture. Both studies contained (among a variety of other conditions) a distributive condition: for (1)–(2) (sample sentences from Ionin & Luchkina 2019), the target picture showed three different boys each feeding a different bird. Such a picture makes (1) true only on the surface-scope reading, but makes (2) true only on the inverse-scope reading.

Another study (Ionin, Ebert & Stolterfoht 2011) examined the behavior of sentences such as (3), comparing availability of LD indefinite scope in English to German. In this case, the target condition which teased apart the two readings of (3) had two children, a girl and a boy, each playing with some toys; the teacher put away all the toys that the boy played with, but not all the toys that the girl played with, thus making (3) true on the inverse-scope (indefinite-LD/wide) reading, but false on the surface-scope (indefinite-local/narrow) reading.

All three studies compared sentences with *a* indefinites to those with *one* indefinites. The results of the studies are summarized in Table 1.

What do the results show? First, the two studies that tested local configurations obtained similar patterns of results. The rates of true/yes responses were higher for (1), which was true on surface scope, than for (2) which was true only on inverse scope, consistent with a processing preference for surface scope (cf. Kurtzmann & MacDonald 1993; Anderson 2004), but acceptance of inverse-scope readings was much greater with *a* than with *one*, in both studies: *one*-indefinites in subject position in (2) were resistant to taking narrow scope. In the LD configuration in (3), *one* indefinites took LD wide scope more readily than *a* indefinites.

Table 1: Summary of experimental findings

	Scontras, et al. 2014	Ionin & Luchkina 2019	Ionin, et al. 2011
Which reading makes the sentence true?	(1): The surface-scope, *every>a/one* reading (narrow scope of indefinite) (2): The inverse-scope, *every>a/one* reading (narrow scope of indefinite)		(3): The inverse-scope, *a/one>every* reading (LD wide scope of indefinite)
%True/Yes responses with *a*	(1): 93% (2): 56%	(1): 93% (2): 84%	(3): 50%
%True/Yes responses with *one*	(1): 100% (2): 28%	(1): 87% (2): 51%	(3): 75%

3 Conclusion

Thus, while both surface-scope and inverse-scope readings are available to both types of indefinites, *one* indefinites in subject position are more likely to be interpreted as scopally specific (and/or topical, per Endriss 2009) than *a* indefinites.

References

Anderson, Catherine. 2004. *The structure and real-time comprehension of quantifier scope ambiguity*. PhD dissertation, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.

Barwise, Jon & Robin Cooper. 1981. Generalized quantifiers and natural language. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 4(2). 159–219.

Deichsel, Annika & Klaus von Heusinger. 2011. The cataphoric potential of indefinites in German. In Iris Hendrickx, Sobha Lalitha Devi, António Branco & Ruslan Mitkov (eds.), *DAARC 2011: Anaphora Processing and Applications*, 144–156. Berlin: Springer.

Endriss, Cornelia. 2009. *Quantificational topics: A scopal treatment of exceptional wide scope phenomena*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Farkas, Donka. 1981. Quantifier scope and syntactic islands. *Chicago Linguistics Society* 17, 59–66.

Fodor, Janet Dean & Ivan Sag. 1982. Referential and quantificational indefinites. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 5(3). 355–398.

Heine, Bernd. 1997. *Cognitive foundations of grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2002. Specificity and definiteness in sentence and discourse structure *Journal of Semantics* 19(3). 245–274.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2011. Specificity. In Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn & Paul Portner (eds.), *Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning*, vol. 2, 1025–1058. Berlin: De Gruyter.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Udo Klein. 2013. The distribution of two indefinite articles in Uzbek. In Cornelia Ebert & Stefan Hinterwimmer (eds.), *Different kinds of specificity across languages*, 155–176. Dordrecht: Springer.

Ionin, Tania, Cornelia Ebert & Britta Stolterfoht. 2011. One indefinite scopes out of islands: An experimental study of long-distance scope in English and German. Presented at 50 years of Linguistics at MIT: A scientific reunion, December 9–11, 2011.

Ionin, Tania & Tatiana Luchkina. 2019. Scope, syntax and prosody in Russian as a second or heritage language. In J. Camacho and M. Cabrera (eds.), *Exploring interfaces: Lexicon, syntax, semantics and sound*, 141–170. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kratzer, Angelika. 1998. Scope or pseudoscope? Are there wide scope indefinites? In Susan Rothstein (ed.), *Events and Grammar*, 163–196. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Kurtzmann, Howard & Maryellen E. MacDonald. 1993. Resolution of quantifier scope ambiguities. *Cognition* 48(3). 243–279.

May, Robert. 1985. *Logical Form: Its structure and derivation*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Reinhart, Tanya. 1997. Quantifier scope: How labor is divided between QR and choice functions. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 20(4). 335–397.

Schwarzschild, Roger. 2002. Singleton indefinites. *Journal of Semantics* 19(3). 289–314.

Scontras, Gregory, Cheng-Yu Edwin Tsai, Kenneth Mai & Maria Polinsky. 2014. Chinese scope: An experimental investigation. *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung* 18. 396–414.

Winter, Yoad. 1997. Choice functions and the scopal semantics of indefinites. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 20(4). 399–467.

***Welche* auf dem Weg zum indefiniten Pluralartikel? Spracherwerb und Sprachwandel**

Agnes Jäger – Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena
agnes.jaeger@uni-jena.de

1 Die Lücke

Der Spracherwerb gilt seit Langem als wichtige Ursache des Sprachwandels. Aufgrund des Bedürfnisses, den erworbenen Artikelslot auch bei indefiniten Nominalphrasen (NPn) im Plural zu füllen - dem *horror vacui* beim Indefinitartikel, wie Harnisch (2006) das Phänomen benennt - trägt der Spracherwerb zur potenziellen Entwicklung eines indefiniten Artikels im Plural im Deutschen bei.

Wie viele andere Sprachen[1] besitzt das Deutsche einen indefiniten Artikel: *ein*. Dieser hat sich – wiederum parallel zu vielen anderen Sprachen[2] – aus dem Numeral (Zahladjektiv) ‚ein‘ entwickelt, das im Deutschen als Homonym bis heute existiert. Die Grammatikalisierung ist bereits im Althochdeutschen im Gang. Hier erscheinen indefinite NPn jedoch noch ganz überwiegend ohne Artikel (Petrova 2015: 217), und erst ab dem Mittelhochdeutschen gilt der indefinite Artikel als vollständig grammatikalisiert (Szczepaniak 2009).[3] Aus der Herkunft des indefiniten Artikels aus dem Zahlwort ‚ein‘ ergibt sich naturgemäß eine paradigmatische Lücke im Plural: *ein* bezeichnet als Numeral eine Einzahl, es gibt (ursprünglich) keinen Plural von *ein*.[4] Diese paradigmatische Lücke besteht im heutigen Standarddeutschen ähnlich wie in anderen Sprachen mit einem indefiniten Artikel gleichen Ursprungs, etwa im Englischen, nach wie vor,[5] so dass indefinite NPn im Plural im Gegensatz zu ihren Singular-Pendants keine Form von *ein* aufweisen, sondern artikellos stehen (bloße NPn), wie (1) illustriert.[6]

(1)   *Klaus hat {**einen spannenden Aufsatz** / _ **spannende Aufsätze**} geschrieben.*

2 Option I: Plural von *ein*

Eine Option, die paradigmatische Lücke beim indefiniten Artikel im Plural zu füllen, besteht darin, über die vom Numeral her existierenden Singularformen hinaus tatsächlich

---

[1] Im Sample des *World Atlas of Language Structures* (WALS) 214 Sprachen mit indefinitem Artikel + 24 mit indefinitem Nominalaffix, 296 Sprachen ohne indefiniten Artikel (Dryer 2013).

[2] Laut Schroeder (2006) in allen europäischen Sprachen mit indefinitem Artikel; in Dryers (2013) WALS-Sample 112 von 214 Sprachen mit indefinitem Artikel; vgl. u.a. von Heusinger & Klein (2009) zu rezenten Entwicklungen im Usbekischen.

[3] Der Grammatikalisierungsprozess vom Numeral zum indefiniten Artikel verläuft dabei nach Givón (1981) von einem pragmatisch gesteuerten (z.B. Einführung prominenter Diskursreferenten) zu einem semantischen Ausdruck für Indefinitheit, wobei zuerst nur spezifische Lesarten (Identifizierbarkeit des Referenten für den Sprecher, vgl. zur Spezifizität von Heusinger 2011) auftreten, erst später auch unspezifische, vgl. auch die differenziertere Entwicklungsskala bei Heine (1997). Zur Anwendung aufs Deutsche: Szczepaniak (2009); demgegenüber kritisch Petrova (2015) zu *ein* (keine Beschränkung auf spezifische Lesarten in Frühphase) sowie von Heusinger (2012) zu *son* (s.u.) und indefinitem *dies* (statt Grammatikalisierung vom Diskurs zur Satzsemantik ähnlich starke Referenz in allen Domänen).

[4] Aus diesem Ursprung ergibt sich zudem zunächst eine Beschränkung auf Zählbares, d.h. Inkompatibilität mit Massennomina (Kontinuativa) wie bis heute im Standarddeutschen, demgegenüber dialektal z.T. Generalisierung des indefiniten Artikels auch hier, z.B.: *Wer möchte* (*ein) *Salz?* vs. *Wer mɔg a sɔiz?* (Bairisch).

[5] Für den negativen indefiniten Artikel *kein* besteht diese paradigmatische Lücke dagegen nicht: *Klaus hatte vor ein paar Jahren noch {**kein Enkelkind** / **keine Enkelkinder**}* (zur Entwicklung von *kein* vgl. Jäger 2007).

[6] Das Fehlen des indefiniten Artikels im Plural kann im Kontrast zum *ein* im Singular im paradigmatischen Kontext selbst als morphologisches Zeichen angesehen werden, entsprechend spricht man auch vom Nullartikel.

morphologische Pluralformen des indefiniten Artikels auszubilden. Dies ist etwa im Spanischen mit der Form *unos* als Plural-Pendant zum Singular *un* zu beobachten, vgl. (2).[7]

(2) *Tenía*   **unos**   **profesores**   *excelentes.*
      ich-hatte   INDEF.ART   Professoren   exzellente
      ‚Ich hatte exzellente Professoren.' (nach Le Bruyn 2010: 17)

Auch im historischen Deutschen sind vereinzelt Pluralformen von *ein* mit indefiniten Plural-NPn belegt, wie (3) zeigt (vgl. Donhauser 1995). Diese Entwicklungsoption hat sich jedoch im Deutschen nicht durchgesetzt, wobei dialektal (u.a. im Bairischen, Fränkischen und Berlin-Brandenburgischen, s. Donhauser 1995: 62) durchaus auch heutzutage Pluralformen des indefiniten Artikels *ein* verwendet werden, vgl. (4). Dies wäre also ein gangbarer Weg gewesen, den übrigens auch Kinder im Spracherwerb aus dem Bedürfnis der generellen Füllung des Artikelslots heraus bisweilen spontan neu einschlagen, vgl. (5).

(3) *Sih   nahtun   **eino ziti**   thaz   man   tho   firoti   eina   wechun   thuruh   not,*
      sich   nahten   eine   Zeiten   REL   man   da   feierte   eine   Woche   aus   Notwendigkeit
      so   ther   wizzod   gibot
      REL   das   Gesetz   gebot
      ʿDa nahten sich Zeiten, in denen man nach den Gesetzen des alten Bundes eine Woche feierte.' (Althochdeutsch: Otfrid III 15, 9)

(4) *Hinten   san   **oi**   **Leit**.*
      hinten   sind   eine   Leute
      ʿHinten sind Leute. ' (Bairisch, nach Harnisch 2006: 399)

(5) *Eine Windräder!*
      (Merle 2;06 angesichts mehrerer Dutzend Windräder am Rand der Autobahn)

Der einzige Fall, in dem sich im heutigen Deutschen tatsächlich mit nennenswerter Häufigkeit ein auf das Lexem *ein* zurückgehender indefiniter Pluralartikel findet, ist das aus der Kombination von *so* und der Kurzform *'n* des indefiniten Artikels *ein* gebildete umgangssprachliche *son*, das auch im Plural vorkommt, wie (6) illustriert.[8] Je nach linguistischer Analyse weist also die Kurzform des indefiniten Artikels auf Vorkommen mit *so* beschränkte Pluralformen auf[9] oder aber es handelt sich um einen eigenständigen neuen indefiniten Artikel *son* mit vollständigem Paradigma incl. Pluralformen (so Hole & Klumpp 2000, von Heusinger 2012).

(6) *Da sind doch **sone** Teiche.* = ʿDa gibt es doch Teiche.' (Hörbeleg)

---

[7] Nach Le Bruyn (2010) hat sich die Pluralform *unos* parallel zur Singularform entwickelt (vereinzelt seit 12. Jh., frequenter/grammatikalisiert seit 15. Jh.), dabei ursprünglich v.a. in partitiver Verwendungsweise, befinde sich aber im Gegensatz zu *un* noch im Stadium der Kennzeichnung pragmatisch relevanter indefiniter NPn.

[8] Insofern *so+n* ursprünglich auf Unterarten referiert und die Existenz einer Obermenge impliziert, dürfte auch in diesem Fall zunächst ein Zusammenhang mit partitiver Semantik bestehen. Wie von Heusinger (2012) zeigt, wird *son* nicht mehr nur deiktisch/anaphorisch verwendet.

[9] Dass die Kurzform des indefiniten Artikels von der Vollform verschiedene Flexivionsformen ausbildet, zeigt auch die Form ʿnen im Nom./Akk.Sg.Neutr., Nom.Sg.Mask.: *Ich hab da 'nen / *einen / ein Problem* (Vogel 2006).

3 Option II: Suppletion – *welche*

Neben der Verwendung von morphologischen Pluralformen des indefiniten Artikels bzw. auf diesen zurückgehenden Formen besteht jedoch noch eine andere Option, die paradigmatische Lücke des indefiniten Artikels im Plural zu schließen: Suppletion, also die Nutzung von Formen, die auf ein ganz anderes Lexem zurückgehen. Auch dies ist in verschiedenen Sprachen zu beobachten, etwa im Italienischen und Französischen mit *dei* bzw. *des* als Plural-Pendant des indefiniten Artikels *un*, vgl. (7). Der Ursprung liegt jeweils in einer partitiven Konstruktion (,von' + definiter Artikel). Cardinaletti & Giusti (2016) argumentieren jedoch überzeugend, dass hier (im Gegensatz zu homonymen partitiven PPn) tatsächlich ein indefiniter Pluralartikel ohne partitive Interpretation vorliegt. So impliziert (7) nicht die Existenz einer größeren Menge von Jungen.[10]

(7)	a.	*Ho*	*visto*	***dei***	***ragazzi***
	b.	*J'ai*	*vu*	***des***	***garçons***
		ich-habe	gesehen	INDEF.ART	Jungen
		ʿIch habe Jungen gesehen. ʾ			

Die Ausbildung einer suppletiven Pluralform des indefiniten Artikels deutet sich auch im Deutschen als eine Option an, die durch den Spracherwerb vorangetrieben wird. Die Grundlage dürfte ebenfalls eine ursprünglich partitive Konstruktion sein, nämlich die mit dem indefinit-partitiven Pronomen *welche*, vgl. (8), das in dieser Funktion im späten Frühneuhochdeutschen aufgekommen ist (Glaser 1992)[11] und hier, ebenso wie in der auf Unterarten referierenden *was-für*-Konstruktion, vgl. (9), das standardsprachlich korrekte pluralische Pendant zu *ein* darstellt.[12] Umgangssprachlich ist es zudem bereits in der ebenfalls auf Unterarten referierenden Konstruktion mit *so* im Plural gebräuchlich, vgl. (10) (Pluralpendant zu *Wer hat auch so einen?*) – in all diesen Fällen jedoch als eigenständiges Pronomen, nicht als Determinierer (Artikelwort) mit einem Nomen.

(8)   *Hat Klaus letztes Jahr Vorträge gehalten? – Ja, er hat {**einen** / **welche**} gehalten.*

(9)   *Was für {**einen** / **welche**}?*

(10)   *Weiße Bergmolchlarven – selten und schön! Wer hat auch **so welche**?*
        (Internetbeleg: http://www.feuersalamander.com/forum/index.php?page=Thread&threadID=6202)

---

[10] Le Bruyn (2010) argumentiert dagegen für frz. *des*, das bis ins 14. Jh. selten und nur in spezifischer Lesart belegt war, ab dem 15. Jh. auch mit *kind*-Lesart, dass es noch nicht vollständig zum indefiniten Pluralartikel geworden sei.

[11] *Welch* (< ,wie beschaffen, welche Gestalt habend') ist im historischen Deutschen zunächst v.a. als Interrogativum, später auch als Relativum belegt, im Althochdeutschen wie im Altsächsischen jedoch auch schon gelegentlich in indefiniter Verwendung ,irgendein, ein gewisser' (auch als Determinierer mit Nomen), im Hochdeutschen in dieser Verwendung ausgestorben, im Niederdeutschen erhalten (Glaser 1992: 117f., 127). In indefinit-partitiver Funktion ersetzte es vom Niederdeutschen aus die durch den Genitivschwund zurückgehenden partitiv-genitivischen Personalpronomen, die sich dialektal z.T. versteinert erhalten haben (z.B. Zentralhessisch: *Joa, häi seiere!* – ja hier sind-ihrer ,Ja, hier sind welche'), z.T. aber auch eine Leerstelle hinterlassen haben (Nullpronomen, z.B. Alemannisch: *Hesch Gäld? – Ja, i ha _ ,*Hast du Geld? – Ja, ich habe welches') oder durch den indefiniten Artikel *ein* ersetzt wurden, auch mit Bezug auf Massennomina und Plural-Nomen, s.o. (z.B. Bairisch: *Do liing oa* – da liegen eine ,Da liegen welche'), vgl. Glaser (1992: 129f.), Strobel (2017).

[12] In der Standardsprache wird indefinit-partitives *welch* auch bei Bezug auf Massennomina, also Nicht-Zählbares, verwendet: *Wer Kaffee möchte, kann sich **welchen** nehmen* (vgl. Glaser 1992).

Die Verwendung von *so* mit *welche* als eigenständigem Pronomen, darüber hinaus aber tatsächlich auch als Artikelwort mit Nomen ist besonders im Spracherwerb zu beobachten, was vielen Sprechern durchaus bewusst ist. So heißt es im Internetforum des LEO-Sprachlabors:[13] „*So welche* is very colloquial German […]. It's a form children will use frequently, adults rather would not." (vgl. auch den Buchtitel *Nicht so welche Sprüche, Mami! Kindermund*). Dabei kommt *so welche* nicht nur im frühen Spracherwerb bis zur Vollendung des siebten Lebensjahrs vor, vgl. die Belege in (11) bis (13), sondern hält sich auch darüber hinaus, vgl. (14), wobei die Verwendung durch entsprechende Muster bei anderen Kindern zusätzlich gestützt wird, wie der folgende Forenbeitrag[14] belegt: "Ich selber benutze „sowelche"/"so welche" auch auf keinen Fall (schlechtes Deutsch). Mich hat nur gewundert, das [sic] unsere Tochter (7 Jahre) und ihre Klassenkameraden seit Schulbeginn (und auch andere Kinder im Freundeskreis) das oft sagen. […] Mann [sic] sollte ja meinen, dass sie das Wort in der Schule aufgeschnappt haben." Auch in der Jugendsprache und der Umgangssprache Erwachsener ist diese Verwendung von *so welche* als Pluralpendant zu *so ein* mit Nomen und damit Evidenz für den Wandel vom eigenständigen Pronomen zum Artikelwort bereits zu finden, vgl. (15) und (16).[15]

(11)   ***so welch Krone*** *tragen Könige*
         (Leo 2;08 beim Anschauen einer Spielkarte mit einer Krone, CHILDES)

(12)   *ich schreibe auch in Zeitung, in an* ***so welche Fische****, so welche, die Haare haben*
         (Leo 2;10, CHILDES)

(13)   *Ich hab schon lange nicht mehr in* ***so welchen Malbüchern*** *gemalt*
         (Merle 5;01)

(14)   *Magst du* ***so welche Zöpfe****?*
         (Rahel 7;06)

(15)   *Kennt ihr auch* ***so welche hoffnungslose fälle***
         (Instagram-Beleg: https://www.instagram.com/p/CJ1Bf8yqTkI/?hl=de)

(16)   *Wie löst ihr* ***so welche Schrauben****, bzw Reste davon ???*
         (Internetbeleg: https://www.bulliforum.com/viewtopic.php?t=66969)

Aber nicht nur in Kombination mit *so* taucht *welche* als Pluralpendant des indefiniten Artikels *ein* auf (ähnlich wie die Kurzform des indefiniten Artikels im Plural mit *so*, s.o.). Kinder nutzen auch bloßes *welche* als Entsprechung von *ein*, um den Artikelslot bei indefiniten NPn im Plural zu füllen, nehmen also eine weitere Übergeneralisierung von *welche* in Richtung indefiniter Pluralartikel vor,[16] wie bereits in Harnisch (2006: 399) erwähnt.[17] Der bei Harnisch angegebene

---

[13] https://dict.leo.org/forum/viewGeneraldiscussion.php?idForum=4&idThread=311837&lp=ende&lang=de
[14] https://www.gutefrage.net/frage/gibt-es-das-wort-sowelche-bzw-so-welche
[15] Die Entwicklung eines Determinierers ausgehend von der Verwendung als eigenständiges Pronomen lässt sich auch im Fall des Demonstrativs *der/die/das-lo/do* im Moselfränkischen beobachten (Rauth & Speyer 2018).
[16] Hier liegt entsprechend keine Unterart-/partitive Lesart vor. *Welche* scheint dabei sowohl spezifisch, vgl. (20) oder (24), als auch unspezifisch, vgl. (23) oder (25) (ggf. in (25), aber nicht in (23) standarddeutschem *irgendwelche* entsprechend), vorzukommen.
[17] Dialektal ist dies im Niederdeutschen belegt, wo sich die indefinite Verwendung von *welche* mutmaßlich seit dem Altsächsischen gehalten hat (s. Fußn. 11), z.B. *Dor kaamt* ***welke Lüd*** – da kamen welche Leute ‚Da kamen Leute' (Glaser 1992: 127).

Beleg und weitere Belege aus dem frühen und fortgeschrittenen Spracherwerb, finden sich in (17) bis (25).

(17)   *da wohnen auch **welche Leute***.
        (Leo 2;05 auf Wohnhaus zeigend, CHILDES)

(18)   *Der Clown hat **welche Schuhe** an*.
        (Kind 3;09, nach Harnisch 2006: 399)

(19)   *weil da noch **welche Milchbrötchen** drin sind*
        (Merle 5;04)

(20)   *da drin schlafen **welche Tiere** von mir*
        (Rahel 5;05)

(21)   *da sind auch **welche Sachen** von Alma, Merle und mir*
        (Rahel 5;11)

(22)   *Ich bräuchte noch **welche Smarties**, dass ichs hinkriege*.
        (Rahel 6;01 legt ein Muster mit Smarties)

(23)   Vater: *Willst du noch 'ne Kartoffel oder bist du satt*?
        Rahel: *Ich will noch **welche Kartoffeln***.
        (Rahel 6;02)

(24)   *Wir haben noch **welche Zusatzaufgaben** bekommen*.
        (Merle 10;11)

(25)   *falls noch **welche Stühle** unten stehen*
        (Alma 11;08)

Gegen die These, dass der Spracherwerb zum Sprachwandel beitrage, ist in der Literatur wiederholt eingewandt worden, dass Kinder im Erstspracherwerb zum einen nach anfänglichen Fehlern, Übergeneralisierungen etc. früher oder später die zielsprachlichen Strukturen perfekt erlernen, zum anderen, dass Kinder nicht über genügend sozialen Einfluss verfügen, als dass ihre Fehler von Erwachsenen übernommen und in der Sprechergemeinschaft verbreitet würden. Wie die Belege in (24) und (25) zeigen, hält sich *welche* als indefiniter Pluralartikel aber trotz Fehlen dieser Konstruktion in der Zielsprache auch deutlich nach Ende der kritischen Erwerbsphase – hier mag wiederum das Auftreten dieser Übergeneralisierung bei anderen Gleichaltrigen konsolidierend wirken. Zum anderen sind Belege wie der in (26) aufschlussreich, in dem die Exploratorin im Gespräch mit dem Kind diese nicht-zielsprachliche Konstruktion des Kindes wiederholt und sogar in der Kommunikation mit dem Kind spontan selbst verwendet (Akkomodation), vgl. (27). Insofern ist durchaus eine Übernahme allgemein als kindersprachlich markierter Konstruktionen (wie bereits im Fall der oben diskutierten mit *so welche*) in die Umgangssprache denkbar, die sich unter Umständen als Sprachwandel manifestiert.

(26)   Leo: *auch **welche Enten***.
        Mechthild: *Da sind auch **welche Enten**?*
        (Leo 2;02; Mechthild: Exploratorin, CHILDES)

(27)   *Möchtest du noch **welche Eiskugeln** mitnehmen?*
        (Mechthild: Exploratorin, im Gespräch mit Leo, CHILDES)

Der Spracherwerb trägt somit zu einem potenziellen Wandel von *welche* zum indefiniten Pluralartikel im Deutschen bei.[18] Ob diese Option sich durchsetzen und dadurch die paradigmatische Lücke beim indefiniten Artikel geschlossen wird, wird die Zukunft zeigen.

Literatur

Bildhauer, Felix, Eric Fuß, Sandra Hansen-Morath & Franziska Münzberg. 2019. Starke und schwache Adjektivflexion in neuem korpuslinguistischen Licht. In Ludwig M. Eichinger & Albrecht Plewnia (eds.), *Neues vom heutigen Deutsch. Empirisch - methodisch - theoretisch (Jahrbuch des Instituts für Deutsche Sprache 2018)*, 293–312. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Cardinaletti, Anna & Giuliana Giusti. 2016. The syntax of the Italian indefinite determiner *dei*. *Lingua* 181. 58–80.

CHILDES = Child Language Data Exchange System. https://childes.talkbank.org

Donhauser, Karin. 1995. Gibt es einen Indefinitartikel Plural im Althochdeutschen? – Überlegungen zur Syn- und Diachronie des deutschen Artikelsystems. In Erwin Arndt & Gisela Brandt (eds.), *Wie redet der Deudsche man jnn solchem fall? Studien zur deutschen Sprachgeschichte: Festschrift anläßlich des 65. Geburtstages von Erwin Arndt* (Stuttgarter Arbeiten zur Germanistik 318), 61–72. Stuttgart: Heinz.

Dryer, Matthew S. 2013. Indefinite Articles. In Matthew S. Dryer & Martin Haspelmath (eds.), *World atlas of language structures*. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. [Online: http://wals.info/chapter/38].

Givón, Talmy. 1981. On the development of the numeral 'one' as an indefinite marker. *Folia Linguistica Historica* 2. 35–53.

Glaser, Elvira. 1992. Umbau partitiver Strukturen in der Geschichte des Deutschen. *Sprachwissenschaft* 17. 113–132.

Harnisch, Rüdiger. 2006. Dieser freundlicher Streit mit Rivalem und andern welchen Leuten. Über aktuelle Ungewöhnlichkeiten und latente Möglichkeiten in der Nominalphrase. *Zeitschrift für germanistische Linguistik* 34. 394–405.

Heine, Bernd. 1997. *Cognitive foundations of grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2011. Specificity. In Klaus von Heusinger, Claudia Maienborn & Paul Portner (eds.), *Semantics: An international handbook of natural language meaning* (Semantics 2), 1025–1058. Berlin: De Gruyter.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2012. Referentialität, Spezifizität und Diskursprominenz im Sprachvergleich. In Lutz Gunkel & Gisela Zifonun (eds.), *Deutsch im Sprachvergleich– Grammatische Kontraste und Konvergenzen*, 417–455. Berlin: De Gruyter.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Udo Klein. 2013. The Distribution of two indefinite articles: The case of Uzbek. In Cornelia Ebert & Stefan Hinterwimmer (eds.), *Different kinds of specificity across languages*, 155–176. Dordrecht: Springer.

Hole, Daniel & Gerson Klumpp. 2000. Definite type and indefinite token: the article *son* in colloquial German. *Linguistische Berichte* 182. 231–244.

Jäger, Agnes. 2007. 'No' changes: On the history of German indefinite determiners in the scope of negation. In Werner Abraham, Elisabeth Leiss & Elisabeth Stark (eds.), *Nominal*

---

[18] Evidenz für die zunehmende Artikelartigkeit von *welche* stellt auch die in den letzten ca. 100 Jahren zunehmende schwache Flexion attributiver Adjektive nach *welche* (wie nach flektierten Artikeln) dar, vgl. Bildhauer et al. (2019: 305–307).

determination: Typology, context constraints, and historical emergence, 141–170. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Le Bruyn, Bert S. W. 2010. *Indefinite articles and beyond*. Utrecht: LOT publications.

Petrova, Svetlana. 2015. Synchronic variation and diachronic change in the expression of indefinite reference: evidence from historical German. *Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft* 34. 213–246.

Rauth, Philipp & Augustin Speyer. 2018. Vunn dem doo Ardiggel bin ich ganz bibb: DP-interne Adverbien im Rhein- und Moselfränkischen. *Zeitschrift für Dialektologie und Linguistik* 85. 35–63.

Schroeder, Christoph. 2006. Articles and article systems in some areas of Europe. In Giuliano Bernini & Marcia L. Schwartz (eds.), *Pragmatic organization of discourse in the languages of Europe*, 545–611. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Strobel, Thomas. 2017. *Pronominale Partitivität: Arealität und Mikrovariation einer morphosyntaktischen Variable in den Varietäten des Deutschen.* Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
[Online: http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/44424].

Szczepaniak, Renata. 2009. *Grammatikalisierung im Deutschen: Eine Einführung*. Tübingen: Narr.

Vogel, Petra M. 2006. "Ich hab danen kleines Problem!" Zur neuen Kurzform des indefiniten Artikels im Deutschen. *Zeitschrift für Dialektologie und Linguistik* 73. 176–193.

He sang **and** ***she danced.***
English gendered pronouns through the lens of Google Ngram Viewer

Katja Jasinskaja – University of Cologne
katja.jasinskaja@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

When I started to work at the University of Cologne in 2014 and became part of Klaus von Heusinger's team, it was not only exciting linguistic research that I got to do, but I also took on some administrative duties. One of my first tasks of the latter kind was to organize a series soft skills workshops for postdocs like myself at the time, and the topic of one of those workshops had to be *Gender and cultural diversity* (*in linguistics*). I must admit that until that point I had never given serious thought to the role of gender in society and remained comfortably oblivious of the extent of its impact on my own life. My attitude changed dramatically after the experience of both preparing and attending that workshop, and I continued to be curious about gender-related issues both in society and in language. In this short essay, I relate some (admittedly superficial) observations concerning the use of the English pronouns *he* and *she* that I made along the way.

One convenient feature of the English pronouns is that the choice between *he* and *she* is largely determined by their reference, where *he* is used for male and *she* for female human individuals (if we disregard relatively rare uses of *she* for countries, vessels, and vehicles, and the purportedly gender-neutral generic uses of *he*, cf. Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 484–495). Secondly, *he* and *she* are unambiguously nominative, in contrast to the oblique *him* and *her* (same holds for the pronouns *they/them*, *I/me*, *we/us*). Therefore, by looking at the relative frequency of the pronouns *he* and *she* we can get a rough picture of how often a 3d person pronominal grammatical subject of a clause refers to a male or a female individual.

In what follows I report frequencies of the pronouns *he* and *she* over the past fifty years (1970–2019) in different contexts in the *Google Books Corpus*, using the search engine of *Google Ngram Viewer* (https://books.google.com/ngrams). Google Books is a corpus of millions of digitized books, and 361 billion words in its English section only, whose contents is split into case-sensitive n-grams, sequences of blocks of text separated by whitespace (e.g. 'I am' is a bigram, 'I am surprised' is a trigram, etc.). Despite its undeniably impressive size and ease of use, the corpus has a number of limitations, especially for diachronic study of language, due to unbalanced representation of text genres across centuries (an increasing skew towards scientific texts since 1900), poor optical character recognition (especially for older texts), and errors in metadata (Pechenick, Danforth & Dodds 2015). Therefore, all observations reported in this essay should be taken with a grain of salt, as questions for future research rather than ripe conclusions.

2 *he* and *she*

A simple frequency check on unambiguously nominative pronouns (Figure 1) shows that *he* has been persistently the second most frequent pronoun, losing the first place only to the first person pronoun *I* (see Dahl 2001 on egocentricity in discourse). In contrast, *she* used to be the least frequent pronoun of them all until very recently. (*You* and *it* are not included in the graphic, because they are ambiguous between nominative and oblique case, but yes, *she* is also less frequent than those pronouns.) The fact that *she* overtook the plural pronouns *we* and *they* around 2010 instills hope that things might be changing. Even so, in 2015 *she* only has about two thirds (0.22541%) of the frequency of *he* (0.33741%) in Google Books.

Figure 1: Frequency of unambiguously nominative pronouns *I*, *we*, *he*, *she*, and *they*

This, of course, can indicate a number of things. It could be that women are more often referred to by full name and title, than by a pronoun. It could be that women appear overwhelmingly in grammatical roles, other than the subject. But there is also a certain chance that women are not mentioned that much at all.

Seeing this general predominance of male gender among singular human pronominal subjects in English clauses, I asked myself if there were contexts where the pattern would be reversed. More specifically: Are there verbs that have female subjects more frequently than male subjects? To answer this question I performed searches for bigrams consisting of a pronoun *he* or *she* followed by a verb in simple past tense, e.g. *went*, *took*, *said*, *wanted*, etc. The selection of verbs used was largely opportunistic and no statistical analysis was performed. The cases I report here are where the difference to the general pattern was categorical, i.e. *she*+verb bigrams either tying in with or winning against the respective *he*+verb bigrams in frequency.

It is hardly surprising that for most general use verbs like *went*, *took*, *said*, *wanted*, the distribution of *he* and *she* subjects did not differ strongly from the general frequency pattern of the pronouns, the variant with *he* being substantially more frequent than the variant with *she*. On the other hand, it is to be expected that verbs describing activities conforming to traditionally female gender role would be more frequent with female subjects. This indeed is the case for the verb *cooked*, as shown in Figure 2. Interestingly, *he* and *she* are equally frequent with the verb *washed*, although the parity in washing was only established in the 1980s. Before that, disconcertingly, he washed more frequently than she did.

This could be a specific manifestation of the fact that work in general was done more frequently by men (Figure 3). Against this background, it is remarkable that both genders got roughly the same amount of relaxation in the last fifty years (Figure 3), which made me wonder whether verbs with a preference for female gender subjects could be found in the domain of free time activities. Indeed, the gender gap for the verb *sang* is much smaller, although *he* sang still more frequently than *she* did. On the other hand, more recently she beat him in dancing (Figure 4). Moving further into the domain of partner activities: While he was undeniably the more prolific kisser, she took the lead in hugging (Figure 5).

The partner activity that linguists know most about is, of course, that between the speaker and the listener in speech communication. Interestingly, it appears that most of both speaking and listening is done by men. However, I wonder if this impression could simply be the result of differences in decibels, women's voices being overheard due to lower speech volume. As it turns out, she whispered much more frequently than he did in the past five decades, while he shouted more than she did (Figure 6). Moreover, quite often she did not put her thoughts to words at all: While he and she wondered roughly the same amount of time, she actually asked

her question less frequently (Figure 7). Incidentally, Klaus von Heusinger criticized this behavioral pattern in me more than once.

Figure 2: he/she washed/cooked

Figure 3: he/she worked/relaxed

Figure 4: he/she sang/danced

Figure 5: he/she kissed/hugged

Figure 6: he/she whispered/shouted

Figure 7: he/she wondered/asked

Figure 8: he/she ordered/begged

Figure 9: he/she said yes/no

Figure 10: he/she blinked/blushed

Figure 11: he/she wriggled/squirmed

Of course, it is easier to perform directive speech acts when you are in a position of authority. Differences in authority between male and female subjects can be seen in the distribution of pronouns with verbs like *ordered* and *begged* (Figure 8): While male and female subjects were roughly equal in the amount of begging they did, unsurprisingly, male subjects ordered more frequently. Finally, it is all a question of *what* you say – how you respond to questions, orders, requests, and pleas. Here the picture for female gender subjects is much more positive: While he said *no* more often than she did, she said *yes* more (Figure 9).

However, of all the verbs I have looked at, I was most surprised to find a clear preference for female subjects in the verbs *blinked*, *blushed*, and *wriggled*. I had never thought that women blinked more than men (Figure 10), but apparently they do (see Sforza et al. 2008). I could

have guessed that women might blush more than men, or at least, that blushing in women might have greater social significance (see e.g. Crozier 2016), but I did not expect to find the greatest relative gender gap to the advantage of the female with the verb *blushed* among all the verbs I considered (Figure 10). Finally, the verb *wriggled*, as well as its near-synonyms *squirmed* and *writhed*, turned out to have a large majority of female gender among human pronominal subjects (Figure 11), which was to me personally the most fascinating finding. I wonder (and ask) whether this could be because blinking, blushing, and wriggling is something we see other people do, but rarely admit to doing ourselves. A point of view character in a story rarely blinks, blushes or wriggles. Interestingly, the verbs *blushed*, *wriggled*, and *squirmed* also show a relatively low co-occurrence with first person subjects, while otherwise the pronoun I is the most frequent (cf. Figure 1). Could the relatively low frequency of male gender pronouns as subjects of these verbs be the consequence of the narrator taking his perspective?

3 Conclusion

These observations made me worry: How will Google Books affect the vulnerable artificial mind of a robot trying to navigate the complexity of human life? What will it learn about the human female from all those books? As far as I can see, there is nothing to prevent it from getting the impression that a woman is someone who cooks and hugs, probably wonders why, wriggles and squirms (not to be confused with dancing), but ultimately says yes, in a whisper. Or is there? I cannot express enough gratitude to Klaus von Heusinger to bringing these questions to my attention, wondering about them was a life-changing experience for me. However, the questions remain questions. There is no conclusion, except, perhaps, that those of us endowed with natural intelligence should write more books, with more verbs, and more pronouns.

References

Crozier, W. Ray. 2016. The blush: Literary and psychological perspectives. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 46(4). 502–516.

Dahl, Östen. 2001. Egocentricity in discourse and syntax. *Functions of Language* 7(1). 37–77.

Huddleston, Rodney & Geoffrey K. Pullum. 2002. *The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pechenick, Eitan Adam, Christopher M. Danforth & Peter Sheridan Dodds. 2015. Characterizing the Google Books corpus: Strong limits to inferences of socio-cultural and linguistic evolution. *PLoS ONE* 10(10). e0137041.

Sforza, Chiarella, Mario Rango, Domenico Galante, Nereo Bresolin & Virgillio F Ferrario. 2008. Spontaneous blinking in healthy persons: An optoelectronic study of eyelid motion. *Ophthalmic & Physiological Optics: The Journal of the British College of Ophthalmic Opticians (Optometrists)* 28(4). 345–353.

Zu Entstehungsumständen von mirativen *um-zu*-Sätzen im Deutschen

Łukasz Jędrzejowski
Universität zu Köln
l.jedrzejowski@uni-koeln.de

1 Einführung

Im Gegenwartsdeutschen (hiernach Gwd.) werden *um-zu*-Sätze mit drei Satztypen assoziiert: i) Zwecksätze, die einen Hauptsatz modifizieren, (1), ii) Zwecksätze, die einen Sprechakt modifizieren, (2) und (iii) mirative Sätze, die einen Überraschungseffekt markieren, (3):

(1)   Klaus geht gerne schwimmen, um fit zu bleiben.
(2)   Um mich klar auszudrücken: das ist eine Überraschung.
(3)   Klaus ist mit seiner Familie entspannt spazieren gegangen, nur um dann auf einmal von allen Gästen überrascht zu werden.

In (1) stellt *um* eine subordinierende Abhängigkeitsrelation zwischen zwei Handlungen her. Die Handlung *schwimmen gehen von Klaus* wird mit dem Ziel/mit der Intention ausgeführt, *fit zu bleiben*. In (2) modifiziert der Sprecher mit dem *um-zu*-Satz einen assertiven Sprechakt, indem er den Hörer darauf vorbereitet, dass die Aussage, die er machen möchte, klar formuliert werden wird. Schließlich geht es in (3) um übertroffene Erwartungen, die der Sprecher dem Hörer als überraschend darstellt. Hauptsächlich wird der Hörer in (3) dazu eingeladen, eine solche subordinierende Abhängigkeitsrelation zwischen dem Haupt- und Nebensatz zu etablieren, die eine unerwartete Proposition in Bezug auf vergangene Erwartungen in den Vordergrund stellt. Konkret drückt der *um-zu*-Satz in (3) aus, dass man in der Vergangenheit nicht damit gerechnet hat, dass Klaus von Gästen überrascht wird, dies allerdings tatsächlich der Fall ist.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die mirativen *um-zu*-Sätze wie in (3) und geht auf ihre Entstehungsumstände ein.

2 Mirative *um-zu*-Sätze im Gegenwartsdeutschen

Mirative *um-zu*-Sätze sind Adverbialsätze, die im Nachfeld basisgeneriert werden und ihre Grundposition nicht verlassen können. Sie können weder ins Vorfeld noch ins Mittelfeld bewegt werden (vgl. Leys 1971, 1988, 1991 und Pauly 2014):

(4)   [$_{CP}$ Klaus ist mit seiner Familie entspannt spazieren gegangen, [$_{CP}$ nur um dann auf einmal von allen Gästen überrascht zu werden]].
(5)   *[[$_{CP}$ Nur um dann auf einmal von allen Gästen überrascht zu werden]$_i$, ist Klaus mit seiner Familie entspannt spazieren gegangen t$_i$].
(6)   *[$_{CP}$ Klaus ist, [$_{CP}$ nur um dann auf einmal von allen Gästen überrascht zu werden]$_i$ mit seiner Familie entspannt spazieren gegangen t$_i$].

(5) und (6) deuten darauf hin, dass mirative *um-zu*-Sätze syntaktisch nicht in den Matrixsyntax integriert sind. Doch auf der anderen Seite lassen sie Variablenbindung zu, (7), und können unter den Skopus der Matrixnegation fallen, (8):

(7)   Ungewollt verschlimmert er jede$_i$ Situation, um sie$_i$ schließlich doch ebenso ungewollt zu meistern.

(Pauly 2014: 178)

(8)   In diesem Fall steigt das Fieber nicht, um gegen Abend allmählich wieder abzuklingen, sondern um erst dann einen kritischen Gipfel zu erreichen.

<div align="right">(Leys 1991: 18)</div>

(7) und (8) sprechen für eine starke Integration in den Matrixsatz: sollten sie nicht integriert sein, würden sie weder Variablenbindung zulassen, noch wären sie im Skopus der Matrix-negation. In Jędrzejowski (2022) zeige ich, dass sich mirative *um-zu*-Sätze im Gwd. sowohl als zentrale (= integrierte) wie auch als periphere (= teilweise integrierte) Adverbialsätze analysieren lassen (vgl. Haegeman 2012 und Frey 2016 zur Typologie von Adverbialsätzen im Allgemeinen). Diese Variation ist als Ergebnis der Entwicklung von mirativen *um-zu*-Sätzen aus Zwecksätzen aufzufassen. In der folgenden Sektion beschreibe ich die Umstände, unter denen dieser Prozess stattgefunden hat.

3 Mirative *um-zu*-Sätze in der Geschichte des Deutschen

Meines Wissens gibt es keine diachronen Studien zu den Entstehungsumständen von mirativen *um-zu*-Sätzen im Deutschen. In diesem Beitrag skizziere ich ihre wichtigsten Entstehungs-schritte (für mehr Einzelheiten siehe Jędrzejowski 2022).

Schritt I Den Ausgangspunkt der diachronen Entwicklung bildet der Zwecksatz, vgl. (9):

(9)   Tom trainiert jeden Tag, um Weltmeister zu werden.

Auf der Oberfläche sind alle notwendigen Komponenten vorhanden. *Um* wird als Komplementierer verwendet, der ein nicht-finites TP-Komplement selegiert. Der *um-zu*-Satz folgt dem Matrixsatz und weist zu ihm eine subordinierende Abhängigkeitsrelation auf, nämlich die des Zieles.

Schritt II Zwecksätze sind nicht-faktiv, zukunftsorientiert und hypothetisch, d.h., die in dem *um-zu*-Satz genannte Proposition ist nicht Teil der realen Welt. Durch den Gebrauch des Zwecksatzes löst der Sprecher eine Menge von Alternativen aus, die die Bedingungen spezifizieren können, unter denen die im Matrixsatz ausgedrückte Proposition auch wahr ist. Eine der denkbaren Alternativen für (9) könnte beispielsweise sein, dass Tom fit bleiben möchte, und nicht dass er Weltmeister werden möchte. Die Menge von denkbaren Alternativen, die auch mit der Proposition des Matrixsatzes kompatibel sind, ist not-at-issue, da man weder nach ihnen fragen kann, noch kann man sie verneinen. Zu beachten ist jedoch, dass nicht jede beliebige Alternative zu der Menge gehört. Dabei geht es ausschließlich um die Alternativen, die eine Abhängigkeitsrelation des Zieles zu dem Matrixsatz aufweisen. Das heißt, die Alternative *einen Herzinfarkt zu bekommen* gehört nicht zu den denkbaren Alternativen, da sie die Zielrelation in Bezug auf die im Matrixsatz genannte Proposition nicht erfüllt.

Schritt III Vor diesem Hintergrund benötigen wir nun Fälle, die ambig sind; vgl. (10):

(10)   Sie zog nach Amerika, um dort sehr schnell zu heiraten.

<div align="right">(Leys 1988: 100)</div>

(10) kann auf zweierlei Weise interpretiert werden. Wenn der Sprecher den *um-zu*-Satz als einen Zwecksatz gebraucht, dann greift er nach einer Proposition, die am besten zu seinen Erwartungen hinsichtlich der Abhängigkeitsrelation des Zieles zwischen dem Matrix- und dem Nebensatz passt. In (10) geht der Sprecher davon aus, dass der Umzug nach Amerika das Ziel hat, jemanden zu heiraten. Wenn der Sprecher zu der Sprechzeit allerdings weiß, dass die im Nebensatz zum Ausdruck gebrachte Proposition faktiv ist und dass sie auch gleichzeitig mit den alternativen Propositionen, die die Abhängigkeitsrelation des Ziels in Bezug auf den Matrixsatz markieren, nicht kompatibel ist, dann steht die assertierte Proposition in einem Kontrast dazu, was der Sprecher in der Vergangenheit erwartet hatte. In diesem Fall bezieht

sich die Unerwartbarkeit auf vergangene Erwartungen des Sprechers, die eine mirative Interpretation auslöst (vgl. auch Cruschina & Bianchi 2021 für ähnliche Beobachtungen zu dem Verb *jiri* '*gehen*' im Sizilianischen). Diesen Kontrast fasse ich als mirative Implikatur auf:

(11) Mirative Implikatur von *um*:
Es gibt mindestens eine alternative Proposition, die in der Vergangenheit stärker von dem Sprecher in Bezug auf die Abhängigkeitsrelation des Zieles erwartet wurde als die assertierte Proposition.

Ich nehme, an dass die mirative Implikatur den Wandel von *um* ausgelöst hat.

Schritt IV Die mirative Implikatur wird insofern syntaktisiert, als der Zweck-komplementierer in einen mirativen Komplementierer grammatikalisiert wird. Die Implikatur wird als lexikalische Komponente gespeichert und somit in die C-Domäne der deutschen Satzstruktur integriert. Es liegt keine Ambiguität vor, da der Sprecher die im *um-zu*-Satz eingebettete Proposition als wahr interpretiert. Diese Proposition entspricht seinen vergangenen Erwartungen nicht und führt zu einem Kontrast. Im Gwd. wird dieser Kontrast häufig mit der Modalpartikel *doch* verstärkt, vgl. z.B. (7) oben, die signalisiert, dass der Wahrheitswert der eingebetteten Proposition nicht angezweifelt werden sollte, jedoch gleich-zeitig andere konfligierende Informationen zu dem Diskurs hinzugefügt wurden (vgl. Grosz 2014). In (12) signalisiert *doch*, dass die Proposition, dass Tom einen Herzinfarkt bekommen hat, nicht in Frage gestellt werden sollte und dass sie im Kontrast dazu steht, was der Sprecher in Bezug auf die Zielrelation zu dem Matrixsatz erwartet hatte.

(12) Tom trainiert jeden Tag, um dann doch einen Herzinfarkt zu bekommen.

In diesem Zusammenhang drückt der *um-zu*-Satz kein Ziel mehr aus. Stattdessen markiert er einen Kontrast zwischen vergangenen Erwartungen und der assertierten Proposition. Durch diesen Kontrast entsteht ein Überraschungseffekt. Der Sprecher stellt die unerwartete und assertierte Proposition in den Vordergrund. Da er weiß, dass sie wahr ist, stellt er sie dem Hörer als überraschend dar.

4 Zusammenfassung

In diesem Beitrag habe ich die Entstehungsumstände des mirativen Komplementierers *um* skizziert und gezeigt, wie not-at-issue-Bedeutung in die C-Domäne der deutschen Satzstruktur grammatikalisiert wurde. Dadurch gewinnen wir ein besseres Verständnis dafür, wie neue Komplementierer entstehen und wie sie sich weiterentwickeln.

Literatur

Cruschina, Silvio & Valentina Bianchi. 2021. Mirative implicatures at the syntax-semantics interface. A surprising association and an unexpected move. In Andreas Trotzke & Xavier Villalba (Hrsg.), *Expressive Meaning across Linguistic Level and Frameworks*, 86–107.

Frey, Werner. 2016. About some correlations between formal and interpretative properties of causal clauses. In Ingo Reich & Augustin Speyer (Hrsg.), *Co- and Subordination in German and Other Languages*, 153–179. Hamburg: Buske.

Grosz, Patrick. 2014. German *doch*: An element that triggers a contrast presupposition. *Proceedings of the Chicago Linguistic Society* 46: 163–177.

Haegeman, Liliane. 2012. *Adverbial Clauses, Main Clause Phenomena, and the Composition of the Left Periphery*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jędrzejowski, Łukasz. 2022. *Subordinate clauses as modifiers*. *The case of* um-zu-*clauses in German*. Habilitationsschrift, Universität zu Köln.

Leys, Otto. 1971. Die Präpositionalinfinitive im Deutschen. Einige Beobachtungen. *Leuvense Bijdragen* 60. 1–56.

Leys, Otto. 1988. Prospektives *um*. *Deutsche Sprache* 16. 97–102.

Leys, Otto. 1991. Skizze einer kognitiv-semantischen Typologie der deutschen *um*-Infinitive. *Leuvense Bijdragen* 80: 167–203.

Pauly, Dennis. 2014. *Grenzfälle der Subordination: Merkmale, Empirie und Theorie abhängiger Nebensätze*. Doktorarbeit, Universität Potsdam.

Do numeral-noun constructions in Finnish exhibit differential subject marking? Exploring effects of semantic and pragmatic factors on verb number

Elsi Kaiser – University of Southern California
emkaiser@usc.edu

1 Introduction

Many languages exhibit differential object marking (DOM) and differential subject marking (DSM), typically conditioned on arguments' prominence. It is agreed that arguments' referential status plays a key role in DOM and DSM, including animacy (and agentivity), definiteness, specificity and topicality (e.g. Comrie 1979, Bossong 1985, Aissen 2003, de Hoop & de Swart 2009, von Heusinger & G. Kaiser 2011, von Heusinger & Kornfilt 2017). Various devices (e.g. case, agreement) are used for DOM and DSM. Typically in DOM, high-prominence objects are marked (e.g. Givón 1987, Aissen 2003). Some DSM languages mark low-prominence subjects (e.g. Korean: Lee 2009, Polish: Błaszczak 2009); others mark high-prominence subjects (e.g. Hindi: de Hoop & Narasimhan 2009, Turkish: Kornfilt 2009).

   This paper explores unexpected verb number patterns with Finnish numeral-noun constructions with count nouns (e.g. *three birds*) in subject position. Finnish numeral-noun subjects are semantically plural but the noun is spelled out as morphologically *singular*. Numeral-noun subjects typically occur with singular verbs, but sometimes with plural verbs. I explore the possibility that plural verb agreement is associated with particular referential properties, in particular a high level of referential stability (Farkas & von Heusinger 2003), and that plural verb agreement with Finnish numeral-noun subjects could be a type of DSM.

2 Verb number in Finnish

In Finnish, subjects are typically nominative; the verb agrees with the subject in person and number (1). (Existential sentences differ, e.g. Hakulinen & Karlsson 1988, Vilkuna 1996, Sands & Campbell 2001, Huumo 2018). Finnish has no (in)definite articles.[1] In numeral-noun constructions (2), when the numeral is two or more, the noun bears partitive case[2] and is morphologically *singular* (e.g. Hurford 2003, Danon 2012, Ionin & Matushansky 2018, Lohiniva 2021).[3] (Finnish partitive diverges from 'part-whole' partitivity, Tamm 2014). What's relevant is that normally the verb is also singular (Vilkuna 1996, Brattico 2010).

(1) Linnut   istuivat   oksalla.
     Bird-PL.NOM   sit-PAST-3PL   branch-ADE
     'The birds sat on the branch.'

(2) Kolme   **lintua**   istui   oksalla.
     Three.SG **bird-SG.PART**   sit-PAST.3SG   branch-ADE
     'Three **birds** sat on the branch.'

---

[1] Abbreviations: NOM nominative, PART partitive, GEN genitive, ADE adessive, ALL allative, ELA elative, ILL illative, SG singular, PL plural, CL clitic, COND conditional, Px possessive suffix, PRES present.
[2] With *yksi* 'one', the noun is nominative. (With *nolla* 'zero', it is partitive.)
[3] Different patterns emerge with *non-subject* noun-numeral constructions but even then, the noun is singular. But if the numeral is pluralized (e.g. *neljät silmät* four-PL.NOM eye-PL.NOM 'four pairs of eyes,' the noun is also plural (e.g. Hurford 2003, Brattico 2010, Lohiniva 2021).

2.1 A puzzle: Plural verbs with numeral-noun constructions

The singular verb is the standard option for numeral-noun subjects (2), but sometimes plural verbs also occur (3, 4) (e.g. Vilkuna 1996, Hakulinen et al. 2004, section 1276, Wexler 1976, Chesterman 1991).[4]

(3) Kolme   lintua   istuivat   oksalla.
     Three.SG bird-SG.PART sit-PAST-3PL   branch-ADE
     'Three birds sat on the branch.'

(4) Kaksi   miestä   lähtivät   veneilemään Sysmästä
     Two.SG   man-SG.PART   go-PAST-3PL   boating-ILL Sysmä-ELA
     perämoottorilla   varustetulla   soutuveneellä. (www)[5]
     outboard.motor-ALL equipped-ALL   rowboat-ALL
     'Two men went boating from Sysmä using a rowboat equipped with an outboard motor.'

In sum, Finnish numeral-noun subjects are morphologically singular and normally occur with singular verbs but can, unexpectedly, also occur with plural verbs. Below, I explore the distribution of plural verbs with numeral-noun subjects in Standard Finnish (the version of the language used in writing and official settings).[6] Furthermore, since plural verbs with numeral-noun subjects are (typically) optional, the discussion here concerns *tendencies*, not hard-and-fast rules.

3 When are plural verbs used with numeral-noun subjects?

Let's start by considering (5a–b) from Vilkuna (1996).

(5) a. *singular verb*
Neljä   osapuolta   pääsi   sopimukseen.
Four.SG   party-SG.PART   reach-PAST.3SG   agreement-ILL
'Four parties reached an agreement.' (there exist four parties who reached an agreement)

   b. *plural verb*
Neljä   osapuolta   pääsivät   sopimukseen.
Four.SG   party-SG.PART   reach-PAST-3PL   agreement-ILL
'Four parties reached an agreement.' (all four parties reached an agreement)

The singular verb (5a) easily allows for an *existential* construal: there exist four parties who reached an agreement. In contrast, the plural verb (5b) favors a *universal* construal: four parties were involved in the negotiations, and all of these parties (all four) reached an agreement (Vilkuna 1996, see also Chesterman 1991, Hakulinen et al. 2014). However, this universal 'all four parties' interpretation does not necessarily entail that each individual set member (here,

---

[4] Partitive case alone does not trigger plural verbs: partitive plural count nouns in existential sentences (e.g. Hakulinen & Karlsson 1988, Vilkuna 1996) and mass nouns in subject position (partitive singular) require singular verbs.

[5] 'www' denotes a naturally-occurring corpus example from the internet.

[6] I focus specifically on the distribution of *plural* verbs. This is because in many Finnish dialects, third-person plural verbs are rare and singular verbs can be used even with morphologically plural subjects (e.g. Paunonen 1995). This means that the distribution of plural verbs (with numeral-noun subjects) is more informative than the distribution of singular verbs, as plural verbs cannot be attributed to influence from colloquial dialects.

each party) is specific or familiar. Indeed, my corpus searches suggest that when a plural verb is used, although the identity of the set members is sometimes specified in prior discourse, this is not always the case. The meaning difference between (5a–b) is also reflected in (5c–d) (from Wexler 1976 via Chesterman 1991), where the order of the numeral and genitive modifier differs. Due to space limits, I leave a fuller discussion for future work.

(5) c. *singular verb*
Neljä   Suomen   edustajaa   menestyi   hyvin.
four.SG Finland-GEN   representative-SG.PART   succeed-PAST.3SG   well
'Four representatives of Finland did well.' (There exist four Finnish representatives who did well)

    d. *plural verb*
Suomen   neljä   edustajaa   menestyivät   hyvin.
Finland-GEN four.SG   representative-SG.PART   succeed-PAST-3PL   well
'Finland's four representatives did well.' (All four Finnish representatives did well)

3.1 Referential stability of the numeral-noun subject

The prior section suggests that plural verbs are triggered by numeral-noun subjects with certain referential properties. While notions like familiarity, specificity and definiteness seem relevant, it's unclear whether they are applicable in all cases. Instead, let's consider the broader notion of *referential stability* (Farkas & von Heusinger 2003; also Farkas 2002, von Heusinger 2019). This term refers to the stability (vs. variability) of the value assignment for the variable introduced by a noun phrase. Proper names are very referentially stable, while the referential stability of definite descriptions is contextually conditioned. Indefinites are non-stable, and partitives (e.g 'one of George's students') are non-stable but contextually constrained to the relevant set. Farkas & von Heusinger propose a scale of referential stability and posit that more referentially stable direct objects are stronger DOM triggers in Romanian.

    Could the meaning differences between the plural and singular verbs in examples (2–5) be related to referential stability? It seems reasonable to describe the existential construal (5a) as *less referentially stable* than the universal construal (5b). The existential construal simply commits the speaker to the existence of a certain number of set members, while the universal construal commits the speaker to the existence of a set of referentially stable individuals (even if some aspects of their identity are unknown). If this idea is on the right track, it suggests that *the more referentially-stable a numeral-noun subject is, the more likely it is to trigger use of a plural verb in Finnish* – although the numeral-noun subject itself morphologically spelled out as singular.

3.2 Neutralization by morphosyntax

In line with the ideas sketched out above, when numeral-noun subjects are modified by demonstratives (e.g. *ne* 'those'), they can occur with plural verbs (6). Indeed, Brattico (2010) suggests that in this configuration they *must* occur with plural verbs (but see Section 2.1). The same pattern arises with *eräät* 'certain' (7). Note that these determiners must be plural; the singular (*joku, eräs*) would be ungrammatical here. These examples fit with the idea that referential stability plays a role in the use of plural verbs.

(6) **Ne**   kaksi   pientä   autoa   seisoivat   tiellä.
those.NOM.PL   two.SG   small-SG.PAR car-SG.PART   stand-PAST-3PL   road-ADE
'**Those** two small cars stood on the road.'   (adjusted from Brattico 2010, ex.14a)

(7) Siispä   oli   hyvinkin arvattavaa   että **eräät**   kolme
So-CL   be.PAST.3SG   very-CL   predictable-PART that **certain.NOM-PL**   three.SG
suomalaistyttöä   hyvin todennäköisesti päätyisivät   samalle
finnish.girl-SG.PART very likely   end.up-PAST-COND-3PL   same-ALL
veneelle.
boat-ALL
'So it was quite predictable that **certain** three Finnish girls would most probably end up
on the same boat.' (www)

However, plural verbs also occur with the indefinite existential *jotkut* 'some-PL' (8). Here, the referent is *not* presented as familiar and can be non-specific. Example (8) suggests that plural verbs can also be triggered by purely morphosyntactic agreement processes. Whatever is the reason for the prenominal determiners being plural could be the same reason that triggers plural verbs.[7] Indeed, this kind of 'morphosyntactic override' has a precedent: Kornfilt (2009) shows that Turkish DOM and DSM can be neutralized by morphosyntactic factors in certain configurations (also de Hoop & de Swart 2008). Thus, configurations like (8) may simply be a neutralizing context where morphosyntactic factors override DSM.

(8) jos **jotkut**   kaksi   järjestelmää   eivät juttele
if **some.NOM-PL**   two.SG   system-SG.PART   neg-PRES-3PL chat
keskenään   kovin   tehokkaasti
among-each-other.3PX   very   efficiently
'if **some** two systems don't communicate with each other very efficiently' (www)

4 Conclusions

This paper explores the seemingly unexpected use of plural verbs with numeral-noun subjects in Finnish – plural verb agreement is unexpected since the nouns themselves are morphologically realized as singular. I suggest that plural verbs may be more likely to occur with numeral-noun subjects with relatively high referential stability.[8] However, further research is needed to test the validity of this idea and to probe what other factors are at play. Potential effects related to discourse prominence also merit investigation (see Chiriacescu & von Heusinger 2010 on Romanian). If we assume that plural agreement is a type of differential subject marking (DSM), one might wonder why the locus of DSM is verbal number and not case. This could stem from the fact that the noun in numeral-noun constructions bears partitive case regardless of subject/object status. Since this case-marking is 'immobile,' it is perhaps not surprising that the verb acts as the locus of DSM.

---

[7] Relative pronouns modifying numeral-noun subjects must also be plural in Finnish.
[8] Kornfilt (1997), Alexiadou (2019) note that occurrence of plural verb agreement patterns with morphologically *plural* nouns in Turkish and Western Armenian is sensitive to factors like definiteness/specificity.

References

Aissen, Judith. 2003. Differential object marking: iconicity vs. economy. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 21. 435–483.

Alexiadou, Artemis. 2019. Morphological and semantic markedness revisited: The realization of plurality across languages. *Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft* 38(1). 123–154.

Błaszczak, Joanna. 2009. Differential Subject Marking in Polish: The Case of Genitive vs. Nominative Subjects in "X was not at Y"-constructions. In Helen de Hoop & Peter de Swart (eds.), *Differential Subject Marking,* 113–150. Dordrecht: Springer.

Bossong, Georg. 1985. *Differentielle Objektmarkierung in der Neuiranischen Sprachen.* Tübingen: Narr.

Brattico, Pauli. 2010. One-part and two-part models of nominal Case: Evidence from case distribution. *Journal of Linguistics* 46. 47–81.

Chesterman, Andrew. 1991. *On Definiteness: A Study with Special Reference to English and Finnish.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chiriacescu, Sofiana & Klaus von Heusinger. 2010. Discourse prominence and *pe*-marking in Romanian. *International Review of Pragmatics* 2. 298–332.

Comrie, Bernard. 1979. Definite and animate direct objects. *Linguistica Silesiana* 3. 13–21.

Danon, Gabi. 2012. Two structures for numeral-noun constructions. *Lingua* 122. 1282–1307.

de Hoop, Helen & Peter de Swart. 2009. Cross-linguistic Variation in Differential Subject Marking. In Helen de Hoop & Peter de Swart (eds.), *Differential Subject Marking*, 1–16. Dordrecht: Springer.

de Hoop, Helen & Bhuvana Narasimhan. 2009. Ergative Case-marking in Hindi. In Helen de Hoop & Peter de Swart (eds.), *Differential Subject Marking*, 63–78. Dordrecht: Springer.

Farkas, Donka. 2002. Specificity distinctions. *Journal of Semantics* 19. 1–31.

Farkas, Donka & Klaus von Heusinger. 2003. *Stability of Reference and Object Marking in Romanian.* Talk at the Workshop on Direct Reference and Specificity, ESSLLI, Vienna, August 2003.

Givón, Talmy. 1978. Definiteness and Referentiality. In Joseph Greenberg (ed.), *Universals of Human Language*, 4, 291–330. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Hakulinen, Auili & Fred Karlsson. 1988. *Nykysuomen lauseoppia.* Helsinki: SKS.

Hakulinen, Auli, Maria Vilkuna, Riitta Korhonen, Vesa Koivisto, Tarja Riitta Heinonen & Irja Alho. 2004. *Iso suomen kielioppi.* Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Georg Kaiser. 2011. Affectedness and Differential Object Marking in Spanish. *Morphology* 21. 593–617.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Jaklin Kornfilt. 2017. Partitivity and case marking in Turkish and related languages. *Glossa: a journal of general linguistics* 2(1). 1–40.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2019. Indefiniteness and Specificity. In Jeanette Gundel & Barbara Abbott (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Reference,* 146–167. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hurford, James. 2003. The interaction between numerals and nouns. In Frans Plank (ed.). *Noun phrase structure in the languages of Europe*, 561–620. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Huumo, Tuomas. 2018. The partitive A. On the uses of the Finnish partitive subject in transitive clauses. In Ilja A. Seržant & Alena Witzlack-Makarevich (eds.), *The diachronic typology of differential argument marking,* 423–454. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Ionin, Tania & Ora Matushansky. 2018 *Cardinals: The syntax and semantics of cardinal-containing expressions.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kornfilt, Jaklin, 1997. *Turkish.* New York: Routledge.

Kornfilt, Jaklin. 2009. DOM and Two Types of DSM in Turkish. In Helen de Hoop & Peter de Swart (eds.), *Differential Subject Marking*, 79–112. Dordrecht: Springer.

Lee, Hanjung. 2009. Quantitative Variation in Korean Case Ellipsis: Implications for Case Theory. In Helen de Hoop & Peter de Swart (eds.), *Differential Subject Marking*, 41–62. Dordrecht: Springer.

Lohiniva, Karoliina. 2021. Partitive Case in Finnish Numeral-Noun Constructions. *University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics*: 27(1). Article 17.

Paunonen, Heikki. 1995. *Suomen kieli Helsingissä. Huomioita Helsingin puhekielen historiallisesta taustasta ja nykyvariaatiosta.* Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

Sands, Kristina & Lyle Campbell. 2001. Non-canonical subjects and objects in Finnish. In Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald, R.M.W. Dixon & Masayuki Onishi (eds.), *Non-canonical Marking of Subjects and Objects*, 251–306. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Tamm, Anne. 2014. The Partitive Concept versus Linguistic Partitives: From Abstract Concepts to Evidentiality in the Uralic Languages. In Silvia Luraghi & Tuomas Huumo (eds.), *Partitive Cases and Related Categories*, 89–152. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Vilkuna, Maria. 1996. *Suomen lauseopin perusteet.* Helsinki: Edita.

Wexler, Paul. 1976. On the non-lexical expression of determinedness (with special reference to Russian and Finnish). *Studia Linguistica* 30(1). 34–67.

Was zählt, wenn nichts zählt?
Zur Bestimmung von Nullsubjekten am Beispiel von Asterix' 'Goldener Sichel'

Georg A. Kaiser – Universität Konstanz
georg.kaiser@uni-konstanz.de

1 Einleitung

Eine weit verbreitete Unterscheidung von Sprachen besteht darin, diese in Sprachen mit obligatorischem Subjekt (Nicht-Nullsubjektsprachen) und optionalem Subjekt (Nullsubjektsprachen) zu unterteilen (Camacho 2013: 2f). Die intensive Diskussion um den Nullsubjektparameter hat allerdings gezeigt, dass diese Unterscheidung zu vereinfachend ist und eine feingliedrigere Unterscheidung notwendig ist (Cognola & Casalicchio 2018). Außerdem zeigt die Diskussion, dass die Bestimmung von Nullsubjekten keineswegs unproblematisch ist. In diesem Beitrag soll diese Problematik am Beispiel des französischen Asterixtextes 'La serpe d'or' und den Übersetzungen in das Italienische, Spanische, Portugiesische und Deutsche illustriert werden.

2 Zur Bestimmung von Nullsubjekten

Zunächst ist hinsichtlich der Nullsubjekteigenschaft festzustellen, dass diese ausschließlich finite Sätze betrifft. Während infinite Sätze in allen Sprachen durch eine regelmäßige Subjektauslassung (im folgenden Beispiel als Ø symbolisiert) gekennzeichnet sind (Mensching 2017), erlauben in finiten Sätzen typischerweise nur Nullsubjektsprachen ein Nullsubjekt (als ø symbolisiert):[1]

(1) a. [...] **nous** sommes venus Ø t'acheter une serpe d'or pour notre druide... (Fr.)
     b. [...] eigentlich sind **wir** ja gekommen, um Ø eine Goldsichel für unseren Druiden zu kaufen. (Dt.)
     c. ø Siamo venuti a Ø comprare da te un falcetto d'oro per il nostro druido... (It.)
     d. ø Hemos venido a Ø comprarte una hoz de oro para nuestro druida. (Sp.)
     e. ø Viemos Ø comprar-te uma foice de ouro para o nosso druida... (ePg.)

Eine weitere Klarstellung ist die, dass mit Nullsubjekten ausschließlich pronominale Subjekte gemeint sind. Sie werden in Nullsubjektsprachen häufig durch eine reiche Verbflexion identifiziert. In Nicht-Nullsubjektsprachen ist hingegen auch bei eindeutiger Verbmarkierung – z.B. in (1a) im Französischen – die Subjektauslassung ausgeschlossen. Sie ist allerdings dann möglich, wenn das Subjektpronomen in einem koordinierten Satzteil auftritt und mit dem Subjekt des vorangehenden Satzteils identisch ist. In (2) ist das im Deutschen der Fall. Im Französischen wäre die Auslassung auch möglich. Sie ist aber in der Umgangssprache eher unüblich, was auch dadurch bestätigt wird, dass im französischen Asterix-Text keine einzige Subjektauslassung dieser Art vorkommt:

---

[1] Neben Infinitivsätzen sind auch Imperativsätze bei der Bestimmung der Nullsubjekteigenschaft auszuschließen, da diese ebenfalls typischerweise ohne Subjekt realisiert werden. Bemerkenswert ist, dass in zahlreichen einschlägigen Arbeiten zur Nullsubjekteigenschaft auf diese Tatsache nicht hingewiesen wird (Camacho 2013, D'Alessandro 2015, Sheehan 2016).

(2)	a.	**Je** vais boire une cervoise et **je**... reviens. (Fr.)
	b.	**Ich** geh' eine Cervisia trinken und ø komm' dann... zurück! (Dt.)
	c.	ø Vado a prendere una cervogia e... e ø torno! (It.)
	d.	¡ø Voy a tomar una cerveza y... ø vuelo! (Sp.)
	e.	ø Vou beber uma cerveza e ø já volto! (ePg.)

Es spricht viel dafür, diese Auslassungen bei der Bestimmung der Nullsubjekteigenschaft nicht zu berücksichtigen oder zumindest separat zu betrachten.

Problematischer ist die Bestimmung von nicht referentiellen oder semi-argumentalen Nullsubjekten. Nullsubjektsprachen kennen im Gegensatz zu Nicht-Nullsubjektsprachen typischerweise keine expletiven Pronomen (Haider 2001, Cognola & Casalicchio 2018), wie das folgende Beispiel mit einem meteorologischen Verb illustriert:

(3)	a.	[...] et **il** pleut! (Fr.)
	b.	[...] und regnen tut'**s** auch noch!! (Dt.)
	c.	[...] e ø piove! (It.)
	d.	¡[...] y ø llueve! (Sp.)
	e.	[...] e ø chove a potes! (ePg.)

Ein Argument für die Annahme eines Nullsubjekts in den Nullsubjektsprachen könnte hier darin gesehen werden, dass einige Varietäten dieser Sprachen (z.B. dominikanisches Spanisch oder europäisches Portugiesisch) Elemente aufweisen, die Expletiva ähneln. Diese Elemente verhalten sich jedoch nicht wie typische Expletiva – u.a. können sie zur Hervorhebung dienen und i.d.R. nicht postverbal stehen – und sind daher nicht als solche zu analysieren (Corr 2015, Cognola & Casalicchio 2018). Somit stützt sich die Annahme eines Nullsubjekts in Sätzen wie (3c–e) auf die Analogie zu Nicht-Nullsubjektsprachen und auf die in der generativen Grammatik postulierte Annahme, wonach jeder Satz ein (lexikalisches oder leeres) Subjekt haben muss.

Die Frage nach einem expletiven Nullsubjekt betrifft auch Sätze mit Prädikats(pro)nomen oder 'logischem Subjekt'. Sie sind in Nicht-Nullsubjektsprachen oft durch ein Demonstrativ- oder Expletivpronomen eingeleitet, während in Nullsubjektsprachen ein entsprechendes Pronomen fehlt:

(4)	a.	**Ce** sont eux!!! (Fr.)
	b.	**Das** sind sie!!! (Dt.)
	c.	Sono **loro**!!! (It.)
	d.	¡Son **ellos**!! (Sp.)
	e.	São **eles**!!! (ePg.)

Auch wenn in Nullsubjektsprachen solche Sätze ebenfalls ein präverbales Demonstrativpronomen als Subjekt enthalten können, z.B. *Isso são eles!* (Pg.), wird in Sätzen wie (4c–e) i.d.R. nicht von einem Nullsubjekt ausgegangen. Vielmehr wird aufgrund der Kongruenz des postverbalen Pronomens mit dem Verb angenommen, dass wir es mit einem invertierten Subjekt zu tun haben.

Ein ähnlicher Fall liegt in den Sätzen in (5) vor, in denen einzig das Deutsche ein expletives Subjektpronomen aufweist. Für die anderen Sprachen ist aufgrund der Verbkongruenz von einem postverbalen Subjekt und nicht von einem präverbalen leerem Expletivum auszugehen.

(5) a.   Vive Vergétrocérix ! (Fr.)
     b.   **Es** lebe Vergetrocerix! (Dt.)
     c.   Viva Vergogetrecige! (It.)
     d.   ¡Viva Vergetocerix! (Sp.)
     e.   Viva Vergetocerix! (ePg.)

Die Frage eines expletiven Nullsubjekts stellt sich auch beim Deutschen. Hier kann bzw. muss u.a. in adverbial eingeleiteten unpersönlichen Passivkonstruktionen das Expletivum fehlen, sodass aufgrund der Annahme eines notwendigen Subjekts im Satz ein Nullexpletivum postuliert wird:[2]

(6) a.   **Il** y a eu une bataille ici. (Fr.)
     b.   Hier wurde ø gekämpft! (Dt.)
     c.   C'è stata **una lotta** qui, guarda! (It.)
     d.   Aquí ha tenido lugar **una pelea**. (Sp.)
     e.   Aqui ø houve luta. (ePg.)

Das Deutsche kennt noch weitere Möglichkeiten der Subjektauslassung. Eine davon ist die als 'topic drop' bezeichnete Auslassung satzinitialer Subjekte, die sowohl topikalisierte referentielle Pronomen als auch Expletiva betreffen kann, wie diese Beispiele aus dem Korpus belegen:

(7) a.   ø Schmeckt aber komisch! (Dt.)
     b.   ø Scheint niemand da zu sein. (Dt.)

Auch das Französische erlaubt Subjektauslassungen. Sie sind im Gegensatz zum Deutschen fast ausschließlich auf unpersönliche Konstruktionen beschränkt (Zimmermann & Kaiser 2014). Das Korpus liefert hierfür nur ein Beispiel:

(8) N'   empêche   que   tu   as   perdu   ton   pari,   [...]! (Fr.)
     nicht   verhindert   dass   du   hast   verloren   deine   Wette [...]
     'Trotzdem hast du deine Wette verloren [...]!'

Die Interpretation von Subjektauslassungen im Französischen hängt allerdings sehr von dessen syntaktischer Analyse ab und v.a. davon, wie Subjektdoppelungen wie in (9) zu interpretieren sind:

(9) a.   Ce   Gaulois   fada,   **il**   m'   a   vendu   sa
     dieser   Gallier   blöder   er   mir   hat   verkauft   seinen
     boutique [...] !! (Fr.)
     Laden   [...]
     'Dieser Dummkopf von Gallier hat mir seinen Laden [...] verkauft!!!'

---

[2] Die Existenz solcher Sätze hat zur Klassifizierung des Deutschen als 'Semi-Nullsubjektsprache' geführt (Cardinaletti 1990, Biberauer 2010). Bei den entsprechenden Sätzen in den Nullsubjektsprachen hängt die Annahme eines (expletiven) Nullsubjekts vom Verb ab. Im Italienischen und Spanischen bedeutet es '(es) hat stattgefunden', sodass die postverbale Nominalphrase ('ein Kampf') als Subjekt fungiert. Im Portugiesischen hingegen ist das postverbale Nomen Objekt des Verbs '(es) gab', sodass ein Nullsubjekt angenommen werden muss.

b.

	Et		moi,	**je**	suis	inquiet		pour	mon	cousin
	und		ich	ich	bin	beunruhigt		wegen	meines	Vetters

Amérix!! (Fr.)
Talentix
'Und ich mache mir Sorgen um meinen Vetter Talentix!!'

Die Tatsache, dass diese Doppelungen im umgangssprachlichen Französisch auch dann verwendet werden, wenn das Subjekt nicht hervorgehoben ist, wird vielfach als Indiz dafür gesehen, dass die klitischen Subjektpronomen grammatikalisiert wurden und zu Affixen geworden sind. Somit wären für einen Satz wie (2a) Nullsubjekte anzunehmen, während die klitischen Pronomen als Verbalaffixe fungieren (Auger 1993, Culbertson & Legendre 2014):

(10) ø je=vais boire une cervoise et ø je...=reviens.

Eine solche – weit verbreitete – Annahme ist jedoch mit zahlreichen Problemen konfrontiert (Meisenburg 2000, Kaiser 2008, Zimmermann & Kaiser 2014). So müssten die klitischen Objektpronomen, die im Französischen i.d.R. zwischen Subjekt und finitem Verb auftreten, ebenfalls als Affixe analysiert werden. Für eine solche Grammatikalisierung gibt es jedoch kaum Evidenz. Außerdem musste für das Französische eine Diglossiesituation postuliert werden, bei der Sprecher entsprechend der Sprachsituation zwischen dem umgangs-sprachlichen Französisch (als Nullsubjektvarietät) und dem Standardfranzösischen (als Nicht-Nullsubjektvarietät) hin- und herwechseln (Palasis 2013). Es spricht allerdings wenig für eine klare Trennung zwischen beiden Varietäten, da die Unterschiede (noch) zu gering ausgeprägt sind (Koch 1997, Dufter & Stark 2002).

Abschließend soll noch kurz ein Blick auf das brasilianische Portugiesisch geworfen werden, das vielfach als 'partielle Nullsubjektsprache' klassifiziert wird und demnach Nullsubjekte nur "in some instances" erlaubt (Saab 2016: 60). Gegen eine solche Klassifizierung spricht einerseits, dass das brasilianische Portugiesische keine Expletiv-pronomen kennt und somit weiterhin über eine typische Eigenschaft von 'konsistenten' Nullsubjektsprachen verfügt (Duarte & Marins 2021, Kato & Duarte 2021). Andererseits ist die empirische Datenlage unklar: Während einige Untersuchungen einen sehr niedriger Nullsubjektanteil im brasilianischen Portugiesisch konstatieren (Duarte 2000), kann dies in anderen Untersuchungen nicht bestätigt werden (Kaiser & Alencar 2020). Dies zeigt auch die Nullsubjektauswertung im hier untersuchten Korpus entsprechend der hier dargelegten Kriterien:

Table 1: Nullsubjekte in 'Die goldene Sichel'

Fr	Dt	It	Sp	ePg	bPg
1	13	414	431	423	339

Der Nullsubjektanteil im brasilianischen Portugiesisch ist zwar niedriger als im europäischen Portugiesischen und den anderen beiden romanischen Nullsubjektsprachen. Jedoch liegt er deutlich über dem des Deutschen oder Französischen, sodass viel für eine Analyse des brasilianischen Portugiesisch als weitgehend konsistente Nullsubjektsprache spricht.

3 Schlussbemerkung

Diese kurze Abhandlung sollte anschaulich auf der Grundlage eines Paralleltextkorpus illustrieren, dass die Bestimmung von Nullsubjekten durchaus komplex ist und dass es einiger

(theoretischer) Vorüberlegungen bedarf, bevor man das zählen kann, was gar nicht vorhanden ist.

Literatur

Auger, Julie. 1993. More evidence for verbal agreement-marking in Colloquial French. In William J. Ashby, Marianne Mithun & Giorgio Perissinotto (Hrsg.), *Linguistic perspectives on Romance languages. Selected Papers from the XXI Linguistic Symposium on Romance Languages, Santa Barbara, February 21–24, 1991*, 177–198. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Biberauer, Theresa. 2010. Semi null-subject languages, expletives and expletive pro reconsidered. In Theresa Biberauer, Anders Holmberg, Ian Roberts & Michelle Sheehan (Hrsg.), *Parametric variation – Null subjects in Minimalist Theory*, 153–199. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Camacho, José A. 2013. *Null Subjects*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cardinaletti, Anna. 1990. *Es*, pro, and sentential arguments in German. *Linguistische Berichte* 126. 135–164.

Cognola, Federica & Jan Casalicchio. 2018. On the null-subject phenomenon. In Federica Cognola & Jan Casalicchio (Hrsg.), *Null subjects in Generative Grammar: A synchronic and diachronic perspective*, 1–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Corr, Alice. 2015. Overt expletives in Ibero-Romance: A diachronic and diatopic perspective. *Revue Roumaine de Linguistique* 60. 205–222.

Culbertson, Jennifer & Géraldine Legendre. 2014. Prefixal agreement and impersonal 'il' in spoken French: Experimental evidence. *Journal of French Language Studies* 24. 83–105 (Special Issue 01: *Negation and Clitics in French: Interaction and variation*).

D'Alessandro, Roberta. 2015. Null subjects. In Antonio Fábregas, Jaume Mateu & Michael Putnam (eds.), *Contemporary linguistic parameters*, 201–226. London: Bloomsbury.

Duarte, Maria Eugênia Lammoglia & Juliana Esposito Marins. 2021. Brazilian portuguese: A 'partial' null subject language? *Cadernos de estudos lingüísticos* 63. 1–21.

Duarte, Maria Eugênia Lammoglia. 2000. The loss of the 'avoid prounoun' principle in Brazilian Portugese. In Mary A. Kato und Esmeralda Vailati Negrão (Hrsg.), *Brazilian Portuguese and the null subject parameter*, 17–36. Frankfurt: Vervuert.

Dufter, Andreas & Elisabeth Stark. 2002. La variété des variétés: Combien de dimensions pour la description? *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 53. 81–108.

Haider, Hubert. 2001. Parametrisierung in der Generativen Grammatik. In Martin Haspelmath (Hrsg.), *Language typology and language universals* (Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft 20(1)), 283–293. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Kaiser, Georg A. & Leonel Figueiredo de Alencar. 2020. Zwischen Aussprache und Auslassen. Zur Verwendung der Subjektpronomina im brasilianischen Portugiesisch. In Benjamin Meisnitzer & Elissa Pustka (Hrsg.), *Zwischen Sprechen und Sprache = Entre fala e língua*, 209–236. Berlin: Lang.

Kaiser, Georg A. 2008. Zur Grammatikalisierung der französischen Personalpronomina. In Elisabeth Stark, Roland Schmidt-Riese & Eva Stoll (Hrsg.), *Romanische Syntax im Wandel (Festgabe zum 65, Geburtstag von Wulf Oesterreicher)*, 305–325. Tübingen: Narr.

Kato, Mary A. & Maria Eugênia Lammoglia Duarte. 2021. Parametric variation: The case of Brazilian Portuguese null subjects. In András Bárány, Theresa Biberauer, Jamie Douglas & Sten Vikner (Hrsg.), *Syntactic architecture and its consequences III: Inside syntax*, 357–398. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Koch, Peter. 1997. Diglossie in Frankreich? In Winfried Engler (Hrsg.), *Frankreich an der Freien Universität, Geschichte und Aktualität*, 219–249. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Meisenburg, Trudel. 2000. Vom Wort zum Flexiv? Zu den französischen Pronominalklitika. *Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur* 110. 223–237.

Mensching, Guido. 2017. *Infinitival clauses*. In Andreas Dufter & Elisabeth Stark (Hrsg.), *Manual of Romance morphosyntax and syntax*, 369–396. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Palasis, Katerina. 2013. The case for diglossia: Describing the emergence of two grammars in the early acquisition of Metropolitan French. *Journal of French Language Studies* 23. 17–35 (Special Thematic Issue: *L'hypothèse d'une diglossie en France*).

Saab, Andrés. 2016. On the notion of partial (non-) pro-drop in Romance. In Mary A. Kato & Francisco Ordóñez (Hrsg.), *The morphosyntax of Portuguese and Spanish in Latin America*, 49–77. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sheehan, Michelle. 2016. Subjects, null subjects, and expletives. In Susann Fischer & Christoph Gabriel (Hrsg.), *Manual of grammatical interfaces in Romance*, 329–362. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Zimmermann, Michael & Georg A. Kaiser. 2014. On expletive subject pronoun drop in colloquial French. *Journal of French Language Studies* 24. 107–126 (Special Issue 01: *Negation and Clitics in French: Interaction and variation*).

Can pronouns look back a long way?

Hans Kamp – University of Stuttgart / University of Texas at Austin
hans.kamp@ims.uni-stuttgart.de

1 The end of Flaubert's Parrot

(1) Perhaps it was one of them.

(1) is the concluding sentence of Julian Barnes' *Flaubert's Parrot* (Barnes 1985), a book about Flaubert of an unusual sort, not quite a biography, more a kind of smorgasbord of different text types. But you can learn a lot of things about Flaubert from it. In particular there is much you can learn about 'Flaubert's parrot' – a stuffed parrot he had on his desk while writing 'Un Coeur Simple', a short story about a woman who has been in service for most of her life with a family that eventually has no use for her anymore and unceremoniously gets rid of her. Among her few possessions is a stuffed parrot, which during her final days is her sole companion. Apparently, the parrot on Flaubert's desk, that kept him to his subject while the writing was in progress, eventually came to irritate the author, whereupon he returned it to the Municipal Natural History Museum of Rouen, the nearby city from where Flaubert had borrowed the creature. One of Barnes' Flaubert projects that is discussed at length in his book, was to find out what happened to this famous prop of literary history. For the quite amusing details of Barnes' quest I must refer you to the book itself. But for present purposes I must give away the main point of the plot: In the end it turns out that Flaubert's parrot could have been anyone from a pretty large collection, some of which (if only a small proportion) were still in the possession of said museum on his last visit there that Barnes mentions.

Back to (1). Half of the words in (1) are pronouns. Two of them, *one* and *them* are unproblematic. *them* refers to the set of stuffed parrots Barnes is looking at in the museum, which is also referred to in the immediately preceding sentence – by another occurrence of *them* to which that of the last sentence can be construed as anaphoric – and *one* refers to some unspecified member of that set. The case that commands attention is the pronoun *it*. To properly understand what makes this case interesting you should ideally have read *Flaubert's Parrot*. But I don't want to assume that, so I will have to try to explain the problem by telling you enough about the book, and in particular a little more about how it ends. And perhaps you can guess the meaning of (1) just from the little I have told you so far: *it* must refer, somehow, to the parrot that once sat on Flaubert's desk. And (1) is a kind of free indirect discourse; it conveys Barnes' thought when he stands face to face with the three remaining items from the stuffed parrot collection the museum once had, to which, with reasonable probability, Flaubert's parrot must have belonged at some point in time.

So far nothing I have said about the case suggests anything of special interest to the linguist. What makes the case interesting is not what the antecedents of its anaphoric pronouns are, but where those antecedents can be found, assuming the pronouns have any. The antecedent of *them* is, we already noted, unproblematic: it is the *them* in the immediately preceding sentence. To be more explicit: the set of parrots that Barnes is looking at is introduced explicitly in the sixth but last sentence of the book and then resumed in every one the sentences that follow, ending with (1), and in all but the first of these sentences by a pronoun. The string of pronouns is a model example of personal pronouns with short distance antecedents.

Not so the *it* of (1). The last explicit mention of its referent – the parrot from Flaubert's desk – is a noun phrase 57 sentences back (on one count; the counting is a little difficult because of the colons and semi-colons, but the exact sentence number matters less than the fact that this mention was in a different episode, clearly separate from the last one of which (1) is the

concluding sentence). If the *it* of (1) is to be construed as anaphoric to this noun phrase, then this is a case of long-distance antecedent if ever there was one.

The remarkable thing about *it* in (1), however, is that it isn't hard for someone who has read the book up to this point – in other words: for someone who has read the book to the end – to understand that it refers to Flaubert's parrot. After all, Flaubert's parrot is what much of the book is about and the final chapter in particular. For a reader of that chapter Flaubert's parrot is conceptually salient like nothing else. So for those who hold that salience is what matters for anaphora Flaubert's parrot ought to be as good a referent for *it* in (1) as anything could be.

But are they right? I think they are not. True, the reader can readily conclude what *it* must be referring to. But when I read (1) the first time round – as a reader of a piece of literature, not as someone with a professional interest in linguistic analysis – the sentence came across as marked, and as marked because of its *it*. 'Where is its antecedent?', the reader in me was asking. 'Surely what is meant is Flaubert's parrot. But where was it mentioned last?' In fact, it is this markedness of Barnes use of it in (1) that makes it such a good way to end the book. Suppose the last sentence had been 'Perhaps Flaubert's parrot was one of these.' That would have expressed the same proposition. But it would have been a really pedestrian way to end, unworthy of a writer of the quality of Barnes. By using *it* instead the author conveys that his thoughts are so preoccupied – so obsessed – with the object of his quest that for him it is the natural way to speak about it. Or something along these lines.

2 Pronominal anaphora and DRT

When, close to 45 years ago, I first started to try and think seriously about anaphora, one of the problems that occupied the formal semantics community was donkey anaphora, a problem that Geach had found in the scholastic literature and brought to the attention of logicians and philosophers in his *Reference and Generality* (Geach 1962). Donkey anaphora became one of the motivations for *Discourse Representation Theory* (DRT) and the first DRT publication – Kamp (1981) – was on just this. One of the main points of this paper is that donkey anaphora isn't a problem that only shows up in certain sentences – Geach's 'donkey sentences' – but also, and in fact much more commonly, in multi-sentence discourses and texts. DRT gives a formal account of the truth conditions of donkey sentences and donkey discourses, and within this framework it is possible to formulate logical constraints on the pronoun-antecedent relation. The constraint, explicitly formulated in Kamp & Reyle (1993), is known as *accessibility* in DRT. Accessibility is a relation between the positions of pronouns and those of candidate antecedents in Logical Form. When this relation is not satisfied – when the candidate antecedent is not accessible from the position of the pronoun – then the pronoun cannot be anaphoric to it.

As defined in Kamp & Reyle (1993), DRT accessibility cannot deal with all the facts about donkey sentences, of which there are quite a few beyond those that Geach discussed. Some of these shortcomings have been corrected in later definitions of accessibility. But neither the original definition nor its corrections have anything to say about the rarity of long distance relations between pronouns and antecedents: DRT's accessibility imposes no constraints on the distance between antecedent and pronoun. To account for the strong tendency of pronouns to find their anaphoric antecedents nearby we need something quite different. One possibility is to introduce a notion of salience: to qualify as antecedent of an anaphoric pronoun the antecedent must be salient at the point when the pronoun has to be interpreted. Antecedents that are further back won't qualify because they lack the necessary salience. And they lack salience because salience decays as the discourse and its interpretation proceed. But what is salience precisely? (Or better perhaps: what precisely is the salience that is relevant to the

pronoun-antecedent relation?) And what is the rate of decay for the relevant notion of salience? To my knowledge these questions are still without persuasive answers.

In the course of the past four decades DRT has been extended in various directions. The most elaborate, well worked-out and widely known of these is SDRT ('Segmented Discourse Representation Theory') developed first and foremost by Asher & Lascarides (2003). SDRT builds on DRT in that it uses DRSs to represent clause and sentence contents. But in SDRT these DRSs serve as arguments of predicates that represent discourse relations.[1] One observation that SDRT has the tools to account for is that antecedent accessibility isn't just a matter of the structure of sentences and texts, as it is in DRT, but also depends on discourse relations. For instance, indefinite NPs occurring in a clause or sentence S' that stands in the rhetorical relation of Explanation to some other clause or sentence S isn't accessible to a pronoun in a sentence S'' that follows both S and S' in the discourse and stands in a non-subordinating relation (such as Narration) to S. This case of inaccessibility is a special case of a central principle of discourse coherence in SDRT, the so-called 'Right Frontier Constraint' (for details see Asher & Lascarides 2003). Since the Right Frontier Constraint imposes restrictions on multi-sentence texts that go substantially beyond those imposed by DRT, this is a natural place to look for constraints that forbid or strongly disprefer long-distance relations between pronouns and their antecedents. But unfortunately things aren't as straightforward as one might have hoped. Sequences of sentences S^1, S^2, …, S^n from a discourse such that each pair $<S^i, S^{i+1}>$ is related by a coordinating discourse relation should not allow for pronoun-antecedent relations when the pronoun belongs to S^i and the antecedent belongs to S^{i-k} for some $k \geq 2$.[2] But such relations are not impossible.[3]

There is probably more than one way out of this difficulty. One would be to admit larger discourse units that would be able to play a role in connection with nominal anaphora (and perhaps only in this connection). Among these larger discourse units would then be in particular narrative segments S^1, S^2, …, S^i of the sort mentioned in footnote 2. But note well that by itself this would not be enough to deal with the long distance problem we started out with: Once we allow narrative discourse units of two or more sentences, we also need some limits to how long these may be.

Perhaps it is possible to discover principles of discourse structure that give us these limits. Here is an observation that may lead us to such a principle when we pursue it more systematically than I have yet been able to: Suppose you write a bit of text that starts out as a single paragraph. But at some point the paragraph is getting too long. So you decide to split the paragraph into two, Paragraph 1 and Paragraph 2, the second following directly after the first.

---

[1] More accurately, the DRSs used in SDRT are content representations for *discourse units*. Discourse units are those parts of a discourse or text that stand in rhetorical and other discourse relations to each other. Mostly they are sentences or full sentential clauses, but other sentence constituents can also play the part of discourse units, and so can certain bits consisting of several sentences. One of the tasks for discourse theories like SDRT is to say what discourse units can be and how they are identified.

[2] The prediction follows if we assume that a pronoun occurring in a sentence S^j from a text or discourse must find its antecedent either within the semantic representation K^j of S^j itself or else in the DRS K^α of the node in the SDRT representation for the antecedent discourse to which K^i will be attached. In a 'simple narrative discourse' S^1, S^2, …, S^n, in which the relation between each successive sentence pair $<S^i, S^{i+1}>$ is Narration, the only possible attachment point for S^j is K^{j-1}; in other words, K^α is K^{j-1} in this case. So according to the mentioned Right Frontier Constraint the antecedent of an anaphoric pronoun in S^j must either occur in S^j or in S^{j-1}.

[3] Here is an example:

(i)   A man took some steps in Minna's direction and asked her what was going on. Minna didn't know herself. So she didn't know what to say. She kept silent for a full ten seconds. But then he repeated his question and she knew that she had to say something.

In this case it seems to me that *he* is quite acceptable, even though there are two full sentences that separate the pronoun from its antecedent.

Suppose the split has the effect that Paragraph 2 contains a pronoun whose antecedent is in Paragraph 1. In my experience that will hardly ever do, even though there was no problem about this so long as the original paragraph hadn't been divided. So what I end up doing almost invariably is to replace the pronoun with some other noun phrase, which can be happily understood as anaphoric to an antecedent that occurs in a preceding paragraph. (Usually what I choose is some definite description.)

I take it that what is responsible for this change from an acceptable to a non-acceptable pronoun-antecedent relation is that single paragraphs are supposed to convey a form of cohesion that is lost when they are broken up into smaller paragraphs, and that pronoun-antecedent connections are properly satisfied only when both antecedent and pronoun belong to a part of the discourse that is cohesive in this sense. When one splits a paragraph, which is supposed to be cohesive into two or more, that is a way of saying that while the cohesion still holds for the smaller parts, it does not hold for any part of the discourse that consists of two or more of them. Trying to use a pronoun in one of the parts to refer back to an antecedent in some other part is inconsistent with treating these two parts as two paragraphs, as opposed to a single one.

Assume that I am right with my observation that paragraphs imply a cohesion that discourse segments of more than one paragraph do not possess. What kind of cohesion is this? Are single paragraphs different from sequences of two or more paragraphs also in other respects than pronoun-antecedent relations? If we knew about such other differences, then perhaps we would also be in a better position to understand what makes it so hard for pronouns to have antecedents that are far away.

Another factor may play its part as well. We humans are not good at coping with too much plain repetition. Narrative sequences, for instance, are fine, but they shouldn't be going on for too long without telling us any more than 'and then and then and then'. If the 'and thens' get to be too many for our taste we will want to cut the lot into parts, not so much because there is too little coherence in it, but because there is too little diversity. But when we do that, we signal that the conditions for pronoun-antecedent links are now restricted to the parts. This may be another force that keeps a lid on the distance between pronouns and their antecedents, as a kind of side effect. And also note: (i) keeping paragraphs short, for whatever reasons, is a soft constraint. For one thing, there is no fixed cut off point for boredom; it builds up gradually and at some rarely predictable point too much is too much. And (ii) if limits on paragraphs carry limits on pronoun-antecedent relations in their wake, that of course doesn't mean that there won't be other constraints on pronoun-antecedent distance as well. Perhaps some such will emerge when we keep looking into connections between anaphora and discourse coherence more closely.

3 Looking at the problem from the opposite direction: Chiriacescu and von Heusinger on *pe*-marking as a means of creating anaphoric antecedents

Up to this point we have been looking at the problems of anaphora from the perspective of the anaphoric expression: How does such an anaphoric NP find its antecedent? Where in the sentence, or in the antecedent discourse or text, can the antecedent be found, what properties should the antecedent have in order to qualify as pronoun antecedent – how 'salient' should it be, how 'prominent', how 'activated'? And there are also further questions that can be looked at from this perspective: What type of NP should a pronoun antecedent be? And how do different NPs compete with other NPs as antecedents for a given pronoun, in terms of their respective positions and forms?

But we can also adopt the reverse perspective: Consider some definite or indefinite NP type and ask what kind of anaphoric NP could be used to refer back to it at some later point, and

under what conditions determined by the sentence, discourse or text to which antecedent and anaphoric NP belong. This, on my understanding of it, is the perspective of Chiriacescu & von Heusinger (2010). Chiriacescu & von Heusinger are concerned in this paper with the discourse effects of *pe*-marked direct objects in Romanian. Romanian is a D(ifferential)O(bject)M(arking) language, in which animate indefinite descriptions in direct object position can be optionally marked with the particle *pe*, typically in combination with clitic doubling. One effect of *pe*-marking is that the thus marked phrase behaves as a specific indefinite. But as Chiriacescu & von Heusinger show, there is also a forward-looking dimension to the difference between *pe*-marked and non-*pe*-marked indefinite direct objects, in that the former carry an implication that more is going to be said about the entities they introduce. An experiment was conducted by Chiriacescu & von Heusinger, in which Romanian native speakers are asked to continue initial text fragments the last sentences of which have indefinite direct objects. There are two versions of these fragments, one in which the final indefinite object has *pe* and one in which the final indefinite does not. One half of the subjects were asked to continue a fragment with *pe* and the other half got the corresponding fragments without *pe*-marking. The continuations of the two groups were compared along a number of different dimensions.

One of the expectations was clearly confirmed: the continuations of the fragments with the *pe*-marked indefinite objects had substantially more anaphoric references to this indefinite than the continuations of the versions in which the indefinite was not *pe*-marked, and on the whole these anaphoric resumptions came earlier, many of them in the first sentence of the continuation, as if the pe-marked indefinite wants to be seen as a topic and the participants in the experiment feel that pressure and like to confirm that in their continuations by resuming it promptly. With the non-*pe*-marked indefinites there were not only fewer resumptions but on the whole they were more evenly distributed over the five sentences the participants were asked to write.

A second finding was also in line with expectations: in the continuations of the first versions there was a predominance of simple, unmodified definite descriptions, whereas in the continuations to the second versions there was a higher proportion of definite descriptions without modifiers. Exactly what moral about the status of DOM can be derived from this difference in the types of anaphoric resumptions is perhaps not immediately clear and an explanation of this difference is one of the challenges that this paper presents.[4]

Less expected was how little use the participants made of pronouns. To fully understand why, would require a close look at the material – the text fragments they were offered and the continuations they wrote – and that is something, which so far I haven't been able to do (and couldn't do without the help of native speakers). As the authors suggest, the explanation for this sparsity of pronoun uses may well have to do with a variety of factors, some of which may

---

[4] Here is a hunch: The difference between the kinds of descriptions that are preferred in the two tasks is that *pe*-marked indefinites establish their referents as entities, to which a subsequent anaphoric NP can then point. A definite description can do that by pointing at that entity in a way that is unambiguous given what is known about the entity on the basis of how it is introduced by the indefinite. For this to work all that is needed is that the head noun of the description makes it clear which of the established entities is meant. A non-pe-marked indefinite on the other hand does not make an entity available in this same way; it merely adds a representing discourse referent to the discourse representation. A description that refers back to something that is merely present in the form of such a discourse referent must select it as the unique satisfier of its descriptive content within the *class* of entities that the discourse representation represents the entity as being a member of; and that as a rule requires more descriptive information. To do justice to this distinction between entities 'merely' represented by discourse referents and 'referents established as entities', DRT and SDRT as described in Section 2 do not deliver. Needed, rather, is an extension of DRT in which entities can also be represented in some such form as file cards (Perry 1980), (Heim 1982,1988), (Recanati 2012). For one such extension, MSDRT, see e.g. (Kamp 2003), (Kamp 2015), (Kamp 2019).

be specific to Romanian, where the range of anaphoric expressions is different from (and larger than) in English.[5] So we should be very careful about drawing any conclusions from an experiment like this one about the use of English pronouns.

But apart from this, the experiment doesn't tell us anything about long distance anaphora. It wasn't designed for that. In this respect it is representative of pretty much all work on pronoun anaphora that I have seen: the focus is on short distance relations, where pronoun and antecedent are rarely more than two sentences apart. In this regard production-oriented work on pronoun anaphora is like the interpretation-oriented approaches of Section 2. There is no doubt in my mind that we will need to combine work from both these two perspectives to come to a substantially better understanding of anaphoric processes than we have. This will hopefully also show the way toward a better understanding of long distance anaphora. But at this point this no more than a hope.

As it is, then, we have made no real progress with the question we started out with, about the role of *it* in Barnes' last sentence, whose antecedent is apparently so very far away. But perhaps I didn't state that question the right way. Perhaps pronouns, and especially English *it*, are never long distance. That, I believe, is the intuition that most of those who work on nominal anaphora share. It partly motivates and perhaps also justifies that work, with its almost exclusive focus on short distance anaphora. If that intuition is right, then the *it* of sentence (1) isn't anaphoric pronoun at all. But then, what is it?

One of the established insights about pronouns is that they can be used for two related purposes – that of referring and that of resuming some earlier discourse constituent (their anaphoric function). Commonly these two purposes are realized together, when the resumed constituent is a referring phrase and the pronoun refers to the referent of that phrase by virtue of resuming it. But there are also cases where resumption does not entail reference (e.g. when the resumed constituent is a quantifying phrase). And, crucially, pronouns can also refer in the absence of resumption. The paradigmatic examples of this are *deictic* uses, where the speaker draws the attention of her audience to the thing she want to refer to by pointing at it, so that the audience can determine in that way what it she referring to.

Obviously such deictic uses of pronouns aren't found in written prose, which is meant to be read while the author is not present, and which in actual fact is nearly almost read in their absence. In particular, the *it* of (1) isn't a deictic pronoun in the usual sense. But – this is my concluding fling at an answer to the query posed by (1) – there can be something like pronoun deixis in soliloquy. When we talk to ourselves we can use pronouns to refer to things without needing to point at anything in physical space. All we need to do is something like pointing to something within the inner space of our mind, since in soliloquy that space is one that we share with our audience. The 'pointing' we do in such cases is perhaps more like highlighting: the highlighting of an entity representation – presumably one that must have sufficient prominence to begin with. When highlighting lifts such an entity representation into the spotlight, even the

---

[5] Sofiana Chiriacescu-Lindemann and Alina Tigău both checked the final sentence of *Flaubert's Parrot* in the Romanian translation of the book, which I repeat here.

(i) Poate că   unul   dintre   ei   era   **cel**   adevărat.
    perhaps   one   of   them   was   CEL (one)   real.
    'Perhaps one of them was that real one.'

The crucial bit in (i) is *cel* (marked in boldface). I quote Chiriacescu-Lindemann's comment (pers. comm.): 'The translator uses here the *cel* construction. *cel* is a demonstrative adjective (like *acel(a)* 'that'), which has a deictic/anaphoric interpretation. The *cel* construction seems to be best-suited for the present purposes as it points to and simultaneously shifts the attention to the intended referent. The more common Romanian simple personal pronoun and the null pronoun would be infelicitous in this exact context. The null pronoun could have been used in another version of this sentence, however, only in a free indirect discourse, like the present one, which involves context shifting.' It would be no doubt instructive to compare this translation with those into other languages, but this is a project I haven't undertaken.

pronoun *it* can be used in our soliloquizing to refer to the entity that the entity representation represents.

It was this use, I now think when reflecting in retrospect on my first reading of *Flaubert's Parrot*, that the *it* of its last sentence led me to; and with it a vivid image of Barnes standing in front of the parrot display in the museum, musing to himself: 'Was it perhaps one of these?' With that vivid image my reading of *Flaubert's Parrot* came to an end and it lingered on after I had turned the last page. Pronouns in texts are not really meant to be used this way. But that is precisely why Barnes' last sentence makes it so effective; and why it is one worthy of a first rate writer.

Author's note

References

Asher, Nicholas & Alex Lascarides. 2003. *Logics of Conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barnes, Julian. 1985. *Flaubert's Parrot*. London: Pan Books.

Geach, Peter Thomas. 1962. *Reference and Generality: An Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Heim, Irene. 1988. *The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases*. New York: Garland Press.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Sofiana Chiriacescu. 2010. Discourse prominence and *pe*-marking in Romanian. *International Review of Pragmatics* 2. 298–332.

Kamp, Hans. 1981. A theory of Truth and Semantic Representation. In Jeroen A. G. Groenendijk, Theo M. V. Janssen & Martin B. J. Stokhof (eds.), *Formal Methods in the Study of Language*, Part I, 277–322. Amsterdam: Mathematisch Centrum.

Kamp, Hans. 2003. Einstellungszustände und Einstellungszuschreibungen in der Diskursrepräsentationstheorie. In Ulrike Haas-Spohn (ed.), *Intentionalität zwischen Subjektivität und Weltbezug*, 209–289. Paderborn: Mentis.

Kamp, Hans. 2015. Using proper names as intermediaries between labelled entity representations. *Erkenntnis* 80. 263–312.

Kamp, Hans. in press. Entity representations and articulated contexts. An application to the analysis of deictic demonstratives. In Jessica Alden Pepp & Joseph Almog (eds.), *Themes from Kaplan, Thirty Years Later*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kamp, Hans & Uwe Reyle. 1993. *From Discourse to Logic*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Perry, John. 1980. A problem about continued belief. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 61(4). 317–332.

Recanati, François. 2012. *Mental Files.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Warum ist der indefinite Gebrauch des Demonstrativs *tozi* ('dies') im Bulgarischen nicht vorhanden? Überlegungen zum Einfluss des Artikelsystems auf die Herausbildung von indefiniten Demonstrativa

Elena Karagjosova – FU Berlin
elenakar@zedat.fu-berlin.de

1 Indefinite Demonstrativpronomina im Sprachvergleich

In einer der ersten Studien, die sich mit dem indefiniten Gebrauch des Demonstrativs *dies* und des aus dem Demonstrativpronomen *so* und dem indefiniten Artikel *ein* verschmolzenen *son* befassen, zeigt von Heusinger (2012), dass diese für das Deutsche relativ neuen indefiniten Ausdrücke stärkere referenzielle Eigenschaften (Referenzialität, Spezifizität und Diskursprominenz) aufweisen als der indefinite Artikel *ein*. Ein Vergleich mit Sprachen wie Italienisch, Bulgarisch, Russisch und Mongolisch, die ähnliche indefinite Verwendungen von definiten Demonstrativa aufweisen, führt ferner zu dem vorläufigen Schluss, dass das Artikelsystem der jeweiligen Sprache keine Auswirkung auf das Vorhandensein von indefiniten Gebrauchsweisen hat. Daran anknüpfend beabsichtigt der vorliegende Beitrag, die Frage nach dem Einfluss des Artikelsystems auf die Herausbildung indefiniter Gebrauchsweisen von Demonstrativa am Beispiel des Bulgarischen näher zu beleuchten.

2 Die indefiniten Demonstrativpronomina *dies* und *son*

Genauer handelt es sich um den (unbetonten) adnominalen Gebrauch von *dies* und *son* in präsentativen Konstruktionen (cf. (1)), bei dem die jeweiligen NPn ein neues, dem Hörer nicht bekanntes Individuum in den Diskurs einführen. Der neue Diskursreferent hat zudem eine hohe Diskursprominenz, d.h. er wird im nachfolgenden Diskurs wieder aufgegriffen und häufig als Diskurstopik etabliert.

(1)   Da war **dieser/son** Meisterdieb. Er wollte aussteigen. ...

Obwohl laut von Heusinger (2012) *dies* und *son* in dieser Verwendung durch *ein* ersetzbar sind, stellt er einige wichtige Unterschiede hinsichtlich ihrer referenziellen Eigenschaften fest, die im Folgenden kurz zusammengefasst werden.
   Referenzialität wird in von Heusinger (2012) an der Abhängigkeit der Interpretation der NP von Operatoren wie Quantoren und Verben der propositionalen Einstellung festgemacht. Im Unterschied zu deiktisch/anaphorisch benutzen demonstrativen NPn, die unabhängig von anderen Operatoren eine direkte Referenz auf ihre Denotate haben und existenzielle Präsuppositionen auslösen, erlauben indefinite NPn sowohl weite als auch enge Skopuslesarten (cf. (2a),[1] lösen keine existenziellen Präsuppositionen aus (cf. (2b) und sind somit nicht direkt referenziell.

(2)   a.   Jeder Kollege hat **ein** Buch von Klaus gelesen. (verschiedene Bücher > ein Buch)
      b.   Eva will **einen** Film über Klaus sehen, aber es gibt keinen.

Indefinite *dies* und *son* verhalten sich dagegen eher wie direkt referenzielle Demonstrativa, indem sie nur die weite Lesart erlauben (oder sie präferieren) (3) und (zumindest tendenziell)

---

[1] Hier wird die enge Lesart (verschiedene Bücher) wegen der Oberflächenanordnung der Operatoren präferiert.

existenzielle Präsuppositionen auslösen (4), cf. von Heusinger (2012: 441).

(3)   a.   Jeder Kollege hat **dieses** Buch von Klaus gelesen. (ein Buch/*versch. Bücher)
       b.   Jeder Kollege hat **son** Buch von Klaus gelesen. (ein Buch > ?versch. Bücher)

(4)   a.   Eva will diesen Film über Klaus sehen, #aber es gibt keinen.
       b.   Eva will **sonen** Film über Klaus sehen, ??aber es gibt keinen.

Spezifizität wird in von Heusinger (2012) an das Wissen der Sprecher über den durch die NP eingeführten Diskursreferenten gebunden. Während deiktisch/anaphorisch gebrauchte Demonstrativa auf eine spezifische Lesart beschränkt sind, bei der sich die Sprecherin auf ein bestimmtes, ihr bekanntes Objekt bezieht, lässt der indefinite Artikel *ein* auch eine unspezifische Lesart zu (5a), bei der nicht auf einen bestimmten Diskursreferenten Bezug genommen wird, sondern auf die durch das Nomen ausgedrückte Eigenschaft des Referenten. Indefinite *dies* und *son* verhalten sich auch in dieser Hinsicht wie definite Demonstrative, indem sie nur spezifische Lesarten zulassen (5b, 5c)[2].

(5)   a.   Klaus hat mit **einem** Prof gesprochen, ich weiß (nicht) mit welchem.
       b.   Klaus hat mit **diesem** Prof gesprochen, ich weiß (#nicht) mit welchem.
       c.   Klaus hat mit **sonem** Prof gesprochen, ich weiß (??nicht) mit welchem.

Diskursprominenz Im Vergleich zu *ein,* das eine geringe referenzielle Persistenz aufweist, wird für indefinite *dies* und *son* schließlich eine hohe Tendenz festgestellt, den eingeführten Diskursreferenten im nachfolgenden Text wieder aufzugreifen, cf. (von Heusinger 2012: 444).

3 Indefinite Demonstrativa und das Artikelsystem

Ähnliche Eigenschaften (direkte Referenzialität, Spezifizität, Einführung eines neuen Diskursthemas) werden in der Literatur dem englischen indefiniten Demonstrativum *this* attestiert. Eine kleine kontrastive Studie belegt in von Heusinger (2012) das Vorhandensein von ähnlichen indefiniten Gebrauchsweisen der gleichen demonstrativen Ausdrücke auch in nichtgermanischen Sprachen wie Italienisch *(questo),* Russisch *(eto, takoe)* und Bulgarisch *(edin takâv)*.[3] Interessant ist dabei, dass im Unterschied zum Englischen und Italienischen, die wie das Deutsche sowohl definite als auch indefinite Artikel besitzen, aber keine indefinite Verwendung des Demonstrativpronomens für Eigenschaften aufweisen, das Bulgarische nur diese indefinite Verwendung eines Demonstrativums zulässt. Das wiederum steht im Gegensatz zum artikellosen Russisch, das indefinite Verwendungen für beide Arten von Demonstrativa aufweist. Um der Frage nachzugehen, ob sich hinter dieser Verteilung doch eine Systematik verbergen könnte, werde ich im Folgenden auf die Situation im Bulgarischen etwas näher eingehen.

    Zunächst einmal kann festgehalten werden, dass *edin takâv* ähnlich starke referenzielle Eigenschaften wie *dies* und *son* besitzt. So kann gezeigt werden, dass *edin takâv* in dieser Verwendung direkt referenziell (weite Lesart (6a), existenzielle Präsupposition (6b) und spezifisch (6c)) ist:

(6)   a.   Vseki student izretsitira **edno takova** stihotvorenie. Kazva se "Na proštavane".
          'Jeder Student trug son Gedicht vor. Es heißt "Zum Abschied".'

---

[2] Der Fall von *son* ist auch in dieser Hinsicht weniger eindeutig, cf. von Heusinger (2012: 443).
[3] Das Mongolische wird im Folgenden außer Acht gelassen.

b.   Eva iska da vidi **edin takâv** film za Klaus, ??no takâv njama.
         'Eva will sonen Film über Klaus sehen' aber es gibt keinen.'
c.   Klaus govori s **edin takâv** jurist, ??no ne znam koj/poznavam go mnogo dobre.
         'Klaus sprach mit sonem Juristen, aber ich weiß nicht mit wem/ich kenne ihn sehr gut.'

Darüber hinaus scheint indefinites *edin takâv* ähnlich diskursprominent zu sein, was allerdings anhand der dünnen Datenlage (2 Beispiele für indefinite Verwendung von adnominalem *edin takâv* von insgesamt 8,[4] beide mit anaphorischer Wiederaufnahme im nachfolgenden Diskurs, s. Anhang), schwer zu beurteilen ist und durch weitere Untersuchungen geprüft werden muss.

    Anders als im Deutschen hat der bulgarische indefinite Determinierer *edin* ganz ähnliche Eigenschaften wie *edin takâv*. Während *ein* ambig zwischen der engen und weiten Skopuslesart ist, scheint *edin* die weite Skopuslesart zu präferieren, cf. (7a), wobei die enge Skopuslesart durch die nackte NP zustandekommt.[5] Ähnlich wie *edin takâv* (und anders als *ein*) löst *edin* eine existenzielle Präsupposition aus (die mit dem Null-Artikel nicht entsteht),[6] und wird (zumindest präferiert) spezifisch interpretiert (7c), während der Null-Artikel auch die nicht-spezifische Lesart ermöglicht.[7]

(7)   a.   Vseki student izretsitira **edno** stihotvorenie. Kazva se "Na proštavane".
           'Jeder Student trug ein Gedicht vor. Es heißt "Zum Abschied".'
    b.   Eva iska da vidi **edin** film za Klaus, ??no takâv njama.
           'Eva will einen Film über Klaus sehen, aber es gibt keinen.'
    c.   Klaus govori s **edin** jurist, poznavam go mnogo dobre/?no ne znam koj e toj.
           'Klaus sprach mit einem Juristen, aber ich kenne ihn sehr gut/ich weiß nicht mit wem.'

Andererseits scheint die referenzielle Persistenz von *edin* ähnlich gering zu sein wie die von *ein,* wie das die Wiederaufnahme des Referenten in nur 2 von 10 untersuchten Fällen belegt.

    Diese (wenn auch spärlichen) Sprachdaten legen den Schluss nahe, dass *edin* im Vergleich zu *ein* stärkere referenzielle Eigenschaften an den Tag legt und dass sich der Null-Artikel in Bezug auf seine referenziellen Eigenschaften ähnlicher wie *ein* verhält als der indefinite Determinierer *edin*. Dies ist in der Tat kein Zufall, denn dem bulgarischen *edin* wird in der Literatur der Status eines indefiniten Artikels abgesprochen. So zeigt Geist (2001), dass *edin* in Givóns (1981) Grammatikalisierungsprozess begriffen ist, bei dem sich indefinite Artikel aus Zahlwörtern durch Desemantisierung entwickeln und dabei mehrere Stufen durchlaufen, cf. (8). Laut Geist ist die referenzielle Funktion (als Präsentation- und Spezifitätsmarker)[8] zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt die zentrale Funktion von *edin* (Stufe II), allerdings weist es auch nicht-referenzielle (prädikative und generische)[9] Verwendungen auf und befindet sich somit

---

[4] Bei den Daten handelt es sich um die ersten 27 Treffer für die Kollokation *edin takâv* in BulNC (2021), wobei 8 davon adnominal und 19 adjektival verwendet sind (letztere mit einer emotionalen oder hedging-Interpretation, cf. von Heusinger 2012: 438, wobei kein neuer Diskursreferent, sondern eine neue Eigenschaft eines bereits eingeführten Diskursreferenten eingeführt wird, um eine emotionale Distanz/Nähe auszudrücken oder eine genauere Beschreibung des Referenten zu erzielen). Es ist ferner zu beachten, dass weitere mögliche Kollokationen (für die restlichen 2 Genera und den Plural (*edna takava*, *edno takova*, *edni takiva*) in dieser kleinen Pilotstudie nicht berücksichtigt wurden.

[5] *Vseki student izretsitira stihotvorenie. ??Kazva se "Na proštavane".* (*weit/eng)

[6] *Eva iska da vidi film za Klaus, no takâv njama.*

[7] *Klaus govori s jurist, poznavam go mnogo dobre/no ne znam koj e toj.*

[8] Der Status von *edin* als Spezifizitätsmarker ist allerdings nicht so eindeutig, wie Beispiele wie (7c) zeigen.

[9] Generische und prädikative NPn beziehen sich auf die Eigenschaft des Referenten als Mitglied einer Kategorie und nicht auf das Individuum selbst.

am Übergang zwischen Stufe II und III.

(8) Stufe I   Stufe II   Stufe III
     Quantifikation   > referenziell   > nicht-referentiell
     Numerale   > indefiniter Determinierer > indefiniter Artikel

Nun könnte dieser nicht vollständig abgeschlossene Grammatikalisierungsstatus von *edin* als indefinitem Artikel ein Grund sein für den (sich wohl gegenwärtig in den Anfängen befindenden) Gebrauch von *edin takâv* statt von *tozi* als "neue" Form, die zur eindeutige(re)n Markierung von referenziell zu lesenden indefiniten NPn dienen soll. Givón (1981: 51) führt die sprachübergreifend belegte Beliebtheit von Numeralia wie *ein/edin* als Quelle für die Herausbildung von indefiniten Artikeln auf ihre ursprünglichen, im Prozess der Grammatikalisierung nach und nach gebleichten Eigenschaften wie Quantifikation und Referenzialität zurück.[10] Alternative Referenz induzierende Kandidaten wie definite/deiktische Ausdrücke und Possessiva sind laut Givón weniger gut geeignet, da sie nicht nur Referenzialität, sondern auch Definitheit und daher die Bekanntheit des Referenten induzieren. Wie die Existenz von indefiniten *this/dies/questo* zeigt, muss Givóns Aussage jedoch dahingehend abgeschwächt werden, dass der Schritt von einer definiten Form zur indefiniten Funktion, einen neuen Referenten im Diskurs einzuführen, ein größerer sein dürfte als der von einer quantifizierten Form, die Referenzialität aber auch Unbekanntheit impliziert. Vor dem Hintergrund des unstabilen indefiniten Bereichs des bulgarischen Artikelsystems (wo sich der Wandel des Numerales *ein* zum nicht-referenziellen indefiniten Artikel noch nicht vollständig vollzogen hat),[11] scheint daher die Wahl einer rein demonstrativen Form als Ausgangspunkt für die Herausbildung einer indefiniten Markierung der weniger ökonomische Grammatikalisierungspfad zu sein. Dahingegen stellt die Verwendung einer Konstruktion, die *edin* als Komponente enthält, dessen referenzielle Eigenschaften allerdings durch eine definite Form wie *takâv* als zweite Komponente deutlich gestärkt werden, eine bessere Strategie dar, um diese Lücke im System zu schließen.[12]

Andererseits vollzieht sich die Entwicklung der indefiniten Demonstrativa *dies/this/questo* vor dem Hintergrund relativ stabiler indefiniter Systeme, in denen der Grammatikalisierungszyklus der Numerale vollendet ist und die entsprechenden indefiniten Artikel *ein/a/un* schwache referenzielle Eigenschaften aufweisen. Wie von Heusinger (2012) für *son* zeigt, sind die referenziellen Eigenschaften einer solchen Form durch die schwache Referenzialität des indefiniten Artikels weniger stark ausgeprägt als bei einem reinen Demonstrativum für Individuen wie *dies*. Dies könnte auch der Grund sein, warum nicht alle betrachteten Sprachen, die einen indefiniten Artikel besitzen, auch indefinite Formen wie *son* aufweisen (diese fehlen im Englischen und Italienischen). Im artikellosen Russisch wiederum befindet sich das Numerale *odin* ('ein') gegenwärtig noch am Übergang zwischen Stufe I und II von Givóns Grammatikalisierungszyklus (indem es als Präsentationsmarker, jedoch ohne Spezifizitätsmarkierung, verwendet wird). Die indefinite Verwendung der beiden Demonstrativa *takoj* (ohne *odin*) und *etot* könnte auf das Nichtvorhandensein eines indefiniten Determinierers wie *edin* und somit auf das Vorhandensein nur eines der beiden oben skizzierten Grammatikalisierungspfade für indefinite Demonstrativa, nämlich die Rekrutierung von reinen

---

[10] "having quantity implies existence/reference; having existence/reference implies having connotation/genericity".

[11] und in dem der Null-Artikel sich nur teilweise wie ein indefiniter Artikel verhält.

[12] In dieser indefiniten refenziellen Konstruktion trägt das Demonstrativum *takâv* eine definite, sich auf Eigenschaften beziehende referenzielle Komponente bei, die die referenziellen Eigenschaften von *edin* unterstützt und stärkt, während die indefinite Komponente, die *edin* mit sich bringt, die definiten Eigenschaften von *takâv* zu neutralisieren oder zumindest abzuschwächen scheint.

Demonstrativa, zurückgeführt werden.

Somit scheint die Beschaffenheit des Artikelsystems in allen betrachteten Sprachen einen Einfluss auf die Art der sich herausbildenden indefiniten Demonstrativa (und vielleicht auch auf ihr Vorhandensein) zu haben.

Literatur

BulNC. 2021. Bulgarian national corpus, http://search.dcl.bas.bg/.

Geist, Ljudmila. 2001. Bulgarian *edin:* The rise of an indefinite article. In Uwe Junghanns, Dorothee Fehrmann, Denisa Lenertova & Hagen Pitsch (Hrsg.), *Proceedings of Formal Description of Slavic Languages (FDSL)* 9, 125–148. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

Givón, Talmy. 1981. On the development of the numeral 'one' as an indefinite marker. *Folia Linguistica Historica* II(1). 35–53.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2012. Referentialität, Spezifizität und Diskursprominenz im Sprachvergleich am Beispiel von definiten Demonstrativpronomen. In Lutz Gunkel & Gisela Zifonun (Hrsg.), *Deutsch im Sprachvergleich - Grammatische Kontraste und Konvergenzen,* 417–456. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Anhang: indefinite Verwendungen von *edin takâv* im BulNC

(9)   Stovarjam az na Vinohradi gjumovete, gledam vsičko mi e nared, a tam pokraj men minava **edin takâv** mladež s kola, konte njakakvo, s edna žena i, predstavete si, ne se sramuvat da me zamerjat s obuvka! ...
'Ich lade also die Milchkannen in Vinohrady ab, bei mir ist alles in Ordnung, und da fährt an mir son Jugendlicher vorbei, ein Geck, mit einer Frau, und stellt euch das nur vor, die schämen sich nicht, einen Schuh nach mir zu werfen!...'

(10)   Ponjakoga v očite na momičetata [...] se dolavjaše **edin takâv** pogled, kakâvto Tirion Lanistâr nikak ne dâržeše da vižda.
'Manchmal konnte man in den Augen der Mädchen [...] son Blick erhaschen, den wollte Tyrion Lannister nicht unbedingt sehen.'

Verben des Kontakts und Argumentalternation

Semra Kizilkaya – Universität zu Köln
semra.kizilkaya@uni-koeln.de

1 Einleitung

Verben des Kontakts durch Aufprall wie *schlagen, treten, beißen* zeigen im Deutschen systematisch Argumentalternationen nach Belebtheit. An der direkten Objektposition dieser Verben sind nur belebte Argumente lizensiert (1a). Unbelebte Argumente werden mit Präposition realisiert (1b).

(1)　a.　　Sie schlug den Jungen.
　　 b.　　Sie schlug *(gegen/auf) den Tisch.

Diese Variation wurde für eine Reihe von germanischen Sprachen beobachtet, wie neben dem Deutschen auch für das Niederländische, Dänische und Schwedische (Lundquist & Ramchand 2012; de Swart 2014; de Swart & de Hoop 2018). Dabei werden in der Literatur hauptsächlich zwei distinkte Argumentationsstränge vertreten, um die Daten zu erklären. Der eine stellt die Kategorie Affiziertheit ins Zentrum der Analyse, während der andere das Merkmal Sentienz als ausschlaggebend erachtet. In diesem Beitrag konzentriere ich mich auf die Argumentalternation mit dem Kontaktverb *schlagen*. Ich argumentiere, dass das Merkmal Sentienz die Argumentalternation nicht umfassend erklären kann. Stattdessen ist die Ereignisstruktur entscheidend: Themaargumente von *schlagen* sind als direkte Objekte lizensiert, wenn sie entweder als affiziert interpretiert werden können oder Pfadobjekte darstellen.

2 Kontaktverben

Verben des Kontakts durch Aufprall werden in der syntaktischen und semantischen Literatur oft diskutiert, da sie im Sprachvergleich Variation in der Argumentrealisierung zeigen. Sie lassen sich im Allgemeinen durch Bewegung des Instruments zur Ziellokation bzw. zum Patiensargument charakterisieren (Levin 1993). Nach Fillmore (1970) sind die wesentlichen Bedeutungskomponenten von *schlagen*-Verben (i) Bewegung, (ii) Kontakt und (iii) Kraft ('force'). Im Gegensatz zu Verben der Zustandsveränderung wie *zerbrechen* oder *töten* assertiert diese Klasse von Verben zwar physikalischen Kontakt zwischen zwei Entitäten, jedoch ohne jegliche grundlegende Veränderung des Objekts zu inferieren (Fillmore 1970: 125). Die Aktion des Agens trifft also auf das Patiens, bewirkt aber nicht notwendigerweise Veränderung. Die Beispiele in (2) zeigen, dass Veränderung für das Themaargument mit Verben der Zustandsveränderung wie *töten* nicht falsifizierbar ist (2a). Mit Verben des Kontakts durch Aufprall hingegen ist Veränderung möglich (2b), aber nicht in der lexikalischen Semantik kodiert (2c).

(2)　a.　　Die Soldatin tötete den Jungen. #Es hat sich dadurch nichts an ihm verändert.
　　 b.　　Die Soldatin schlug/trat/biss den Jungen. Er sah danach ziemlich übel aus.
　　 c.　　Die Soldatin schlug/trat/biss den Jungen. Er sah danach genauso aus wie vorher.

3 Sentienz

De Swart (2014) sowie de Swart & de Hoop (2018) analysieren die Argumentalternationen mit Kontaktverben dieser Art im Niederländischen als Instanz paradigmatischer Differentieller Objektmarkierung (DOM) nach Ackerman & Moore (2001). Diese Art von DOM dient dazu, thematische Unterschiede zwischen zwei Gruppen von Objekten zu signalisieren. Sie argumentieren, dass Verben des physischen Kontakts ein sentientes Objekt voraussetzen, also eines, das Empfindungs- und Wahrnehmungsfähigkeit in Bezug auf das Ereignis besitzt. Belebte Themaargumente sind sentient und können als direkte Objekte realisiert werden (3a). (3b) hingegen stellt ein Mismatch zwischen der selektionalen Sentienzrestriktion des Verbs und der unbelebten DP dar. Um dies aufzulösen, wird eine Präposition eingefügt (3c).

(3)   a.   Sie schlug $_{+\text{ sentientes Objekt}}$ den Jungen.
      b.   *Sie schlug $_{+\text{ sentientes Objekt}}$ den Tisch.
      c.   Sie schlug gegen/auf den Tisch.

Basierend auf Dowty's Proto Rollenmodell (1991) schlägt de Swart (2014) vor, Sentienz als neues Proto-Patiens-Merkmal einzuführen. Belebte interne Argumente tragen dadurch mehr Proto-Patiens-Merkmale als unbelebte Argumente und werden als direktes Objekt realisiert. Unbelebten Argumenten fehlt per se die Eigenschaft *geschlagen*, *gebissen* oder *getreten* zu werden. Da sie eine geringere Anzahl von Proto-Patiens-Merkmalen aufweisen, werden sie als oblique Argumente realisiert.

   In Bezug auf Kontaktverben im Deutschen ist diese Argumentation jedoch nicht ausreichend, da in gewissen Kontexten auch unbelebte Themaargumente als direkte Objekte realisiert werden. Etwa, wenn resultative Prädikate spezifizieren, dass das Kontaktereignis eine Veränderung hervorbringt (4). Dies gilt gleichermaßen für konkret physische (4a), aber auch abstrakte Formen von Veränderung in einem *schlagen*-Ereignis (4b).

(4)   a.   Sie schlug den Tisch <u>in Stücke</u>.
      b.   Die Polizei schlug die Demonstration <u>nieder</u>.

4 Ereignisstruktur: Affiziertheit, Agentivität, Pfad

Ausgehend von der ebengenannten Beobachtung mit unbelebten Themaargumenten schlage ich deshalb im Folgenden vor, dass die direkte Objektposition von Kontaktverben nicht von der Belebtheit des Themaarguments, sondern der jeweiligen Ereignisstruktur abhängig ist. Themaargumente von *schlagen* sind als direkte Objekte lizensiert, wenn sie entweder als affiziert interpretiert werden können oder Pfadobjekte darstellen.

   Affiziertheit ist eine zentrale linguistische Kategorie, die die Veränderung beschreibt, die ein Themaargument erfährt. Jede DP, die über eine Eigenschaft verfügt, die sich durch das Ereignis kontinuierlich verändert oder Resultat einer Veränderung ist, kann als affiziert definiert werden. In Dowty's Proto-Modell thematischer Rollen ist Affiziertheit das Gegenstück zu Agentivität. Nach Primus (1999) besteht eine Dependenzrelation zwischen beiden Konzepten: Die Affiziertheit des Patiens ist abhängig von der Agentivität des Agens.

AGENTIVITÄT: PROTO-AGENS		AFFIZIERTHEIT: PROTO-PATIENS
Volitionalität	←——→	Zustandsveränderung
Sentienz	←——→	Inkrementelles Thema (Pfadargument)
Kausalität	←——→	Kausale Affiziertheit
unabhängige Existenz	←——→	keine unabhängige Existenz

Während Proto-Agens-Merkmale eine morphosyntaktische Realisierung des Arguments als Subjekt begünstigen, gilt für Proto-Patiens-Merkmale, dass sie die direkte Objektrolle begünstigen. Pfadargumente bzw. inkrementelle Themen werden in neueren Arbeiten vom affizierten Argument distinguiert (Ramchand 2008; Beavers 2011). Es gilt jedoch als etabliert, dass beide sprachübergreifend zentrale Charakteristika direkter Objekte darstellen.

Belebte Themaargumente von Kontaktverben sind in direkter Objektposition lizensiert, da sie als mental affiziert interpretiert werden können, vgl. Lundquist & Ramchand (2012) und Fleischhauer (2018). Anders als unbelebte verfügen sie über ein komplexes mentales Innenleben und sind damit in mehr Kontexten affiziert als unbelebte Entitäten. Dies bestätigt die Umschreibungsmöglichkeit mit der *was (mit) x PASSIEREN* Paraphrase, die gemeinhin als Test für Affiziertheit gilt (5). Für unbelebte Entitäten ist der bloße Kontakt nicht hinreichend, um als affiziert interpretiert zu werden. Erst die Kombination mit resultativen Prädikaten zeigt Veränderung an und ermöglicht die Paraphrasierung in (6b).

(5)   a. Was dem Jungen passiert ist, dass er geschlagen wurde.
        b. Was dem Jungen passiert ist, dass er <u>in tiefe Melancholie/wund</u> geschlagen wurde.
(6)   a. #Was mit dem Tisch passiert ist, dass er geschlagen wurde.
        b. Was mit dem Tisch passierte ist, dass er <u>in Stücke</u> geschlagen wurde.

Ein weiteres Indiz dafür, dass Ereignisstruktur der entscheidende Faktor ist, kommt von der Interaktion von Agentivität und Affiziertheit im Kontaktereignis. Ein schwächeres Agens wie *der Ast* in (7a) (–Volition, –Sentienz) kann eine schwächere Affiziertheit des Patiens bewirken, sodass auch ein belebtes Themaargument als Präpositionalobjekt realisiert werden muss. Parallel zu der Distribution mit unbelebten Argumenten lizensieren dann resultative Prädikate die direkte Objektposition (7b).

(7)   a.   Beim Ausritt gestern schlug der Ast *(gegen/auf) den Jungen.
        b.   Beim Ausritt gestern schlug der Ast den Jungen <u>vom Pferd</u>.

Was in der Literatur bisher außerdem unbeobachtet blieb, sind Verwendungen von *schlagen* als Kreationsverb. Auch in solchen Fällen können unbelebte Argumente als direkte Objekte von *schlagen* realisiert werden (8). Da sie erst als Resultat des Ereignisses entstehen bzw. kreiert werden, sind sie nicht affiziert (vgl. Diskussion in Beavers 2011: 346–349). Ereignisstrukturell stellen sie inkrementelle Themen bzw. Pfadargumente dar.

(8)   a.   Sie schlug einen Mauerstein.
        b.   Sie schlug eine Skulptur (aus dem Stein).
        c.   Sie schlug einen Kreis.

5 Fazit

In diesem Kurzbeitrag habe ich Argumentalternationen mit Verben des Kontakts durch Aufprall, insbesondere dem Verb *schlagen* diskutiert. Ich habe argumentiert, dass die Kategorie Sentienz kein hinreichendes Erklärungspotential für die Distribution im Deutschen bietet. Sowohl unbelebte als auch belebte Themaargumente werden als direkte Objekte von Kontaktverben realisiert, wenn sie (i) entweder als affiziert interpretiert werden können, oder (ii) Pfadargumente von Kreationsinterpretationen dieser Verben darstellen. Damit ist nicht Belebtheit, sondern Ereignisstruktur ausschlaggebend.

Referenzen

Ackerman, Farrel & John Moore. 2001. *Proto-properties and grammatical encoding: A correspondence theory of argument selection*. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.

Beavers, John. 2011. On affectedness. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 29(2). 335–370.

de Swart, Peter & Helen de Hoop. 2018. Shifting animacy. *Theoretical Linguistics* 44(1–2). 1–23.

de Swart, Peter. 2014. Prepositional inanimates in Dutch: A paradigmatic case of Differential Object Marking. *Linguistics* 52(2). 445–468.

Dowty, David. 1991. Thematic Proto-Roles and Argument Selection. *Language* 67(3). 547–619.

Fillmore, Charles. 1970. The Grammar of Hitting and Breaking. In Roderick Jacobs & Peter Rosenbaum (Hrsg.). *Readings in English Transformational Grammar*, 120–133. Waltham, MA: Ginn.

Fleischhauer, Jens. 2018. Animacy and affectedness in Germanic languages. *Open Linguistics* 4(1). 566–588.

Levin, Beth. 1993. *English verb classes and alternations*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Lundquist, Björn & Gilian Ramchand. 2012. Contact, animacy, and affectedness in Germanic. In Peter Ackema, Rhona Alcorn & Caroline Heycock (Hrsg.). *Comparative Germanic Syntax*, 224–248. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Primus, Beatrice. 1999. *Cases and thematic roles – Ergative, accusative and active*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Ramchand, Gillian Catriona. 2008. *Verb meaning and the lexicon. A first phrase syntax*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Er backte einen Kuchen.
Zur Verwendung von Personalpronomen in türkischen Texten

Gökben Konuk – Universität zu Köln
goekben.konuk@uni-koeln.de

1 Personalpronomen im Türkischen

Türkisch zählt zu den Sprachen, die pronominale Subjekte nicht notwendigerweise explizit realisieren müssen.[1] Die Sprache hat eine sehr starke Tendenz, Subjektpronomen, wo es nur möglich ist, wegzulassen und diese als Nullpronomen auszudrücken.[2]

(1)   a.   Klaus pasta yap-tı. Çay iç-ti.
               Klaus Kuchen backen-PRÄT Tee trinken-PRÄT
               'Klaus backte einen Kuchen. Er trank Tee.'

        b.   Klaus pasta yap-tı. #O çay içti.
               Klaus Kuchen backen-PRÄT Tee trinken-PRÄT
               'Klaus backte einen Kuchen. Er trank Tee.'

Die grammatischen Kategorien Person und Numerus werden im Türkischen als Suffixe am Verb markiert. Im Gegensatz zu Sprachen wie Deutsch oder Englisch, kodiert das Türkische kein Genus. Das Personalpronomen der dritten Person Singular gleicht in Form dem distalen Demonstrativpronomen.[3]

    Auf Satzebene unterliegen Personalpronomen im Türkischen starken syntaktischen Restriktionen, die mit strukturellen Beziehungen erfasst werden können, die uns aber aufgrund des begrenzten Rahmens hier nicht weiter interessieren sollen. Auch sollen die in der Literatur vorgeschlagenen Lizensierungsbedingungen, die Türkisch zwischen Sprachen wie Spanisch, Italienisch einerseits und Japanisch, Chinesisch und Koreanisch andererseits, verorten, nicht weiter verfolgt werden (Kornfilt 1984; Özsoy 1987; Öztürk 2001).[4] Vielmehr sollen uns in diesem Beitrag die Parameter interessieren, von denen in der Literatur behauptet worden ist, dass sie die Verwendung von Personalpronomen im Türkischen auf Textebene steuern, obwohl nicht ausgeschlossen werden soll, dass es einen Zusammenhang gibt zwischen den Bedingungen, die den Gebrauch von Personalpronomen im Türkischen auf Satzebene steuern und denjenigen, die ihren Gebrauch auf Textebene steuern.

    Auf Textebene unterliegt die Verwendung von Personalpronomen im Türkischen in hohem Maße pragmatischen Bedingungen (Enç 1986; Erguvanlı-Taylan 1986; Öztürk 2001). Im Grunde lassen sich hier zwei Hauptannahmen ausmachen, die in der Literatur existieren und

---

[1] Meinem verehrten Doktorvater Klaus von Heusinger zu seinem 60. Geburtstag. Der Beitrag entwickelt Überlegungen aus meinem Dissertationsprojekt weiter. Formulierung des Titels gibt leitenden Hinweis. Im Kern handelt es sich um Personalpronomen der dritten Person Singular Nominativ im Türkischen.

[2] In der Generativen Grammatik geht man davon aus, dass die Subjektpronomen nur auf der Oberfläche weggelassen werden, d.h. in der syntaktischen Repräsentation sind sie als leeres Pronomen vorhanden. Türkisch lässt auch das Weglassen von Objektpronomen zu. Diese Eigenschaft soll uns hier nicht weiter interessieren.

[3] Dies lässt hinsichtlich der Textfunktion von Personalpronomen im Türkischen interessante Vermutungen aufstellen, auf die ich in Abschnitt 3 nochmals kommen werde. Im Folgenden werde ich unter Personalpronomen diejenigen Pronomen fassen, die phonologisch gefüllt sind. Pronomen, die phonologisch leer sind, werden als Nullpronomen bezeichnet.

[4] In der Literatur gibt es eine theoretische Debatte über den Status von Türkisch als pro-drop Sprache, da die Sprache eine interessante Zwischenstellung einnimmt, zwischen Sprachen wie Spanisch, Italienisch einerseits und Japanisch, Chinesisch und Koreanisch andererseits.

die eng miteinander verzahnt sind. In der Literatur wird zum einen vorgeschlagen, dass das Nullpronomen im Türkischen verwendet wird, wenn auf ein Topik Bezug genommen werden soll, was im Türkischen zumeist auch NP1, also der Referent, der zuerst in den Text eingeführt wird, ist, und das Subjekt ist. In (2) treffen alle diese Eigenschaften auf *Klaus* zu. *Klaus* ist NP1, das Topik und das Subjekt und es kann im nachfolgenden Text auf *Klaus* mit einem Nullpronomen Bezug genommen werden, ohne, dass es wie in (2b) zu einer markierten Lesart kommt, wenn das Subjektpronomen jedes Mal lexikalisch ausgedrückt wird.

(2)   a.   Klaus dün üç saat boyunca mutfaktaydı. Önce ellerini yıkadı. Sonra önlüğünü boynuna taktı. Çok geçmeden dolaptan malzemeleri çıkardı.
'Klaus war gestern drei Stunden in der Küche. Zuerst wusch er sich die Hände. Dann legte er seine Schürze um den Hals. Kurz darauf holte er die Zutaten aus dem Schrank.'

          b.   #Klaus dün üç saat boyunca mutfaktaydı. O önce ellerini yıkadı. O sonra önlüğünü boynuna taktı. O çok geçmeden dolaptan malzemeleri çıkardı.
'Klaus war gestern drei Stunden in der Küche. Zuerst wusch er sich die Hände. Dann legte er seine Schürze um den Hals. Kurz darauf holte er die Zutaten aus dem Schrank.'

Soll dagegen ein Topikwechsel angezeigt werden, so ist die gängige Annahme in der Literatur, dass im Türkischen ein Personalpronomen, statt ein Nullpronomen verwendet wird. Betrachten wir hierzu noch einmal das eingangs angeführte Beispiel. In (3a) wird mit dem Nullpronomen der Erhalt des Topiks angezeigt.

(3)   a.   Klaus pasta yap-tı. Çay iç-ti.
Klaus Kuchen backen-PRÄT Tee trinken-PRÄT
'Klaus backte einen Kuchen. Er trank Tee.'

          b.   Klaus pasta yap-tı. #O çay iç-ti.
Klaus Kuchen backen-PRÄT Tee trinken-PRÄT
'Klaus backte einen Kuchen. Er trank Tee.'

In (3b) wird mit dem Personalpronomen eine Lesart erzeugt, in der das Pronomen sich auf einen anderen Referenten als *Klaus* bezieht. D.h. es kommt zu einem Topikwechsel wie in (4b) exemplarisch dem Eigennamen *Ali* angezeigt:

(4)   a.   Klaus pasta yap-tı. Çay iç-ti.
Klaus Kuchen backen-PRÄT Tee trinken-PRÄT
'Klaus backte einen Kuchen. Er trank Tee.'

          b.   Klaus pasta yap-tı. Ali çay iç-ti.
Klaus Kuchen backen-PRÄT Ali Tee trinken-PRÄT
'Klaus backte einen Kuchen. Ali trank Tee.'

Folgt man den in der Literatur gemachten Annahmen, dann sind Kontexte, in denen mit einem Personalpronomen auf NP1 oder Topik oder Subjekt Bezug genommen wird, ausgeschlossen. Die Sprache lässt aber die Verwendung von Personalpronomen in genau solchen Kontexten zu, etwa wenn eine referentielle Kette zeitweilig unterbrochen wird, wenn beispielsweise ein

neuer Referent (NP2) in den Text eingeführt wird, und die referentielle Kette später im Text weiter fortgesetzt wird wie in (5):

(5)   Klaus dün üç saat boyunca mutfaktaydı. Önce ellerini yıkadı. Sonra önlüğünü boynuna taktı. Çok geçmeden dolaptan malzemeleri çıkardı. Birden Ali geldi. Ama o devam etti çalışmaya.
       'Klaus war gestern drei Stunden in der Küche. Zuerst wusch er sich die Hände. Dann legte er seine Schürze um den Hals. Kurz darauf holte er die Zutaten aus dem Schrank. Plötzlich kam Ali. Aber er arbeitete weiter.'

Diese Daten werfen die Frage auf, was genau die Verwendung von Personalpronomen im Türkischen steuert. Wenn, wie eingangs erwähnt, Subjektpronomen im Türkischen nicht notwendigerweise explizit ausgedrückt werden müssen, dann stellt sich die Frage, was die Verwendung von Personalpronomen im Türkischen notwendig macht. Da Personalpronomen in dieser Sprache im Vergleich zu Sprachen wie Deutsch oder Englisch relativ selten vorkommen, und wenn, dann nur in bestimmten Kontexten, lässt sich daraus schließen, dass es klare Bedingungen geben muss, die den Gebrauch von Personalpronomen im Türkischen steuern. Die Daten legen den Schluss nahe, dass der Hörer durch das Personalpronomen im Türkischen angewiesen wird, seine Aufmerksamkeit auf einen neuen Referenten zu richten, der aktuell nicht im Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit steht und der mit dem Gebrauch des Personalpronomens ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit geholt wird.

2 Daten und Annotationskategorien / Anmerkungen zur Korpusstudie

Das untersuchte Korpus umfasste 60 Daten, die für die Zwecke der Untersuchung aus dem METU Korpus extrahiert wurden. Demnach bildete das Untersuchungskorpus einen Subkorpus eines umfangreicheren Gesamtkorpus. Das METU Korpus ist ein Referenzkorpus für Türkisch, das öffentliche Texte aus verschiedenen Bereichen wie Wissenschaft, Presse und Literatur aus den Jahren 1990 bis 2000 enthält.

Hauptziel der Korpusstudie war es, die Kontexte zu ermitteln, in denen Personalpronomen verwendet werden, und diese Kontexte so genau wie möglich zu beschreiben. Um dies zu erreichen, wurde die Studie auf Personalpronomen der dritten Person Singular im Nominativ im Türkischen beschränkt und im Korpus nach diesen Fällen gesucht. Hierzu wurde zuerst in das Suchfeld im Korpus das Zielwort eingegeben und die ersten erscheinenden Treffer im Korpus gesichtet und alle Fälle, in denen das Zielwort vorkam, aus dem Korpus extrahiert. In den extrahierten 60 Daten befanden sich auch immer Fälle, in denen das Zielwort auf der Ebene der direkten Rede vorkam, oder strukturell betrachtet tiefer eingebettet war. Solche Fälle wurden aus dem Datenset herausgenommen. Die verbleibenden Daten wurden anschließend einer aufwendigen Annotation unterzogen, die vor allem, wie weiter unten beschrieben werden wird, auf strukturelle Parameter bezogen war, anhand derer die oben aufgeworfene Frage beantwortet werden sollte. Die leitenden Forschungsfragen waren die folgenden:

–   Was ist der Bezugsreferent von *o*?
–   Wo kommt der Bezugsreferent im vorangegangenen Text vor?

Basierend auf diesen Fragen wurden die folgenden Annotationskategorien entwickelt, auf die ich im nächsten Abschnitt näher eingehen werde.

–   Referenz
–   Lokalität

- Level
- Distanz

Kategorie 1 bezieht sich auf die Referenz. Ist der Bezugsreferent NP1 oder NP2? Die Kategorien 2, 3 und 4 beziehen sich alle auf die Frage, wo sich der Bezugsreferent im vorangegangenen Text befindet, beantworten diese jedoch auf unterschiedliche Weise. Kategorie 2 bezieht sich auf die Lokalität. Befindet sich der Bezugsreferent in demselben Satz, in dem sich auch das Pronomen befindet, oder in einem anderen Satz? Kategorie 3 bezieht sich auf die Einbettung. Befindet sich der Bezugsreferent im Matrixsatz oder im eingebetteten Satz? Kategorie 4 bezieht sich auf den Abstand zwischen Pronomen und Bezugsreferent in Form von Wörtern. Wie viele Wörter liegen zwischen dem Pronomen und dem Bezugsreferent? Diese Kategorie beinhaltet ferner, ob sich im vorangegangenen Kontext andere Referenten verzeichnen lassen, die zwischen dem Pronomen und dem Bezugswort erscheinen.

3 Diskussion und Fazit

Wir haben basierend auf introspektiven Daten danach gefragt, was den Gebrauch von Personalpronomen im Türkischen auf Textebene steuert. Wir haben in einer Korpusstudie vier Faktoren unterschieden, von denen angenommen wurde, dass sie den Gebrauch von Personalpronomen im Türkischen auf Textebene steuern: Referenz, Lokalität, Level und Distanz. Hinsichtlich des Faktors Referenz hat sich gezeigt, dass NP1 viel häufiger (81%) Bezugsreferent von *o* war als NP2 (19%). Hinsichtlich des Faktors Lokalität konnte verzeichnet werden, dass der Bezugsreferent sich viel häufiger in einem anderen Satz befand (97%) als in demselben Satz, in dem sich auch das Pronomen befand (3%). Hinsichtlich des Faktors Level konnte verzeichnet werden, dass der Bezugsreferent sich viel häufiger in einem Matrixsatz befand (83%) als in einem eingebetteten Satz (17%). Hinsichtlich des Faktors Distanz hat sich gezeigt, dass die durchschnittliche Wortanzahl zwischen dem Pronomen und dem Bezugsreferent bei NP1 höher war (M=42 Wörter) als bei NP2 (M=12 Wörter). Ferner hat sich gezeigt, dass in NP1 Fällen, also in Fällen, in denen NP1 der Bezugsreferent war, zwischen dem Bezugsreferent und dem Pronomen sich viel häufiger andere Referenten verzeichnen ließen (96%) als in NP2 Fällen (4%). Insgesamt weisen diese Ergebnisse daraufhin, dass strukturelle Faktoren den Gebrauch von Personalpronomen im Türkischen zu bedingen scheinen. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass insbesondere dem Faktor Referenz zusammen mit dem Faktor Distanz im Türkischen eine hohe Bedeutung zukommt.

Betrachtet man die Ergebnisse auf einer allgemeineren Ebene, können wichtige Tendenzen ausgemacht werden. In Abschnitt 1 wurde bereits darauf hingewiesen, dass das Personalpronomen der dritten Person Singular im Türkischen in Form dem distalen Demonstrativpronomen gleicht. Balpınar (2019) zeigt für Türkisch, dass Personalpronomen sich historisch aus dem Demonstrativsystem entwickelt haben. Entsprechend könnte die Vermutung aufgestellt werden, dass zwischen der Entwicklung der Personalpronomen im Türkischen und deren Textfunktion eine Verbindung besteht. Die Ergebnisse weisen auf einen Aspekt der Bedeutung von *o* hin, der mit einer Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung erfasst werden kann. Die Funktion des Personalpronomens ist es, zu signalisieren, dass die Aufmerksamkeit nun auf einen anderen Referenten gelenkt werden soll. Zu dieser Vermutung passt, dass bei einem Topikwechsel sowie Rückbezug zu einem Topik genau das passiert. Bei einem Topikwechsel wird die Aufmerksamkeit des Hörers auf einen anderen Referenten gelenkt, der bislang nicht im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit stand. Bei einem Rückbezug zu einem Topik wird der Referent, der zeitweilig aus dem Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit gerückt war, wieder ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit geholt. Zu der aufgestellten Vermutung passt auch, dass die Referenten, denen durch das Personalpronomen eine hohe Aufmerksamkeit zuteil wird, mit

einem Pronomen aufgegriffen werden, obwohl durchaus denkbar wäre, diese mit einer sprachlich expliziteren Form aufzugreifen, woraus wir auf eine gewisse Aktivierung schließen können. In diesem Zusammenhang könnte vermutet werden, dass mit der Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung eine Aktivierung von Referenten einhergeht, was sich in der gewählten Form, mit der der Referent aufgegriffen wird, zeigt (Ariel 1990). Zusammen betrachtet kann somit angenommen werden, dass der Hörer durch das Personalpronomen im Türkischen angewiesen wird, seine Aufmerksamkeit auf einen neuen Referenten zu richten, der bislang nicht im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit stand oder der nochmal ins Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit geholt wird und dass mit dieser Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung eine Aktivierung von Referenten einhergeht, was sich letztlich in der Form, mit der der Referent aufgegriffen wird, zeigt. Wenn diese Annahme stimmt, dann sollte der hohe Prominenzstatus des jeweiligen Referenten sich auch im nachfolgenden Text in der Anzahl der anaphorischen Wiederaufnahmen des jeweiligen Referenten zeigen (von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019). Anders ausgedrückt, der Referent, dem durch das Personalpronomen eine hohe Aufmerksamkeit zuteil wird, sollte auch öfter im nachfolgenden Text anaphorisch aufgegriffen werden. Dies würde bedeuten, dass mit dem Gebrauch des Personalpronomens im Türkischen dem Hörer nicht nur signalisiert wird, die Aufmerksamkeit auf einen anderen Referenten zu lenken, sondern dass mit dem Gebrauch des Personalpronomens dem Hörer zugleich Hinweise über die referentielle Entwicklung im nachfolgenden Text gegeben wird.

In Bezug auf die Hypothese steht hier jedoch die Bestätigung anhand eines größeren Datensets noch aus. Auch muss noch eine empirisch breiter angelegte Korpusstudie zeigen, dass mit dem Gebrauch des Personalpronomens im Türkischen neben Topikwechsel, auch Rückbezug zu einem Topik angezeigt werden kann. Es sind weitere empirische Untersuchungen notwendig, um Aussagen darüber machen zu können, dass mit dem Gebrauch des Personalpronomens im Türkischen eine Aufmerksamkeitssteuerung und Aktivierung von Referenten einhergeht.

Literatur

Ariel, Mira. 1990. *Accessing noun phrase antecedents*. London: Routledge.

Balpınar, Metin. 2019. *Demonstratives and grammaticalization. A perspective from Modern Turkish*. London: Routledge.

Enç, Mürvet. 1986. Topic switching and pronominal subjects in Turkish. In Dan I. Slobin & Karl Zimmer (Hrsg.), *Studies in Turkish Linguistics*, 195–208. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Erguvanlı-Taylan, Eser. 1986. Pronominal versus zero representation of anaphora in Turkish. In Dan I. Slobin & Karl Zimmer (Hrsg.), *Studies in Turkish Linguistics*, 209–231. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Petra Schumacher. 2019. Discourse prominence: Definition and application. *Journal of Pragmatics* 154. 117–127.

Kornfilt, Jaklin. 1984. *Case marking, agreement, and empty categories in Turkish*. PhD Thesis, Harvard University.

Kornfilt, Jaklin. 1997. *Turkish. A descriptive grammar*. London: Routledge.

Özsoy, Sumru A. 1987. Null subject parameter and Turkish. In Hendrik Boschoeten & Ludo Th. Verhoeven (Hrsg.), *Studies on Modern Turkish: Proceedings of the Third Conference on Turkish Linguistics*, 82–91. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.

Öztürk, Balkız. 2001. Turkish as a non-pro-drop language. In Eser Erguvanlı-Taylan (Hrsg.), *The verb in Turkish*, 239–259. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Prominence and Redundancy: A wish list of questions

Jaklin Kornfilt – Syracuse University
kornfilt@syr.edu

1 Introduction

This contribution to a Festschrift for Klaus von Heusinger is essentially a wish list of one item: to add a particular question, along with some sub-questions, to the rich array of questions and topics of the Collaborative Research Center "Prominence in Language": Does redundancy play a role in the interfaces between syntax, morphology, and phonetics/phonology with respect to information-structural prominence, and if it does, to what extent? Is that extent predictable? Also, is there a difference between the interfaces, i.e. is redundancy between syntactic and morphological expression of prominence more acceptable, or less so, compared to redundancy between syntactic and phonetic / phonological expression of prominence on the one hand, and redundancy between morphological and phonetic / phonological expression of prominence, on the other?

2 Discussion

It is quite clear that there is some redundancy between phonetics / phonology, in the form of intonation, on the one hand, and syntax, on the other hand, with respect to prominence. For example, in Turkish, a focused, and thus prominent, constituent tends to be to the immediate left of the verb, thus often going against the canonical SOV order. Some examples follow for a variety of focus types:

Focused DP:

(1) Makale-yi   OYA yaz-dı   (Ayşe değil).
     article-ACC   Oya   write-PST   Ayşe   not
     'OYA wrote the article (not Ayşe).'

Wh-constituent (which, I assume, is focused by default):

(2) Makale-yi   KİM yaz-dı?
     article-ACC   who   write-PST
     'Who wrote the article?'

Polar question with constituent focus:

(3) Makale-yi   OYA mı   yaz-dı?
     Article-ACC   Oya   Y/N Q   write-PST
     'Did OYA write the article? (i.e. 'Was it OYA who wrote the article?[1])

In all three examples, the subject is prominent, while the direct object is old information and is presumably topicalized, and thus in clause-initial position. Thus, in all three examples, we have

---

[1] These polar questions with constituent focus have the flavor of clefts, but are not clefts syntactically. Turkish does have a dedicated cleft construction, whose description would take us too far afield here. Suffice it to say that in clefts, too, the prominent constituent is redundantly marked via intonation as well as via its special syntactic position, the latter as part of the predicate.

OSV order, rather than the canonical SOV order. In addition, in all three examples, the syntactically (because V-adjacent) prominent subject is also intonationally prominent; the latter is expressed via high pitch and loudness.[2]

At the same time as displaying redundancy between syntax and phonetics / phonology (the latter via intonation), example (3) also displays redundancy between morphology and syntax on the one hand, and redundancy between morphology and intonation, on the other. Thus, it appears that all of the logically possible interfaces can and do accommodate redundancy when representing prominence. But are there any differences between these interfaces in this respect?

There is some literature on intonation and the way it expresses information-structural features that might lead us to expect that languages tend to avoid redundancy, or at least that they can "choose" to do so. For example, Féry (2013: 685) states: "if alignment is fulfilled by default, word order is left untouched, no special or higher pitch accent is required, phrasing is also not manipulated and no special morpheme is inserted. And indeed, in every language, focus is sometimes realized with **marked grammatical reflexes, and sometimes it is left unmarked**. However, a **focus that is *not* aligned per default** needs **something special** in order for the hearer to be able to perceive it as such. It is claimed here that **this something special is often alignment, and sometimes prominence**.[3]" (Emphasis mine.) Although this statement is not crystal-clear, it seems that what's stated here is that if there is no syntactic prominence, there has to be either morphological or intonational prominence, if not both. If nothing else, the prediction seems to be that non-redundant marking of prominence does exist at least as an option, i.e. marking in just one component of language, especially via either morphology or intonation, particularly when there is no syntactic expression of prominence.

Some of Gussenhoven's work, e.g. Gussenhoven (2004), seems to point in a similar direction. Thus, we find the statement (cf. Gussenhoven 2004: 22) that "an intonation contour has two structures: a morphological one, which identifies the morphemes and thus gives the meaning of the contour; and a phonological one, which gives its tones." We can then argue that if there is an overt morpheme with a particular meaning, an intonation contour with the same meaning would be redundant and can be left out, and perhaps vice versa: if there is a particular intonation contour with a given meaning, then a dedicated morpheme with the same "meaning" (i.e., for our purposes, with the same information-structural features) can be left out.

Please note that neither Féry nor Gussenhoven make statements about redundancy; they just leave open the possibility of having or avoiding it, and thus enable us to expect to find expressions of prominence either separately or together, with respect to different components, and, in particular, with respect to morphology versus intonation. This general approach seems to be justified, especially if we compare variation across closely related languages. A telling example is offered via constituent polar questions. As illustrated in (3), Turkish allows, and even requires, redundancy with respect to morphology and intonation. However, some other Turkic languages allow only intonation. For example, in both Uyghur and Uzbek, polar questions are marked morphologically only on the verb, thus having the entire clause in the scope of the question marker. If a particular constituent in a polar question is supposed to be marked as prominent, i.e. in a polar question equivalent to the Turkish (3), that constituent is made prominent via intonation only, thus avoiding redundancy between morphology and intonation.

Are there languages where there is, likewise, avoidance of redundancy, but with morphology being chosen as the conveyor of prominence, without any additional intonational expression?

There do seem to be some; e.g. Imbabura Quechua appears to be like Turkish with respect

---

[2] Whether longer duration is also part of this is unclear and worth being investigated.
[3] Here, "prominence" obviously means intonational prominence.

to the possibility of using the morphological marker for polar questions on a focused constituent (while the typical position for that same marker is on the verb in non-focused polar questions, also like Turkish); see, e.g., Dryer 2005a: 375, based on Cole (1982). However, unlike in Turkish, focused constituents in polar questions in Imbabura Quechua cannot be intonationally prominent (cf. Dryer 2005b: 471, based on Cole 1982).[4]

Turkish and Quechua are typologically rather similar morpho-syntactically in a number of respects; just to mention a few: they are both head-final, they both have typically nominalized embedded clauses, with such clauses bearing overt case morphology, and with genitive-marked subjects in such nominalized clauses. Why does Turkish make redundancy between morphology and intonation obligatory with respect to prominent constituents, while Quechua avoids such redundancy and resolves it in favor of morphology, and why do some Turkic languages, while likewise avoiding redundancy, resolve such avoidance in favor of intonation?[5] Can such properties be predicted based on other properties of the languages addressed here? Also, are there cross-linguistic tendencies with respect to allowing, requiring, and avoiding the type of redundancy in question?

3 Conclusions

One might have expected to find some answers to the questions raised in this squib, especially with respect to the last question, in an enterprise such as *WALS*; however, *WALS* does not give us any answers in this respect. Concerning polar questions in particular, intonation is mentioned only where there is no morphological marking. This gap in statistical knowledge as well as in individual and general description shows us how important and needed research of this kind is. Cologne, under the guidance of the dedicatee of this Festschrift, would be an ideal location for this research.

Author note

The dedicatee of this Festschrift has been a co-author as well as a cherished colleague and friend, over many years. His intellectual guidance as well as generosity have been inspirational to his many students, postdocs, and colleagues. This squib cannot express the depth of my gratitude for having had the opportunity of collaborating with Klaus and sharing some of his intellectual entourage. I would also like to express my thanks to Matthew Dryer for correspondence about *WALS*, intonation, focus, and interrogatives, to Travis Major for discussion of Uyghur data, and to Vera Gribanova for discussion of Uzbek facts. All shortcomings of this squib are my responsibility.

References

Cole, Peter. 1982. *Imbabura Quechua*. Lingua Descriptive Studies 5. Amsterdam: North-Holland. (As cited in Dryer 2005a, b.)
Dryer, Matthew. 2005a. Position of Polar Question Particles. In Martin Haspelmath, Matthew Dryer, David Gil & Bernard Comrie (eds.), *WALS*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 374–377.

---

[4] Quechua appears to avoid redundancy between morphology and intonation in other instances of prominence, as well. Thus, the evidentiality marker is used as a focus marker, too, but without an accompanying intonational contour of prominence.

[5] This doesn't mean that such Turkic languages avoid the type of redundancy displayed by Turkish with respect to other kinds of prominence. Thus, both Uyghur and Uzbek have morphological focus markers which do require intonational prominence of the constituent that they attach to.

Dryer, Matthew. 2005b. Polar Questions. In Martin Haspelmath, Matthew Dryer, David Gil & Bernard Comrie (eds.), *WALS*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 470–473.

Féry, Caroline. 2013. Focus as prosodic alignment. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 31(3). 683–734.

Gussenhoven, Carlos. 2004. *The phonology of tone and intonation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

WALS = Haspelmath, Martin, Matthew Dryer, David Gil & Bernard Comrie (eds.). 2005. *The World Atlas of Language Structures (WALS)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A version of *WALS* is also available online at http://wals.info)

Your 60th birthday is here!
Individual concepts in existential possessive constructions in Turkish

Manfred Krifka – Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (Berlin)
krifka@leibniz-zas.de

1 Introduction

Coming from German or English, it seems natural to encode possession as a transitive relation combining the possessor and the possessum.

(1) Der   Klaus   hat   ein-en   Schlips.
     DEF.M.SG.NOM   Klaus   have.PRS.3SG   INDEF.M.SG-ACC   tie
     'Klaus has a tie.'

A glance at the *World Atlas of Language Structures* (WALS) (Stassen 2013, based on Stassen 2009) shows that this pattern is indeed wide-spread – it is exemplified by 63 languages in a sample of 240 languages, occurring not only in Europe but also in Africa and in the Americas. Stassen also notices a historic drift towards this construction. The smallest group in his survey express possession by an adnominal possessive construction, as in 'the tie of Klaus exists' (with 22 languages the smallest group in the sample, mostly in central Asia, Northern India and the Pacific). As an example, consider Turkish:[1]

(2) a. Klaus-un   kravat-ı   var.
         Klaus-GEN   tie-3SG.POSS   exist.3SG
         'Klaus has a tie.'
     b. Kravat-ım   yok.
         tie-1SG.POSS   not:exist.3SG
         'I don't have a tie.'

For a referential use of adnominal possessives, cf. (3).

(3) Klaus-un   kravat-ı   gardırop-ta   asılı.
     Klaus-GEN   tie-3SG.POSS   wardrobe-LOC   hang
     'Klaus's tie is hanging in the wardrobe.'

The manner how possession is expressed in Turkish is remarkable from an English or German viewpoint, as nominal possessives like *my tie* presuppose existence of the object, hence assertion results in a tautology. Also, the existence of nominal possessives should be impossible to be negated, as this would result in a presupposition violation.

I would like to propose an analysis of predicative possessive constructions that reconciles their presuppositional nature with their use in existential possessive constructions. The idea is that the possessor phrases are interpreted as individual concepts.

---

[1] There is also a locative construction (cf. Göksel & Kerlslake 2005), e.g.:

(i) Klaus-ta   bir   kravat   var.
     Klaus-LOC   one   tie   exist.3SG
     'Klaus has (is wearing) a tie.'

2 Predicative possession in Turkish

Individual concepts were introduced by Montague (1973) to account for sentences like:

(4)   The temperature is ninety and rising.

From (4) we cannot conclude that ninety is rising. Why not? *Temperature* denotes a function from world/time indices to a temperature degree, and the predicate *rising* needs information about the temperature at more than just one index.

There are other uses of individual concepts. For example, Gupta (1980) presents an analysis of common nouns like *passenger* as applying to individual concpets. Grosu & Krifka (2008) propose that the subject of (5) denotes an individual concept that is defined only for the addressee's claims, and in Krifka (2021) I show that the noun *outfit* in sentences like (6) should refer to combinations shirts and pants that exist only at certain times.

(5)   The gifted mathematician that you claim to be should have solved this problem.
(6)   These two shirts and two pants make four outfits.

I propose that *Klaus'un kravatı* in (2a) and (3) is interpreted in a similar way, namely as referring to an individual concept that is defined only for those world-time indices at which the tie of Klaus exists. The two occurrences even share the uniqueness presupposition, but notice that this presupposition does not have to be satisfied at the world-time index of evaluation of the sentence.

The expression of adnominal possession is subject to intense study starting with Seiler (1983); see Ortmann (2018) for a recent study that brings together typological and semantic aspects, and Öztürk & Erguvanlı Taylan (2016) for the full range of adnominal possessives. Glossing over details, we can assume the interpretation (7), which maps an index of interpretation i and an entity x to truth if x is owned by Klaus in i and is a tie in i. We can now propose a meaning for the existence predicate EX: It maps predicates P to Truth iff they are non-empty at the index of evaluation, i_0:

(7)   Klaus'un kravatı $\lambda i \lambda x[\text{POSS}(i)(x)(\text{KLAUS}) \wedge \text{TIE}(i)(x)]$, = KT

(8)   Klaus'un kravatı var $\text{EX}(i_0)(\text{KT})$, where $\text{EX}(i)(P)$ iff $P(i) \neq \emptyset$

However, *Klaus'un kravatı* comes with an uniqueness interpretation. The first choice would be to involve the iota operator, but considering cases of plural-marked expressions such as *Klaus'un kravat-lar-ı* 'the ties of Klaus' and number-marked expressions such as *Klaus'un üç kravat-ı* 'the three ties of Klaus' this definiteness is best captured by the MAX operator as defined in (9), were $\sigma(P(i))$ refers to the sum of all objects that $P(i)$ applies to. This is a function that maps indices i to the sum of all individuals that P applies to in i, under the presupposition that this sum itself falls under P in i. In this way, existence and uniqueness are satisfied.

(9) $\text{MAX}(P) = \lambda i.\ P(i)(\sigma(P(i)))\ .\ \sigma(P(i))$

We can assume that in the Turkish genitive-possessive construction the possessed noun incorporates this MAX operator, leading to a definite interpretation; the possessor is an argument that has to be realized by a genitive noun.

(10) Klaus'un kravatı $\quad\quad\quad \lambda y\ \text{MAX}(\lambda i\lambda x[\text{POSS}(i)(x)(y) \wedge \text{TIE}(i)(x)])(\text{KLAUS})$
$$= \text{MAX}(\lambda i\lambda x[\text{POSS}(i)(x)(\text{KLAUS}) \wedge \text{TIE}(i)(x)])$$

This does not strictly imply that Klaus only has a single tie; the world-time index can be additionally restricted by the situation, and uniqueness then is satisfied in this situation. The representation format also captures cases like *Klaus'un kravat-lar-ı* 'Klaus's ties' and *Klaus'un üç kravat-ı* 'Klaus's three ties'.

The analysis of predicative possessives as in (2a) now proceeds as follows. The existence predicate *var* denotes a function that maps an individual concept c and a world-time index i to truth, if c(i) is defined, and to falsity otherwise, cf. (11). Expression of existence and non-existence is exemplified in (12) and (13).

(11) $\text{EXIST}(i)(c) = 1$ iff $c(i)$ is defined, $= 0$ else

(12) Klaus'un kravatı var $\quad\quad\quad \text{EX}(i_0)(\text{KT})$

(13) Klaus'un kravatı yok $\quad\quad\quad \neg\text{EX}(i_0)(\text{KT})$

Notice that *yok* and *var* are intensional predicates; they take an intensional meaning as argument. Non-extensional predicates, when applied and an index i to an individual concept c, reduce this to c(i), as in the following analysis of (3).

(14) Klaus'un kravatı gardıropta asılı. $\quad\quad\quad \text{HANG\_IN\_WARDROBE}(i_0)(\text{KT}(i_0))$

The analysis in (12) and (13) does not capture the fact the genitive argument typically forms an immediate constituent of the sentence. For example, adverbs may occur between the possessor and the possessum (Göksel & Kerslake 2005):

(15) Ayten-in   İstanbul-da   iki   arkadaş-ı   var.
  Ayten-GEN Istanbul-LOC   two   friend-3SG.POSS   exist.3SG
  'Ayten has two friends in Istanbul.'

According to Öztürk & Taylan (2016), the possessor argument can be topicalized, leading to the following structure for (12) (here simplified):

(16) [TP *Klaus'un* λt_1[PredP t_1 [[DP t_1 [nP [NP *kravat*] -ı]] *var*] T^0]]

That is, *Klaus'un* moves from the specifier position of the possessive DP to the specifier position of the TP, leaving a trace. This does not change the essence of the individual concept analysis, as the DP with the trace now is just interpreted as containing a free variable that is supplied by the moved constituent later; the possessive marker, here *-ı*, expresses this relation via agreement.

(17) a. [DP t_1 [nP [NP *kravat*] -ı]] $\quad\quad\quad \text{MAX}(\lambda i\lambda x[\text{POSS}(i)(x)(x_1) \wedge \text{TIE}(i)(x)])$

  b. λt_1[[PredP t_1 *kravatı var*] T^0] $\quad\quad \lambda x_1\lambda i[\text{EX}(i)(\text{MAX}(\lambda i\lambda x[\text{POSS}(i)(x)(x_1) \wedge \text{TIE}(i)(x)])]$

  c. [TP *Klaus'un* [PredP *kravatı var*]] $\quad \lambda i[\text{EX}(i)(\text{MAX}(\lambda i\lambda x[\text{POSS}(i)(x)(\text{KLAUS}) \wedge \text{TIE}(i)(x)])]$

3 Conclusion

Kornfilt (1997), citing Lewis (1975), stresses that a sentence like (18) should not be rendered idiomatically as 'a very old book of Hassan exists'. This is right, but the individual concept analysis shows how these two meanings are related.

(18) Hasan-ın çok eski bir kitab-ı   var.
      Hasan-GEN very old one book-3SG.POSS exist.3SG
      'Hasan has a very old book.'

(18) could either be treated as involving a property, as in analysis (8), or as an existential quantifier that introduces a discourse referent for individual concepts. Further research is needed.

Author's note

This is a contribution to a Festschrift for Klaus von Heusinger, focusing on a common interest in Turkish and nominal semantics. Unfortunately, space is too restricted to point out similar constructions in Daakie (Vanuatu) from my own field work – see von Prince (2016) for the similar situation in Daakaka.

Abbreviations

1/2/3 – first/second/third person, ACC – accusative, DEF – definite, GEN – genitive, INDEF – indefinite, LOC – locative, M – masculine, NOM – nominative, POSS – possessive, PRS – present tense, SG – singular.

References

Göksel, Aslı & Celia Kerlslake. 2005. *Turkish. A Comprehensive Grammar*. London: Routledge.

Grosu, Alexander & Manfred Krifka. 2007. 'The gifted mathematician that you claim to be': Equational intensional 'reconstruction' relatives. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 30(4). 445–485.

Gupta, Anil. 1980. *The Logic of Common Nouns: An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kornfilt, Jaklin. 1997. *Turkish*. London: Routledge.

Krifka, Manfred. 2021. Counting possible configurations. In Sebastian Löbner, Thomas Gamerschlag, Tobias Kalenscher, Markus Schrenk & Henk Zeevat (eds.), *Concepts, Frames and Cascades in Semantics, Cognition and Ontology*, 43–63. Cham: Springer.

Lewis, Geoffrey. 1975. *Turkish Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Montague, Richard. 1973. The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English. In Jaakko Hintikka, Julius Moravcsik & Patrick Suppes (eds.), *Approaches to Natural Language. Proceedings of the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics*, 221–242. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Ortmann, Albert. 2018. Connecting the typology and semantics of nominal possession: Alienability splits and the morphology-semantics interface. *Morphology* 28(1). 99–144.

von Prince, Kilu. 2016. Alienability as control: The case of Daakaka. *Lingua* 182(1). 69–87.

Öztürk, Balkız & Eser Erguvanlı Taylan. 2016. Possessive constructions in Turkish. *Lingua* 182. 88–108.

Seiler, Hansjakob. 1983. *Possession as an Operational Dimension of Language.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Stassen, Leon. 2009. *Predicative Possession*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stassen, Leon. 2013. Predicative possession. In Matthew S. Dryer & Martin Haspelmath (eds.), *The World Atlas of Language Structures Online*. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, < https://wals.info/chapter/117>.

Deconstructing the Givenness Hierarchy

Manuel Leonetti and Victoria Escandell-Vidal
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
mleonett@ucm.es and victoria.escandell@ucm.es

1 Introduction

The Givenness Hierarchy (GH) presented in Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski (1993) has proved to be a very useful tool in research on reference and discourse anaphora, since it offers a valuable answer to the question of how hearers manage to identify the intended referent of referential expressions. The basic idea of the GH hypothesis is that different determiners and pronouns encode different cognitive statuses, i.e., different statuses of a referent in the hearer's mental representations. This explains the relationship between referring forms and their conditions of use in discourse.

2 Linguistic meaning and cognitive statuses

According to Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski (1993), six cognitive statuses are relevant for interpreting referential expressions, as shown in (1). The statuses are implicationally related: Each status unidirectionally entails the statuses on its right, so they are ordered from most restrictive ('in-focus') to least restrictive ('type identifiable').

(1)   **Givenness Hierarchy**
      In-focus > Activated > Familiar > Uniquely identifiable > Referential > Type identifiable
       it, *she*   *that*, *this*   *that N*   *the N*   *indefinite*   *a N*
                      this N   *this N*

Relying on the distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning as developed in Relevance Theory (Wilson & Sperber 1993), the GH considers that the conventional meaning of determiners and pronouns is procedural, i.e., it is a processing instruction for the hearer – in the present case, the instruction to locate a referent that has a certain cognitive status in his/her mental representations. Thus, the GH assumes that the cognitive status signalled by each determiner or pronominal form is (a part of) its conventional meaning (see Gundel 2010, Gundel & Hedberg 2016).

   Although we partially agree with this idea in the case of definite articles, we believe that the cognitive statuses in the GH are not part of the conventional meaning of determiners and pronouns. More specifically, we claim that the correspondence between referring forms and cognitive statuses in the GH is not a direct relation built on encoded meaning but an indirect, inferred relation that obtains from combining encoded meaning, on the one hand, and contextual information, on the other. This is by no means a suggestion to dispense with the use of the GH in current research; rather it is a way to answer some questions concerning the place of the GH in grammatical systems.

   We concentrate on three significant facts related to definite DPs (leaving aside the two statuses at the right end of the hierarchy, which concern indefinite interpretations).

   1. In the GH framework, pronouns – more precisely, zero and unstressed pronouns –encode a condition on the *in-focus* status of their referents, so they are used for referents that are familiar to the hearer, activated in discourse and at the current centre of attention. This generalization is descriptively correct. However, from this point of view, there is no principled

explanation for the correlation between pronouns and their cognitive status, in the sense that there is no explicit connection between the definiteness feature of pronouns (namely, uniqueness, assuming that definiteness is exactly the same semantic feature in pronouns and definite articles) and the interpretation obtained. This is particularly puzzling, since the left part of the GH is but an ordered scale of definite interpretations, from the most restrictive to the basic and most general one. In addition, certain uses of plural pronouns seem to be incompatible with the *in-focus* status, as shown in Borthen (2010). A natural way out of these problems is provided by an alternative view in which the cognitive status is not directly encoded by pronouns, i.e., it is not a part of their conventional meaning. In order to explain the correlation, only the minimal assumption is needed that pronouns, being definite, encode the instruction to locate a uniquely identifiable referent. Since they also lack conceptual or descriptive content, they are only able to retrieve highly accessible referents that do not need to be additionally described for the hearer to be able to locate them. This gives the result of constraining the use of pronouns to *in-focus* referents, as the by-product of definiteness and the absence of descriptive content. In this way, cognitive statuses are pragmatically inferred based on contextual information. The explanation is thus made on more general, principled grounds and the account is also more flexible.

2. The same problem reappears with demonstratives. The GH stipulates that they conventionally signal the statuses *activated* and *familiar* for their referents: Demonstratives refer to given referents. Again, this does not explain how the correlation between forms and statuses emerges from the combination of definiteness and the deictic component of demonstratives, nor does it clarify the role of descriptive content. It seems better to assume, instead, that demonstratives encode an abstract procedure based on definiteness and deixis that does not specify the cognitive status of the referent, but rather gives indications to the hearer towards specifying it in a way that is consistent with the semantic requirements encoded. Again, the association between forms and statuses is not conventional: The linguistic meaning of demonstratives does not directly indicate cognitive statuses but a more abstract set of instructions for inferring them.

3. The case of definite descriptions has been already addressed by Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski, who realize that such forms may be used in many contexts not only for uniquely identifiable referents but also for "higher" statuses, such as *activated* and *familiar*, which entail identifiability. This results in a one-to-many mapping between forms and statuses, which is not what we would expect from a conventional association between them. Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski (1993) claim that forms encoding a particular status are underspecified for higher statuses. The problem with this view is that it gives rise to contradictory interpretive outcomes: In some cases, this gives rise to stronger interpretations for weaker forms (as can happen with definite descriptions), whereas in others it is the negation of stronger readings that prevails, as in quantity (Q1) scalar implicatures with demonstratives. In the current GH approach, it is not easy to explain how the two opposed strategies coexist, and which one wins over the other in which case. Whatever the optimal account of these facts may be, we believe that it should lead us to abandon the assumption that cognitive statuses are directly encoded by referring forms.

3 Conclusion

The main consequence of our discussion is that, as it stands, the GH cannot be a part of the grammatical system of a language and does not represent genuine linguistic knowledge. For it to be useful it must be deconstructed. There is no direct correlation between linguistic forms and cognitive statuses; rather, linguistic forms encode more abstract semantic instructions, which combined with the presence or absence of descriptive content and contextual

information make it possible to infer cognitive statuses. As pointed out in von Heusinger & Schumacher (2019: 123), in the GH the relation between forms and statuses is fixed and static: A more central role for a dynamic process of competition between options is needed to account for the use of referential expressions (see also Ahn 2019).

References

Ahn, Dorothy. 2019. *THAT thesis: A competition mechanism for anaphoric expressions*. PhD dissertation, Harvard University.

Borthen, Kaja. 2010. On how we interpret plural pronouns. *Journal of Pragmatics* 42(7). 1799–1815.

Gundel, Jeanette. 2010. Reference and accessibility from a Givenness Hierarchy perspective. *International Review of Pragmatics* 2(2). 148–168.

Gundel, Jeanette K. & Nancy Hedberg. 2016. Reference and cognitive status: Scalar inference and typology. In M. M. Jocelyne Fernández–Vest & Robert D. Van Valin, Jr. (eds.), *Information structure and spoken language in a cross-linguistic perspective*, 33–53. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Gundel, Jeanette K., Nancy Hedberg & Ron Zacharski. 1993. Cognitive status and the form of referring expressions in discourse. *Language* 69(2). 274–307.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Petra B. Schumacher. 2019. Discourse prominence: Definition and application. *Journal of Pragmatics* 154. 117–127.

Wilson, Deirdre & Dan Sperber. 1993. Linguistic form and relevance. *Lingua* 90(1–2). 1–25.

Thematic roles affect pronoun production in Romanian

Sofiana I. Lindemann – Universitatea Transilvania din Brasov
Sofiana.chiriacescu@unitbv.ro

1 Introduction

Research has convincingly shown that pronoun resolution is influenced by a range of factors on the sentence as well as on the discourse level. On the sentence level, one of the factors that seems to play a central role is grammatical function. A referent realized as the sentence subject is more prone to be subsequently pronominalized compared to a non-subject referent (Givón 1981, Ariel 1990, Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski 1993, Grosz, Joshi & Weinstein 1995, Chiriacescu 2011). The picture is less clear with respect to the role played by different thematic roles in guiding pronoun processing. While one line of research showed that thematic roles do not affect reference form production (Kehler, Kertz, Rohde & Elman 2008, Fukumura & van Gompel 2010), other studies argued that thematic roles influence pronoun usage (Arnold 2001, Kaiser, Li & Holsinger 2011, Rosa & Arnold 2017). The present study investigates these two options, by exploring the impact of different thematic roles on pronoun production in Romanian.

Romanian is a pro-drop language (Dobrovie-Sorin 1994), which allows for both overt and null pronouns in preverbal subject position. The widespread view regarding its pronominal system is that null pronouns are predominantly used for the most accessible antecedent, while overt pronouns are employed to refer back to a less accessible antecedent, with accessibility being primarily driven by grammatical function. Accordingly, null pronouns are typically referring back to preverbal subjects and overt pronouns are generally used for a lower syntactic position (see e.g. Zafiu 2008, Pagurschi 2010, Teodorescu 2016, on Romanian and Carminati 2002 for Italian).

This is the first study exploring whether a semantic factor affects reference form in Romanian language production. The main goal is to determine whether the alternation between null and overt pronoun production is guided by different thematic roles, in addition to the long attested subjecthood constraint. If thematic roles do play a role as well, we expect this effect to add up to the grammatical function bias. Second, the findings will bring further evidence to the debate whether thematic roles affect reference form production or not.

2 The experimental study

Participants

50 native speakers of Romanian from the Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania, took part in the experimental study (age range: 18–45 years, mean age 28 years, 29 female). It took about twenty minutes to complete each version of the study.

Design, procedure and materials

A written story completion task was used in which each target sentence consisted of two human referents that had the same gender (e.g. Mihai and Anton in the first example in Table 1). Speakers tend to prefer less explicit types of referring expressions (e.g. pronouns) to refer back to a previously introduced subject referent, thus, in order to keep grammatical and thematic roles apart, we used transfer-of-possession verbs. These verbs are a good testing case, as some of them realize the Goal as the grammatical subject (e.g. *get* in CND_2 in

Table 1), while others realize the Source in grammatical subject position (e.g. *give* in CND_1 in Table 1). Participants' task consisted in reading the given one-sentence target items and providing one natural sounding written sentence continuation to each item. We crossed thematic roles (Goal vs. Source) and grammatical function (Subject vs. Object) and used 18 experimental items, 9 for each condition, and 20 filler items, distributed in two lists. In line with the findings from previous studies on pronoun production, the predictions are that null pronouns will prefer a subject antecedent, whereas overt pronouns will preferentially pick up the non-subject referent. If the manipulation of thematic role matters as well, the expectation is that Goal referents will increase the rate of both null and overt pronominalization, irrespective of grammatical function (Rosa & Arnold 2017).

Table 1: Example items with English translations

CND1_Goal=Non-Subject	Mihai i-a dat un bilet lui Anton.
	Mihai gave a note to Anton.
CND2_Goal=Subject	Cristian a primit o carte de la Dan.
	Cristian got a book from Dan.

Results

Two independent coders manually annotated the type of referring expression (i.e. null pronoun, overt pronouns, clitic, demonstrative pronoun, proper name, definite noun phrase, etc.) chosen by the participants to refer back to the referent. They coded 900 continuations.

The general finding is that both grammatical function and grammatical role matter. Overall, given all overt and null pronouns produced by participants in their continuations, the majority was used to pick up the subject referents (72%). Furthermore, the most robust finding is that more null pronouns were used to pick up the previous subject referent (77%), irrespective of its thematic role. This is in line with previous studies and the predictions made (Ariel 1990, Zafiu 2008).

The overt pronoun seems to be more versatile, as it is used to refer back to either the previous subject or non-subject referent, however, still with a slight preference for the previous subject (57%) rather than the non-subject (43%). The findings indicate that we do not find a clear division of labour between the two pronoun forms in terms of syntactic structure, as was expected based on the existing literature. The observed biases can be best accounted for in terms of preferences: the null pronoun has a more robust preference towards the subject antecedent than does the overt pronominal form.

Interestingly, we found an additional effect of thematic role. More concretely, the realisation of a referent as the thematic Goal (vs. the Source) contributed to its predictability in terms of next mention and pronominalization. Both subject and non-subject referents benefited from the thematic role manipulation, such that the overall pronominalization rates increased for the Goal referents (i.e. the non-subject in CND1 and the subject in CND2). Being realized as the thematic Goal particularly impacted overt pronoun production. In CND2, 93% of the personal pronouns were used for the subject=Goal antecedent (vs. 22% for the Source subject in CND1), while in CND1, 78% of all personal pronouns were used to pick up the non-subject=Goal antecedent (vs. 7% for the Source object in CND2).

3 Conclusion

The experimental study revealed two main findings. First, grammatical role has a strong impact on the type of referring expression used. As many approaches to accessibility predict,

participants produced more null pronouns when referring to the subject of the previous sentence, than to other referents. The Romanian null pronouns are presumably the default option for resuming the subject antecedent. This result is in line with previous observations on Romanian and the predictions.

Second, the overt personal pronouns were more versatile, being used to pick up both the subject and non-subject referent, not being specialized for reference to non-subjects, as expected. So, null and overt Romanian pronouns do not exhibit a division of labour effect such that a subject bias for null pronouns corresponds to a non-subject bias for overt pronouns.

Third, this study brings favourable evidence for the observation that the use of a particular thematic role affects the choice of subsequent mention (Arnold 2001, Kaiser, Li & Holsinger 2011, Rosa & Arnold 2017). Participants produced more (null and overt) pronouns to refer to the previous Goal than to the previous Source. The Goal-bias was stronger for the non-subject, compared to the subject. In addition, the Goal-bias changed the observed preference of overt pronouns to pick up the subject referent, as for this condition more overt pronouns were used for the non-subject than for the subject referent. The results predict that Goals are more accessible than Sources, which contributes to the use of more reduced types of referring expressions. Thematic role effects are strongest in overt pronoun production in Romanian.

Overall, this is the first study to show that subjecthood alone does not suffice to account for pronoun production in Romanian. As in English, thematic roles may affect reference form production in addition to grammatical role. The present results furthermore supports a multi-dimensional approach, suggesting that different referential forms are constrained by different grammatical and semantic factors and that these factors might differ cross-linguistically (Ariel 1990, Kaiser & Trueswell 2008; von Heusinger & Chiriacescu 2009, Chiriacescu & von Heusinger 2011, Lindemann 2020).

Author Note

References

Ariel, Mira. 1990. *Accessing noun-phrase antecedents*. London: Routledge.

Arnold, Jennifer. 2001. *Reference form and discourse patterns*. PhD dissertation, Stanford University.

Carminati, Nella. 2002. *The processing of Italian subject pronouns*. PhD dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst.

Chiriacescu, Sofiana I. & Klaus von Heusinger. 2011 The discourse structuring potential of definite noun phrases in natural discourse. In Iris Hendrickx, António Branco, Sobha Lalitha Devi & Ruslan Mitkov (eds.), *Anaphora and reference resolution: Proceedings of the 8th discourse anaphora and anaphor resolution colloquium*, 151–162. Lisbon: Edições Colibri.

Chiriacescu, Sofiana. 2011. Factors contributing to the salience of referents. In Manuela Nevaci (ed.), *Studia linguistica et philologica*, 74–96. Bucuresti: Editura Universitatii.

Dobrovie-Sorin, Carmen. 1994. *The Syntax of Romanian*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Fukumura, Kumiko & Roger van Gompel. 2010. Choosing anaphoric expression. Do people take into account likelihood of reference? *Journal of Memory and Language* 62. 52–66.

Givón, Talmy. 1981. On the development of the numeral 'one' as an indefinite marker. *Folia linguistica historica* 2. 35–53.

Grosz, Barbara, Aravind Joshi & Scott Weinstein. 1995. Centering: A framework for modelling the local coherence of discourse. *Computational Linguistics* 21. 203–225.

Gundel, Jeanette, Nancy Hedberg & Ron Zacharski. 1993. Cognitive status and the form of referring expressions in discourse. *Language* 69(2). 274–307.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Sofiana Chiriacescu. 2009. Definite "bare" nouns and *pe*-marking in Romanian. In M. Teresa Espinal, Manuel Leonetti & Louise McNally (eds.), *Proceedings of the IV Nereus International Workshop "Definiteness and DP Structure in Romance Languages"*, 63–82. Konstanz: Universität Konstanz.

Kaiser, Elsi & John Trueswell. 2008. Interpreting pronouns and demonstrantives in Finnish: Evidence from a form-specific approach to reference resolution. *Language and Cognitive Processes* 23(5). 709–748.

Kaiser, Elsi, David Li & Edward Holsinger. 2011. Exploring the lexical and acoustic consequences of referential predictability. In Iris Hendricks, António Branco, Sobha Lalitha Devi & Ruslan Mitkov (eds.), *Anaphora Processing and Applications, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence*, 171–183. Heidelberg: Springer.

Kehler, Andrew, Laura Kertz, Hannah Rohde & Jeffrey Elman. 2008. Coherence and coreference revisited. *Journal of semantics* 25. 1–44.

Lindemann, Sofiana. 2020. *Special indefinites in sentence and discourse*. Tübingen: Narr Franke Attempto.

Pagurschi, Florentina. 2010. *Interpreting Pronouns in Discourse Representation Theory*. Doctoral dissertation. Bucharest: University of Bucharest Press.

Rosa, Elise & Jennifer Arnold. 2017. Predictability affects production: Thematic roles can affect reference form selection. *Journal of Memory and Language* 94. 43–60.

Teodorescu, Otilia. 2016. On pronominal anaphora resolution in temporal adjuncts in chid Romanian. *Working Papers in Linguistics* XVIII. 37–48.

Zafiu, Rodica. 2008. Anafora. In Valeria Guţu Romalo (ed.), *Gramatica limbii române II. Enunţul*, 656–672. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române.

Aspekt-sensitive Verwendungen von *mou* (*schon*) und *mada* (*noch*) im Japanischen

Yoshiki Mori – Universität von Tokio

mori@boz.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Schon und *noch* gibt es auch im Japanischen, zumindest die damit vergleichbaren Lexikoneinträge. Ihre temporalen Verwendungen sind auch im Japanischen die zugrunde liegenden. Ich möchte hier skizzenhaft darstellen, wie ihre Bedeutungen kompositionell aufgebaut sind. Ich möchte dabei aber auch der Tatsache Rechnung tragen, dass kognitive Gegebenheiten ihre diversen Interpretationen bestimmen. In diesem Beitrag konzentriere ich mich auf ihre Modifikation von Verbalphrasen und lasse außerdem rein skalare und modale Lesarten außer Acht.

1 Statische Sätze

Betrachten wir die Beispiele in (1):

(1)   a. Soto-wa   mada/mou   akaru-i.

            draußen-TOP noch/schon   hell-PRÄS

            'Es ist noch/schon hell draußen.'

      b. Kurausu-wa   mada/mou   60-sai   da.

            Klaus-TOP   noch/schon 60-Lebensjahr KOP.PRÄS

            'Klaus ist noch/schon 60 Jahre alt.'

Die Sätze in (1) kann man ganz parallel zum Deutschen interpretieren. (Für (1b) ist die hier intendierte Lesart „noch/schon in der Zeitspanne des 60. Lebensjahrs".) Wir setzen eine zweiphasige Skala nach König (1977) und Löbner (1989) an (Abbildung 1). Auch wenn sie formal in mehrere Teile (Behauptung, Präsupposition und Implikatur) eingeteilt werden muss (Löbner 1989, Beck 2020, u.a.), spielt sie als Einheit eine entscheidende Rolle für unterschiedliche Interpretationsmöglichkeiten, auf die ich unten eingehe.

Abbildung 1: Übergangskonstruktionen für *mou* (*schon*) und *mada* (*noch*)

Ich möchte mich an dieser Stelle mit minimalen Begrifflichkeiten begnügen: einen Übergangsabschnitt $g_\rightarrow$, dessen Granularität kontextabhängig ist, und einen Bewertungsgrad g_b auf der gegebenen Skala. Ich nehme an, dass mehrere Grade (typischerweise Zeiten) in Betracht gezogen werden können, und lasse hier die Frage offen, ob eine Aussage zum Bewertungsgrad vor dem Hintergrund einer Präsupposition über einen benachbarten oder nicht unbedingt benachbarten, vorhergehenden Grad getroffen wird (Krifka 2000, Ippolito 2007, Beck 2020). Unten wird gezeigt, dass bei der Verwendung von *mou* (*schon*) und *mada* (*noch*) in jedem Fall von diesen zweiphasigen Übergangskonstruktionen Gebrauch gemacht wird. Bei der Interpretation von (1) ist die betreffende Skala eine Zeitskala. Bei einem statischen Satz p ist die Referenzzeit, die der Bewertungszeit von *mou* bzw. *mada,* t_b, entspricht, in einem an den Übergangsabschnitt $t_\rightarrow$ angrenzenden Zeitintervall lokalisiert, für das p gilt. Für einen Satz im Progressiv (2) kann dieses Zeitintervall einfach als Ereigniszeit betrachtet werden (vgl. Ippolito 2007).

(2) Ken-wa   mou/mada   soto-de ason-de   i-ru.
     Ken-TOP   schon/noch draußen spiel-ASP   AUX-PRÄS
     'Ken spielt im Moment schon/noch draußen.'

2 Komplikation 1

Die Tatsache, dass die Angemessenheit der Übergangskonstruktion für die Analyse von *mou* (*schon*) und *mada* (*noch*) so offensichtlich ist, verdankt sich der Stativität der Prädikate. Wenn man dynamische Verben als Prädikate wählt, sieht die Situation etwas anders aus:

(3) a. Kurausu-wa   mou shukuen-o   hajime-ta.
        Klaus-TOP   schon Fest-AKK   beginn-PRÄT
        'Klaus hat das Fest schon begonnen.'
     b. Kurausu-wa   mou shukuen-o   hajime-ru.
        Klaus-TOP   schon Fest-AKK   beginn-PRÄS
        'Klaus beginnt das Fest schon (bald).'

In der japanologischen Linguistik selten angemerkt worden ist der Umstand, dass (3a) und (3b) keine parallele Beschreibung mehr erlauben. Die beabsichtigte, stärkere Lesart beinhaltet die Amalgamierung des präsentischen Tempus mit der relativtemporal-aspektuellen (jeweils Perfekt- und Prospektiv-) Interpretationen von *-ta* und *-ru*. Sie werden hier der Einfachheit halber als Varianten der statischen Interpretation betrachtet. Die Bewertungszeit (t_b) von *mou* (*schon*) und *mada* (*noch*) liegt für beide Fälle nach wie vor auf der Referenzzeit des Tempussystems, die mit der Sprechzeit identifiziert wird. Jedoch ist der Bezug des

Ereignisses zu den Übergangskonstruktionen in Abbildung 1 unterschiedlich: In (3a) liegt das durch vP beschriebene Ereignis auf der Übergangszeit ($t_\rightarrow$), in (3b) jedoch auf der maximalen Zeit (t_{max}), also an der oberen Schranke der nicht mehr den Namen würdigen „p-Phase". Den letzteren Fall begleitet eine Implikation, dass das Ereignis imminent bevorsteht, und eventuell zusätzlich eine weitere, dass das Ereignis früher als erwartet zustande kommt. Jedenfalls kann die Phase zwischen der Übergangszeit ($t_\rightarrow$) und der maximalen Zeit (t_{max}) nicht mehr als Geltungszeit für p, Ereigniszeit o.ä. erfasst werden, sondern eher als eine Art von Extended Now (McCoard 1978, von Stechow 1999), das sich allerdings bei dem Perfekt und dem Prospektiv von der Bewertungszeit (t_b) aus in unterschiedliche Richtungen ausdehnt und mit dem durch die vP gestalteten Ereignis endet. Für (3) gibt es zusätzlich schwächere Lesarten, die auf den tempusbezogenen Interpretationen von *-ta* und *-ru* basieren.[1] Diese nähern sich denjenigen im Deutschen an, in denen sich *schon* und *noch* als Modifikatoren zu Zeitadverbien analysieren lassen. Das durch die vP beschriebene Ereignis wird mittels der tempusbezogenen Referenzzeit in der Vergangenheit (3a) oder Nicht-Vergangenheit (3b) der Sprechzeit lokalisiert. Geht man davon aus, dass *mou* und *mada* entsprechend der Darstellung in der Übergangskonstruktion (Abbildung 1) die Referenzzeit der Verbprojektion modifizieren, bedeutet dies, dass die tempusbezogene Referenzzeit einschließlich der Ereigniszeit mit der Bewertungszeit der Übergangskonstruktion (t_b), die, so ist die Annahme hier, in der Relation zur Sprechzeit lokalisiert wird, identifiziert wird. Dabei findet das auf (3b), und nicht auf (3a) angewendete Muster Verwendung, d.h., auf der maximalen Zeit der Konstruktion (t_{max}) sollte ein gleichartig charakterisiertes Ereignis vorliegen, das allerdings im Vergleich zu dem Ereignis in der Bewertungszeit (t_b) als Irrealis interpretiert werden muss. Vermutlich wird aus diesem Grund eine Implikatur ausgelöst, dass das reale Ereignis auf der Bewertungszeit schneller als erwartet zustande kommt.

3 Komplikation 2

Auch der entsprechende temporale Kontrast bei der Verwendung von *mada* (*noch*) in (4a) und (4b) ist nicht einfach zu behandeln.

(4)   a. #Kurausu-wa   mada   shukuen-o   iwat-ta.
          Klaus-TOP   noch   Fest-AKK   feier-PRÄT
          'Klaus hat noch gefeiert.'
       b. #Kurausu-wa   mada   shukuen-o   iwaw-u.
          Klaus-TOP   noch   Fest-AKK   feier-PRÄS
          'Klaus feiert noch das Fest.'

---

[1] Man stelle sich am besten Verwendungen der Sätze in (3) in einem Roman oder in einer Bühnenanweisung vor.

Die relativtemporal-aspektuelle Interpretation von *-ta* und *-ru* scheint hier nicht möglich zu sein (daher ‚#' sowohl in (4a) als auch (4b)). [2] In Bezug auf das Format der Übergangskonstruktion heißt das, dass ein Einzelgeschehen des durch die vP beschriebenen Ereignisses weder an der unteren Schranke der p*-Phase, also der minimalen Zeit (t_{min}) im Falle von (4a) noch auf der Übergangszeit ($t_\rightarrow$), der oberen Schranke der p*-Phase, im Falle von (4b) in der relevanten Nähe der Bewertungszeit (t_b) lokalisierbar ist.

In (4) ist die tempusbezogene Interpretation von *-ta* und *-ru* dagegen möglich. Es geht jedoch hier nicht um die zu (3) parallele Lokalisierung des Einzelgeschehens des durch vP beschriebenen Ereignisses. Das würde zur Identifizierung der Ereignis- und Referenzzeit der Verbprojektion mit der Bewertungszeit (t_b) der Übergangskonstruktion führen und eine modale Uminterpretation des diesmal auf der Übergangszeit ($t_\rightarrow$) lokalisierten gleichartigen Ereignisses verursachen. Es bleibt stattdessen die Lesart mit der kontinuativen (m.a.W., imperfektiven) Interpretation des tempuslosen Satzradikals: Entweder wird es als Fortsetzen des Aktivitätsteils des durch vP beschriebenen Ereignisses, oder als dessen iterative bzw. habituelle Wiederholung interpretiert. Für diese Interpretation wird ein koverter aspektueller Operator angesetzt. Insgesamt erhält man am Ende Interpretationen, die der stativischen Interpretation in (1) sehr ähnlich sind.[3] (Genau aus diesem Grund lokalisiert die stärkste Interpretation von (4b) die Bewertungszeit von *mada* auf der Sprechzeit.) Ein möglicher Unterschied liegt darin, dass in (5a) die Fortsetzung von Ankünften hin zur Bewertungszeit von *mada* (qua Referenzzeit des Tempussystems) betont wird, während in (5b) auch eine weitere Interpretationsmöglichkeit besteht, dass die Fortsetzung von Ankünften nach der Bewertungszeit von *mada* hervorgehoben wird. Die Gemeinsamkeit und der Unterschied zwischen (4a) und (4b) lassen sich vielleicht durch den Kontrast zwischen (5a) und (5b) nachvollziehen.

(5) a. Kurausu-no gakusei-tachi-ga mada touchaku-shi-ta.
　　　　Klaus-GEN Student-PL-NOM noch Ankunft-tu-PRÄT
　　　　'Die Studenten von Klaus kamen noch (nach wie vor) an.'

---

[2] Es scheint jedoch mindestens drei Ausnahmefälle zu geben, alle bezogen auf die Prospektivinterpretation von (4b). Zum einen erleichtert die Einbettung des *mada*-Satzes unter einem Kognitionsverb oder einem epistemischen Modalverb die Prospektivinterpretation von *-ru* (i). Ein Subjekt in der ersten Person wie in (ii) macht sogar die Hinzufügung eines modalen Elements überflüssig. Außerdem erlaubt die Nominativmarkierung *-ga* am Subjekt anscheinend leichter die intendierteLesart, wie in (iii) illustriert. In diesem Fall gehe ich davon aus, dass das Subjekt als Fokus markiert ist. Die Lesart von (iii) stellt jedoch eine Mischung des Effekts der Prospektivinterpretation von *-ru* und des Effekts der auf dem Hintergrundteil basierten iterativenInterpretation vom vP-Teil dar, die gleich zur Sprache kommt. Diese Phänomene müssen weiter untersucht werden.
　(i) Kurausu-wa mada huro-ni hair-u {to omow-u, ni chigai na-i}.
　　　　　　Bad-zu geh-PRÄS COMP glaub-PRÄS, müss- PRÄS
　　　　' (Ich) glaube, Klaus wird noch ein Bad nehmen. / Klaus muss noch ein Bad nehmen.'
　(ii) Watashi(-wa) mada huro-ni hair-u. 'Ich werde noch ein Bad nehmen.'
　(iii) Kurausu-ga mada huro-ni hair-u. 'Klaus nimmt noch ein Bad.'
[3] Ich setze voraus, dass prozesshafte Kontinuation von progressiver, d.h., statischer Kontinuation unterschieden werden kann.

b. Kurausu-no gakusei-tachi-ga   mada touchaku-su-ru.

Klaus-GEN   Student-PL-NOM   noch   Ankunft-tu-PRÄS

'Die Studenten von Klaus kommen noch (weiter) an.'

4 Zusammenfassung

In diesem Beitrag ist die kognitive Angemessenheit und explanatorische Effektivität der Analyse von *mou* und *mada* durch die hier sogenannten Übergangskonstruktion in den Fokus gerückt worden, auch wenn diese formal in mehrere Bestandteile (Behauptung, Präsupposition und Implikatur) eingeteilt werden muss (Löbner 1989, Beck 2020, u.a.). Durch das Zusammenspiel mit der aspektuellen Komposition und Tempus lassen sich verschiedene Lesarten von *mada* (*noch*) und *mou* (*schon*) erklären. Die Untersuchung über deren Zusammenspiel mit Zeitadverbien muss ich aber auf eine andere Gelegenheit verschieben.

Literatur

Beck, Sigrid. 2020. Readings of scalar particles: *noch/still. Linguistics and Philosophy* 43. 1–67.

Ippolito, Michela. 2007. On the meaning of some focus-sensitive particles. *Natural Language Semantics* 15. 1–34.

König, Ekkehard. 1977. Temporal and non-temporal uses of *noch* and *schon* in German. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 1. 173–198.

Krifka, Manfred. 2000. Alternatives for Aspectual Particles: Semantics of *still* and *already. Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*. 401–412.

Löbner, Sebastian. 1989. German *schon–erst–noch*: An integrated analysis. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12. 167–212.

McCoard, Robert W. 1978. *The English Perfect*. Amsterdam: North Holland.

von Stechow, Arnim. 1999. Eine erweiterte Extended-Now Theorie für Perfekt und Futur. *Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik* 29. 86–118.

Salience and definiteness in Turkish children's narratives

Duygu Özge and Özlem Yeter – Middle East Technical University
duyguo@metu.edu.tr and ozlemyeter1@gmail.com

1 Introduction

Von Heusinger has posed definite descriptions as dynamic expressions that (i) pick the most salient entity as their referents and (ii) change the salience hierarchies of the introduced referents and their supersets (von Heusinger 1997; 2003; 2007). With this proposal, he departs from the assumption of the uniqueness attributed to definite expressions in Russel's (1905) Theory of Descriptions, and from the assumption that an expression can either have context dependence or salience changing potential, but not both (e.g., Kamp 1981; Heim 1982; Groenendijk & Stokhof 1991). In this altered dynamic semantics approach, definite descriptions have double dynamics (von Heusinger 2003). First, they do not gain their uniqueness condition via the lexical semantics of the definite article, but dynamically, via the function it has in a discourse, so they are context-dependent. Second, they do have the power to alter the context and update the salience structure of the discourse.

Among others, two of the discourse functions of definite nouns that will be relevant for our purposes are situational salience, where the referent is the most salient entity that is accessible to both interlocuters, as in *the glacier* in (1a), and the anaphoric relation where the referent is introduced with an indefinite article (*a glacier*) in its first mention and is referred with a definite noun in its re-mention (*the glacier*), as in (1b) (von Heusinger 1997). These examples clearly illustrate that the definite expressions tend to refer to the most salient entity and that they gain their meaning by their function in the discourse.

(1)
a. Oh my God! **The glacier** is very steep and almost impossible to climb.
b. There is **a glacier** in our town. **It** is very steep and almost impossible to climb. Even the most advanced climbers need continuous belaying and extreme care and it has caused many injuries in the past. **The ice waterfall route** in the Skyler area is much better though. Despite the dangers, some climbers insist on going for **the glacier**.
c. **The glacier** is very steep and almost impossible to climb. Even the most advanced climbers need continuous belaying and extreme care and it has caused many injuries in the past. Despite this some climbers insist on going for **the route**.

Also, the example in (1b) is a good case where another definite noun (*the ice waterfall route*) shifts the salience from one entity *(the glacier)* to another (*the waterfall*). Furthermore, the re-mentioning of the first definite entity *(the glacier)* after this other entity (*the waterfall*) again shifts the salience back to *the glacier* as the most salient noun in this discourse, which demonstrates the discourse changing potential of the definite referents. Finally, in (1c), *the glacier* is re-mentioned with another relevant noun that includes *the glacier* as its member *the route,* an example of *salience spreading* where the definite expression changes the salience of their supersets as well (von Heusinger 2003).

In this study, we analyze the narratives of Turkish-speaking children focusing on their referential choices for discourse referents and their function, with a special focus on the functions of definite descriptions in children's referential chains.

2 Method

Participants
We tested 21 primary school monolingual Turkish children (12 Females) (M_{age} = 9.56, SD = 0.61). Tested as a control group for another study, these children come from a relatively lower SES.

Materials
We used the *Multilingual Assessment Instrument for Narratives* (Gagarina et al. 2012, 2019). It consists of 4 stories, each two having the same number of story characters: Cat Story/Dog Story and Baby Birds/Baby Goats. We analysed the first stories told by children (i.e., cat story and dog story). These stories contain 3 characters (i.e., cat, butterfly and the child in the "Cat Story" and dog, mouse and child in the "Dog Story"). Reference to the setting, an initiating event, goal, attempt and outcome in an organized manner constitute the story structure.

Procedure
Story pictures were printed out in vivid colours, cut and stuck next to each other as suggested in the manual. Each story was printed 3 times and was put in separate envelopes. Later, the child was asked to choose among the envelopes, although they all contained the same story. This was made in order to make the child believe that the experimenter does not know what story was going to be told. This was crucial to prevent shared knowledge effect between the child and the experimenter (Gagarina et al. 2012). The narration was audio-recorded and transcribed by 2 Turkish native speakers and was checked by the second author.

Coding
Only the animate story characters were coded. Ambiguous and incomprehensible sentences were excluded (N = 3). 372 utterances were coded in total (ungrammatical sentences causing ambiguity and utterances containing no animate reference have not been coded, N = 18). 9 children told the cat story while 12 told the dog story. Introduction refers to the first mention of the story characters. Maintenance is when the story character that is being mentioned is referred to also in the previous utterance. We coded the story characters that re-appeared after being interrupted by the mention of another story character as re-mention.

3 Results and Discussion

While the number of indefinite expressions was greater than the number of definite entities when introducing the referent, the number of definite expressions was greater when maintaining and re-mentioning the already introduced entity [X^2(1, N=372)=208.23, p<.00001] (Table 1).

Table 1: Function of definite and indefinite expressions in children's narratives

	# of total occurrences	# of definite occurrences	# of indefinite occurrences
Introduction	61	21	39 (4 generic)
Re-mention	104	102	1
Maintenance	207	205	2
Total	372	328	42

Despite this pattern, the number of using bare definite nouns while introducing a subject referent was still at a remarkable rate (%43). This is an example of using the definites for situational salience (von Heusinger 2003). This is in line with previous studies in Turkish children's narratives (Küntay 2002; Aksu-Koç & Nicolopoulou 2015). However, different from previous studies, our participants did not have a shared visual narrative context with their interlocutors but they were still treating the subject entities as the situationally the obvious and shared character. This may be due to limited Theory of Mind skills, so further studies should address this possible correlation. We also see that the number of subject mentions was also greater than the number of object mentions [X^2(1, N=285)=10.58, p=.005] (Table 2). This also concurs with previous studies underlying the subject-bias in referential chains (for a summary, Schumacher & von Heusinger 2019).

Table 2: The number of subject and object roles depending on the function of the entity

Character function	# of total subjects	# of total objects
Introduction ($N = 61$)	43	14
Re-mention ($N = 104$)	86	4
Maintenance ($N = 207$)	128	21
Total ($N = 372$)	257	39

We then examined the percentage of definite nouns and their morphosyntactic realizations in different word orders within subject and object referents separately. The pattern for the definiteness (i.e., greater indefinites for introduction, greater definites for maintenance and re-mention) and the subject-bias persisted in this analysis. Analyzing the word order for subject referents, we found that the number of SV utterances was greater than that of SOV when introducing a referent while we observed just the opposite pattern for character re-mention [X^2(1, N=236)=111.64, p<.00001]. Furthermore, OV and V orders were greater for maintaining the reference while there was no difference between SOV and SV orders. Hence, the subject is more likely to be introduced with the verb without any other referents to establish the salience of this initial entity and once this is done, an additional referent (i.e., object) is introduced in an SOV order. For object referents, the word order did not differ by the function of the referent [X^2(1, N=42)=5.99, p=.42]. This may be due to the smaller number of object mentions in total. We then looked at the morphosyntactic realization of the referents in subject mentions as the majority of the cases. A greater number of indefinite referents were introduced by an indefinite article, as in (2a) (Aksu-Koç & Nicolopoulou 2015), whereas all of the definite subject referents were introduced by a bare noun in SOV and SV order while they were all introduced by a null pronoun in V order (2b). All referents were definite during the re-mention and maintenance, and they were mentioned by a null pronoun in OV and V and by a bare noun, demonstrative noun and pronoun in SOV and SV. Finally, there were also some examples of definite expressions referring the supersets of the main entity, as in (2b), a la von Heusinger's (2003) observation of salience spreading.

(2) a. **Bir tane** kedi varmış. (There was **a** cat)
        O sırada **bir tane** çocuk gelmiş. (Meanwhile **a** boy came)

     b. Şimdi **bir tane fare** varmış. Böyle ağacın deliğinden girmiş. (SV order)
        (Now there is **a** mouse. (**The** mouse) passed through the hole in the tree.)

     c. Bir tane **köpek** varmış burada. Fareyi kovalıyormuş. Yakalamış. Fareyi kovalarken içine girmiş. Kaçmaya çalışıyormuş. Ondan sonra **hayvan** kafasını vurmuş.

(There is **a dog** here. (It: dog) is chasing the mouse. (It: dog) caught (it: mouse). As (it: dog) was chasing the mouse, (it: dog) got into it. (It: mouse) was trying to run away. Then the **animal** (i.e., dog) hit his head.)

In conclusion, the analysis of Turkish 9-year-olds' referential chains in their narratives indicates that the subject is the most salient entity and although the characters are generally introduced by an indefinite noun, they are oddly and frequently introduced by a bare definite noun, which is supposed to mark the situationally salient entity. Children are adultlike in using more definite expressions for character maintenance and re-mention. The morphological realization of these nouns (i.e., bare nouns, (null)pronouns, demonstratives) interacted with the word order/information structure and the discourse function of these entities. Although infrequently observed, children's use of definite expressions for salience spreading is also adultlike at age 9. Therefore, for children just like adults, definite expressions are dynamic expressions marking the salience and updating the salience hierarchies of the referents and their supersets (von Heusinger 1997). The only developing feature at this age seems to be situational salience that may be related to other socio-cognitive abilities, which we intend to investigate in future studies.

References

Aksu-Koç, Ayhan & Angeliki Nicolopoulou. 2015. Character reference in young children's narratives: A crosslinguistic comparison of English, Greek, and Turkish. *Lingua* 155. 62–84.

Gagarina, Natalia, Daleen Klop, Sari Kunnari, Koula Tantele, Taina Välimaa, Ingrida Balčiūnienė, Ute Bohnacker & Joel Walters. 2012. MAIN: Multilingual Assessment Instrument for Narratives. *ZAS Papers in Linguistics* 56. 1–140.

Gagarina, Natalia, Daleen Klop, Sari Kunnari, Koula Tantele, Taina Välimaa, Ute Bohnacker & Joel Walters. 2019. MAIN: Multilingual Assessment Instrument for Narratives – Revised. *ZAS Papers in Linguistics* 63. 1–36.

Groenendijk, Jeroen & Martin Stokhof. 1991. Dynamic predicate logic. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 14. 39–100.

Heim, Irene. 1982. The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases. PhD dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Published in 1988 by Garland.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 1997. *Salienz und Referenz. Der Epsilonoperator in der Semantik der Nominalphrase und anaphorischer Pronomen.* Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2003. The double dynamics of definite descriptions. In Jaroslav Peregrin (ed.), *Meaning: The dynamic turn*, 149–168. Leiden: Brill.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2007. Anaphors in Text: Cognitive, formal and applied approaches to anaphoric reference. In Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Manfred Consten & Mareile Knees (eds.), *Anaphors in Text: Cognitive, Formal and Applied Approaches to Anaphoric Reference*, 123–144. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Kamp, Hans. 1981. A theory of truth and semantic representation. In Jeroen Groenendijk, Theo Janssen & Martin Stokhof (eds.), *Formal methods in the study of language*, 277–322. Amsterdam: Mathematical Centre.

Küntay, Aylin C. 2002. Development of the expression of indefiniteness: Presenting new referents in Turkish picture-series stories. *Discourse Processes* 33(1). 77–101.

Schumacher, Petra B. & Klaus von Heusinger. 2019. Introduction to prominence in discourse. *Journal of Pragmatics* 154. 18–21.

Den Klaus kennt jeder.
On the use of the definite article with proper names in German

Edgar Onea, Melanie Loitzl, Lea-Sophie Kravanja and Sophie Pfundner
University of Graz
edgar.onea-gaspar@uni-graz.at, melanie.loitzl@edu-uni-graz.at,
lea.kravanja@edu-uni-graz.at and sophie.pfundner@edu.uni-graz.at

1 Introduction

While proper names (PNs) are usually treated as complete definite descriptions in the literature and are assigned the semantic type *e*, they can be combined with the indefinite article leading to sortal interpretation, (1b), quantification over stages, (1c), or manifestations, (1d), of the individual denoted (von Heusinger 2010). PNs can also be combined with the definite article (DA). While an unmotivated use of the DA is unacceptable in English, (1e), the use of the DA is acceptable if the PN is modified by a relative clause, (1f), or if it can be understood as an individual brand, (1g). Finally, in some languages such as Greek the usage of the DA is arguably obligatory with PNs.

(1)   a. Klaus worked on these data.
      b. I met a (certain) Mary.   (Longobardi 1994: 636)
         a person called Mary
      c. Durch die Tür kam ein wütender Paul.   (German)
         'a furious Paul entered'   (von Heusinger & Wespel 2007: 337)
      d. We need another Roosevelt.   (Payne & Huddleston 2002: 521)
         another manifestation of the real Roosevelt / Someone like Roosevelt
      e. (?? The) Klaus is semanticist.
      f. The/An Anselm I met yesterday was born in Aosta.   (Longobardi 1994: 639)
      g. The Donald did it my way.   (January 22 2017, *The Sunday Times*)

In (1) the usage of the definite or indefinite article is associated with clear semantic effects. However, in German, the usage of the DA with PNs denoting persons does not have any immediate semantic correlates, (2).

(2)   Ich habe (den) Klaus besucht.
      'I visited Klaus.'

The literature mentions several potential reasons to use the DA with PNs (Werth 2020: 2–9). Firstly, there seems to be regional variation to the extent that northern German speakers tend to accept the usage of the DA with PNs less and associate it with lack of politeness, whereas speakers of southern German varieties accept the usage more readily, cf. (Bellmann 1990). Social and politeness related effects may further depend on which kind of proper noun (e.g., first names, nick names, full names) occur with the DA. Moreover, some discourse structuring aspects associated with the usage of the DA with PNs in spoken German have been suggested in Golato (2013) and Betz (2015), which remain to be further investigated. Finally, the usage of articles may have a syntactic function in clarifying the syntactic relations in a sentence, since case morphology is virtually non-existent in PNs in current German, which contrast with historical practice of case marking with PNs (see Paul 1917: 153–163 and Nübling 2012: 225–229).
    This paper is part of an attempt to elucidate the parameters of variation for the usage of the

DA with person-denoting PNs in written standard German. Here, we report the first results of a large-scale corpus study on this variation.

2 The study

The alleged case-marking function of the DA on PNs appears to be general enough to be detected in written language. Thus, we focus on case marking as a predictor of DA with PN.

Hypothesis If case-marking is a motivation to use the DA with PNs, we expect that the DA will more often be used when the DP is not in nominative. This is because nominative is the unmarked default case in German. Further, we expect a correlation between morphological case-marking and the use of the DA, e.g. genitive is often marked morphologically on the noun (*Peter* vs. *Peters*).

Method We have extracted four data-sets from the German Reference Corpus (DeReKo) based on different queries: 1) MA: contains the most frequent 15 male first names, 2) ARMA: contains a DA directly followed by a male, 3) FE: contains the most frequent 15 female PNs, 4) ARFE: contains a DA followed by a female PN. The first names were chosen from a statistical evaluation of the most commonly used first names in Austria in the past years compiled by Statistik Austria (2020). For each of the data-sets, 200 examples
were screened for errors and annotated for gender and case. To name a few criteria, samples were regarded as erroneous when they were used for organisations (*Thomas Hardy-Gesellschaft*), when relevant (linguistic) information was missing, e.g. the case of the DP could not be determined, or if the article before a PN was used as a relative pronoun. Importantly, in MA and FE, the use of a DA with the PN was considered an error, because this way, all data sets became disjunct.

For the evaluation of the results, we were interested in the probability of using the DA given a certain case: $p(article|case)$. The direct way to calculate this would have been to search for all PNs in a certain case and check the proportion of article usage with them. However, since DA is used very rarely with PNs in written language, this would have been an unrealistic task. Fortunately, using Bayesian reasoning, our data allowed estimating the desired probability. In particular:

$$p(art|case) = \frac{p(art) \cdot p(case|art)}{p(case)} = \frac{p(art) \cdot p(case|art)}{p(case|art) * p(art) + p(case|noart) * p(noart)} \qquad (1)$$

From these, $p(case|art)$ and $p(case|noart)$ are the proportion of DA/no-DA usage given a certain case, which can be estimated from the annotated data and $p(art)$ is derived from estimating the rate of DA in the sample given the rate of errors in the sample and the total hits.

We estimated the $p(case|art)$ for each case using a hierarchic Stan simulation using the rstan package (Stan Development Team 2020), with 10 chains of 10.000 iterations and a burn-in of 5.000 and flat priors for all variables; the models achieved good convergence as witnessed by the potential scale reduction statistic (Rhat) of approximately 1 for all cases and the usual visual diagnostics. Thereby, we analytically derived $p(art|case)$ in each simulation iteration.

Results We show the results in Figure 1 for each case and for a variant of the model in which all marked cases are merged (i.e. feminine dative and genitive and masculine accusative, dative and genitive). The results clearly show that the usage of the DAs in written standard German is well predicted by the case of the DP. At the same time, the probability of using an article with a PN is generally extremely low.

Figure 1: Probability of article usage depending on case

3 Concluding discussion

The data suggest that case-marking is an important factor in determining the usage of the DA with PNs in German. While this has been suggested in the literature before, our method provides a quantitatively more solid estimation of the distributional facts as compared to prior studies such as Schmuck & Szczepaniak (2014) and Werth (2014).

However, our data presented here are insufficient to provide a more detailed explanation of this observation. Are articles actively used to disambiguate case? Is this a reflex of spoken German data or of regional variation? What other factors influence the distribution? For example, we clearly see that for the genitive case, alternation between pre- or postponed possessor (relative to the head noun) is a relevant factor. However, we still lack a clear enough understanding of the semantic and pragmatic effects of such alternations. We hope that by exploring further details of our annotated data we can contribute to explaining the factors governing the distribution of the DA with PNs in German.

References

Bellmann, Günter. 1990. *Pronomen und Korrektur. Zur Pragmalinguistik der persönlichen Referenzformen.* Berlin: De Gruyter.

Betz, Emma. 2015. Recipient design in reference choice. Negotiating knowledge, access, and sequential trajectories. *Gesprächsforschung* 16. 137–173.

DeReKo – *Deutsches Referenzkorpus*, https://cosmas2.ids-mannheim.de/cosmas2-web/ (2nd February 2022).

Golato, Andrea. 2013. Reparaturen von Personenreferenzen. *Deutsche Sprache* 41. 31–51.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2010. Zur Grammatik indefiniter Eigennamen. *Zeitschrift für germanistische Linguistik* 38(1). 88–120.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Johannes Wespel. 2007. Indefinite proper names and quantification over manifestations. *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung* 11. 332–345.

Longobardi, Giuseppe. 1994. Reference and proper names: A theory of N-movement in syntax and Logical Form. *Linguistic Inquiry* 25(4). 609–665.

Nübling, Damaris. 2012. Auf dem Weg zu Nicht-Flektierbaren: Die Deflexion der deutschen Eigennamen diachron und synchron. In Björn Rothstein (Hrsg.), *Nicht-flektierende Wortarten*, 224–246. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Paul, Hermann. 1917. *Deutsche Grammatik*, vol. 2. Halle a. S.: Niemeyer.

Payne, John & Rodney Huddleston. 2002. Nouns and noun phrases. In Rodney Huddleston & Geoffrey K. Pullum (Hrsg.), *The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language*, 323–524. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schmuck, Mirjam & Renata Szczepaniak. 2014. Der Gebrauch des Definitartikels vor Familien- und Rufnamen im Frühneuhochdeutschen aus grammatikalisierungs-theoretischer Perspektive. In Friedhelm Debus, Rita Heuser & Damaris Nübling (Hrsg.), *Linguistik der Familienname*, 97–137. Hildesheim: Olms.

Statistik, Austria. 2020. *Statistik der natürlichen Bevölkerungsbewegung. Statistik der 60 häufigsten Vornamen 1984–2019 in Österreich – etymologisch zusammengefasst.* https://www.statistik.at/ (2nd February 2022).

Werth, Alexander. 2014. Die Funktion des Artikels bei Personennamen im norddeutschen Sprachraum. In Friedhelm Debus, Rita Heuser & Damaris Nübling (Hrsg.), *Linguistik der Familienname*, 139–174. Hildesheim: Olms.

Werth, Alexander. 2020. *Morphosyntax und Pragmatik in Konkurrenz. Der Definitartikel bei Personennamen in den regionalen und historischen Varietäten des Deutschen.* Berlin: De Gruyter.

How to achieve a prominence GOAL! in different speaking styles

Lena Pagel, Simon Roessig and Doris Mücke – University of Cologne
lena.pagel@uni-koeln.de, simon.roessig@uni-koeln.de and doris.muecke@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

Speakers vary the degree of vocal effort in speech production to successfully convey a message to listeners. Vocal effort can be globally increased over entire utterances, as in loud speech. Furthermore, it can vary within an utterance to locally highlight important information, which is then referred to as prosodic prominence. The global and local modulations can be interpreted in light of the H&H continuum, which assumes that speech varies on a scale between hypoarticulation and hyperarticulation (Lindblom 1990). A wide range of studies show that vocal effort has a number of acoustic and articulatory correlates (e.g. Geumann 2001, de Jong 1995, Cho 2005). Particularly, for highlighting related to prosodic prominence, two strategies have been carved out. Through a greater opening of the vocal tract, more acoustic energy radiates from the mouth, yielding a sonority expansion (Beckman et al. 1992). An enhancement of vocalic place features, i.e. localised hyperarticulation, yields more distinct vowel productions (de Jong 1995).

We can assume that there is an interaction between the increase in vocal effort on the global level (i.e. loud speech) and on the local level (i.e. to mark prosodic prominence). However, these interactions have not yet been investigated in the domain of articulation. The present study examines supralaryngeal signatures of prominence in loud speech as opposed to habitual speech. We ask: If speakers increase the vocal effort of an utterance globally in loud speech, can they still enhance vocal effort locally to mark prominence?

2 Methods

We recorded 20 native German speakers acoustically and articulatorily using 3D Electromagnetic Articulography. The subjects were engaged in an interactive experimental game that was set in a football stadium. It involved a question-answer task, in which participants described scenes on the field to a virtual avatar. This avatar, Marie, was introduced as their friend who accompanied them to the match but forgot her glasses and consequently asked for descriptions of the situations on the field (cf. Fig. 1).

The target sentences were the answers to the avatar's questions. They were of the form "X spielt Y zu" ("X passes to Y"). The questions were constructed so that the focus structure of the target sentences was manipulated in two different ways: Either the whole sentence was in broad focus or the object (position Y) of the sentence was in contrastive focus and the subject (position X) was in the background.

Figure 1: Experiment screen for one trial

The target words occurred in either the subject (X) or the object (Y) position. We call the subject position initial and the object position medial. When the target word is medial, it is either in broad focus or in contrastive focus; when it is initial, it is either in broad focus or in the background. Accordingly, the focus conditions are called broad-broad (henceforth BR-BR) and background-contrastive (henceforth BA-CO). It is important to note that when going from the BR-BR to the BA-CO condition, we expect a prominence increase in the medial position, as opposed to a prominence decrease in the initial position.

The three pseudo words Labiba /la'bi:ba/, Sabima /za'mi:ma/ and Nabima /na'bi:ma/ were selected as target words. The target syllable was the penultimate syllable, which carried the lexical stress and included the vowel /i/. Exemplary question-answer pairs for the target word Nabima are presented in Table 1. During the first half of the virtual football game, participants spoke in a habitual style. For the second half, they were told that the atmosphere in the stadium heated up such that they needed to speak very loudly to be understood by their friend.

Table 1: Exemplary question-answer pairs for the target word Nabima

| Position	Focus	Question	Answer
initial	BR-BR	Was passiert gerade?	[Nabima spielt Vanessa zu]F.
initial	BA-CO	Spielt Nabima Holly zu?	Nabima spielt [Rebecca]F
medial	BR-BR	Was passiert gerade?	[Carlotta spielt Nabima zu]F.
medial	BA-CO	Spielt Annette Lotte zu?	Annette spielt [Nabima]F zu.

The acoustic data was segmented using the Montreal Forced Aligner (McAuliffe et al. 2017) and hand-corrected in Praat (Boersma & Weenink 2021). Then, relevant articulatory landmarks were automatically extracted with emuR (Winkelmann et al., 2021) in R (R Core Team, 2020). Here, we examine target positions of labial and lingual movements during the production of syllables containing the vowel /i/. The Euclidean distance between the upper and lower lip was calculated to measure the target for the maximum lip aperture during /i/. In

addition, the vertical (close-open) and the horizontal (front-back) movement dimensions are analysed to capture the maximum tongue raising and fronting during /i/.

3 Results

The results are presented for two exemplary speakers, labelled A and B. It is important to keep in mind that the BA-CO focus condition induces a prominence increase in the medial and a decrease in the initial position. Fig. 2 I (top) shows lip aperture targets, with higher values indicating a greater opening. Both speakers produce the vowel with an overall greater lip aperture in loud speech compared to habitual speech. Concerning the focus conditions, the lips are more open under increasing prominence (i.e. in BA-CO in the medial position) and less open under decreasing prominence (i.e. BA-CO in the initial position). This is the case in both speaking styles, but the degree of lip aperture modifications depends on the speaking style. The between-focus changes of the labial system are stronger in loud speech as compared to habitual speech.

Figure 2: Results for lip aperture (top) and tongue body position (bottom)

The results for the tongue body are shown in Fig. 2 II (bottom). The y-axis represents the vertical movement dimension, where higher values indicate a raising of the tongue in /i/. The x-axis is related to the horizontal movement dimension, with values to the left indicating a fronting of the tongue in /i/. Note that the figures can be read similarly to an acoustic vowel

chart. The data reveal that the overall tongue target is lower and fronted in loud speech as compared to habitual speech, but we find differences due to focus structure and speaker-specific strategies. In habitual speech, both speakers modify the tongue target of /i/ in a way that the features [+high, +front] are enhanced under increasing prominence in the medial position. In the initial position, speaker A retracts the tongue under decreasing prominence, weakening the [+front] feature. Speaker B, on the contrary, exhibits a fronting of the tongue under decreasing prominence, strengthening the [+front] feature. Additionally, speaker B lowers the tongue, weakening the [+high] feature. Most of these patterns are mirrored in loud speech, except that speaker B produces a fronted but lower target in the medial position and speaker A additionally weakens the [+high] feature in the initial position.

4 Discussion and conclusion

The research aim of this contribution was to examine if vocal effort can be locally increased in loud speech – a speaking style that requires a globally high level of vocal effort. Despite speaker-specific strategies, kinematic lip and tongue body data reveal that prominence relations found in habitual speech can indeed be preserved in loud speech. In both speaking styles, we observe similar highlighting strategies: sonority expansion and localised hyperarticulation. Under prominence, the lips are opened to a greater extent, expanding the sonority of the vowel, and tongue body targets are partly hyperarticulated. However, there are also differences in the encoding of prosodic prominence when comparing loud and habitual speech. Both speakers tend to use more sonority expansion in loud speech and more localised hyperarticulation in habitual speech.

The data on loud speech underline the flexibility of prominence marking in supralaryngeal articulation, in that particularly those dimensions are modulated that are less restricted phonologically or physiologically. For instance, the lips encode prosodic structure more freely than the tongue body and to a greater extent than in habitual speech. Moreover, in cases where the strategies of sonority expansion and localised hyperarticulation conflict in the vertical tongue body movement, the horizontal movement may enhance the vowel's place feature. Both findings indicate the importance of expanding sonority in loud speech. Further corroborating the notion of complementarity, the results show that not only are more prominent entities strengthened, less prominent entities are additionally weakened in their production, finally making the prominent entity stand out more.

To conclude, kinematic modifications for the encoding of prominence are found in habitual and loud speech. The two levels of local and global vocal effort variation go hand in hand in order to increase intelligibility and successfully convey a message. The articulatory data from two exemplary speakers provide evidence for flexible and complementing strategies with the goal to encode prominence in loud speech. The relative importance of the highlighting strategies shifts: In these speakers, sonority expansion appears to be stronger in loud speech, while localised hyperarticulation seems to be stronger in habitual speech. This is likely to be triggered by the complex interplay of physiological constraints of vocal tract configurations and the demands of the communication process. The data of the two speakers is preliminary. It is possible that speakers differ in the way they prioritise the articulatory cues to express prominence in loud speech, which will be assessed in the analysis of the entire corpus of 20 speakers.

References

Beckman, Mary, Jan Edwards & Janet Fletcher. 1992. Prosodic structure and tempo in a sonority model of articulatory dynamics. In Gerard J. Docherty & Robert D. Ladd (eds.), *Gesture, segment, prosody*, 68–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boersma, Paul & David Weenink. 2021. Praat: doing phonetics by computer.

Cho, Taehong. 2005. Prosodic strengthening and featural enhancement: Evidence from acousticand articulatory realizations of /A,i/ in English. *The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America* 117(6). 3867–3878.

Geumann, Anja. 2001. Invariance and variability in articulation and acoustics of natural perturbed speech. In Philip Hoole (ed.), *Forschungsberichte des Instituts für Phonetik und Sprachliche Kommunikation der Universität München (FIPKM),* vol. 38, 265–393. Munich: Institut für Phonetik und Sprachliche Kommunikation, Ludwig-Maximilans-Universität München.

de Jong, Kenneth. 1995. The supraglottal articulation of prominence in English: Linguistic stress as localized hyperarticulation. *The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America* 97(1). 491–504.

Lindblom, Björn E. 1990. Explaining Phonetic Variation: A Sketch of the H&H Theory. In W. J. Hardcastle & A. Marchal (eds.), *Speech production and speech modelling*, 403–439. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

McAuliffe, Michael, Michaela Socolof, Sarah Mihuc & Michael Wagner. 2017. Montreal Forced Aligner: Trainable Text-Speech Alignment Using Kaldi. In *Proceedings of INTERSPEECH*, *20-24 August, Stockholm, Sweden*, 498–502.

R Core Team. 2020. R: A language and environment for statistical computing.

Winkelmann, Raphael, Klaus Jaensch, Steve Cassidy & Jonathan Harrington. 2021. emuR: Main Package of the EMU Speech Database Management System. R package version 2.3.0.

Affectedness-driven phenomena? A short overview

Anna Pineda – Sorbonne Université / Universität zu Köln
apineda@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

The notion of affectedness, linked to the idea of change that a participant undergoes or to the notion of transmission of force towards a participant, has been claimed to play a role in a wide range of linguistic phenomena at the syntax-semantics interface. In particular, the relation between affectedness and a transitive encoding is widely present in the literature since Fillmore (1968) and Dowty (1991). Likewise, a correlation has been established between a greater or lesser degree of affectedness and a higher or lower degree of transitivity, as can be seen in the words of Hopper & Thompson (1980: 252): 'The degree to which an action is transferred to a patient is a function of how completely this patient is affected.'

2 Affectedness-driven phenomena?

The idea that some sort of affectedness underlies the choice of a transitive encoding (as opposed to an oblique, e.g. dative encoding) has been present in the literature for many years.[1] Blume (1998), in an extensive cross-linguistic study comparing Indo-European and Polynesian languages, establishes a correlation between dative case-marking and non-patient objects, i.e. objects that refer to participants which are *active* (as opposed to *patient*) in at least one of the subevents that are part of the complex event described by the predicate (Blume 1998: 254).[2] In such dative configurations, unlike transitive ones, there is no

---

[1] In addition to the correlation between affectedness and accusative case, and lack of affectedness and dative case, there is also an important tradition which correlates affectedness with lexical aspect (Tenny 1992, 1994). Likewise, in the realm of Slavic languages, Richardson (2007) has delved into the link between aspect and case: non-accusative (lexical) case appears with atelic verbs whose event structure is not compositional, and accusative (structural) case appears with verbs that have a compositional structure. Svenonius (2002) also links accusative case with the existence of a temporal overlap between the events described by the verb, and dative case with the lack of this overlap. Finally, Kratzer (2004) establishes a connection between telicity and accusative case in German and English.

[2] The idea of *activeness* and, somehow, affectedness, is also found in García (1975: 314–315), who claims that, among the semantic notions involved in the distribution of Spanish accusative and dative clitics, there are social status and gender. She provides the following two examples, produced by the same informant:

(i)　a.　*María　tiene　　　　mucho　trabajo　en　la　casa,　pero　el　marido　nunca*
　　　　Mary　have.PRS.3SG　much　work　　in　the　house　but　the　husband　never
　　　　la　　ayuda
　　　　her.ACC　help.PRS.3SG
　　　　'Mary has a lot of work at home, but her husband never helps her.'

　　　b.　*María　tiene　　　una　muchacha　que　**le**　ayuda　　　　en　el　trabajo*
　　　　Mary　have.PRS.3SG　a　girl　　　　who　her.DAT　help.PRS.3SG　in　the　work
　　　　de　la　casa
　　　　of　the　house
　　　　'Mary has a maid who helps her in the house work.'

According to García, accusative is used when 'Mary's social superior (her husband) [sic!] is in focus' (ia), in which case Mary is referred to 'least active' and 'most distant' with respect to her husband, whereas dative is used when 'her social inferior (a maid, actually under her orders) is in focus' (ib), in which case Mary is just 'less active' and 'closer' with respect to her maid. In other words, the husband would be in a position of producing a greater degree of affectedness on Mary than the maid.

affectedness, since 'the activity of the nominative participant never manipulates or affects the activity of the dative participant' (Blume 1998: 268).

The notion sketched by Blume (1998) can account, for example, for the following contrast in Catalan, noted by Solà (1994: 174–175). In (1b), where the object takes dative case, the subject undertakes some action to encourage the other participant to succeed in doing another action, so that both are agent active participants:[3]

(1) a. *Jo l' ajudo.*
     I   him.ACC help.PRS.1SG
     'I help him.'

   b. *Jo li ajudo a acabar els deures.*
     I   him.DAT help.PRS.1SG to finish.INF the homework
     'I help him finishing his homework.'

The idea that a difference of affectedness lies behind dative/accusative alternations is explored by Pineda (2012, 2014, 2016, 2020) for several Romance languages, such as Catalan, Spanish, Aragonese and Italian varieties, with a wide range of verbs. See the contrasting contexts for *robar* + accusative and *robar* + dative in Catalan:[4]

(2) a. *Uns lladres el van apallissar i el van robar.*
     some thieves him.ACC beat.PST.3PL and him.ACC rob.PST.3PL
     'Some thieves beat him and robbed him.'

   b. *Li van robar mentre era al bar, no se'n va adonar.*
     him.DAT rob.PST.3PL while be.IPFV.3SG at.the bar
     'They robbed him while he was at the bar, he did not realise.'

Likewise, if we compare the two alternants of the locative alternation, we realise that in (3a) the stones (the accusative object) correspond to a participant which has been totally affected by a change of location, whereas in (3b) it is the cart which has been totally affected by a change of state:

(3)   a. *The children loaded the stones on the cart*.
       b. *The children loaded the cart with stones*.

The link between affectedness and accusative (/absolutive) encoding, and lack of affectedness and dative encoding, has also been investigated by Smith (1987) for German, Palmer (1994) for Hungarian, Georgian, Tabassaran, Dyirbal or Chichkchee, Bardðal (2001) and Jónsson (2013) for Icelandic, and Dixon (1994) and Kittilä (2007) for a variety of languages, among others.

---

[3] Glosses follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules in a simplified way: I indicate morphological information for verbs and for clitics.
[4] However, note that this connection is not always straightforward, for example with *phone*-verbs, as exemplified for Catalan:

(i) a. *Jo el telefono.*
     I   him.ACC phone.PRS.1SG

   b. *Jo li telefono.*
     I   him.DAT phone.PRS.1SG
     'I call him by phone.'

The idea of affectedness as a determinant of transitivity, and as a defining notion of patient arguments, is however complex. Beavers (2007: 1), for example, conceives it as 'a three-place relationship, relating an event, an affected entity, and a property scale' and defines 'varying "degrees" of affectedness that form an implicational Affectedness Hierarchy', such as holistic vs. potentially partial affectedness (e.g., *John wrote his dissertation* vs. *John wrote on his dissertation*), or actual impingement vs. unspecified impingement (e.g., *John hit the wall* vs. *John hit at the wall*).

Affectedness has also been claimed to be relevant for the account of the distribution and the diachronic expansion of differential object marking (DOM) in languages such as Spanish (Torrego 1999; von Heusinger & Kaiser 2007, 2011; von Heusinger 2008). In particular, different verb classes can be distinguished on the basis of their degree of affectedness (e.g., 'kill' has a greater degree of affectedness than 'see'), and each of these classes has a different impact on the presence or absence of DOM. More specifically, there is some correlation between verb classes high on affectedness and higher frequency of DOM, as shown by the following contrast between two Spanish examples from the 14th century (von Heusinger & Kaiser 2011: 606):

(4) a. *Tomará   también   vuestras   fijas [...]*.
       take.FUT.3SG also   your   daughters
       'He will also take your daughters [...].'
    b. *había   muerto   á   cuchillo   á   todos   los   profetas*
       have.PST.3SG kill.PTCP by   knife   DOM all   the   prophets
       'He had killed all the prophets with a knife.'

Likewise, from the synchronic point of view, Romero Heredero & García García (in press) show that affectedness has also a significant influence on the acceptability of DOM with human indefinite NPs among present-day European Spanish speakers (see also Spitzer 1928, Pottier 1968 and Torrego 1998, 1999).

Affectedness has also been advocated as a relevant semantic factor in determining the accusative or dative encoding of the causee in the Romance *faire*-infinitive constructions. For example, in Spanish, when the embedded infinitive is transitive, one expects dative case marking for the causee. However, Exceptional Case Marking (ECM) can occur, and then accusative marking arises. This is shown by Strozer (1976: 442–443) by means of the following contrasts (see also Treviño 1992: 316–318 for similar claims based on the distinction between direct and indirect causation):[5]

---

[5] Beyond ECM with transitive embedded verbs, Spanish also shows variability when the embedded verb is intransitive. For example, Strozer (1976: 441) provides the following contrasting examples, where adding a context that evinces the forcefulness of the event (and thus the affectedness of the causee) makes dative no longer available (ib), whereas if a context which implies lack of force is added, accusative tends to be dispreferred (ic).

(i) a. ***La/Le***   *hice*   *entrar.*
       her.ACC/her.DAT   make.PST.1ST   go.in.INF
       'I made her go in.'
    b. ***La/*Le***   *hice*   *entrar   a patadas.*
       her.ACC/her.DAT   make.PST.1ST   go.in.INF   kicking.her
       'I kicked her in.'
       Le pedí que entrara y después de que entró le expliqué por qué
    c. ***le/*la***   *había*   *hecho*   *entrar.*
       her.DAT/*her.ACC   have.PST.1SG   make.PTCP   go.in.INF
       'I asked to go in and after she went in I explained to her why I had made he'

(5) a. ***La/Le***   *hice*   *probarlo.*
     her.ACC/her.DAT   make.PST.1SG   try.INF=it
     'I made her try it.'

    b. ***La/*Le***   *hice*   *probarlo*   *a la fuerza.*
     her.ACC/her.DAT   make.PST.1SG   try.INF=it   by.force
     'I made her try it by force.'

    c. ***Le/*La***   *hice*   *probarlo*   *diciéndole*   *que*   *era*   *riquísimo.*
     her.ACC/her.DAT   make.PST.1SG   try.INF=it   tell.GER=her.DAT   that   was   delicious
     'I made her try it telling her that it was delicious.'

ECM is also found in Catalan, as the survey carried out by Pineda & Sheehan (in press) shows. In (6), 25/25 speakers accepted dative, and 7/25 also accepted accusative. In (7), 25/25 speakers accepted dative, and 10/25 also accepted accusative.

(6) ***Li/%l'***   *he*   *fet*   *rentar*   *els*   *plats.*
     him.DAT/ACC   have.1SG   made   wash.INF   the   dishes
     'I have made him wash the dishes.'

(7) ***Li/%l'***   *he*   *fet*   *escombrar*   *el*   *menjador.*
     him.DAT/ACC   have   made   sweep.INF   the   dining room
     'I have made him sweep the dining room.'

ECM patterns are also found in Italian (Burzio 1986: 232) and French (Hyman & Zimmer 1976, Rouveret & Vergnaud 1980, Abeillé, Godard & Miller 1997, Sheehan 2020). Interestingly, at least for a number of speakers, there seems to be a semantic contrast between the dative causee and the ECM (accusative) pattern, since the latter implies a higher degree of affectedness or coercion. The idea that a different degree of control of control of the event by the causee is associated with a dative/accusative alternation is also described for Japanese by Shibatani (1973). More recently, von Heusinger & Kaiser (2021) have also discussed whether and how affectedness influences the case marking of the embedded subject in the Romance *faire*-infinitive. As they explain, in connection to affectedness, closely related notions such as the level of force that the causer exercises on the causee, or the level of control of the causee over the event expressed by the embedded verb, are worth investigating in order to disentangle what is exactly determining the choice of one syntactic pattern or the other.

3 Conclusion

The role of affectedness in the syntactic realisation of argument structure has long been discussed, for many languages and within different theoretical approaches. The notion itself, though, is still far from having been defined in an unambiguous, unanimous way. Notwithstanding, there are numerous studies on the role affectedness plays in phenomena such as case alternations in two-place predicates (agent-object), the emergence or expansion of differential object marking, and case alternations in causative constructions. Certainly, exploring related semantic notions, as well as expanding the range of phenomena under study, will help us understand more about the notion of affectedness itself and how it actually interacts with syntactic structure.

References

Abeillé, Anne, Danièle Godard & Philip Miller. 1997. Les causatives en français: un cas de compétition syntaxique. *Langue Française* 115. 62–74.

Barðdal, Jóhanna 2001 *Case in Icelandic: A Synchronic, Diachronic, and Comparative Approach*. PhD dissertation, Lund University.

Beavers, John. 2007. *Deconstructing Affectedness: A Hierarchical Approach*. Ms., University at Buffalo.

Burzio, Luigi. 1986. *Italian Syntax*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Blume, Kerstin 1998. A contrastive analysis of interaction verbs with dative complements, *Linguistics* 36(2). 253–280.

Dixon, Robert M. W. 1994. *Ergativity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dowty, David R. 1991. Thematic Proto-Roles and Argument Selection. *Language* 67. 547–619.

Fillmore, Charles J. 1968. The case for case. In Emmon Bach & Robert T. Harms (eds.), *Universals in Linguistic Theory*, 1–90. New York: Holt.

García, Erica C. 1975 *The role of theory in linguistic analysis: the Spanish pronoun system*. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Georg A. Kaiser. 2021. Argument encoding in Causatives Constructions and Affectedness. Presentation at the *NEREUS Research Network Worshop*, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, 23-24 October 2021.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2008. Verbal semantics and the diachronic development of DOM in Spanish. *Probus* 20. 1–31.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Georg A. Kaiser. 2007. Differential Object Marking and the lexical semantics of verbs in Spanish. In Klaus von Heusinger & Manuel Leonetti (eds.), *Proceedings of the Workshop "Definiteness, Specificity and Animacy in Ibero-Romance languages"*, 85–110. Universität Konstanz: Fachbereich Sprachwissenschaft.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Georg A. Kaiser. 2011. Affectedness and differential object marking in Spanish. *Morphology* 21. 593–617.

Hopper, Paul J. & Sandra A. Thompson. 1980. Transitivity in grammar and discourse. *Language* 56(2). 251–299.

Hyman, Larry & Zimmer, Karl. 1976. Embedded Topic in French. In N. L Charles. (ed.), *Subject and Topic*, 189–211. New York: Academic Press.

Jónsson, Jóhannes Gísli. 2013. Dative versus Accusative and the Nature of Inherent Case. In Beatriz Fernández & Ricardo Etxepare (eds.), *Variation in Datives. A Microcomparative Perspective*, 144–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kittilä, Seppo. 2007. On the encoding of transitivity-related features on the indirect object. *Functions of Language* 14(1). 149–164.

Kratzer, Angelica. 2004. Telicity and the Meaning of Objective Case. In Jacqueline Guéron & Jacqueline Lecarme (ed.), *The Syntax of Time*, 389–424. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Palmer, Frank Robert. 1994. *Grammatical roles and relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pineda, Anna. 2012. Transitividad y afectación en el entorno lingüístico romance y eusquérico. In Xulio Viejo (ed.), *Estudios sobre variación sintáctica peninsular*, 31–73. Oviedo: Trabe/Seminariu de Filoloxía Asturiana de la Universidad de Oviedo.

Pineda, Anna. 2014. What lies behind dative/accusative alternations in Romance. In Stefania Marzo & Karen Lahousse (eds.), *Romance Languages and Linguistic Theory 2012*, 123–139. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Pineda, Anna. 2016. *Les fronteres de la (in)transitivitat. Estudi dels aplicatius en llengües romàniques i basc* [published and revised version of the PhD dissertation]. Barcelona: Institut d'Estudis Món Juïc.

Pineda, Anna. 2020. From Dative to Accusative. An Ongoing Syntactic Change in Romance. *Probus. International Journal of Romance Linguistics* 32(1). 129–173.

Pineda, Anna & Michelle Sheehan (in press): A Cyclic Agree account of the Romance faire-infinitive: new evidence from Catalan. *Syntax*.

Pottier, Bernard. 1968. L'emploi de la préposition *a* devant l'objet en espagnol. *Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique* 63(1). 83–95.

Richardson, Kylie R. 2007. *Case and Aspect in Slavic*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Romero-Heredero, Diego & Marco García-García. In press. Differential Object Marking in Spanish: the effect of affectedness. *Caplletra. Revista Internacional de Filologia. Special issue "Differential object marking in Romance languages"*.

Rouveret, Alain & Jean-Roger Vergnaud. 1980. Specifying Reference to the Subject: French Causatives and Conditions on Representations. *Linguistic Inquiry* 11(1). 97–202.

Sheehan, Michelle. 2020. The development of Exceptional Case Marking in Romance with a particular focus on French. *Probus* 2(2). 367–400.

Shibatani, Masayoshi. 1973. *A Linguistic Study of Causative Constructions*. PhD dissertation, University of California.

Solà, Joan. 1994. *Sintaxi normativa: estat de la qüestió*. Barcelona: Empúries.

Smith, Michael Brockman. 1987. *The Semantics of Dative and Accusative in German: An Investigation in Cognitive Grammar*. PhD dissertation, University of California.

Spitzer, Leo. 1928. Rum. p(r)e, span. á vor persönlichem Akkusativobjekt. *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie* 48. 423–432.

Strozer, Judith. 1976. *Clitics in Spanish*. PhD dissertation, University of California.

Svenonius, Peter. 2002. Icelandic case and the structure of events. *Journal of Comparative Germanic Linguistics* 5. 197–225.

Tenny, Carol L. 1992. The Aspectual Interface Hypothesis. In Ivan A. Sag & Anna Szabolcsi (eds.), *Lexical matters*, 1–27. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

Tenny, Carol L. 1994. *Aspectual Roles and the Syntax-Semantics Interface*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Treviño, Esthela. 1992. Subjects in Spanish causative constructions. In Paul Hirschbühler & Konrad Koerner (eds.), *Romance Languages and Modern Linguistic Theory. Papers from the 20th Linguistic Symposium on Romance Languages (LSRL XX)*, Ottawa, 10-14 April 1990, 309–324. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Torrego, Esther. 1998. *The dependencies of objects*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Torrego, Esther. 1999. El complemento directo preposicional. In Ignacio Bosque & Violeta Demonte (ed.), *Gramática descriptiva de la lengua española. Vol. 2: Las construcciones sintácticas fundamentales. Relaciones temporales, aspectuales y modales*, 1779–1805. Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

On resolving prominence conflicts –
exceptional case marking in Tima and Yali

Gertrud Schneider-Blum[1], Sonja Riesberg[1,2], Birgit Hellwig[1] and Nikolaus P. Himmelmann[1]
[1]Universität zu Köln – [2]CNRS-LaCiTO
schneider_blum@yahoo.de, sonja.riesberg@cnrs.fr, bhellwig@uni-koeln.de and
sprachwissenschaft@uni-koeln.de

1 Introduction

This paper compares two genetically and areally unrelated languages, Tima (Niger-Congo, Sudan) and Yali (Trans-New Guinea, West Papua) with regard to one mechanism employed in resolving prominence conflicts. The mechanism in question is exceptional case marking (ECM), specifically exceptional agent marking (also known as optional ergative marking).

In both languages, core arguments are usually unmarked for case, the more agentive argument preceding the less agentive one. In Tima, basic word order is AVP,[1] in Yali it is APV. Importantly, neither of the two languages makes use of voice alternations to handle prominence conflicts.

In Tima as well as in Yali, initial edge-position is reserved for the most prominent discourse referent. This is usually also the agentive argument. But if, in a particular discourse context, the non-agentive argument happens to be more prominent than the agentive one, the former is placed initially and the latter occurs later, obligatorily case-marked.

In terms of prominence, ECM can be interpreted as a mechanism to resolve conflicts between competing prominence hierarchies. Discourse prominence pertains to the status of a given participant in the current discourse world, where at any one moment only one participant can be the most prominent one. Prominence status here changes on a moment-by-moment basis (cf. von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019; see also Himmelmann & Primus 2015). Agent prominence is built in, as it were, into the semantics of (many) verbs in many languages, with the agent argument being the most prominent argument by default. ECM in this view then signals the fact that the usual agent prominence does not apply: the agent is not discourse prominent but it is still the most prominent verbal argument. Alternatively, but with essentially the same result, ECM can also be interpreted as signalling that the participant referred to with the case marked expression has an unexpected thematic role in the event, or as a means to stress agentivity, e.g. when an inanimate participant assumes the agent role.

2 Resolving prominence conflicts in Tima and Yali

When there is *no* conflict in prominence status between the two arguments, i.e. when the inherently prominent agent is also more discourse prominent than the patient, a transitive clause in both languages will have unmarked word order, with the agent occurring in edge-position and (usually) being unmarked for case. Example (1) illustrates this for Yali, elicited with Task 5 from Skopeteas et al. (2006), in which an agent is presented in a first picture, who then, in a second picture handles a newly introduced patient. A parallel unmarked structure to (1) (though AVP) is invariably produced by Tima speakers when describing comparable stimuli with given A. Note that in both languages, a reduction strategy may be

---

[1] In addition to abbreviations covered by the Leipzig Glossing Rules, we use the following abbreviations: A = agent (or actor), antip = antipassive, ds = different subject, ref = referential, P = patient (or undergoer), p = person marker for 3sg and 3pl, plur = pluractional, seq = sequential, ss = same subject, im = immediate, V = verb. (Abbreviations in small caps; A, the first P and V with capitals).

used, in which the given A argument is not expressed in the second clause, if coreferential with the agent of the first clause, as indicated by the brackets.

Figure 1: Stimulus with given agent

(1) Yali

a. *ap   misig   inggik   yunggul   oho   unduhuk*
   man   one   hand   fold   ADV.PTCP ('participle' acc. to LGR) stand
   'A man is standing with his arms folded.'

b. (*ap   itno*)   *horiye-ruk   angge   wa-lug   waha-ruk*
   man   DET   sit-PROG   3SG.GEN:thing   take-SEQ   come-PROG
   'He (The man) is bringing a chair (lit: sitting thing).'

Though ECM in Tima and Yali differs in many aspects, some of the usage conditions that trigger agent marking are actually identical. Consider examples (2) and (3), again elicited with the same stimulus set, but this time prompting the patient as the prominent argument. Here, the 'chair' is introduced in an intransitive construction by using a semantically vague verb, 'stay'/'exist', and unlike in (1), it is now discourse prominent at the moment the next clause is planned. When this referent then becomes the patient in the second picture, a prominence conflict between the discourse prominent 'chair' and the inherently prominent agent arises. In many of the elicited responses in both languages, this second clause exhibits marked word order, and the agent receives case marking. Thus, the 'chair' remains in the edge-position of the second clause, i.e. it remains the prominent discourse referent. As is the case with regard to the given agent in (1)b, mentioning the given patient in (2)b and in (3)b (i.e., *horiyeruk angge itno* and *cʌkɨdʌkweeŋ*) is optional. That is, clausal edge position is only one indicator for discourse prominence, the other one is to make use of the reduction strategy. But, importantly for present purposes, the agent is not discourse prominent and receives ECM in both cases.

Figure 2: Stimulus with given patient

(2) Yali:

a. *horiye-ruk   angge   itno   wereg=ma*
   sit-PROG   3SG.GEN:thing   DET   exist=DS.SEQ
   'There is this chair (lit: sitting thing).'

b. (*horiye-ruk*   *angge*   *itno*)   ***ap***   ***itno=en***   *wa-lug*   *la-ruk*
sit-PROG   3SG.GEN:thing   DET   man   DET=ERG   take-SEQ   go-PROG
'**The man** takes it (the chair) away.'

(3) Tima:

a. *c-ʌkɨdʌk=nʌ*   *hɘlak*   *kʊ-hʊwan=na*
SG-seat=DEM.PROX   stay:AP   SG-empty=DEM.PROX
'This chair is staying (there) empty.'

b. (*c-ʌkɨdʌk=weeŋ*)   *aŋ-kʊt-ɪ*   ***ɲ=c-idʌ***   *kɔɔ=nɔ*
SG-seat=DEM.REF   3PRF-take-TR   ERG=SG-body   family=DEM.PROX
ɘ-diik-aa   *cɛ-hʊndɔnɔ-waa*
P-walk-INS   3IPFV-sit.down-INS
'**This person** (lit: the body of the family) has taken it (that chair) and walked away with it to sit down on it.'

Considering examples (1)–(3), the situation seems straightforward. After the introduction of a referent, be it the agent or the patient of the following clause, this referent remains discourse-prominent. If the patient occurs in the prominence signalling sentence-initial position, the agent is case marked.

Yet, prominence conflict resolution as displayed in (2) for Yali and (3) for Tima is not constrained to ECM. Other strategies are possible, as demonstrated with the Tima example in (4) (elicited with Task 3 of Skopeteas et al. 2006). Again, a referent is introduced, here by an event-central thetic statement in the first clause (cf. Becker & Schneider-Blum 2020), and then becomes the patient argument of the second clause, thus resembling the situation in (2) and (3). But this time the new agent is introduced in an intransitive SV construction (*wɔrʈɘmaadɘh idiyʌŋ* 'a man comes'). A fuller account of prominence management in the two languages thus would have to include a very basic level choice as to how to introduce the new participant: by a construction primarily serving the purpose of explicitly introducing the participant, as in (3)b, and thereby open the ground for a prominence switch or by including it in a more complex construction that involves an intransitive SV clause which assigns the new participant immediate prominence, as in (4)b. In natural discourse, it seems to us, that the former option is the much more common and typical one.

(4) Tima:
a. *ku-duwʌ=li*   *ʊ-dʊwa*   *parna*
SG-seat=FOC.SG   P-stay   [IDEO]
'There is a pole standing somewhere.'

b. *wɔrʈɘmaadɘh*   *i-diyʌŋ,*   *u-ʈuuh*
SG.man   P-come   P-pull:PLUR
'A man comes and pulls (at it).'

Examples (2)–(4) show that a given patient is only a sufficient, not a necessary factor for the use of the ergative construction.

Furthermore, in both languages, we find situations, in which a discourse prominent agent is marked for ergative, i.e. where ergative marking takes place without there being a prominence conflict that would motivate its use. In the Tima example in (5), the 'boy' has been discourse-prominent for several clauses, hence unmarked for case and, except for the very first mention, not even overtly expressed. Then, all of a sudden, we find him as ergative-marked argument *minʌ* 'ERG3SG'. The verb, i.e. *ʊdɔɔwaa*, lit: '(with this) (s)he/they stood

up', is basically intransitive and semantically relatively empty (note that speakers translate it with 'then/and then'). This verb obligatorily triggers case marking on the agent. Other markers, verbal as well as adverbial, which are used in the language to enhance the storyline have no such influence on the construction. I.e., the speaker could have chosen a discourse marker that does *not* trigger ECM on the following noun. We hypothesize that *ʊdɔɔwaa* (and its related form *dɔɔwaa*) indicates the boundary between episodes, with the speaker, as it were, pressing a kind of reset button. It is difficult to say whether the clause in (5) is actually at the end of the finished episode or at the beginning of the new one (see further below).

(5) Tima:

['A boy (lit: child) came by bicycle, he came and found the person up (in the tree), he found the baobab fruits (which) the person had gathered on the ground, nnn, a basket, in a basket and secretly took the basket and put (it) on the bicycle by theft/stealing.']

[...]	*ʊ-dɔɔ-waa*	*ɔ-daa-waa*	***minʌ***	*ŋ=ajala*
	P-stand.up-INS	P-run-INS	ERG3SG	INS=bicycle

'Then **he** ran away with it on the bicycle.'

In Yali, ergative marking can occur in very similar situations. Consider the following example (discussed in more detail in Riesberg 2018):

(6) Yali:[2]

['After (the child) together with the dog has woken up, they see it. (There is) only the jar, there is only the jar itself. Eh, the frog that had been sitting there, isn't there anymore. It escaped. It escaped. They thought that it escaped.']

[...] *pehesareg*
pe-ehesa-teg
think-3PL.IM.PST-SS.SEQ

itanoen	***malik***	***itnoente***	*yahiye*	*itno*	*hira*	*suruk*	*ari*
itanoen	malik	itno=en=te	yahiye	itno	hira	su-tuk	ari
then	child	DET=ERG=TOP	frog	DET	look.for	do-PROG	DEM

'After they thought like this, then **the child** is searching for the frog.'

Like in the Tima example above, in example (6) from a Yali re-telling of the 'Frog Story' (the children's book *Frog, where are you*, Mayer 1969) all participants have already been introduced into the discourse and the agent has been topical for quite some time. In the clauses preceding this example, the child and his dog discover that the frog, which they had kept in a jar, has disappeared while they were asleep. Then follows a description how they wonder what might have happened, but like in Tima, the agent referent(s) is/are not overtly realised in this passage. Only when the speaker announces what will happen next (i.e. the child will be searching for the frog), is the child realised as a full NP plus determiner, and marked by the ergative.

The Tima example (5) as well as the Yali example (6) can be considered what Heeschen (1998: 308ff) calls "forms of summarizing" (for similar observations in Papuan languages,

---

[2] Unlike in Tima, marked word-order structures are actually relatively rare in Yali, and unlike Tima, Yali allows for exceptional agent marking also in unmarked word order. The final clause in example (6) exhibits such a structure, i.e. an ergative marked agent in unmarked APV order. While PA$_{ERG}$V and A$_{(ERG)}$PV constructions clearly follow different usage conditions in Yali, both are related to prominence management.

see also de Vries 2006). These forms include all relevant referents realised as overt NPs and are usually used to summarize what has been said before, as an "utterance-final comment or a concluding statement at the end of an episode" (Heeschen 1998: 311). They can, however, also function as introductory clauses for what is to happen next, i.e. as "the summarizing headline of the story the narrator is going to tell" (Heeschen 1998: 309). In fact, it may not be necessary (or possible) to clearly allocate a summarizing clause to the preceding or following paragraph. Maybe it is literally a boundary between two episodes. Examples (5) and (6) suggest that both languages employ such summarizing forms at episode boundaries and that they can include an ergative marked agent. How frequently this is the case remains to be investigated, using larger amounts of data.

3 Conclusion

To summarize, in both Tima and Yali, ECM plays an important role for prominence management in discourse. Despite differences in the usage conditions of ECM (cf. Riesberg 2018; Schneider-Blum & Hellwig 2018), we find evidence for very similar strategies in both languages. This includes the use of ECM for resolving prominence conflicts between two participants (as in (2) and (3)), but also more generally for structuring discourse (as in (5) and (6)). Not all details are fully understood yet, but it is clear that the concept of prominence as a dynamic notion, with its central idea that "the prominence status of an entity changes over time [...] as the discourse unfolds" (von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019: 118; see also Himmelmann & Primus 2015), is well positioned to capture and account for the distribution of ECM across the two languages and beyond.

References

Becker, Laura & Gertrud Schneider-Blum. 2020. Morphological marking of contrast in Tima. *Glossa: a journal of general linguistics* 5(1), 125. 1–35.

De Vries, Lourens 2006. Areal pragmatics of New Guinea: Thematization, distribution and recapitulative linkage in Papuan narratives**.** *Journal of Pragmatics* 38(6). 811–828.

Heeschen, Volker. 1998. *An ethnographic grammar of the Eipo language.* Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Petra B. Schumacher. 2019. Discourse prominence: definition and application. *Journal of Pragmatics* 154. 117–127.

Himmelmann, Nikolaus P. & Beatrice Primus. 2015. Prominence beyond prosody – A first approximation. In Amedeo De Dominicis (ed.), *pS-Prominence: Prominence in Linguistics*. Proceedings of the International Conference, 38–58. Viterbo: DISUCOM Press.

Mayer, Mercer. 1969. *Frog, where are you?* New York: Dial Books for Young Readers.

Riesberg, Sonja. 2018. Optional ergative, agentivity and discourse prominence – Evidence from Yali (Trans-New Guinea). *Linguistic Typology* 22(1). 17–50.

Schneider-Blum, Gertrud & Birgit Hellwig. 2018. Reference tracking in Tima and its interplay with split ergative marking. *Studies in Language* 42(4). 970–993.

Skopeteas, Stavros, Ines Fiedler, Sam Hellmuth, Anna Schwarz, Ruben Stoel, Gisbert Franselow, Caroline Féry & Manfred Krifka. 2006. *Questionnaire on information structure (QUIS): Reference manual*. Working Papers of the SFB 632. Potsdam: Universitätsverlag Potsdam.

Die diskursstrukturierende Funktion von Demonstrativpronomen

Petra B. Schumacher, Clare Patterson and Magdalena Repp
Universität zu Köln
petra.schumacher@uni-koeln.de

1 Funktionen von Demonstrativpronomen

Das Deutsche besitzt mit *der, die, das* und *dieser, diese, dieses* zwei demonstrative Pronomen, was die Frage aufwirft, wodurch sich diese beiden Formen mit Blick auf ihre referentiellen Funktionen unterscheiden. Damit hat sich von Heusinger (2014) bereits in seiner Antrittsvorlesung an der Universität zu Köln in einem Vortrag „Über dies und das. Die Funktionen von Demonstrativen." befasst.

Demonstrativpronomen gliedern sich zum einen in eine Reihe von referentiellen Formen ein, die die kognitive Zugänglichkeit eines Referenten signalisieren (zurückweisende Funktion). Auf der anderen Seite verfügen sie über das dynamische Potential, den Status eines Referenten ändern zu können (vorausweisende Funktion). Zusätzlich schlagen wir hier vor, dass sie weitere diskurspragmatische Aspekte ausdrücken, die über die Handhabung der Rangfolge der Referenten hinausreichen (diskursstrukturierende Funktion).

Unter diskursstrukturierender Funktion verstehen wir hier Aspekte, die sich nicht unmittelbar auf die Rangfolge der Referenten (Prominenzhierarchie) beziehen, sondern einen übergeordneten Einfluss auf die Diskursstruktur ausüben. Dem *dieser*-Demonstrativpronomen wird beispielsweise eine stärkere kontrastive und hervorhebende Rolle in Kontexten mit Alternativen zugeschrieben (Bisle-Müller 1991, Diessel 1999). Dieser Bedeutungsaspekt erfordert ein Alternativenset und bezieht sich damit nicht primär auf die Prominenzhierarchie. Voigt (2021) konnte allerdings in einem Experiment mit erzwungener Auswahl (*der* vs. *dieser*) keinen Kontexteffekt (±Kontrast) zwischen den beiden Demonstrativa finden. Weitere zusätzliche Bedeutungsaspekte, wie Förmlichkeit, Modalität oder Affekt, könnten unter dieser umfassenderen Funktion ebenfalls subsumiert werden, da sie Merkmale der Kommunikationssituation und/oder des Sprechers darstellen. Patil et al. (2020) schlagen beispielsweise vor, dass das *dieser*-Demonstrativpronomen verstärkt in formalen Kontexten auftritt, während das *der*-Demonstrativpronomen in Umgangssprache und eher informellen Kontexten vorherrscht.

Die zurückweisende Funktion hat in der bisherigen Forschung die meiste Beachtung erhalten. Mit der Verwendung eines Demonstrativpronomens wird ausgedrückt, dass der prominenteste Referent im Diskurs als potentielles Antezedens ausgeschlossen werden kann. Es wird vorgeschlagen, dass Demonstrativpronomen eine Anti-Subjekt-, Anti-Topik- oder Anti-Agens-Interpretation auslösen (Bosch, Katz & Umbach 2007, Bosch & Hinterwimmer 2016, Schumacher, Dangl & Uzun 2016, u.a.), was jedoch im Kontext von Diskursen mit mehr als zwei potentiellen Antezedenten zu kurz gefasst ist (Patterson & Schumacher 2021). Zifonun, Hoffmann & Strecker (1997) schlagen für das *dieser*-Demonstrativpronomen eine Letztnennungspräferenz und für das *der*-Demonstrativpronomen ein flexibleres Selektionsvermögen vor. Jedoch konnten Fuchs & Schumacher (2020) keinen Unterschied in den Präferenzen für den letztgenannten Referenten feststellen. Die Frage, wodurch sich das *der*-Paradigma vom *dieser*-Paradigma unterscheidet, kann also mit Blick auf die zurückweisende Funktion noch nicht zufriedenstellend beantwortet werden.

Hinsichtlich der vorausweisenden Funktion wird dem *dieser*-Demonstrativpronomen die Fähigkeit zur Unterbrechung einer referentiellen Kette zugeschrieben (Weinrich 1993). Abraham (2002) bezeichnet das *der*-Demonstrativpronomen als „Themawechsler" im Gegensatz zum Personalpronomen, das ein „Themafortsetzer" sei. Mit Givón (1983) lassen sich hier Vorhersagen für den Folgetext formulieren, wonach Demonstrativa die Prominenz-

struktur der Diskursreferenten verschieben können. Mittels einer Textvervollständigungs-studie (Fuchs & Schumacher 2020) zeichnet sich ein Unterschied zwischen den beiden Demonstrativa ab: Die Verwendung des *dieser*-Demonstrativpronomens scheint parenthetischer Natur zu sein und wird mit einem Einschub in der Diskursstruktur verbunden (siehe auch Weinrich 1993), während das *der*-Demonstrativpronomen mit einem referentiellen Wechsel einen länger anhaltenden Einfluss auf die Diskursstruktur ausübt. Dieses Unterscheidungskriterium soll in den folgenden beiden Studien weiter untersucht werden.

2 Referentieller Wechsel vs. Einschub – Entscheidungsaufgabe

Um zu überprüfen, ob die beiden Demonstrativpronomen mit einem kurzfristigen Einschub oder einem dauerhaften Wechsel der referentiellen Struktur einhergehen, wurde eine *forced-choice* Aufgabe mit 113 Testpersonen und je zwei Items durchgeführt, bei der ein Text, in dem ein referentieller Wechsel initiiert wird (1a) mit einem kurzen Einschub (1b) verglichen werden sollte (ein Paar mit *diese* und eines mit *die*). Die Teilnehmer:innen wurden gebeten anzugeben, welcher der beiden Texte (a oder b) sich besser anhört. In (1a) wird der Referent, den das Demonstrativum aufgreift, zum Topik der Folgesätze. In (1b) leitet das Demonstrativum lediglich einen momentären Topikwechsel ein, bevor sich der Text dann wieder um das vorherige Topik (*Klaus*) dreht.

(1)   Diese Woche war am Institut richtig viel los. Sophie arbeitete an der Konzeption eines neuen Studiengangs. Petra testete die neuen Apparaturen im Labor. Und Klaus vergab Themen für Abschlussarbeiten. Am Dienstag konnte er eine Studentin für eine Masterarbeit zum Türkischen gewinnen. ...

   a.   Wechsel:
        ... Die / Diese war begeistert von dem Thema. Sie wollte herausfinden, wie Pronomen im Türkischen verwendet werden. Dazu wollte sie eine Fragebogenstudie durchführen. Sie war schon sehr gespannt, was dabei herauskommen würde.

   b.   Einschub:
        ... Die / Diese war begeistert von dem Thema. Klaus wollte herausfinden, wie Pronomen im Türkischen verwendet werden. Er hatte klare Hypothesen für eine Fragebogenstudie und war schon sehr gespannt, was dabei herauskommen würde.

Die Ergebnisse sind in Abb.1 dargestellt. Sie zeigen, dass die beiden Pronomen sich nicht in ihrer textuellen Progression unterscheiden und kein deutlicher Zusammenhang mit dem Wechsel- bzw. Einschubsszenario vorliegt. Bei der Wahl zwischen einem Text mit einem referentiellen Wechsel oder einem kurzfristigen Einschub gab es keine klaren Präferenzen, weder für das *dieser*- noch für das *der*-Demonstrativpronomen. Die statistische Analyse bestätigte dies: Ein generalisiertes lineares gemischtes Modell (Kontext ~ Pronomen + (1 | Versuchsperson)) generierte keine Effekte. (Das Modell beinhaltete kein Item-Intercept, weil nur eine geringe Anzahl von Items (n=2) präsentiert wurde.)

Abb.1: Anzahl der Antworten in der *forced-choice* Aufgabe

Die Daten können nicht bestätigen, dass sich die beiden Demonstrativpronomen hinsichtlich der vorausweisenden Funktion – insbesondere der Persistenz des referentiellen Wechsels – unterscheiden. Nun kann dieser Befund auch methodische Gründe haben. Zum einen könnte dies mit der *forced-choice* Aufgabe zusammenhängen. In einer Folgestudie mit 21 Testpersonen und einer 100-stufigen Analogskala gab es ebenfalls keinen Kontexteffekt für die beiden Demonstrativa, d.h. der Befund auf Zufallsniveau liegt nicht am Skalenniveau. Eine alternative Erklärung wäre zum anderen, dass die Texte zu konstruiert wirken bzw. die Variation von (1a–b) zu subtil ist. Aus diesem Grund wurde im Folgenden eine Korpusanalyse vorgenommen.

3 Referentieller Wechsel vs. Einschub – Korpusdaten

Sechzig Belege, je 30 für das *der*- und *dieser*-Demonstrativpronomen wurden zufällig aus dem DWDS Referenz- und Zeitungskorpus (2000–2018) ausgewählt. Diese Belege hatten die Struktur Demonstrativpronomen + Form von *sein*, wie in den Stimuli in (1). Ein Beispiel findet sich in (2):

(2) Diese Schelte war kein Ausrutscher Chiracs, sondern eine kalkulierte Brüskierung. Die ist ihm gelungen. Die Öffentlichkeit im "neuen Europa" ist empört. (Die Zeit, 27.02.2003, Nr. 10, „Sie küssen und sie schlagen sich").

Es wurde überprüft, ob der Referent des Demonstrativpronomens im Folgesatz aufgegriffen wurde (Wechsel) oder nicht (Einschub). Abb. 2 zeigt, dass beide Demonstrativpronomen mehrheitlich in Verbindung mit einem Einschub auftraten.

Abb.2: Art und Anzahl der Textprogressionen in der Korpusanalyse

Interessanterweise waren jedoch wenige der parenthetischen Verweise derart, dass der Text unmittelbar nach dem Satz mit dem Demonstrativum das Topik des Vorgängersatzes wiederaufnahm (Einschub+Wiederaufnahme). Stattdessen zeichnete sich ein Großteil der Einschübe dadurch aus, dass danach ein neuer Referent eingeführt wurde (Einschub+Neuer Referent), wie *die Öffentlichkeit im „neuen Europa"* in (2).

Die Demonstrativpronomen deuten damit einen referentiellen Wechsel in der Diskursstruktur an. Dieser muss jedoch nicht zwingend zur Prominenzpromotion des Referenten des Demonstrativums führen, sondern kann einen Wechsel in der übergeordneten Diskursstruktur signalisieren. Die Verwendung des Demonstrativums führt damit zur Herabstufung der aktuell prominenten Entität und öffnet den Raum für eine neue Reihung der Referenten. Die prominente Entität weicht dabei häufig einem diskurs-neuen Referenten. Die Ergebnisse der behavioralen Studie lassen sich damit möglicherweise durch die simple Diskursstruktur der Stimuli erklären, in der ein diskurs-gegebener Referent (*Klaus*) nach dem Einschub wiederaufgegriffen wird. In der Realität unserer kleinen Korpusanalyse wird im Gegensatz dazu der Einschub häufig durch eine neue Entität oder eine Komplexanapher (z.B. *diese Tatsache*) fortgesetzt.

Mit Blick auf einen funktionalen Unterschied zwischen *der* und *dieser* zeichnet sich hier nur ein numerischer Trend ab. Während das *der*-Demonstrativpronomen in der Korpusanalyse mehr genuine Wechsel aufzeigt, geht das *dieser*-Demonstrativpronomen mit einer größeren Anzahl an Einschüben unter folgender Wiederaufnahme des vorherigen prominenten Referenten einher. Ob dieses Muster in einer umfassenderen Korpusanalyse signifikante Unterschiede hervorbringt, muss noch untersucht werden. Klar ist aber, dass Demonstrativpronomen einen von ihrem Referenten unabhängigen Wechsel in der referentiellen Struktur evozieren können.

4 Konklusion

Neben den beiden referentiellen Funktionen, die sich auf die Prominenzhierarchie der Diskursreferenten beziehen, sollte eine weitere Funktion in Betracht gezogen werden, die zur globalen Diskursstrukturierung beiträgt und u.a. ein Aufmerksamkeitssignal verkörpert und referentielle Neuorientierung ermöglicht. Diese diskursstrukturierende Funktion ist nicht an die referentielle Rangordnung gebunden und übermittelt zusätzliche diskurssteuernde Bedeutungsaspekte. Die vorausweisende Funktion des referentiellen Wechsels, die den Demonstrativpronomen zugeschrieben wird, sollte daher aus einer globaleren Perspektive der Diskursstrukturierung betrachtet werden. Es ist nicht der Fall, dass es zwingend zu einem Topikwechsel unter Promotion des Referenten kommt (vorausweisende Funktion im engeren Sinne), sondern Demonstrativpronomen können einen von ihrem Referenten unabhängigen Wechsel in der referentiellen Struktur einläuten (was wir hier als diskursstrukturierende Funktion bezeichnen). Dies scheint auf beide demonstrative Formen zuzutreffen.

Referenzen

Abraham, Werner. 2002. Pronomina im Diskurs: Deutsche Personal- und Demonstrativpronomina unter „Zentrierungsperspektive". Grammatische Überlegungen zu einer Teiltheorie der Textkohärenz. *Sprachwissenschaft* 27(4). 447–491.

Bisle-Müller, Hansjörg. 1991. *Artikelwörter im Deutschen. Semantische und pragmatische Aspekte ihrer Verwendung*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Bosch, Peter & Stefan Hinterwimmer. 2016. Anaphoric reference by demonstrative pronouns in German. In Anke Holler & Katja Suckow (eds.), *Empirical perspectives on anaphora resolution*, 193–212. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Bosch, Peter, Graham Katz & Carla Umbach. 2007. The non-subject bias of German demonstrative pronouns. In Monika Schwarz-Friesel, Manfred Consten & Mareile Knees (eds.), *Anaphora in text: Cognitive, formal and applied approaches to anaphoric reference*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Diessel, Holger. 1999. *Demonstratives: Form, function, and grammaticalization*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Fuchs, Melanie & Petra B. Schumacher. 2020. Referential shift potential of demonstrative pronouns – Evidence from text continuation. In Næss, Åshild, Anna Margetts & Yvonne Treis (eds.), *Demonstratives in discourse*, 185–213. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Givón, Talmy. 1983. *Topic continuity in discourse: A quantitative cross-language study*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2014. Über dies und das. Die Funktionen von Demonstrativen. Antrittsvorlesung an der Universität zu Köln, January 13.

Patil, Umesh, Peter Bosch & Stefan Hinterwimmer. 2020. Constraints on German diese demonstratives: Language formality and subject-avoidance. *Glossa* 5(1). 14.

Patterson, Clare & Petra B. Schumacher. 2021. Interpretation preferences in contexts with three antecedents: Examining the role of prominence in German pronouns. *Applied Psycholinguistics* 42(6). 1427–1461.

Schumacher, Petra B., Manuel Dangl & Elyesa Uzun. 2016. Thematic role as prominence cue during pronoun resolution in German. In Anke Holler & Katja Suckow (eds.), *Empirical perspectives on anaphora resolution*, 213–240. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Voigt, Robert. 2021. Kontrast als möglicher Einflussfaktor auf die pronominale Verwendung der Demonstrative *der* und *dieser* im Deutschen. Universität zu Köln.

Weinrich, Harald. 1993. *Textgrammatik der deutschen Sprache*. Mannheim: Dudenverlag.

Zifonun, Gisela, Ludger Hoffmann & Bruno Strecker. 1997. *Grammatik der deutschen Sprache*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

<div align="center">

Zurück zu Kratylos?

Christoph Schwarze
cschwarze@sunrise.ch

</div>

1 Einleitung

In Platons Schrift *Kratylos* vertritt der Philosoph gleichen Namens gegenüber seinem Freund Hermogenes die These, die sprachlichen Zeichen seien nicht von Menschen gesetzt, sie seien vielmehr Verweise auf die Natur der bezeichneten Dinge.[1] Bekanntlich steht die heutige Linguistik auf der Seite des Hermogenes: Die Bedeutungen der Wörter, abgesehen von der Onomatopöie (*knacken*, *krächzen*, *Kikeriki*), beruhen auf Konvention, oder, wie es de Saussure ausdrückte, die sprachlichen Zeichen sind willkürlich (*l'arbitraire du signe*). Doch es gibt einen französischen Arabisten, Georges Bohas, der die Willkürlichkeit des sprachlichen Zeichens grundsätzlich in Frage stellt.

2 Georges Bohas' These einer allgemeinen Lautsymbolik

In seinen einschlägigen Schriften, z.B. Bohas (2016), bezieht sich Bohas auf Daten aus dem arabischen Wortschatz, die er anhand einer von ihm selbst entwickelten Theorie des Lexikons analysiert und interpretiert. Diese von ihm so genannte „Theorie der Matrizen und Etyma" (*Théorie des matrices et étymons*), abgekürzt TME (Bohas 1997), besagt Folgendes: Die formale Struktur des arabischen Lexikons lasse sich nicht anhand der meist drei-konsonantischen Wurzeln erkennen, die für die arabischen Grammatiker und, diesen folgend, auch für die westlichen Arabisten die kleinsten lexikalischen Einheiten sind. Man müsse die Wurzeln auf zweikonsonantische Einheiten zurückführen, eben die Matrizen und Etyma, und man solle auch nicht die Phoneme betrachten, sondern deren phonologische Merkmale. Man könne dann sehen, dass es ungeordnete Paare von Merkmalen gebe, denen bestimmte, konzeptuell zusammengehörige Wortgruppen zugeordnet werden können. Es bestehe folglich ein natürliches Band zwischen den Merkmalspaaren und der Bedeutung der Wörter, in denen sie auftreten. Die Gemeinsamkeit der Wörter, die diese Wortgruppen bilden, bestehe darin, dass sie auf ein bestimmtes Artikulationsorgan und dessen Bewegungen Bezug nehmen; das postulierte natürliche Band beruhe darauf, dass jeweils ein bestimmtes Artikulationsorgan bei der Realisierung der dem Wortfeld zugeordneten Merkmale aktiv ist. So sei das Merkmal [nasal] charakteristisch für das lexikalische Feld der Nase. Bohas stützt seine Analysen auf ein eindrucksvolles Korpus sorgfältig beschriebener Daten. Allerdings verzichtet er auf die kritische Prüfung seiner Ergebnisse anhand möglicher Gegenbeispiele und auf jegliche quantitative Auswertung seiner Beobachtungen.

Interessant auch außerhalb der Arabistik ist Bohas' Ablehnung der konventionellen Natur der lexikalischen Bedeutung deswegen, weil er behauptet, ein solches natürliches Band zwischen Laut und Bedeutung bestehe *mutatis mutandis* auch in anderen, nicht semitischen Sprachen (Bohas 2006: 37).

3 Eine Überprüfung von Bohas' Thesen anhand des Deutschen

Es hat mich gereizt, einmal zu sehen, ob sich vergleichbare Beobachtungen auch für das Deutsche machen lassen. Als dies wider Erwarten tatsächlich der Fall zu sein schien (*Nase*, *Nüstern, Schnupfen* und *schnäuzen* enthalten einen Nasal), habe ich eine kleine Analyse

---

[1] Der Inhalt des *Kratylos* ist in Wikipedia ausführlich dargestellt, s. [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kratylos].

durchgeführt. Getestet habe ich zwei lexikalische Netze, das Netz der Nase und das der Lippe. Zunächst habe ich die entsprechenden Wortlisten zusammengestellt, s. (1) und (2):

(1) Nase, riechen, schnüffeln, schnuppern, wittern, rümpfen, nasal, Nüstern, Schnauze, Zinken, Aroma, Duft, duften, Geruch, muffig, Gestank, stinken, Parfüm, Schnupfen, Taschentuch, Tempo, hochziehen, laufen, niesen, putzen, schnäuzen, schniefen, triefen, tropfen, bluten

(2) Lippe, blass, dick, rissig, rot, schmal, spröde, trocken, voll, wulstig, Oberlippe, Unterlippe, Mund, verziehen, Schnauze, Schnute, Hasenscharte, Kuss, Lippenstift, schminken, küssen, blasen, lächeln, nippen, öffnen, pfeifen, prusten, saugen, schlürfen, schürzen, spitzen, zusammenpressen, beißen, lecken, lesen

Um die beiden lexikalischen Netze mit dem übrigen Wortschatz vergleichen zu können, habe ich eine Kontrollgruppe definiert. Sie besteht aus einer Liste von 1000 Wörtern, die ohne Rücksicht auf die Semantik zusammengestellt wurde. Sie wurde mit Hilfe von *Sketch Engine* erstellt, einer Software für die lexikalische Analyse von Korpora. Es wurden die Wörter ausgewählt, die im deutschen Korpus *von Sketch Engine* die häufigsten sind. Aus Raumgründen kann diese Liste hier nicht wiedergegeben werden.

Dann waren die zu testenden Hypothesen zu formulieren. Die Hypothesen betreffen erstens die Analyse der beiden Wortgruppen im Hinblick auf das jeweils interessierende phonologische Merkmal, also [nasal] für das lexikalische Netz der Nase und [labial] für das Netz der Lippe, und zweitens den Vergleich mit der Kontrollgruppe. Sie lauten:

Hypothese 1
Im lexikalischen Netz der Nase sind die Wörter, die das Merkmal [nasal] enthalten, häufiger als diejenigen, die dieses Merkmal nicht enthalten.

Hypothese 2
Im lexikalischen Netz der Lippe sind die Wörter, die das Merkmal [labial] enthalten, häufiger als diejenigen, die dieses Merkmal nicht enthalten.

Hypothese 3
In der Kontrollgruppe, den randomisierten 1000 Wörtern, sind die Wörter, die das Merkmal [nasal] enthalten, weniger häufig als diejenigen, die dieses Merkmal nicht enthalten.

Hypothese 4
In der Kontrollgruppe, den randomisierten 1000 Wörtern, sind die Wörter, die das Merkmal [labial] enthalten, weniger häufig als diejenigen, die dieses Merkmal nicht enthalten.

Um die Zählungen automatisch durchführen zu können, wurde für die beiden zu testenden lexikalischen Netze und die Kontrollgruppe mit Hilfe der Software FileMaker Pro® je eine Datenbank eingerichtet. Die jeweiligen Wörter wurden dort eingetragen und die Merkmale [nasal] bzw. [labial] anhand der Werte "+" und "-" spezifiziert. Die Tabellen 1 und 2 zeigen die Ergebnisse der Zählung.

Tabelle 1: Die Ergebnisse für das lexikalische Netz der Nase

	Wörter	Wörter mit [nasal]	Wörter ohne [nasal]
Netz der Nase	30	19	11
		59.38 %	**40.62 %**
1000 Wörter	1000	466	534
		46.60 %	**53.40 %**

Tabelle 2: Die Ergebnisse für das lexikalische Netz der Lippe

	Wörter	Wörter mit [labial]	Wörter ohne [labial]
Netz der Lippe	36	22	14
		61.11 %	**38.89 %**
1000 Wörter	1000	581	419
		58.10 %	**41.90 %**

Wie Tabelle 1 zeigt, stimmen alle Ergebnisse für das lexikalische Netz der Nase mit den Hypothesen 1 und 3 überein. Anders verhält es sich mit den Ergebnissen in Tabelle 2. Es trifft zwar zu, dass im lexikalischen Netz der Lippe die Wörter mit dem Merkmal [labial] häufiger sind als die Wörter ohne dieses Merkmal (Hypothese 2), aber auch in der Kontrollgruppe sind die Wörter mit [labial] häufiger als die ohne dieses Merkmal. Das liegt daran, dass das Deutsche mehr Labiale als Nasale hat, sechs Labiale ([p], [b], [pf], [f], [v] und [m]) gegenüber nur drei Nasalen ([n], [ŋ] und [m]). Es ist daher nicht sehr überraschend, dass die Labiale auch in dem repräsentativen Ausschnitt aus dem globalen Wortschatz stark vertreten sind. Daher stellte sich die Frage, ob die Proportion der Wörter mit einem Labial im Netz der Lippe vielleicht höher ist als in der Kontrollgruppe. Tabelle 3 zeigt die Antwort:

Tabelle 3: Die Proportion der Labialwörter im Netz der Lippe und in der Kontrollgruppe

Netz der Lippe	Kontrollgruppe
61.11%	58.7%

Die Proportion der Wörter mit einem Labial ist im Netz der Lippe tatsächlich höher als in der Kontrollgruppe. Die statistische Bewertung zeigt aber, dass dieses Ergebnis nicht signifikant ist, es kann auch dem Zufall geschuldet sein.

4 Fazit

Bohas' provokative These wird demnach von dem Test am Deutschen nicht gestützt. Wir bleiben also bei Hermogenes und de Saussure.

Andererseits hat sich ergeben, dass auch im Deutschen lautsymbolische Zusammenhänge bestehen, die über die bloße Lautmalerei hinausgehen. Die beobachteten unsystematischen lautsymbolischen Zusammenhänge können möglicherweise als Rudimente aus einer frühen Phase der Evolution gedeutet werden. Bohas selbst hat dies angedeutet (Bohas 2016: 7); zu der These, die menschliche Sprache sei aus Gesten entstanden, s. Corballis (2010).

Author note
Eine sehr viel ausführlichere Version dieses Beitrags erscheint in französischer Sprache als Schwarze (Sous presse). Dort werden die Daten präsentiert, der ideengeschichtliche Hintergrund wird vollständiger dargestellt, und das statistische Vorgehen wird im Detail erläutert.

Literatur

Bohas, Georges. 1997. *Matrices, Étymons, Racines - Éléments d'une théorie lexicologique du vocabulaire arabe*. Louvain: Paris.

Bohas, Georges. 2016. *L'Illusion de l'arbitraire du signe*. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Corballis, Michael C. 2010. The gestural origins of language. *Cognitive Science*. 1. 2–7.

Schwarze, Christoph. Sous presse. L'arbitraire du signe, une illusion? La « Théorie des matrices et étymons » testée sur l'allemand. *Bulletin de la Société Linguistique de Paris.*

Sketch Engine
https://auth.sketchengine.eu/#login?next=https%3A%2F%2Fapp.sketchengine.eu%2F

Partitive subjects and the verbal indexing

Ilja A. Seržant – University of Potsdam
serzant@uni-potsdam.de

1 Introduction

Partitives are understood here as grammatical constructions that may be used to encode the true-partitive relation (cf. *some of our students*), which crucially involves two (normally) distinct sets of referents of the same kind, without relying on contextual inferences (Seržant 2021a, 2021b drawing on von Heusinger 2002; von Heusinger & Kornfilt 2017; von Heusinger, Kornfilt & Kizilkaya 2019; Hoeksema 1996).[1] Partitives obligatorily encode a quantifier (e.g. *some* in *some of our students*) and the restrictor (*our students*). Partitives are often encoded by a special marker (*of*) or lexically.

In addition to the true-partitive meaning which is definitional for partitives here, partitives are sometimes used to encode plain quantification, e.g. 'some words' in *a bunch of words.* This use does not encode the true-partitive relation but rather simply quantifies the NP in the restrictor. This use of the partitive construction is referred to as pseudo-partitives (Selkirk 1977).

Quite frequently partitives generalize the indefinite quantifier 'some, any' as part of their inherent meaning. In this case, the quantifier is no longer expressed overtly and there is only a restrictor NP. For example, the partitive expression 'of his colleagues' in (1b) does not have an explicit expression of the quantifier which, in this case, has to be understood as 'some' while other frequent meanings of the quantifier such as 'one (of)', 'most (of)' or 'the majority (of)' are excluded:

(1)   Lithuanian (Indo-European; p. k.)
   a. *Mačiau*   **keletą**   *jo*   *kolegų.*
      see.PST.1SG   **some.ACC**   3SG.GEN   colleague.GEN(=PART).PL
      'I saw **some** of his colleagues.'

   b. *Mačiau*   *jo*   *kolegų.*
      see.PST.1SG   3SG.GEN colleague.GEN(=PART).PL
      'I saw **[some]** of his colleagues.'

I refer to this type of partitives as *generalized partitives*.

Since partitives in general and generalized partitives in particular are most frequently indefinite they are mostly found in the object, sometimes in the intransitive-subject and only rarely in the transitive-subject position due to the well-known dispreference of transitive subjects for indefinite referents. Some languages even do not allow partitives in the (transitive) subject position altogether. However, if partitives are allowed in the subject position, there may be different ways how they are indexed on the verb (on indexing see Haspelmath 2013; Lazard 1998).[2] In this paper, I present an overview of indexing strategies that languages employ.

---

[1] Contextual inferences are understood in the narrow sense, excluding anaphora resolution.
[2] I avoid the more traditional terms *bound pronouns* or *agreement markers* (cf. Corbett 2006) and follow Lazard (1998) and Haspelmath (2013) and refer to these as (*bound person-number*) *indexes* (already introduced in Boelaars 1950 or earlier). Furthermore, I avoid the notions *pro*-drop and agreement which are ill-advised for many reasons (see Haspelmath 2013 with further literature).

2 Indexing the quantifier, the restrictor or none

In the languages of Europe, partitive subjects are indexed on the verb along the number and person of the explicit quantifier, cf. the third-person plural and first-person singular quantifiers in (2) and (3), respectively:

(2)   *Some of our students **are** really good.*

(3)   Russian (p.k.)
        Iz   vsex   prepodavatelej tol'ko ja   ne   pojdu   na večerinku.
        from   all.GEN.PL lecturer.GEN.PL only   1SG.NOM NEG go.PFV.**1SG** on party
        'From all lecturerers only I won't go to the party.'

This situation is expected since the verb generally indexes the head of the NP in these languages:

(4)   *The house in the States **was** shabby.*

Generalized partitives lack an explicit quantifier. Accordingly, many languages of Europe do not index generalized partitives on the verb at all, for example, Russian, Basque, Lithuanian, Ossetic (with the exception of coordinated partitives, see below), or Turkish. The verb carries the default third-person singular form, for example in Turkish:

(5)   Turkish (Turkic; Özyıldız 2017: 889)
        Öğrenci-ler-den   gel-di.
        student-PL-ABL(PART)   come-PST.**3SG**
        '(Some of the) students came.'

It is always the third singular form regardless of the number and person properties of the generalized partitive. Non-indexing is even more evident in Lithuanian, because this language has a dedicated non-agreeing form of the participle that is used with subjects that lack person and number properties (e.g. infinitives):

(6)   Lithuanian (Indo-European, p.k.)
        Musų   studentų   buvo   ten atsirad-ę
        1PL.GEN student.GEN(PART).PL be.3PST   there appear.PTCP.ACT-**NONAGREEING**
        '(Some) or our students had appeared there.'

However, there are also languages in which the quantifier of a generalized partitive is indexed. In the following example of a generalized partitive from Garifuna, the quantifier, which is third plural, is indexed, but not the restrictor, which is first plural:

(7)   Garifuna (Awakan; South America; Barchas-Lichtenstein 2012: 189):
        Éibagua-tiyan   wá-dagiya.
        run-3PL   1PL-from(PART)
        '(Some) of us ran.'

In these languages, the verbal index is the only coding of the referent of the quantifier. The partitive reminds of split exponence here: the quantifier of the generalized partitive is the verbal index while the restrictor is coded in the partitive NP. Likewise, in Ancient Greek, the verbal

index provides the (number) properties of the quantifier of generalized partitives (Seržant 2012). In (8), the verbal index refers to a singular quantifier while in (9) it refers to a plural quantifier:

(8)   Ancient Greek (Eur. Her. 976-7)
       ouk   ésti   thnētôn,   hóstis ...
       NEG   be.**3SG** mortal.GEN(PART).PL   REL.NOM.SG
       'There exists not a (single one) of mortals who (would rescue him).'

(9)   Ancient Greek (Arist. Hist. Anim. 513a)
       Eisì   dè kaì   tôn   perì fúsin
       be.PRS.**3PL** PRT and   DET.GEN(=PART).PL   about nature
       'There **are [some]** of the nature philosophers ...'

Examples of generalized partitives in the subject position whose quantifier is only coded on the verb via indexing are found in other languages as well (possibly also in Tlingit (Athabaskan), cf. Leer 1991: 135):

(10)   Modern Eastern Armenian (Indo-European; Dum-Tragut 2009: 313)
       Ṙadioyov   heṙarjak-v-um   ēin   Hovhannes
       radio.ins   broadcast-PASS-PTCP.PRS   AUX.**3PL**.PST   Hovhannes
       T'umanyan-i   patmvack'-ner-ic'.
       T'umanyan-DAT   story-PL-ABL(PART)
       '(Some) of Hovhannes T'umanyan's stories were broadcasted on the radio.'

(11)   Jibbali (Afroasiatic, Semitic; Oman; Hofstede 1998: 42)
       mən   έ-yɔ́   dcɔd   yɔzir   īḳbért
       from(PART)   DEF-people   still   visit.IMPF.3M.**PL**   DEF.tomb
       '(some) people still visit a (saint's) tomb'

Above I have discussed partitives with the true-partitive meaning relying on a proportion between two distinct sets. Partitives, however, may also pattern as pseudo-partitives. In this case, their meaning is the one of plain quantification or measure phrase. Under this meaning, their syntactic structure tends to shrink into one NP (Selkirk 1977). Accordingly, the verb indexes the number value of the entire partitive construction. This development is frequently found with headed partitives, turned quantification phrases:

(12)   *There are a lot of cars.*

The former head *a lot* is obviously a singular noun historically. Nevertheless, the verb indexes the plural of *cars*. The entire meaning is the one of plain quantification with no relation to the true-partitive meaning.
    Similarly, generalized pseudo-partitives, which encode the meaning of indefinite quantification (similar to 'some/any') of objects encoded by the restrictor NP, may require plural index on the verb in some languages. Thus, in French, the generalized pseudo-partitive turned completely into an indefinite-plural expression that is no longer case-marked. Accordingly, the verb indexes the plural:

(13)   *Des   hommes sont   venus.*
        PART.PL man.PL AUX.3PL gone
        'Some people went.'

Similarly, cross-indexing of the superset is found occasionally in Veps (Lytkin & Majtinskaja 1975: 108) and occasionally in North Russian (e.g. around Onega lake) (Seržant 2014: 311–313):

(14)   North Russian (Seržant 2015: 142)
        Tut-to   medvedej   byvajut,   tol'ko malo
        here-PRT bear.GEN.**PL** occur.3**PL** only   few
        'There are bears here, but only few.' (lit. 'There are of bears here, only a few.')

(15)   Veps (Koptjevskaja-Tamm and Wälchli 2001: 568)
        mamšīd'   niťabad
        woman.PART.PL carry.PRS.3PL
        'Women carry …'

The situation in Ossetic is not entirely clear. The ablative subjects trigger plural agreement only if they occur in coordination, in which case it is not entirely clear whether there is semantic indexing (*Peter, John and Bill are …*) or whether the ablative NPs themselves are indexed with plural on the verb (note that the number of the ablative NPs is singular):

(16)   Ossetic (Ossetic National Corpus,[3] courtesy of Oleg Belyaev)
        Fos-ɐj,   ts'u-ɐj, sabi-jɐ   sɐ   fɐllad uaʁ-oj
        cattle-ABL   bird-ABL child-ABL   their   labour leave-PST.3PL
        'Cattle, birds, children were resting.'

Above I have discussed instances of quantifier indexing and non-indexing. In what follows I provide examples in which the restrictor is indexed. In the following example from Warapu, the verb indexes the second person (plural), that is, the referent of the restrictor, while the quantifiers 'one' and 'some' are likely to be third person:

(17)   Warapu (Sko; Papua New-Guinea; Corris 2005: 158)
        Ra n-amá-ute,   owu   n-o-ké(p)í.
        one IRR-**2SG**.M-walk   some   IRR-**2PL**.M-sit
        'One of you will go,   some of you will stay.'

Likewise, the first person partitive pronoun of Eibela 'of us' marked via the locative affix *-jɛ:* on the first-person plural form *ni:* is indexed on the verb as first person, while the quantifier is evidently a third person:

(18)   Eibela (Bosavi; Papua New-Guinea; Aiton 2016: 371)
        ni:jɛ: la: smɛnɛ:na: kɛi   di-si
        1.PART DET   go.1.FUT   ASSER PFV-MED.PFV
        '(U:gei said) "Some of us will also go."'

---

[3] http://corpus.ossetic-studies.org/search/

In the following example the NP *kiñekentu* 'some' – literally 'ones' and formally a group derivation from the noun *kiñe* 'one' – encodes the quantifier while the verbal index *-iñ* (1PL) encodes the restrictor:

(19) Mapuche (Araucanian; Chile; Smeets 2008: 382; glosses adapted)
       kiñekentu   tripa-y-iñ   đoy kiñe tripantu.
       some.PL   go.out-IND-1PL more one year
       'Some of us left for more than a year.'

Bininj-Gun-Wok requires the demonstrative and relativizing adnominal marker *-wu(-bu)* for the partitive meaning of *yika* 'some' (Evans 2003: 131–132). In the following example, the verb indexes the restrictor, i.e., the first plural ("non-augmented" in Evans 2003) and not the quantifier 'some':

(20) Bininj-Gun-Wok (Evans 2003: 495)
       wanjh yika na-wu ngarri-ngime   ku-rurrk   ngarri-djarrk-yo-y.
       well   some M-REL 1PL-enter.NON-PST LOC-house 1PL-together-sleep-PST.PFV
       balanda-dorreng, dja yika na-wu   wurdwurd birri-lobme-ng.
       white-with   and some M-REL   children   3PL-run-PST.PFV
       'Some of our people went into the dormitory, and slept among white people;
       but some of the children ran away.'

In Tatar, the verb optionally may index either the explicit quantifier (cf. §2.1) or the restrictor (Lyutikova, forthc.):

(21) Tatar (Turkic; Russia; Lyutikova, forthc.; glosses adapted)
       berär-egez šuš̩ı kijem-ne   kij-ep   irkenlek-kä čıg-ıp   kit-ärgä
       any-2PL   this clothing-ACC put_on-CNV space-DAT   exit-CNV go-INF
       telä-mi-sez-me?
       want-NEG.IPF-**2PL**-Q
       'Would anyone of you put on this clothing and go outside?'

3 Conclusions

In this paper I have provided an overview of different indexing patterns of partitive subjects. While some languages simply employ the default, non-indexing verb form, in other languages, the verb tends to index either the quantifier or the restrictor. Interestingly, the choice of the former or the latter strategy seems to correlate with the degree to which languages allow for the subject referents to be solely expressed by indexing (soc. *pro*-drop). Lithuanian is a counterexample here since this language predominantly expresses the anaphoric subject by indexing only, but, at the same time, employs only the non-indexing form.

Author note
It is a great pleasure indeed to contribute to this Festschrift in honor of Klaus von Heusinger. He was not only the mentor of my habilitation thesis devoted to partitives but he was also the first and the only one I have so extensively consulted on this topic since back in 2010 in Stuttgart.

References

Aiton, Grant. 2016. *Grammatical relations and information structure in Eibela: A typological perspective.* PhD dissertation, James Cook University.

Barchas-Lichtenstein, Jena. 2012. Garifuna Quantification. In Edward L. Keenan & Denis Paperno (eds.), *Handbook of quantifiers in natural language*, 165–226. Dordrecht: Springer.

Boelaars, Jan H. M. C. 1950. *The Linguistic Position of South-Western New Guinea.* Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Corbett, Greville G. 2006. *Agreement.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Corris, Miriam. 2005. *A grammar of Barupu: a language of Papua New Guinea.* PhD dissertation, University of Syndney.

Dum-Tragut, Jasmine. 2009. *Armenian: Modern Eastern Armenian.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Enç, Murvet. 1991. The semantics of specificity. *Linguistic Inquiry* 22(1). 1–25.

Evans, Nicholas 2003. *Bininj Gun-Wok: a pan-dialectal grammar of Mayali, Kunwinjku and Kune.* Volume 1. Canberra: Ciril's Printers.

Haspelmath, Martin. 2013. Argument indexing: A conceptual framework for the syntax of bound person forms. In Dik Bakker & Martin Haspelmath (eds.), *Languages across boundaries: Studies in memory of Anna Siewierska*, 197–226. Berlin: De Gruyter.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2002. Specificity and definiteness in sentence and discourse structure. *Journal of Semantics* 19(3). 245–274.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Jaklin Kornfilt. 2017. Partitivity and case marking in Turkish and related languages. *Glossa* 2(1). 1–40.

von Heusinger, Klaus, Jaklin Kornfilt & Semra Kizilkaya. 2019. Differential Object Marking, partitivity and specificity in Turkish. In Tanya Bondarenko, Justin Colley, Colin Davis & Mitya Privoznov (eds.), *Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on Altaic Formal Linguistics (WAFL14)*, 145–156. Cambridge, MA: MIT Working Papers in Linguistics 90.

Hoeksema, Jacob. 1996. Introduction. In Jacob Hoeksema (ed.), *Partitives: Studies on the syntax and semantics of partitive and related constructions*, 2–24. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Hofstede, Antje Ida. 1998. *Syntax of Jibbāli.* PhD dissertation, University of Manchester.

Koptjevskaja-Tamm, Maria & Bernhard Wälchli. 2001. The Circum-Baltic languages: An areal-typological approach. In Östen Dahl & Maria Koptjevskaja-Tamm (eds.), *The Circum-Baltic languages: Typology and contact*, vol. 2: Grammar and typology, 615–750. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Lazard, Gilbert. 1998. *Actancy.* Berlin: De Gruyter.

Leer, Jeffrey A. 1991. *The schetic categories of the Tlingit verb.* Volume 1. PhD dissertation, University of Chicago.

Lyutikova, Ekaterina, forthc. Agreeing inflected quantifiers, intensifiers and anaphors as derived personal pronouns: Evidence from Tatar. In Tania Paciaroni, Alice Idone & Michele Loporcaro (eds.), *The many facets of agreement.* Special issue of Word Structure.

Lytkin, Vasilij Il'ič & Klara Jevgen'evna Majtinskaja. 1975. *Osnovy finno-ugorskogo jazykoznanija: Pribaltijsko-finskie, saamskie i mordovskie jazyki.* Moscow: Nauka.

Özyıldız, Deniz. 2017. Quantifiers in Turkish. In Edward L. Keenan & Denis Paperno (eds.), *Handbook of quantifiers in natural language.* Volume 2, 857–937. Dordrecht: Springer.

Selkirk, Elisabeth O. 1977. Some remarks on noun phrase structure. In Peter W. Culicover, Thomas Wasow & Adrian Akmajian (eds.), *Formal Syntax: Proceedings of the 1976 MSSB-UC Irvine Conference on the Formal Syntax of Natural Language, June 9–11, 1976, Newport Beach, California*, 285–316. New York: Academic Press.

Seržant, Ilja A. 2012. Morphosyntactic properties of the partitive genitive in Ancient Greek. *Indogermanische Forschungen* 117. 187–204.

Seržant, Ilja A. 2014. The independent partitive genitive in North Russian. In Ilja A. Seržant & Björn Wiemer (eds.), *Contemporary approaches to dialectology: The area of North, Northwest Russian and Belarusian vernaculars*, 270–329. Bergen: John Grieg AS.

Seržant, Ilja A. 2015. An approach to syntactic reconstruction. In Carlotta Viti (ed.), *Perspectives on historical syntax,* 117–154. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Seržant, Ilja A. 2021a. Typology of partitives. *Linguistics* 59(4), 881–947.

Seržant, Ilja A. 2021b. Diachronic typology of partitives. In Giuliana Giusti & Petra Sleeman (eds.), *Partitive Determiners, Partitive Pronouns and Partitive Case,* 111–167. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Smeets, Ineke. 2008. *A grammar of Mapuche.* Berlin: De Gruyter.

Zum Geburtstag viel Glück – weak and not so weak definites in German

Elisabeth Stark and David Paul Gerards
University of Zurich and University of Leipzig
estark@rom.uzh.ch and david.gerards@uni-leipzig.de

1 Introduction

Even if the occasion to write this paper is a specific, definite birthday we are happy to celebrate, the German formula *Zum Geburtstag viel Glück!* (a popular equivalent of *Happy Birthday!*) contains the contracted element *zum* ('to.the'), which appears frequently in so-called short weak definites (henceforth SWD). In German *Ich muss immer zum Zug rennen* ('I always have to run to the train'), the DP-complement of the preposition *zu* 'to', *dem Zug* ('the train'),[1] comes with semantic properties typical of indefinites, i.e., among others, narrow scope, lack of uniqueness / maximality, familiarity / identifiability, and of specificity. Additionally, SWDs display semantic enrichment and a restriction to certain lexical combinations which refer to stereotyped situations or actions (*go to the doctor, take the bus* etc.; Carlson et al. 2006; Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts 2013; Gerards 2020; Brocher et al. 2020). As shown by Klaus von Heusinger and colleagues (see Brocher et al. 2020; contra Carlson et al. 2006; Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts 2013), SWDs seem to be able to establish discourse referents at the textual level, though less prominent ones than those established by indefinite or strongly definite nominals. SWDs are found in many languages (Klein et al. 2013; Leonetti 2019) and represent the best described case of 'indefinite definites' or 'non-maximal definites'. Next to SWDs, there exist at least three other types of 'non-maximal definites':

(1)   The hand of the baby grasped *the finger of the surgeon*.
        [**long weak definite**, relational noun + possessor PP]

(2)   Fr. Jean a levé *la main*. [**expletive definite**, inalienable possession]
        lit. 'John raised *the hand*.'

(3)   In Alaska, we filmed *the grizzly*. [**representative object definite**]

                                    (1) & (2): Espinal & Cyrino (2017); (3): Krifka et al. (1995)

2 Some new data and observations: ROI or SWD?

In what follows, we focus on type (3), i.e. on definite nominals with so-called representative object interpretations (ROIs), and present some descriptive observations which might help to identify their syntactic and discourse-related properties. As for their semantics, we assume that they denote inherently non-specific, regular object exemplars exclusively relevant as instantiations of their corresponding kind (Gerards 2020; see also Krifka et al. 1995: 85ff.). Still, it needs to be underscored that ROI-nominals are **not** kind-denoting, given that they (also) occur with stage-level predicates. The following German examples evince the relative flexibility of ROI-nominals as for their syntactic distribution (subject (4) and object position (5), (7), and complement of P° (6)); additionnally, we see a wide variety of tense, mood or aspect options of the respective predicate:

---

[1] As noted by Schwarz (2013), SWDs in PPs are only available in German with the contracted form of the definite article (here: *zum* 'to.the'), but not with the full form (here: *zu dem* 'to the'); see also Krifka & Modarresi (2016).

(4)   Massaker an der Schwarzen Elster – Was ist hier passiert? Im Internet kursieren Bilder von einem Schaf-Massaker in Saathain. *Der Wolf* soll hier zugeschlagen haben, heißt es. [www.nordkurier.de]
'Massacre at the Schwarze Elster [a river] – What happened here? Pictures of a sheep massacre in Saathain are circulating on the Internet. *The wolf* is said to have struck here.'

(5)   Ich hätte hier noch *die Coburger Brie-Torte*. [overheard, grocery store in Leipzig]
'I'd also have *the Coburg Brie-Cake* here.'

(6)   Der große hat 77cm und 1.1 kg und der kleine 60 cm und knapp 500 gr. Ich bin zurück. und beide wieder *auf den klassischen Wurm*, endlich ... [Facebook group *Aal-Angler*]
'The big one is 77cm and 1.1 kg and the small one 60 cm and just under 500 gr. I'm back. and both caught *with the classic worm*, finally ...'

(7)   Ich habe *den neuen Burger mit Mozzarella* bestellt und habe nach dem ersten Bissen feststellen müssen, dass dieser mit Hühnchen ist! [reklamation24.de]
'I ordered *the new burger with mozzarella* and after the first bite found out that it is with chicken!'

ROI-nominals are also attested in older stages of German (and Spanish and Portuguese; see Gerards 2020).

(8)   Die Galla sind ohne Unterschied Jäger [...]. Sie jagen *den Büffel*, um Schilde aus seinem Fell und prächtige Trinkgefässe aus seinen Hörnern zu machen, *den Elefanten* seiner Zähne wegen, die einen ruhmreichen Namen dem Lande geben [...] sie stellen *dem Leoparden* und *Löwen* Schlingen [...]. [Fünf Jahre in Ostafrika, A. Cecchi & M. von Siegroth, 1888]
'The Galla are all hunters [...]. They hunt *the buffalo* to make shields from its hide and magnificent drinking vessels from its horns, *the elephant* for its teeth, which give a glorious name to the country [...] they make snares for *the leopard* and lion [...].'

Examples of ROI-nominals can especially be found in what could qualify as 'expert discourse', e.g., recipes, medical treatises (see Gerards 2020 for Old Spanish and Old Portuguese), or online discussion fora on different kinds of biological species (mushrooms, animals, plants, etc.). Most strikingly, ROI-nominals seem to most easily occur with taxonomic subkinds and show number neutrality (cf. (9) and (10) for the distributive reading triggered by the temporal/local adjunct; see also (12) and (13) below for anaphorical uptake), a property they share with kind-denoting definite descriptions:

(9)   Häufigste Art war heute *das Tagpfauenauge* (6 Ex.), gefolgt vo*m Kleinen Fuchs* (4 Ex.) und zwei Zitronenfaltern. Außerdem beobachtete ich 2 Weißlinge [schmetterling-raupe.de]
'The most frequent species today was *the peacock butterfly* (6 exemplars), followed by *the small tortoiseshell* (4 exemplars) and two brimstones. I also observed 2 pieridae.'

(10) In Deutschland kann man *den Europäischen Luchs* in insgesamt 55 öffentlichen Haltungen sehen. [facebook.com/TobisTierfotos/posts/348912430171114/]
'In Germany, one can observe *the European lynx* in a total of 55 public enclosures.'

As for their capacity to introduce discourse referents, ROI-nominals seem to at first glance behave like SWDs. They are able to function as antecedents to coreferential indefinite nominals in the subsequent discourse:

(11) *Der Wolf* ist in der Stadt [Überschrift]. Vechta (Niedersachsen) – *Ein Wolf* jagt über die Straßen von Lohne im Landkreis Vechta. Kommt näher und näher [...]. [bild.de]
'*The wolf* is in town [headline]. Vechta (Lower Saxony) – *A wolf* is running on the streets of Lohne in the district of Vechta. Comes closer and closer [...].'

Coreference in (11) seems to be an indirect or partial one, possibly similar to what happens in associative anaphors. Contrary to SWDs, however, we also find examples with personal pronouns in the subsequent discourse, attesting again the number neutrality of ROI-nominals:

(12) Häufig kann man *den Admiral*$_i$ auf Schmetterlingsflieder (Buddleja davidii), Brombeeren (Rubus fruticosus), Prächtige Fetthenne (Hylotelephium spectabile) oder Wasserdost (Eupatorium cannabinum) beobachten, im Herbst saugen *sie*$_i$ auch gerne auf am Boden aufgeplatztem Fallobst und an Efeublüten (Hedera helix). [wikipedia.de]
'One can frequently observe *the red admiral*$_i$ on summer lilac (Buddleja davidii), blackberries (Rubus fruticosus), showy stonecrop (Hylotelephium spectabile), or hemp-agrimony (Eupatorium cannabinum), in autumn *they*$_i$ also like to suck on fallen fruit bursting on the ground and on ivy flowers (Hedera helix).'

(13) Habichtspilz [...]. Unter Kiefern gibt es [...] *den seltenen, nicht essbaren Finnischen Braunsporstachling*$_j$, die$_j$ bitter schmecken.[PL] [...]. Im Laubwald findet man *den seltenen, nicht essbaren Gallen-Stachling*$_j$, der$_j$ ebenfalls bitter schmeckt.[SG] [Android app *Meine Pilze*]
'Shingled hedgehog [...].Under pines there is [...] *the rare, inedible Finnish sarcodon*$_j$, which$_j$ taste.[PL] bitter [...]. In the deciduous forest you can find *the rare, inedible bitter tooth*$_j$, which$_j$ also tastes.[SG] bitter.'

Brocher et al. (2020) interpret their experimental findings for SWDs as an indicator of their rather low discourse prominence. This should result in a generally lower probability to be uptaken by a subsequent anaphor and, in particular, to have as subsequent coreferential expressions full nominals (indefinite or strongly definite ones) rather than referentially weak expressions like pronouns (Brocher et al. 2020: 2834). If this turns out to be correct, our examples (12) and (13) point to a crucial difference between ROI-nominals and SWDs: the former can introduce more prominent discourse referents than the latter.

3 Conclusion

Like SWDs, ROI-nominals can be considered "dependent definites" (Krifka & Modarresi 2016), albeit possibly via familiarity/identifiabilty rather than via uniqueness. Krifka & Modarresi (2016) assume that SWDs come with an existential presupposition and with the uniqueness condition being fulfilled in the most local, derivationally deeply nested context. In cases of ROI-nominals, in turn, it appears to us that the familiarity/identifiability condition

is fulfilled by addressing an expert public.[2] If this hypothesis is on the right track, then we would, for instance, not expect ROI-nominals to frequently appear at the beginning of science fiction texts or fairy tales, where phantastic beings are introduced:

(14)   Die Tür glitt lautlos zur Seite, und *der formale Semantiker*ⱼ stand vor mir – ich machte sogleich ein Photo. Endlich war es mir gelungen, *ihre*ⱼ Existenz zu belegen. Nun musste ich der Welt nur noch beweisen, wie wertvoll *er*ⱼ für die Forschung war.
       'The door slid silently to the side, and *the formal semanticist*ⱼ stood before me – I immediately took a photo. At last I had succeeded in proving *their*ⱼ existence. Now I only had to prove to the world how valuable *he*ⱼ was for research.'

References

Aguilar-Guevara, Ana & Joost Zwarts. 2013. Weak Definites Refer to Kinds. *Recherches Linguistiques de Vincennes* 42: 33–60.

Brocher, Andreas, Frederike Weeber, Jet Hoek & Klaus von Heusinger. 2020. Referent Management in Discourse: The Accessibility of Weak Definites. In Stephanie Denison, Michael Mack, Yang Xu & Blair C. Armstrong (eds.), *Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*, 2829–2835. Toronto: Cognitive Science Society.

Carlson, Greg, Rachel Sussman, Natalie Klein & Michael Tanenhaus. 2006. Weak Definite Noun Phrases. In Christopher Davis, Amy Rose Deal & Youri Zabbal (eds.), *Proceedings of NELS* 36, 179–196. Amherst, MA: GLSA.

Espinal, M. Teresa & Sonia Cyrino. 2017. The Definite Article in Romance Expletives and Long Weak Definites. *Glossa* 2 (1): 23. 1–26.

Gerards, David Paul. 2020. *Bare Partitives in Old Spanish and Old Portuguese*, PhD dissertation, University of Zurich.

Klein, Natalie, Greg Carlson, Whitney Gegg-Harrison & Michael Tanenhaus. 2013. Experimental Investigations of Weak Definite and Weak Indefinite Noun Phrases. *Cognition* 128(2). 187–213.

Krifka, Manfred, Francis J. Pelletier, Greg Carlson, Alice ter Meulen, Gennaro Chierchia & Godehard Link. 1995. Genericity: An Introduction. In Greg Carlson & Francis J. Pelletier (eds.), *The Generic Book*, 1–124. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Krifka, Manfred & Fereshteh Modarresi. 2016. Number Neutrality and Anaphoric Update of Pseudo-incorporated Nominals in Persian (and weak definites in English). *Proceedings of SALT 26*. 874–891.

Leonetti, Manuel 2019. On Weak Readings of Definite DPs. In Natascha Pomino (ed.), *Proceedings of the IX Nereus International Workshop "Morphosyntactic and Semantic Aspects of the DP in Romance and beyond"*, 1–26. Konstanz: Universität Konstanz.

Schwarz, Florian. 2013. Two Kinds of Definites Cross-Linguistically. *Language and Linguistics Compass* 7/10. 534–559.

---

[2] With some (possible) exceptions, as, for instance, the newspaper articles on wolves (cf. (4) and (11)). Note, however, that over the past years the species CANIS LUPUS has been gaining considerable salience in public discourse – and thus in the general knowledge of readers – given the vivid discussions on the return of this species all across Europe.

Revisiting indefinite direct objects in contexts triggering non-specific interpretation

Alina Tigău – Univesity of Bucharest
alina.tigau@lls.unibuc.ro

1 Introduction

This paper studies the behaviour of indefinite direct objects (DO) when occuring in four contexts which trigger a non-specific intepretation on the DO. As known, Romanian DOs may be marked by means of the differential object marker '*pe*' (deriving from the locative preposition *(s)p(r)e* (on)) and may be additionally doubled by a pronominal clitic. The former mechanism has been labelled *Differential Object Making (DOM)* while the latter bears the name of *Clitic Doubling (CD)*.

The starting point of the analysis is the controversial issue of specificity discussed in the literature in connection to both DOM and CD: Farkas (1987), Dobrovie-Sorin (1990, 1994) and Cornilescu (2000) argue that DOM is responsible for the specific reading. Steriade (1980) and Gierling (1997) on the other hand correlate specificity to clitic doubling. Tigău (2011), Chiriacescu and von Heusinger (2011a, b) regard specificity as a joint effect of DOM and CD. Tigău (2015, 2016) insists even on the functional unity of CD + DOM as a clause-level construction exhibinting a dedicated semantics and pragmatics.

The experiment enclosed in this paper has been developed on the model presented in Tigău (2020) and von Heusinger and Tigău (2019) with the aim of verifying some inconclusive results there. More specifically, von Heusinger and Tigău (2019) report on the existence of two groups of speakers: one group which allows marked DOs in these contexts and another group which discards these DPs as ungrammatical. We also added a norming task in order to probe for the exact interpretation that the respondents assign to the items.

2 An experiment on indefinite DOs

Experiment design. The experiment focused on the behaviour of unmarked, DOMed and CDed+DOMed indefinite direct objects in the context of four contexts forcing a non-specific reading: *cel mult/cel puțin* ('at most' / 'at least'), *câte* ('some'), *oarecare* ('any'), *subjunctive*. Relative to each context we built 8 sentences in which we varied the DO type, thereby obtaining three variants for each sentence and an overall number of 96 items. We evenly distributed these items in 4 lists. We added 14 fillers to each list and then randomly distributed all the items in the lists. The lists were afterwards formatted as Google online forms in such a way that respondents could only see one item at a time, they could not move back or forth across the questionnaire, nor were they able to access the following item without having assessed the previous one first.

For each item we designed an acceptability scale ranging from 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good) and a special question probing for the specific/non-specific interpretation of the indefinite DO in that item. Example (1) contains an actual experimental item in all its three variants:

(1)   Directorul   de proiect (**îi**)   va   accepta (**pe**) cel mult trei   voluntari.
       Manager.the of project them.CL will accept   DOM at most three   volunteers
       'The project manager will accept at most three volunteers.'

Each questionnaire was assessed by at least 20 native speakers of Romanian, with a total of over 80 people taking part in the experiment.

Experimental results. Given the vast literature discussing both DOM and CD as specificity mechanisms, our expectation was for respondents to accept items containing unmarked DOs and to reject those items featuring marked DOs (DOMed and CDed+DOMed). We thus started from the following two hypotheses:

H1: Unmarked indefinite DOs are accepted in non-specific contexts and evince a non-specific interpretation

H2: Marked indefinite DOs will be rejected in non-specific contexts, given that there is a clash between these contexts and DOM and CD as specificity triggering mechanisms

Observations on the norming task. Several important observations may be made on the basis of the norming results depicted in Graph 1:

Graph 1: Norming results

Firstly, ***all types of DOs, whether marked or not, seem to lose their specific interpretation when occurring in the four contexts***. The majority of speakers chose the non-specific reading over the specific one irrespective of the context or DO type; the ratios between +S vs. -S are roughly constant for three of the contexts (*cel mult/cel puțin, câte, subjunctive*), with over 61% of speakers assigning the items -S readings irrespective of DO type. There is a significant increase in preference for the non-specific interpretation for the *oarecare* context, where over 84% of the informants opted for -S reading on all DO types. Expectedly, respondents most readily assign the non-specific interpretations to items containing unmarked DOs but the difference in this respect between unmarked items on the one hand and marked ones is not very big and show a steady decline on a scale ***unmaked > DOMed > CDed+DOMed*** (there is one exception: *cel mult/cel puțin* contexts where DOMed items reach the highest percentage on a non-specific interpretation). Thus, it is quite clear that all the four contexts force non-specificity and that marking does not impinge on this effect. The results confirm our hypothesis H1, but disconfirm hypothesis H2.

Observations on the acceptability task. The vast majority of informants assessed the experimental items as acceptable, assigning scores which surpass by far the mid of the 7-rung acceptability scale.

Acceptability results

Items containing unmarked DOs receive very high acceptability scores, surpassing the threshold of 5 for all the four contexts. Items featuring DOMed DOs or DOMed+CDed DOM receive lower scores but these revolve around an average of 4,34 so they are deemed as quite acceptable by speakers. Note also that there is no significant difference as to the speakers´ preference for items featuring DOMed DOs or CDed+DOMed DOs. Thus, all experimental items were found acceptable by speakers, irrespective of DO marking, with a noticeable preference for items containing unmarked DOs. The results confirm our hypothesis H1, but disconfirm H2 as our expectation was for marked DOs to be excluded from non-specific contexts.

Discussion. We need to discuss experimental results against the background of our initial hypotheses:

1. **High acceptability for unmarked DOs:** As seen, the acceptability scores assigned to unmarked DOs were expectedly high. Romanian unmarked indefinite DOs may allow both a specific as well as a non-specific reading and may acquire both a wide scope and a narrow scope interpretation when co-occurring with other scope taking expressions. As a consequence, the non-specific reading, which is generally available with unmarked indefinites, will be the one to get actualized in the four contexts forcing a non-specific interpretation.

2. **Unexpectedly high acceptability for marked DOs:** A possible explanation for these results might be that neither DOM nor CD are specificity triggers. The specific reading signalled in many papers may arise as a consequence of the syntax that these mechanisms come with: they may trigger movement to a position which favours certain semantic mechanisms of interpretation which, in turn, lead to the specific reading (see Tigău 2020 and López 2012 for a proposal).

3 Conclusions

The experiment presented in this paper has revealed a few interesting facts regarding the behaviour of Romanian indefinite DOs in contexts forcing a non-specific interpretation. Unmarked DOs fare very well in these contexts, exhibiting a non-specific reading. This is to be expected, given that unmarked indefinites freely allow both a specific and a non-specific interpretation. DOMed and CDed+DOMed DOs fare less optimally than their unmarked counterparts but, contrary to our expectations, they are assessed as quite acceptable and

assigned a non-specific reading. It seems then that neither DOM nor CD represent specificity triggering mechanisms and we may conclude that Romanian does not have a category of objects which are necessarily interpreted as specific.

References

Chiriacescu, Sofiana & Klaus von Heusinger. 2011a. The discourse structuring potential of two types of definite noun phrases in Romanian. In Kees van Deemter, Albert Gatt, Roger P. G. van Gompel & Emiel Krahmer (eds.), *Proceedings of the Pre-Conference of the Cognitive Science Society*, 1−7.

Chiriacescu, Sofiana & Klaus von Heusinger. 2011b. The discourse structuring potential of definite noun phrases in natural discourse. In Iris Hendrickx, Sobha Lalitha Devi, António H. Branco & Ruslan Mitkov (eds.), *Anaphora processing and application. Proceedings of the 8th Discourse Anaphora and Anaphor Resolution Colloquium*, 151−162. Lisbon: Edições Colibri.

Cornilescu, Alexandra. 2000. Notes on the interpretation of the prepositional accusative in Romanian. *Bucharest Working Papers in Linguistics* 2(1). 91−106.

Dobrovie-Sorin, Carmen 1990. Clitic Doubling, *wh*-movement, and quantification in Romanian. *Linguistic Inquiry* 21. 351–397.

Dobrovie-Sorin, Carmen. 1994. *The syntax of Romanian. Comparative studies in Romance*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Farkas, Donka. 1978. Direct and indirect object reduplication in Romanian. *Chicago Linguistics Society* 14. 88–97.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Alina Tigău. 2019. Clitic Doubling and Differential Object Marking in non-specific contexts in Romanian. *Revue Roumaine de Linguistique* 64(4). 409–430.

Gierling, Diana. 1997. Clitic Doubling, specificity and focus in Romanian. In James R. Black & Virginia Motapanyane (eds.), *Clitic, pronouns and movement*, 63–85. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

López, Luis. 2012. *Indefinite objects: Scrambling, choice functions, and Differential Marking*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Steriade, Donca. 1980. Clitic Doubling in the Romanian *wh*-constructions and the analysis of topicalization. *Papers of the Chicago Linguistic Society* 16. 282–297.

Tigău, Alina. 2011. *Syntax and interpretation of the direct object in Romance and Germanic languages with an emphasis on Romanian, German, Dutch and English*. Bucharest: Editura Universităţii Bucureşti.

Tigău, Alina. 2015. On the syntax of Romanian Clitic Doubling Constructions. *Generative Grammar in Geneva IX*: 1–25.

Tigău, Alina. 2016. *A DRT analysis of Clitic Doubling*. Bucharest: Editura Universităţii Bucureşti.

Tigău, Alina. 2020. *Experimental insights into the syntax of Romanian ditransitives*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Enhancing children's discourse awareness:
A reflection on possible didactic implementations

Jacopo Torregrossa – Goethe University Frankfurt
Torregrossa@lingua.uni-frankfurt.de

1 Introduction

The reflections contained in this short contribution have been developed during a session of a seminar taught by Klaus von Heusinger, to which I was invited. The seminar was mostly attended by future German school teachers. During this session, the students analysed some written narratives in terms of the cohesive forms used in them. We discussed how far the production of cohesive narratives can be considered as a reliable indicator of children's narrative abilities and academic success. Furthermore, we noticed that the design of didactic activities for the enhancement of children's cohesion in narrative production may be particularly challenging. On the one hand, children (and even adults) may not have clear intuitions about discourse cohesion, since it is a very complex construct (Section 2). On the other hand, didactic materials provide only fragmented, partial or even incorrect information on discourse cohesion (Section 3).

Linguistic research on discourse coherence and cohesion has made great progress in the understanding of the relationship between cohesive forms and discourse structure. Klaus von Heusinger has provided a significant contribution to this debate throughout the years (see, e.g., Brocher et al. 2016; Deichsel & von Heusinger 2011; von Heusinger 1997; von Heusinger, Zimmermann & Onea 2019; von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019). Ideally, these theoretical reflections should inform the didactic activities related to the enhancement of children's discourse awareness. This would initiate a much-needed cross-fertilization between theoretical linguistics and educational research.

2 Is discourse awareness possible?

Children engage in metalinguistic reflections starting from very young age. For example, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) reports that she was corrected by her daughter as follows, when she taught her the word "typewriter": "You're the typewriter. That's a typewrite" (Karmiloff-Smith 1992: 31). The daughter seemed to be able to analyze the word into its morphological components and entertain the abstract representation that in English, the suffix *-er* expresses agentivity. Children can be seen as "young linguists" (Karmiloff-Smith 1992: 31), who construct their own theory of language based on what they currently know about language and their ability to connect a new linguistic representation (e.g., the word "typewriter") to a previously formed one (e.g., the expression of agentivity by means of the suffix *-er*). In terms of James (1999), this involves an "inside-out" process.

These metalinguistic reflections may take different linguistic units as objects of attention. For example, phonological awareness refers to the ability to reflect upon, manipulate and analyze the sound units of words; the objects of morphological awareness are the smallest units of meaning (e.g., the suffix *-er* considered above). In the domain of discourse, children seem to have clear intuitions about the referential function of pronouns and full nouns at both the intra- and intersentential level. For example, Karmiloff-Smith et al. (1993) report the following explanation by an 8-year-old child.

(1)   Well, if you've already talked about the boy, then you use "he" in the next bit […], but if it's a different boy, you can't say "he".

<div align="right">(Karmiloff-Smith et al. 1993: 566)</div>

Likewise, in a very recent study, we asked bilingual children to notice, correct and explain grammatical errors in Italian sentences, related, a.o., to gender-marking on clitics (e.g., the use of a masculine clitic instead of a feminine one). The sentences were used to describe pictures. A 9-year-old child provided the explanation in (2), showing that s/he was aware that feminine clitics are used to refer to female characters (see Torregrossa, Eisenbeiß & Bongartz (2022) for further details).

(2)   È una femmina e deve essere LA tocca, non LO tocca.
        'It is a female and it should be touches HER, not HIM'

However, children do not seem to be able to explain the function of pronouns or full nouns when moving from the sentence (or two-sentence) to the discourse level. Karmiloff-Smith et al. (1993) have shown that children are able to detect discourse repairs while hearing a narrative. For example, they notice if a speaker uses a full noun to refer to the main character of a story and then corrects herself using (a more appropriate) pronoun. However, they are not able to explain why the repair occurred. In other words, they are not able to relate the use of pronouns (or full nouns) to the broader discourse structure. Crucially, the authors noticed that also the explanations provided by the adult participants of their study were not more accurate than the ones provided by 11-year-old children.

    In the face of these results, one may ask whether discourse awareness exists at all (in Karmiloff-Smith's terms, at least), together with phonological and morphological awareness. In this contribution, I remain agnostic about this issue, especially given that, to my knowledge, the study by Karmiloff-Smith et al. (1993) is the only one considering children's and adults' discourse awareness. However, the "inside-out" process is not the only pathway by means of which metalinguistic awareness may develop. Metalinguistic awareness can work "from outside in" (James 1999), too. Children may learn *explicitly* what the discourse functions of pronouns and full nouns are and then use this knowledge to reflect on the use of these forms in their own language.

3 The development of discourse awareness in school: A reflection on some didactic materials

School offers a unique opportunity to learn "from outside in" which discourse functions are associated with pronouns and full nouns. However, some recent reviews of teaching materials have shown that this kind of reflection is often not included. If it is included, this is usually done in a misleading way. Calaresu (2019) notices that although the most recent language books in primary and secondary schools include reflections on pragmatic aspects of language (i.e., the study of language use across different contexts), these reflections are not integrated into the more "traditional" reflections on grammar. The author provides a relevant example from a book of Italian grammar. Students are asked to identify the "minimal" unit in the Italian sentence corresponding to the following English translation: "The dog of my neighbor barks continuously in the garden" (Calaresu 2019: 41). The correct answer would be "The dog barks". However, this leads to a different meaning compared to the original one, especially considering that in Italian, the expression "the dog" can express both a generic and specific reading.

The examples reported in Averintseva-Klisch, Bryant & Peschel (2019) are even more relevant for the present contribution. The authors notice that some schoolbooks of German grammar deal with the use of pronouns. However, reflections at the discourse level are often neglected. A title of one of the didactic units reported in the study is emblematic in this respect: "Mit Pronomen Bezüge im Satz herstellen" (in English, "to establish reference in sentences by means of pronouns"), whereby it is made clear that the function of pronouns is analysed at the sentence level. Other books associate the use of pronouns with the avoidance of repetitions. However, this observation corresponds to a normative approach to the use of pronouns and ascribes pronouns a subordinate function compared to full nouns. This does not reflect the "default" nature of pronouns in natural language conversation: pronominal forms are generally easier and more economic to produce (Hendriks 2014; Torregrossa, Bongartz & Tsimpli 2019). Furthermore, it is never discussed under which discourse conditions the substitution of a full noun with a pronoun is possible and under which conditions it is not.

Crucially, the review studies reported in this section raise similar concerns in spite of the different educational contexts that they consider (Italy and Germany). This suggests that, in general, school programs do not give much attention to the fostering of children's discourse awareness. This is particularly surprising considering that the ability to use cohesive linguistic devices in spoken and written texts is considered as one of the most reliable predictors of children's literacy skills and reading abilities (e.g., McCabe & Rollins 1994). Therefore, much more work needs to be done in this direction. The cross-fertilization between linguistic theories on discourse cohesion and educational research may provide a significant contribution to the development of new ways of fostering discourse awareness at school.

4 Discourse theory meets education practices

As shown in Section 2, discourse awareness allows children to figure out how the use of cohesive forms (such as pronouns and full nouns) relates to specific discourse strategies. In order to enhance discourse awareness, teachers may encourage children to reflect on written texts (which could also be transcriptions of oral data). The use of the written modality allows children to reflect upon discourse structure by "freezing the fast-fading message of spoken text" (Karmiloff-Smith et al. 1993: 586).

I now turn to some ideas related to the didactic implementation of the above arguments, with the aim to enhance children's discourse awareness.

Teachers may encourage children to track reference in discourse, asking them to identify the reference chain corresponding to one or the other character in a narrative. Children may be asked to *notice* which character is mentioned at which point in the narrative and which referring expression (pronoun vs. full noun) is used to refer to it. In this way, children may become aware of existing associations between the use of a type of referring expression and reference to a certain character. The clearest example is the use of pronouns to refer to the main protagonist of a narrative and full nouns to refer to secondary characters. Likewise, teachers may encourage children to reflect on which kind of referring expression is used to introduce or reintroduce discourse characters, and how reference introduction or reintroduction affects a speaker's tendency to refer to one or the other character at a later point in the narrative. The identification of topic shifts and their impact on the overall discourse structure is common practice in linguistic research (see von Heusinger & Schumacher 2019 for a review). This kind of reflections can be easily implemented in classroom activities. It is important to point out that the generalizations at which children will arrive should not be intended in a normative way. By reaching this level of abstraction, children can become aware that certain uses of cohesive forms can only be accounted for by means of principles operat-

ing beyond the sentence level. In Section 2, we referred to this ability as the fundamental component of discourse awareness.

References

Averintseva-Klisch, Maria, Doreen Bryant & Corinna Peschel. 2019. Referenzielle Kohärenz: Diskrepanz zwischen Theorie und Vermittlung. Eine kritische Analyse von Deutschlehrwerken der Sekundarstufe I. *Linguistik Online* 100(7). 19–64.

Brocher, Andreas, Sofiana Chiriacescu & Klaus von Heusinger. 2016. Effects of information status and uniqueness status on referent management in discourse comprehension and planning. *Discourse Processes* 55(4). 346–370.

Calaresu, Emilia. 2019. Tra il dire e il fare: grammatica e pragmatica a scuola. Su costituenti, significati e referenti. In Elena Nuzzo & Ineke Vedder (eds.), *Lingua in contesto. La prospettiva pragmatica*. Studi AItLA 9. Milano. 29–45.

Deichsel, Annika & Klaus von Heusinger. 2011. The cataphoric potential of indefinites in German. *Notes in Artificial Intelligence* 7099. 144–156.

Hendriks, Petra. 2014. *Asymmetries Between Language Production and Comprehension*. Dordrecht: Springer.

von Heusinger, Klaus. 1997. *Salienz und Referenz. Der Epsilonoperator in der Semantik der Nominalphrase und anaphorischer Pronomen*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

von Heusinger, Klaus, Malte Zimmermann & Edgar Onea. 2019. *Questions in discourse. Vol. 1: Semantics*. Leiden: Brill.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Petra Schumacher. 2019. Discourse prominence: Definition and application. *Journal of Pragmatics* 154. 117–127.

James, Carl. 1999. Language Awareness: Implications for the Language Curriculum. *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 12(1). 94–115.

Karmiloff-Smith, Annette. 1992. *Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Karmiloff-Smith, Annette, Hilary Johnson, Julia Grant, Marie-Claude Jones, Yara-Natasha Karmiloff, Jon Bartrip & Pat Cuckle. 1993. From sentential to discourse functions: Detection and explanation of speech repairs by children and adults. *Discourse Processes* 16(4). 565–589.

McCabe, Allyssa & Pamela Rosenthal Rollins. 1994. Assessment of preschool narrative skills. *American Journal of Speech Language Pathology* 3. 45–56.

Torregrossa, Jacopo, Christiane Bongartz & Ianthi M. Tsimpli. 2019. Bilingual reference production. A cognitive-computational account. *Linguistic Approaches to Bilingualism* 9(4-5). 569–599.

Torregrossa, Jacopo, Sonja Eisenbeiß & Christiane Bongartz. 2022. Boosting bilingual metalinguistic awareness under dual language activation: Some implications for bilingual education. *Language Learning*.

Specificity and modal particles

Andreas Trotzke – University of Konstanz & University of Cologne
andreas.trotzke@uni-konstanz.de

1 Common ground(s) between Klaus and me

Klaus and I share a lot of things: We both received our habilitation at the University of Konstanz (even on a closely related topic!), we both enjoyed the Californian sun during that stage of our career (in Santa Cruz and at Stanford, respectively), and we both work on German with a contrastive perspective on Romance languages.

However, there is something we have in common that I think Klaus might not be aware of: We both have worked on the semantics and pragmatics of the DP. *Yes*, I have worked on the DP too – but compared to Klaus's massive oeuvre in this domain, my work is maybe not even worth further mentioning at all. Let me nevertheless take the opportunity of this festschrift to point Klaus to some data from my work in this domain. I hope this is of interest to you, Klaus, and I'm sure you'll have much more to say about the following observations than I have, and I'm very much looking forward to discussing this with you in Cologne.

2 DP-internal modal particles: Why Klaus should care!

In Trotzke (2015, 2018), I have investigated the DP-internal occurrence of German modal particles. Here is one relevant example taken from the classic literature (Thurmair 1989: 27) and involving the particle *ja* (lit. 'yes'):

(1) dieser ja leider viel zu früh verstorbene Komponist
     this JA unfortunately much too soon departed composer

Examples such as (1) are mentioned only casually in the literature, and it is unclear whether this is an idiosyncratic property of German or whether other languages that have a rich inventory of modal particles at the level of CP license DP-internal particles as well. Be that as it may, the main point of my two papers on that type of particle occurrence was to show that there are parallels between the functional make-up of the syntactic representation involving modal particles at the level of CP and DP. In particular, I have argued for an analysis where the DP contains its own illocutionary operator and where DP-internal particles also fulfill the information-structural role of acting as a 'watershed' element within the AP.

Needless to say, there's much more to mention about those claims and the phenomenon itself, but in the context of this festschrift I'd like to point out to Klaus that modal particles can also occur in indefinite DPs – and in this context my work touches on the topic of specificity, which is so central to Klaus's research over the years.

The following observations are due to an unpublished manuscript that Roland Hinterhölzl and Manfred Krifka have sent me almost ten years ago. Interestingly, they show that indefinite DPs, when containing a modal particle, can only be interpreted as referring to a unique entity. More specifically, in the following example (Hinterhölzl & Krifka 2013: 9) we see that modal particles are excluded from the *de dicto* reading given in (2c). Note that Hinterhölzl & Krifka (2013) use the particle *wohl* (lit. 'well') to illustrate this property, but in Trotzke (2018) I show that the observed pattern holds for different particles (e.g., also for *ja*) and is thus not due to lexical idiosyncrasies of individual German modal particles.

(2) a. Hans sucht   eine {ja, wohl}   erst   30-jährige Frau.
       Hans looks:for   a   JA, WOHL   only 30-year-old woman
   b. Speaker asserts [{ja, wohl}]: There is a 30 years old woman.
      Speaker asserts: Hans is looking for this woman.
   c. Speaker asserts: Hans wants it to be the case that there is a 30 years old woman.
      Speaker asserts: Hans is looking for this woman.

We know that an indefinite DP like *eine Frau* is not intrinsically unique; still, in (2b) Hans is looking for a unique individual (*de re* reading), whereas in (2c) Hans is looking for any woman that fulfills the criterion to be of a specific age. That is, in potentially intensional contexts as in (2a), only the *de re* reading of the DP is available as soon as we use modal particles like *ja* and *wohl*. In other words, the modal particles force a specific interpretation of the indefinite DP, which is an interesting observation in its own right.

    However, based on von Heusinger's (2011) discussion, I would like to go one step further and hypothesize that the licensing of modal particles within the DP and many of the observations in Trotzke (2015, 2018) actually dovetail nicely with what von Heusinger (2011) calls *specificity as noteworthiness* in his overview article. Look at the following patterns from von Heusinger (2011: 1028, 1053):

(3) a. He put √a/#this 31 cent stamp on the envelope, so he must want it to go airmail.
   b. He put √a/√this 31 cent stamp on the envelope, and only realized later that it
      was worth a fortune because it was unperforated.

While (3b) is felicitous because a noteworthy property is mentioned, (3a) is judged as infelicitous. In sum, Klaus points out that indefinite *this* is only licensed when 'the speaker intends to assert a noteworthy property of the referent' (von Heusinger 2011: 1028). Crucially, the data in my articles on DP-internal modal particles suggest something very similar: Modal particles inside the DP are only licensed when 'the speaker intends to assert a noteworthy property of the referent'. To see this, look at one of the observations mentioned in Trotzke (2018: 329):

(4) a. ?? der ja schwarze   Rabe
          the   JA black   raven
   b.   der   ja   pechschwarze Rabe
          the   JA   pitch-black   raven

In Trotzke (2018), I have argued at length that DP-internal modal particles, when occurring with simple adjectives, preferably occur with adjectives that do not express a non-restrictive, but rather a restrictive property. In (4a), the adjective denotes some evident feature of the NP referent (in a prototype-theoretic sense), and so the denotation of the NP is not restricted by the modification, irrespective of the context (in formal terms: ADJ∩NOM = NOM). On the other hand, modification can restrict the NP denotation as in *pechschwarz* in (4b) because ravens are not pitch-black per se (i.e., ADJ∩NOM ⊆ NOM).

    Crucially now, as I demonstrate in the paper, the restrictive modification that licenses the occurrence of modal particles inside the DP must always be interpreted as being part of a scale, and after reading Klaus's work on specificity again my hunch is that in most cases this scalar property can probably be conceptualized in terms of 'noteworthiness'. In other words, modal particles on the one hand force a specific interpretation of indefinite DPs (see [2] above); on the other hand, one could hypothesize that they are only licensed in both indefinite and definite DPs if they scope over a property of the NP referent that is both restrictive and

noteworthy. Accordingly, when looking at the research on specificity, there seem to be interesting parallels between licensing conditions of demonstratives and DP-internal modal particles, which both belong to the domain of discourse deixis and which, dear Klaus, hopefully provide you with food for thought for many years to come!

References

von Heusinger, Klaus. 2011. Specificity. In Paul Portner, Claudia Maienborn & Klaus von Heusinger (eds.), *Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning*, 1025–1058. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Hinterhölzl, Roland & Manfred Krifka. 2013. Modal particles in adverbial and adnominal clauses. Ms., Ca'Foscari University of Venice & Humboldt University of Berlin.

Thurmair, Maria. 1989. *Modalpartikeln und ihre Kombinationen*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Trotzke, Andreas. 2015. DP-internal discourse particles, expressive content, and illocutionary force. *Grazer Linguistische Studien* 83. 93–105.

Trotzke, Andreas. 2018. DP-internal modal particles: A case study of German *ja*. *Studia Linguistica* 72(2). 322–339.

POSSIBLE (How to read Grice)

Ken Turner – Formerly of the University of Brighton
kenturner31090@outlook.com

> 'If there is a moral issue in the business of doing linguistics (or philosophy KT) it is that we should struggle to avoid making our students the victims of our personal histories and limitations.'
> (Labov 1975: 128)

> 'I think the history of twentieth-century philosophy of language ought to be rewritten.'
> (Recanati 2004: 83)

I, with certain caveats that may emerge in what follows, fully agree. Here are some notes to contribute to a draft of one of the chapters of a suitably moral, responsible and historically revealing account. Only notes, mind you: As Richmond Thomason says somewhere, pointing the way is easier than going the distance.

1 Thesis: Grice was not a 'Gricean'[1]

Grice was careful to emphasize, as others were, it seems, similarly careful to ignore, the following:

> 'The conversational maxims (...) and the conversational implicatures connected with them, are specially connected (...) with the particular purposes that talk (...) is adapted to serve and is primarily employed to serve. I have stated my maxims as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information (...).'
>
> (Grice 1975a: 67–68; 1975b: 47; 1989: 28)

He went on:

> '(...) this specification is (...) too narrow, and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others.'
>
> (Grice 1975a: 68; 1975b: 47; 1989: 28)

So, what, we might ask, is 'a maximally effective exchange of information' as opposed to, presumably more diffuse, and undefined, 'general purposes'?

2 (Some) Evidence

The answer to this question is simple now that we are, as earlier critics and commentators were not, in possession of *Studies in the Way of Words*.[2] In the Preface to this book Grice speaks of his 'recurrent endeavor (...) to approach philosophy through a study of language, in particular *ordinary* language' and to examine 'the role of the consideration of ordinary

---

[1] … although the jury is still out on Davidson (cf. Cook 2009). There is now a small, but developing industry examining whether Frege was a Fregean (cf. Janssen 2001, 2012; Pelletier nd., 2001; Hintikka 1980: 50, and Ruffino 2003). I'm of the view that Frege was a proto-Gricean, but that is a story for another birthday.

[2] This is, of course, Grice (1989). It is, quite clearly, not sufficient to be in simple possession of this extraordinary and endlessly fascinating book. It is necessary to also read it with the greatest possible care and Inspector Morse-esque forensic attention to detail, style, nuance and wit. (On that last, let us not forget that Grice was keen to proclaim 'it is my belief that doing philosophy ought to be *fun*. I would, in fact, be prepared to go further, and to suggest that it is no bad thing if the products of doing philosophy turn out, every now and then, to be *funny*' (Grice 1986a: 61; emphasis in the original).)

language in philosophizing'[3] (Grice 1989: vi). And in the Prolegomena (Grice 1989: 3–21) he makes a declaration that should be continuously flashing in red neon lights at the entrance of every Linguistics and Philosophy department:

> 'My primary aim is (...) to determine how any such distinction between meaning and use is to be drawn, and where lie the limits of its philosophical utility.'
>
> (Grice 1989: 4)

3 Philosophical utilities

Grice's strategy for distinguishing meaning and use is by now familiar and is relatively simple to execute. It involves taking a feature that some have thought integral to the meaning of an expression and showing that it is more convincingly interpreted as resulting from a contextual mechanism. Thus, the content of 'and' is identical to that of '&' because temporal and causal features derive from the application of contextual maxims and not from an overly promiscuous spectrum of conventional meanings. Similarly for 'or'. Its content is exhaustively modelled by 'v' and any divergence is accountable by an infringement of the Maxim of Quantity. Similarly for 'if'. Its content is exhaustively modelled by the material conditional and any 'gap' between the material and the natural indicative conditional is filled by the conventional implicature that Grice calls 'The Indirectness Condition'. Thus, with these hypotheses, especially, no doubt with the eternal gratitude of Philo of Megara, the last, Grice saves propositional logic and puts money in the philosophical bank. All of this is now text-book material.[4]

Grice (1961) also attempts to save The Causal Theory of Perception. In the context of someone, in full daylight, standing just feet from a red British post box and saying 'That looks red to me', in flagrant violation of any proposed Doubt or Denial Condition, that someone is not speaking falsely but is speaking truly, but oddly. The Doubt or Denial Condition is shown to behave in similar ways to temporal and causal 'features' of 'and', what we might call 'The Ignorance Condition' for 'or' and 'The Indirectness Condition' for 'if'. Thus, we begin to see the gradual emergence of a natural class of contextual inferences, The result is that The Causal Theory of Perception is brought back to life and Grice puts more money in the philosophical bank.

The strategy of moving 'stuff' out from the conventional and placing it within the contextual rests upon (i) a familiar principle of parsimony:

> On general grounds of economy, I would be inclined to think that if one can avoid saying that the word so-and-so has this sense, that sense and the other sense, or this meaning and another meaning, if one can allow them to be variants under a single principle, that is the desirable thing to do: don't multiply senses beyond necessity.
>
> (Grice 1982: 232; 1989: 291)[5]

---

[3] This last word is ugly, (although it may have been current at the time; cf. Emmet 1968) and I shall replace it, except in quotes, in what follows with 'philosophical discussion', or 'philosophical discourse'. On the more substantive question of what he means by 'philosophizing', Grice is not so helpful: 'Unfortunately I do not find it by any means easy to give a general characterization of the philosophizing in which I engage; indeed I am not sure that it is all of one sort' (Grice 1989: 171).

[4] Not so well-publicised is the clever argument that puts Grice's consequentialist implication back into the conventional meaning of indicative conditionals; see Strawson & Wiggins (2001). For an instructive early practical analysis of the method for placing value in the content or in the context, see Grice (1973). This is a topic that deserves its own dedicated chapter in the revised history of twentieth-century philosophy of language.

[5] This principle is often called Modified Occam's Razor – notice that I, like Grice, prefer the Latinate 'Occam' to the Anglo-Saxon 'Ockham' – or more simply Grice's Razor. (The earliest application of Occam to language that I have been able to find is in Ziff (1960: 44): 'There is no point in multiplying dictionary entries beyond necessity. (This is the point of Occam's eraser)' (although I am certain that more assiduous archeology will encounter applications that predate this).) Grice's Razor was challenged by what might be called Cohen's Beard (cf. Cohen

and (ii) a less familiar, but very natural, principle of portability:

> Rational human thought and communication will, in pursuit of their various purposes, encounter a boundless and unpredictable multitude of distinct situations. Perhaps unlike a computer we shall not have, ready made, any vast array of forms of description and explanation from which to select what is suitable for a particular occasion. We shall have to rely on our rational capacities, particularly those for imaginative construction and combination, to provide for our needs as they arise. It would not them be surprising if the operations of our thoughts were to reflect, in this or that way, the character of the capacities on which thought relies.
>
> <div align="right">(Grice 1988: 200)</div>

Language is, quite clearly, much more useful to its clients if it can be moved easily around, from context to context, in relatively small and manageable packages.

An extension of the strategy is illustrated in Grice's rebuttal of certain criticisms of the Theory of Descriptions. According to Grice (1981/1989: 269–282), 'The present King of France is bald' entails 'There is a present King of France' (as per Russell) and 'The present King of France is not bald' conversationally implicates 'There is a present King of France' and this implicature behaves properly under the usual diagnostics. Grice is not personally committed to this analysis. Like his account of vacuous names (Grice 1969), he regards it as an interesting exploratory exercise. I will not pursue the matter in these remarks. (Note that Grice has nothing to say on the further matter of the referential/attributive distinction.)

Now, to conclude this section (and to embark upon a sentence of quasi-Gricean complexity), and with the above utilities in mind, if we make a distinction, perhaps already latent in the literature, between the mere *illustrations* that Grice provides (mostly of a mundane, conversational nature) and the more substantial applications that Grice makes (mostly of a solid, philosophical character) of (what Cohen (1971, 1977) calls) the Conversationalist Hypothesis, then, it is not too implausible to infer, and, indeed, I would most certainly be willing to infer, that uppermost in Grice's interests is the solution, or, if not a solution, then progress towards a solution, of persistently troublesome philosophical problems: He wants to show that the Conversationalist Hypothesis, or some version of the Conversational Hypothesis, is a useful philosophical investment and 'if not true ('profitable', KT), at least not too obviously false ('unprofitable', KT)' (Grice 1961: 121).[6]

4 Forgotten observations

One has been mentioned already in Section 1: the one about 'a maximally effective exchange of information'. This observation, when noted, allows, for example Harnish (1976) to say:

1971, 1977) with its proliferation of meanings, although this challenge was not vigorously maintained nor explicitly executed. It later gave way to a more fashionable Cohen's Stubble (Cohen 1986). Grice shaves, but not necessarily very closely (cf. Bontly 2005; Hazlett 2007; Phillips 2012). This topic deserves a more elaborate treatment in the longer version of these notes.

[6] The distinction between, shall we say, Grice the Philosopher and the Gricean Linguist, has some circumstantial merit: '*Logic and conversation* (…) appeared in two separate collections, both published in 1975. Its publication was clearly the source of some confusion, with both sets of editors claiming to offer the essay in print for the first time. *The Logic of Grammar*, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, seems to have been Grice's preferred publication, and was the one he always cited. There, his lecture appears alongside essays by past and contemporary philosophers such as Frege, Tarski and Quine. The editor's [*sic*] introduction places Grice in a tradition of philosophers interested in the application of traditional theories of truth to natural language. In *Speech Acts*, (…) on the other hand, *Logic and conversation* is placed in the context of contemporary linguistics. (…). The editors (…) hail the first publication of 'the seminal word on this topic'. It is rumoured that Grice signed the contract for his lecture to appear in this linguistic series while at a conference at Austin, Texas, and only after a long evening spent in the bar' (Chapman 2005: 186). It would seem that some linguists attempted to get Grice drunk in a Cold War-esque effort to recruit him as one of their own.

Grice nowhere says, nor would he want to say, that all conversations are governed by the cooperative maxims. There are too many garden variety counterexamples: social talk between enemies, diplomatic encounters, police interrogation of a reluctant suspect, most political speeches, and many presidential news conferences. These are just some of the cases in which the maxims of cooperation are not in effect and are known not to be in effect by the participants.

<div align="right">(Harnish 1976: 340 fn 29)</div>

This observation, again, when noted, also allows, for example, Swiggers (1981) to propose 'the maxim (or super maxim) of 'Conversational Topology'' which states: 'Pay attention to (or: have in mind) the kind of conversation we are having'. He goes on:

This maxim (…) is hierarchically the most important: it is only with regard to the topology maxim that the maxim of relevance can impose itself on the maxims belonging to the categories of quality, quantity and manner. (…) the admission of this maxim allows us to give a pragmatic-linguistic substratum to the (…) scope (…) of a discussion. It is the topology maxim which *determines* what is relevant or not for the kind of conversation we are dealing with.

<div align="right">(Swiggers 1981: 306; emphasis in the original)</div>

It makes enormous strategic and methodological sense, of course, to begin small and leave the larger, more general, conversational purposes for later. Grice, remember, observes that '[i]t is irrational to bite off more than you can chew whether the object of your pursuit is hamburgers or the Truth' (Grice 1989: 369).

Another observation relates to the Maxim of Quantity. The first words of Quantity 1 are 'Make your *contribution* (…)'. The first words of Quantity 2 are: 'Do not make your *contribution* (…)' (emphases added in both cases: KT). The observation is that in Gricean pragmatics 'the notion of contribution (…) has remained an overlooked (and almost clandestine) concept, despite its early appearance in pragmatics in the formulation of the Gricean conversational maxims' (Nemo 1999: 413).

The argument continues:

If it seems (…) to have been considered, without discussion, that contributions and utterances were one and the same thing, (footnote: Even though it is (…) clear that a contribution may be formed of a single utterance, it is also beyond doubt, especially in Grice's maxims, that there is no reason whatsoever to believe that contributions should be formed of a single utterance.) it is very important to avoid this confusion and to understand that the constraints on utterances[7] (…) and the constraints on contributions are of quite a different nature.'

<div align="right">(Nemo 1999: 413)</div>

And the conclusion deserves a lengthy quotation:

(…) whatever is said is paid in terms of what is left unsaid. (…) as soon as [utterances] are considered [not one by one but] as a whole, then the **'This (is what) must be taken into account'** or **'This (is what) should be considered'** nature of contributions becomes apparent. Which explains why their fundamentally social value, a value of intervention in a social context, is also interpretable in terms of the speaker's goals (or relations to things). Contributions (…) are revealing the interlocutors' aims or affects, a dimension which despite not being part of the communicated content, is clearly part of the understanding we have of the communication process.'

<div align="right">(Nemo 1999: 413–414)</div>

The final observation, in the present context, anyway, relates to two of Grice's more vaguely formulated, and therefore less than helpful, proposals. First problem, The Cooperative Principle: 'The cooperative principle (…) is problematic (…) because it does not specify the nature of cooperation under consideration' (Kasher 1982: 38). Solution, replace The Cooperative Principle with The Principle of Effective Linguistic Means: 'Given a desired literal purpose, the ideal speaker opts for a linguistic action which, to the best of his belief,

---

[7] In the interests of economy I make no reference to the natures or the names of these constraints. Such an attempt would take us very far afield. A very careful reading of Nemo (1999) and subsequent work is recommended.

attains that purpose, most effectively and at least cost, *ceteris paribus*' (Kasher 1977: 114; cf. Kasher 1987: 286). Second problem, The Maxim of Relation: 'Be Relevant.' Grice had enormous difficulty in clarifying what this maxim amounted to (Grice 1975a: 67; 1975b: 46; 1989: 27). Others have attempted to convert the maxim into a statement about the psychological processing of utterances. Of these others, Grice has said that their attempts have ignored the fact that 'only after the identification of a focus (…) of some particular direction (…) of relevance (…) can (…) and assessment [of relevance] be made'; Grice 1989: 371–372). Solution, emphasise ends, goals, directions and ambitions of all participants and fill out 'Be relevant' in this way: '[A]t every stage in your pursuit of your desired ends, consider the means used concurrently by others, and determine the manner of using your means accordingly; moreover, prefer using your means in a manner which you believe is likely to help other persons in their pursuit of their desired ends over any other way of your means, *ceteris paribus*' (Kasher 1977: 115).[8]

5 Abbreviated notes for an interim conclusion of this preparatory note

There is the potential for many a slip betwixt a proper name and its corresponding denominal adjective: Frege/Fregean; Davidson/Davidsonian; and, in the present context, Grice/Gricean. So, the precautions to keep in mind when navigating Grice's Proper Name to Denominal Adjectival Transition (GPNtDAT, for short) include, but are not limited to:

(1) Grice is principally, perhaps only, interested in the clarification of philosophical discourse, with the ambition of finding durable philosophical progress;
(2) Philosophical progress is founded on the move away from the conflation of 'meaning' and 'use' and towards their distinction;
(3) The basic unit of philosophical discourse is not the utterance (as per much contemporary pragmatic research), but the 'contribution' (more work needed here);
(4) There is much virtue in modesty. Grice (1989: 4) acknowledges that he is merely taking 'some tottering steps' towards 'a systematic *philosophical* theory of language' (emphasis added: KT).

Where those tottering steps eventually lead involves answering questions that are as open today as they were in 1967. But, to conclude with a final quote: '(…) the narration of these stirring events must be left to another and longer day' (Grice 1989: 385).

Author's note

An obvious debt to Sbisà (2007) is acknowledged. For possible interpretations of 'POSSIBLE', see Jubien (2009). This short note is for Klaus von Heusinger, on the occasion of his 60th birthday, who is, and who has always been, indubitably the best of all possible book-series co-editors.

---

[8] It seems that Grice would have much sympathy with both of these solutions: 'I presume that, in designing the Universe or at least the living segment of it, the imaginary Genitor would be governed by a principle of providing for the highest possible degree of Economy of Effort; such a procedure would not only make his work more elegant, but would be beneficial to the creatures under construction, on the assumption that calculation and concentration of attention involve effort, and that there are to be limitations on the quantity of effort of which a creature is capable at any one time, with the result that the less the effort expended, the greater the reserve which is available for emergencies' Grice (1986b: 30). For an interesting counterbalance to and plausible diagnosis of, this very widespread view, see Roscoe (2014).

References

Bontly, Thomas. 2005. Modified Occam's Razor: Parsimony, pragmatics, and the acquisition of word meaning. *Mind & Language* 20(3). 288–312.

Chapman, Siobhan. 2005. *Paul Grice: Philosopher and Linguist*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1971. Some remarks on Grice's views about the logical particles of natural language. In Yehôšua Bar-Hillēl (ed.), *Pragmatics of Natural Languages*, 50–68. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1977. Can the Conversationalist Hypothesis be defended? *Philosophical Studies* 31(2). 81–90.

Cohen, L. Jonathan. 1986. How is conceptual innovation possible? *Erkenntnis* 25(2). 221–238.

Cook, John. 2009. Is Davidson a Gricean? *Dialogue* 48. 557–575.

Emmet, Eric Revell 1968. *Learning to Philosophize*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Grice, Paul 1961. The causal theory of perception. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Supplementary Volumes) 35 121–152.

Grice, Paul. 1969. Vacuous names. In Donald Davidson & Jaakko Hintikka (eds.), *Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine*, 118–145. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Grice, Paul. 1975a. Logic and conversation. In Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (eds.), *The Logic of Grammar*, 64–75. Encino and Belmont: Dickenson.

Grice, Paul. 1975b. Logic and conversation. In Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics*, vol. 3: *Speech Acts*, 41–58. London: Academic Press.

Grice, Paul. 1981. Presupposition and conversational implicature. In Peter Cole (ed.), *Radical Pragmatics*, 183–198. London: Academic Press.

Grice, Paul. 1982. Meaning revisited. In Neil V. Smith (ed.), *Mutual Knowledge*, 223–243. London: Academic Press.

Grice, Paul. 1986a. Reply to Richards. In Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner (eds.), *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends*, 45–106. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Grice, Paul. 1986b. Actions and events. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 67(1): 1–35.

Grice, Paul. 1988. Aristotle on the multiplicity being. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 69(3). 175–200.

Grice, Paul. 1989. *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Harnish, Robert. 1976. Logical form and implicature. In Thomas G. Bever, Jerrold J. Katz & D. Terrence Langendoen (eds.), *An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Ability*, 313–391. New York: Crowell.

Hazlett, Allan. 2007. Grice's Razor. *Metaphilosophy* 38(5). 669–690.

Hintikka, Jaakko. 1980. Theories of truth and learnable languages. In Stig Kanger & Sven Ohman (eds.), *Philosophy and Grammar: Papers on the Occasion of Quincentennial of Uppsala University*, 37–57. London: D. Reidel.

Janssen, Theo. 2001. Frege, contextuality and compositionality. *Journal of Logic, Language and Information* 10(1). 115–136.

Janssen, Theo. 2012. Compositionality: Its historic context. In Markus Werning, Wolfram Hinzen & Edouard Machery (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality*, 19–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jubien, Michael. 2009. *Possibility*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kasher, Asa. 1977. What is a theory of use? *Journal of Pragmatics* 1: 105–120.

Kasher, Asa. 1982. Gricean inference revisited. *Philosophica* 29: 25–44.

Kasher, Asa. 1987. Justification of speech, acts and speech acts. In Ernest Lepore (ed.), *New Directions in Semantics*, 281–303. London: Academic Press.

Labov, William. 1975. Empirical foundations of linguistic theory. In Robert Austerlitz (ed.), *The Scope of American Linguistics: The First Golden Anniversary Symposium of the Linguistic Society of America*, 77–133. Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press.

Nemo, François. 1999. The pragmatics of signs, the semantics of relevance, and the semantics/pragmatics interface. In Ken Turner (ed.), *The Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of View*, 343–417. Oxford: Elsevier.

Pelletier, Francis Jeffry. nd. *Was Frege a Fregean?* Unpublished manuscript.

Pelletier, Francis Jeffry. 2001. Did Frege believe Frege's Principle. *Journal of Logic, Language and Information* 10(1) 87–114.

Phillips, Ben. 2012. Modified Occam's Razor. *Australian Journal of Philosophy* 90(2). 371–382.

Recanati, François. 2004. *Literal Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roscoe, Philip. 2014. *The true cost of economics*, < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iRT-p737qgI&t=33s>.

Ruffino, Marco. 2003. Why Frege would not be a Neo-Fregean. *Mind* 112(445). 51–78.

Sbisà, Marina. 2007. How to read Austin. *Pragmatics* 17(3). 461–473.

Strawson, Peter & David Wiggins. 2001. Herbert Paul Grice 1913–1988. *Proceedings of the British Academy* 111: 515–528.

Swiggers, Pierre. 1981. The supermaxim of conversation. *Dialectica* 35: 303–306.

Ziff, Paul. 1960. *Semantic Analysis*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

The nature of demonstrations of manner and quality.
Evidence from German and Turkish

Carla Umbach and Umut Özge
University of Cologne and Middle East Technical University
carla.umbach@uni-koeln.de and umozge@metu.edu.tr

1. Introduction

There is a variety of demonstratives found across languages addressing manners, qualities and degrees, for example Turkish *böyle*, Polish *tak*, and German *so* (see König & Umbach 2018). They are directly referential (in the sense of Kaplan 1989), which is the hallmark of genuine demonstratives, but on the other hand act as modifiers of nominal, verbal and adjectival phrases, thereby raising the question of what their nature of demonstration is: what kind of entities are targeted by the use of these demonstratives and how do they relate to the referents of the demonstrative phrases? Consider the example in (1). The target of the demonstration is the car the speaker points to, but the referent of German *so ein Auto /* Turkish *böyle bir araba* is different from the target – they only share certain features.

(1)   Pointing gesture: speaker pointing at a car in the street
    a. So ein Auto hat Anna.
    b. Anna'nın da böyle bir arabası var.
       'Anna has a car like this.'

Following Umbach & Gust (2014), this variety of demonstratives will be called *similarity demonstratives*, in contrast to regular pronominal demonstratives like German *das / dies*, Turkish *bu / şu*, and English *this / that*. In König & Umbach (2018), similarity demonstratives are referred to as *demonstratives of manner, quality, and degree (MQD).* Quality uses and manner uses, as in (1) and (6), will be included in this paper, while degree uses are set aside. We will consider German and Turkish in parallel, and it will turn out that they behave alike with respect to the phenomena discussed in this paper.

Standard approaches to similarity demonstratives that aim to reconcile their demonstrative characteristics with their modifying capacity are based on the idea that they target a property or a kind. For example, Anderson & Morzycki (2015) argue, following Carlson (1980), for Polish *tak* and German *so*, that in using these demonstratives the speaker points to kinds instead of individuals – in the case of (1) the target of the demonstration is a sub-kind of the car-kind, and the demonstrative phrase *so ein Auto/böyle bir araba* refers to an entity instantiating this sub-kind.

Umbach & Gust (2014) take a different route. They assume that the target of the demonstration in (1) is in fact the individual car the speaker points at, but the referent of the demonstrative phrase is only similar to the target. From this point of view, the difference between similarity demonstratives and pronominal demonstratives is not in the nature of their target but in the relation between target and referent, which is not identity (as in the Kaplanian system) but instead similarity.

The major advantage of this approach is that there is no need for an established kind corresponding to *so ein Auto* in (1) – the denotation of this phrase is, first of all, a similarity class, i.e. a set of similar entities. On the other hand, similarity classes formed with nouns and verbs (but not in the case of degrees) can be shown to exhibit kind-like characteristics. Therefore, in the end the similarity approach agrees with the kind-based approach in that *so ein Auto / böyle bir araba* denote a car sub-kind which, however, is created ad-hoc by similarity,

thereby dispensing with arbitrarily established (sub)-kinds and, moreover, providing insight into the role of similarity in kind formation (Umbach & Stolterfoht in prep.).

Similarity is implemented as a 3-place relation (two items to be compared and a set of features of comparison). Truth-conditions are defined using generalized measure functions (μ_F) and multidimensional attribute spaces equipped with a flexible notion of granularity (see Umbach & Gust 2014, Gust & Umbach 2021). In short, two items count as similar iff their images in a contextually given attribute space F are indistinguishable given a particular granularity grid, see (3a). The denotation of the demonstrative phrase *so ein Auto / böyle bir araba* is show in (3b).

(3) a. $sim(x, y, F)$ iff $p^*(\mu_F(x)) = p^*(\mu_F(y))$ for all features $f \in F$ and granularity grid p^* where F is a free variable
    b. $[[\text{so ein Auto / böyle bir araba}]] = \lambda x.\ sim(x, x_{target}, F)\ \&\ car(x)$

2. The nature of demonstrations of manner and quality

The semantic interpretation of *so/böyle* in (3) raises two questions we would like to address in this paper:

(i)   How does the interpretation of *so/böyle* compare to the interpretation of *wie/gibi*, which also denote similarity?
(ii) How is the interpretation of *so/böyle* affected by using iconic gestures instead of pointing gestures?

Ad (i)
German *wie* and Turkish *gibi* occur, among other uses, as comparison particles, see (4). It is argued in Umbach & Özge (in prep.) and Umbach, Hinterwimmer & Gust (2022) that German *wie* as well as Turkish *gibi* denote similarity, just as *so* and *böyle,* except lacking a demonstrative component. This would predict that the combination of *wie / gibi* with pronominal demonstratives is semantically equivalent to *so / böyle*, as shown in (5). In nominal cases, as in (5), the prediction is confirmed by the data: Assuming that the pointing gesture targets the same car, there seems to be no difference in interpretation, neither in German nor in Turkish.

(4)   a. Eine Stadt wie Istanbul zieht viele Touristen an.
     b. İstanbul gibi bir şehir çok turist çeker.
         'A city like Istanbul attracts many tourists.'

(5) Pointing gesture: speaker pointing at a car in the street:
    [[so ein Auto/böyle bir araba]] = [[ein Auto wie das / bunun gibi bir araba]]
    $= \lambda x.sim(x, x_{target}, F)\ \&\ car(x)$

Similarity demonstratives may also be used in verbal phrases, as in (6a–b). In this use, the target of the demonstration is not an individual but an event, that is, the speaker points to an event instead of an individual. This is evident in impersonal constructions, as in (6a), in which similarity demonstratives are fully acceptable even though there is no distinct agent. However, in the verbal case, substitution of similarity demonstratives by pronominal demonstratives combined with comparison particles is no longer possible, see (6c–d). The reason is that pronominal demonstratives cannot be used to target events proper.

One can, of course, point to an event using a pronominal demonstrative. But in this case, the referent is either a nominalization – *the activity of dancing* – or the agent of the event. The demonstrative may, of course, be combined with comparative particles, but then it still targets something nominal in nature. Thus if a *wie das* phrase is used as a manner modifier (like *so* in (6a)), *das* has to target an individual acting as an agent (*... tanzen wie das [Pferd]* 'dance like this [horse]').

(6)   Pointing gesture: speaker pointing to a hall full of dancing
        a. In den Berliner Techno Clubs wird (auch) so getanzt.
        b. Berlin Tekno Club'larında böyle dans ediliyor.
        c. *In den Berliner Techno Clubs wird wie das getanzt.
        d. *Berlin Tekno Club'larında bunun gibi dans ediliyor.
            'In Berlin techno clubs people dance like this.'

Further support for the unavailability of genuine events by pronominal demonstratives is provided by events involving two agents, like *divorcing*. In (7) the demonstrative must be plural thus targeting the agents instead of the fighting event.

(7)   Speaker observing a scene of heated argument in the park:
        a. Anna und Hans haben sich auch so getrennt. / *getrennt wie das. / getrennt wie die.
        b. Anna ve Hans da böyle / *bunun gibi / bunlar gibi ayrıldılar.
            'Anna and Hans have also divorced like this.'

Ad (ii)
In the examples above, similarity demonstratives (*so, böyle*) were used with index gestures pointing at individuals or events. They may, however, also be used with iconic gestures depicting individuals or events (for the contrast between index gestures and iconic gestures see Clark 2019). The difference in method – pointing vs. depicting – has semantic consequences: When pointing at the target it acts like a "seed" of a similarity class: The denotation of *so ein Tisch* / *böyle bir masa* ('a table like this') used with a pointing gesture is the set of tables similar to the target while the features of comparison are determined by context. When depicting the target there is no "seed" – elements of the similarity class have to be similar to each other with respect to features of comparison provided by the depiction. The denotation of *so ein Tisch* / *böyle bir masa* used with a depicting gesture is the set of tables perceptually similar to the depiction, that is, in (8) round tables.
    The nature of depictions is a matter of dispute. There is evidence that it is not just a property but something like an "abstract object" or a painting. For example, in the case of (8) the circle has to be horizontal, a vertical one would not depict a table (see Umbach & Ebert 2009, Ebert, Ebert & Hörnig 2020). But whatever it is, it is not an element of the denotation of *so ein Tisch* – depicting a table is not equivalent to being a table.[1] Accordingly, the parameters of the similarity relation have to be slightly adapted integrating the restriction given by the depiction directly into the features of comparison parameter, see (9).

(8)   Depictive gesture: speaker gesturing a horizontal circle
        a. So einen Tisch hat Anna auch.
        b. Anna'nın da böyle bir masası var.
        c. *Einen Tisch wie das hat Anna auch.
        d. *Anna'nın da bunun gibi bir masası var.
            'Anna also has a table like this.'

---

[1] This is what Clark calls the *ce ne pas une pipe* principle referring to famous painting by Magritte.

(9) [[so ein Tisch/böyle bir masa]] = $\lambda x. \exists y.$ sim(x, y, F_{target}) & table(x) & table(y)[2]

In (10) the similarity demonstrative is combined with a verbal expression and is, again, used with a depictive gesture. Analogous to the nominal case, the denotation of *so tanzen* 'dance like this' is the set of dancing events that are perceptually similar to the depiction, and as before the depiction is not an element of this class.

(10) Depictive gesture: speaker mimicking flamboyant dancing
    a. In den Berliner Techno Clubs wird so getanzt.
    b. Berlin Tekno Club'larında böyle dans ediliyor.
    c. *In den Berliner Techno Clubs wird wie das getanzt.
    d. *Berlin Tekno Club'larında bunun gibi dans ediliyor.
        'In Berlin techno clubs people dance like this.'

(11) [[so tanzen/böyle dans et] = $\lambda e. \exists e'.$ sim(e, e', F_{target}) & dance(e) & dance (e')

Let us come back to the combination of comparison particles and pronominal demonstratives (*wie das / bunun gibi* 'like this'). They cannot be used in place of similarity demonstratives if the latter come with a depiction gesture – neither (8c–d) nor (10c–d) are acceptable. This is unsurprising in the verbal case in (10c–d) because these were already blocked in the pointing version, (6c–d). However, with a depiction *wie das / bunun gibi* is also blocked in the nominal case, in contrast to the nominal case with a pointing gesture, see (1) / (5). This finding is strong evidence that pronominal demonstratives (*das / bu*) are not only restricted to individuals (excluding eventive targets), but also to pointing gestures (excluding depictive ones).

3. Conclusion

Summing up, we saw that similarity demonstratives differ in meaning from pronominal demonstratives combined with comparison particles. They are more flexible with respect to target as well as method – they can target events in addition to individuals and they can make use of depiction in addition to pointing gestures. Finally, this leads to the question of how similarity demonstratives behave in anaphoric usage. It is tacitly assumed in Umbach & Gust (2014) as well as König & Umbach (2018) that anaphoric uses are analogous to those with pointing gestures. That would predict equivalence to *wie das / bunun gibi* in nominal cases which is refuted by the example in (12).

(12) Preceding sentence: Anna should have a speed-limited car.
    a. So ein Auto gibt es (aber) nicht.
    b. *Ein Auto wie das gibt es (aber) nicht.
    c. Böyle bir araba yok.
    d. *Bunun gibi bir araba yok.
        'There are no cars like this.'

Does the observation in (12) lead back to the old idea that similarity demonstratives pick up properties, at least in anaphoric usage? We don't think so. The first sentence in (12) does not introduce a property but an individual exhibiting certain properties. Properties do not occur detached from their carrier (unless nominalized). In depictive uses they are exemplified by the depicting gesture. In anaphoric uses properties are conveyed by the DP description. Just as a

---

[2] Read F_{target} as the set of features (+values) conveyed by the depiction, for details on the F parameter see Gust & Umbach (2021).

depiction does not show a property but a picture exemplifying a property, a DP does not refer to a property (unless nominalized) but to an individual exemplifying a property.

References

Anderson, Curt & Marcin Morzycki. 2015. Degrees as kinds. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 33. 791–828.

Carlson, Greg. 1980. *Reference to kinds in English*. New York & London: Garland.

Clark, Herbert. 2019. Depicting in Communication. In Peter Hagoort (ed.) *Human language. From genes and brains to behavior*, 235–247. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ebert, Christian, Cornelia Ebert, Robert Hörnig. 2020. Demonstratives as dimension shifters. In *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 24*, 161–178.

Gust, Helmar & Carla Umbach. 2021. A Qualitative Similarity Framework for the Interpretation of Natural Language Similarity Expressions. In Lucas Bechberger, Kai-Uwe Kühnberger, Mingya Liu (eds.), *Concepts in Action*, 63–92. Berlin: Springer.

Kaplan, David. 1989. *Demonstratives*. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), *Themes from Kaplan*, 481–563. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

König, Ekkehard & Carla Umbach. 2018. Demonstratives of Manner, of Quality and of Degree: A Neglected Subclass. In Marco Coniglio, Andrew Murphy, Eva Schlachter & Tonjes Veenstra (eds.), *Atypical demonstratives: syntax, semantics and typology*, 285–327. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Umbach, Carla & Cornelia Ebert. 2009. German demonstrative *so* – intensifying and hedging effects. *Sprache und Datenverabeitung* 1–2. 153–168.

Umbach, Carla & Helmar Gust. 2014. Similarity Demonstratives. *Lingua* 149. 74–93.

Umbach, Carla & Britta Stolterfoht (in prep.) Ad-hoc kind formation by similarity.

Umbach, Carla & Umut Özge (in prep.) Scalar and non-scalar comparison across categories: The case of Turkish equatives.

Umbach, Carla, Stefan Hinterwimmer & Helmar Gust. 2022. German '*wie*'-complements: Manners, methods and events in progress. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 40. 307–343.

Kommunikative Beziehungen

Kai Vogeley – Klinik und Poliklinik für Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, Uniklinik Köln
kai.vogeley@uk-koeln.de

„Alles Schreiben, im letzten Sinne, ist nur ein Reden; um zu reden, brauchst du aber ein Du…" (Ludwig Hohl, Die Notizen IV, 20)
„… ohne das Soziale geht es nicht …" (Ludwig Hohl, Die Notizen IV, 21)

1 Begriff der Kommunikation

In unserer Lebenswelt verstehen wir unter Kommunikation Phänomene wie Mitteilung, Gewährung, Verbindung, Austausch, Verkehr, Umgang oder Gemeinschaft (lat. *communicare, communicatio*; Sternschulte 2019). Während Kommunikation als Praxis in unserem Alltag fest verankert ist, lassen sich wissenschaftlich bis zu Hunderten von Kommunikationstheorien ausmachen (Anderson 1996), so dass Kommunikation und ihre Erforschung Gefahr läuft, zu einer „post-discipline" zu werden (Waisbord 2019).

Traditionelle Modelle der Kommunikation seit Shannon und Weaver (1949) sind auf die Transmission von Informationen gerichtet (Berlo 1960). Alternativ lässt sich ein sogenanntes konstitutives Kommunikationsmodell formulieren, das Kommunikation nicht nur als den Raum auffasst, in dem bedeutungsvolle Botschaften transportiert werden, sondern das im kommunikativen Prozess selbst Bedeutung produzieren und sich konstituieren lässt (Craig 1999). Eine ähnliche Konzeption beschreibt auch schon der symbolische Interaktionismus. Danach interagieren wir miteinander auf der Basis von interpretierbaren Bedeutungen oder Symbolen, wobei die Bedeutungen erst in der Interaktion entstehen und sich über die Zeit hinweg ändern können (Mead 1934/1963, Blumer 1969, Carey 2009).

Kommunikation ist also nicht nur als Phänomen zu verstehen, das von psychologischen, soziologischen und kulturellen Faktoren abhängig ist, sondern Kommunikation ist zugleich der primäre konstitutive Prozess, der soziale Strukturen produziert und reproduziert. Kommunikationstheorie kann so zu einer metadiskursiven Praxis im Sinne eines Diskurses über den Diskurs avancieren. Dieser Metadiskurs kann dann verschiedene Traditionen der Kommunikationsforschung zur Kenntnis nehmen einschließlich der rhetorischen, semiotischen, phänomenologischen, kybernetischen, soziopsychologischen, soziokulturellen und kritischen Traditionen (Craig 1999).

2 Erfolgreiche Kommunikation

Eine sehr wesentliche und vielleicht die zentrale Einsicht zu Kommunikation ist, dass Kommunikation einen Beziehungsaspekt und einen Inhaltsaspekt hat. Es ist also nicht nur bedeutsam, was wir mitteilen, sondern auch und vor allem, wie wir etwas mitteilen und mit wem wir den kommunikativen Inhalt teilen. Der Beziehungsaspekt ist dabei grundlegend und dem Inhaltsaspekt vorangestellt. Denn erst eine Beziehung, die uns vertrauenswürdig erscheint, erlaubt auch die verlässliche Vermittlung einer inhaltlichen Botschaft und wird so erfolgreich. Wir suchen Beziehungen zu anderen geradezu intuitiv und automatisch auf. Das belegt unsere Disposition zur Kommunikation. Deutlich wird dies unter anderem daran, dass wir selbst unintendierte Verhaltensweisen anderer als kommunikative Signale verstehen und ausdeuten, „one can not not communicate" (Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson 1967).

Diese Erfahrung der gegenseitigen Verbundenheit wird auch als Rapport bezeichnet. Rapport beruht auf gegenseitiger Aufmerksamkeit, dem wechselseitigen Austausch positiver Signale und der Koordination nonverbaler Verhaltensweisen (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal

1990, Bernieri et al. 1996). Nonverbale Signale steuern und gestalten die Kommunikation, indem sie Diskurs und Dialog koordinieren, die Aufmerksamkeit steuern und Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen den Kommunikationspartnern herstellen (Clark & Brennan 1991, Vogeley & Bente 2010). Illustrieren lässt sich das beispielsweise an der Lenkung des Sprecherwechsels durch Blicksignale (Degutyte & Astell 2021).

Evolutionär haben uns als Spezies diese Leistungen vermutlich in die Lage versetzt, einen „Wir-Modus" (Gallotti & Frith 2013) zu etablieren, der die Voraussetzung bereit gestellt hat für soziale Bindung, Kooperativität und spekulativ auch sogar für die Entwicklung von Wissenschaft, Technik und Kunst als Kulturleistungen in einem universalen Verständnis (Markus & Kitayama 1991, Tomasello 2008).

3 Varianz der Kommunikation

Die Kommunikationsforschung hat sich bisher auf Kommunikation konzentriert, die als zielgerichtet, angenehm oder "erfolgreich" erlebt wird (Shannon & Weaver 1949, Berlo 1960, Zwaan & Ravansky 1998, Pickering & Garrod 2004). In der Regel erreichen wir dieses Ziel, weil unsere Kommunikationsfähigkeiten flexibel und robust zugleich sind und wir so Irritationen und Missverständnisse reparieren können.

Diese Fähigkeiten unterliegen einer erheblichen Variabilität, die aufgrund unserer Kulturzugehörigkeiten zustande kommt, die wiederum durch Sprachen, Normen, Überzeugungssysteme, gemeinsame kognitive Prozesse und Praktiken bestimmt werden (Kitayama & Cohen 2007). Hinzu kommt, dass Kultur und Individuum sich gegenseitig beeinflussen im Sinne eines „looping"-Effekts: Kultur ist ein effektiver Faktor, der das Individuum prägt, zugleich gestalten und konstituieren die Individuen aber auch ihrerseits die Kultur (Hacking 1999, Vogeley & Roepstorff 2009). Kultur ist daher nicht als abstraktes Kollektiv zu betrachten, sondern sollte eher als virtuelle, dynamische Gemeinschaft konzeptualisiert werden, die sich über verschiedene Kompetenzen, Überzeugungen oder Praktiken ausweist.

Diese Anpassungsfähigkeit, die angemessene Reaktionen auf Partner*innen ermöglicht, kann aber auch verloren gehen, etwa aufgrund individuell unterschiedlich ausgeprägter Fähigkeiten, Stile und Repertoires der Personen, die miteinander kommunizieren. Hier ist relevant die Psychopathologie der Kommunikation. Es wurde bereits im Sinne eines Arbeitsprogramms vorgeschlagen, dass die Varianz des menschlichen Erlebens und Verhaltens, die sich in psychopathologischen Zuständen widerspiegelt, als Kommunikations-störung verstanden werden könnte (Ruesch & Bateson 1951, Sullivan 1953, Ruesch 1957, Glatzel 1977, Vogeley 2018). Diese Überlegung steht im Gegensatz zu klassischen psychopathologischen Darstellungen, nach denen nur das Individuum betroffen ist, dem die psychische Störung zugeschrieben wird (Jaspers 1913/1973). Psychopathologische Symptome (Wahrnehmungen, Überzeugungssysteme, emotionale Erfahrungen, kommunikatives Verhalten) beziehen sich aber alle auf eine soziale Gemeinschaft als Hintergrund, zu dem das subjektive Erleben und das Verhalten der Person, die an einer psychischen Störung leidet, in Gegensatz stehen kann (Vogeley & Newen 2009). Es ist also folgerichtig, Kommunikation als zentrales und grundlegendes Konzept in der Psychopathologie zu verankern und als zentralen Forschungsgegenstand zu etablieren.

4 Simulierte Kommunikation

Eine weitere Facette betreffen eindrucksvolle technische Entwicklungen, die uns im Sinne eines Turing-Tests herausfordern. Virtuelle Realitäten ermöglichen die Nachbildung nicht nur sprachlicher, sondern auch nonverbaler Kommunikation einschließlich ihrer körperlichen

Verankerung in künstlichen sozialen Interaktionen mit sozialen Robotern oder virtuellen Charakteren (Clark & Fischer, im Druck). Unsere Kommunikationsdisposition lässt uns in einem sozialen „Als-ob"-Modus mit künstlichen Agent*innen interagieren, als ob sie menschlich wären. Dazu müssen wir dann zumindest temporär unsere Urteilsfähigkeit dazu, ob wir es mit Menschen zu tun haben oder nicht, suspendieren („willing suspension of disbelief"; Coleridge 1817/1907). Wir erleben das als "Präsenz" oder "soziale Präsenz" (Bente et al. 2008). Vermutlich ist die Akzeptanz dieser Agent*innen als Personen umso größer, je stärker sie uns als Menschen erscheinen und je mehr sie sich wie Menschen verhalten (Swartout et al. 2006, Kasap & Magnenat-Thalmann 2007, Vogeley & Bente 2010). Bereits die Anweisung, mit einer anderen Person zu interagieren und ein plausibles Blickverhalten lassen Versuchspersonen glauben, dass sie mit echten Menschen interagieren (Pfeiffer et al. 2014, Vogel et al. 2021). Diese heute verfügbaren Techniken erinnern an philosophische Gedankenexperimente von „Gehirnen im Tank" (Putnam 1981) oder die „Erfahrungs-maschine" (Nozick 1974). Vorausgesehen hat diese Entwicklung bereits der visionäre Autor Stanisław Lem, der lange vor der Etablierung virtueller Realitäten die fiktive Wissenschaft der "Phantomologie" und die dazugehörige Technologie der "Phantomatik" erfand (Lem 1964/2014).

Diese Entwicklungen bergen Herausforderungen. In einer vollständig transformierten virtuellen Lebenswelt wären wir vielleicht nicht mehr in der Lage, zwischen Simulation und Realität zu unterscheiden (Lem 1964/2014), ähnlich wie in Zuständen einer Psychose, bei der die Grenzen zwischen Realität und Virtualität verschwimmen können (Marloth, Chandler & Vogeley 2020). Die künstlichen Anderen würden dann zur "sozialen Halluzination" (Madary & Metzinger 2016). Kommunikation unter den Bedingungen ihrer Simulation kann potentiell auch schaden, uns in Stress-Situationen bringen oder uns traumatisieren (Pan & Hamilton 2018, Ramirez & LaBarge 2018). Damit sind spätestens auch rechtliche Fragen, etwa in Bezug auf Verantwortung und Verantwortlichkeit, aufgeworfen (Lemley & Volokh 2018).

Das bedeutet, dass diese bereits gängigen simulierten Kommunikationsformate begleitet werden sollten, solange ihre Folgewirkungen noch nicht erforscht sind. Mit einer ganz ähnlichen Spannung befasst ist übrigens die Praxis der Psychotherapie. Eine wirksame Psychotherapie setzt voraus, dass Psychotherapeut*in und Patient*in einerseits in eine verlässliche und vertrauensvolle Beziehung zueinander treten. Aber die therapeutisch tätige Person muss zugleich professionelle Distanz wahren und kann nicht gleichzeitig Freund*in oder gar Liebhaber*in werden, um „Übertragungsliebe" zu vermeiden (Freud 1914/1982). Auch hier ist also nur ein schmaler Korridor betretbar, weil einerseits Beziehung stattfinden, andererseits aber auch vermieden werden soll (Vogeley im Druck).

5 Ausblick

Der alltagsrelevante Kontext von Kommunikation birgt also eine Fülle von Forschungsaufträgen. Diese umfassen nicht nur die theoretische Beschäftigung mit dem Begriff der Kommunikation, sondern auch die Erforschung der multimodalen Kommunikation unter Einschluss von Sprache und non- und paraverbalen Signalen. Anwendungen können diese Untersuchungen im interkulturellen Kontext, bei klinischen Störungen der Kommunikationsfähigkeit und bei technologischen Entwicklungen in der Interaktion mit künstlichen sozialen Agent*innen im Sinne von Mensch-Maschine-Interaktion finden.

Literatur

Anderson, James A. 1996. *Communication theory: Epistemological foundations.* New York: Guilford Press.

Bente, Gary, Sabine Rüggenberg, Nicole C. Krämer & Felix Eschenburg. 2008. Avatar-mediated networking: Increasing social presence and interpersonal trust in net-based collaborations. *Human Communication Research* 34. 287–318.

Berlo, David K. 1960. *The process of communication: An introduction to theory and practice.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Bernieri, Frank J., John S. Gillis, Janet M. Davis & Jon E. Grahe. 1996. Dyad rapport and the accuracy of its judgment across situations: A lens model analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 7. 110–129.

Blumer, Herbert. 1969. *Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Carey, James W. 2009. *Communication as culture.* Revised edition. New York: Routledge.

Clark, Herbert H. & Susan E. Brennan. 1991. Grounding in communication. In Lauren B. Resnick, Lauren B, John M. Levine & Stephanie D. Teasley (eds.), *Perspectives on socially shared cognition*, 127–149. Washington: APA Books.

Clark, Herbert H. & Kerstin Fischer. Im Druck. Social robots as depictions of social agents. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*.

Coleridge, Samuel T. 1817/1907. *Biographia literaria.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Craig, Robert T. 1999. Communication theory as a field. *Communication Theory* 9. 119–161.

Degutyte, Ziedune & Arlene Astell. 2021. The role of eye gaze in regulating turn taking in conversations: A systematized review of methods and findings. *Frontiers in Psychology* 12.

Freud, Sigmund. 1914/1982. Bemerkungen über die Übertragungsliebe. In Alexander Mitscherlich, Angela Richards & James Strachey (eds.), *Studienausgabe*, 217–230. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.

Gallotti, Mattia & Chris D. Frith. 2013. Social cognition in the we-mode. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 17. 160–165.

Glatzel, Johann. 1977. *Das psychisch Abnorme. Kritische Ansätze zu einer Psychopathologie.* München Wien Baltimore: Urban & Schwarzenberg.

Hacking, Ian. 1999. *The social construction of what?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hohl, Ludwig. 1984. *Die Notizen.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Jaspers, Karl. 1913/1973. *Allgemeine Psychopathologie.* 8th edition. Heidelberg: Springer.

Kasap, Zerrin & Nadia Magnenat-Thalmann. 2007. Intelligent virtual humans with autonomy and personality: State-of-the-art. *Intelligent Decision Technologies* 1. 3–15.

Kitayama, Shinobu & Dov Cohen. 2007. *Handbook of cultural psychology.* New York: Guilford Press.

Lem, Stanisław. 1964/2014. *Summa technologiae.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Lemley, Mark A. & Eugene Volokh. 2018. Law, virtual reality, and augmented reality. *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 166. 1051–1138.

Madary, Michael & Thomas K. Metzinger. 2016. Real virtuality: A code of ethical conduct. Recommendations for good scientific practice and the consumers of VR-technology. *Frontiers in Robotics and AI* 3. 1–23.

Markus, Hazel R. & Shinobu Kitayama. 1991. Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review* 98. 224–253.

Marloth, Maria, Jennifer Chandler & Kai Vogeley. 2020. Psychiatric interventions in virtual reality: Why we need an ethical framework. *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics* 29. 574–584.

Mead, George H. 1934/1963. *Mind, self, and society.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nozick, Robert. 1974. *Anarchy, state and utopia*. New York: Basic Books.

Pan, Xueni & Antonia F. de C. Hamilton. 2018. Why and how to use virtual reality to study human social interaction: The challenges of exploring a new research landscape. *British Journal of Psychology* 109. 395–417.

Pfeiffer, Ulrich J., Leo Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Bojana Kuzmanovic, Alexandra L. Georgescu, Gary Bente & Kai Vogeley. 2014. Why we interact: On the functional role of the striatum in the subjective experience of social interaction. *Neuroimage* 101. 124–137.

Pickering, Martin J. & Simon Garrod. 2004. Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 27. 169–190.

Putnam, Hilary. 1981. *Reason, truth and history*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ramirez, Erick J. & Scott LaBarge. 2018. Real moral problems in the use of virtual reality. *Ethics Information Technology* 20. 249–263.

Ruesch, Juergen & Gregory Bateson. 1951. *Communication – The social matrix of psychiatry*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc.

Ruesch, Juergen. 1957. *Disturbed communication: The clinical assessment of normal and pathological communicative behavior*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc.

Shannon, Claude E. & Warren Weaver. 1949. *The mathematical theory of communication*. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press.

Sternschulte, Klaus P. 2019. Kommunikation. In Joachim Ritte & Karlfried Gründer (eds.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, 894–895. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Sullivan, Harry S. 1953. *The interpersonal theory of psychiatry*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc.

Swartout, William, Jonathan Gratch, Randall W. Hill, Eduard Hovy, Stacy Marsella, Jeff Rickel & David Traum. 2006. Toward virtual humans. *AI Magazine* 27. 96–108.

Tickle-Degnen, Linda & Robert Rosenthal. 1990. The nature of rapport and its nonverbal correlates. *Psychological Inquiry* 1. 285–293.

Tomasello, Michael. 2008. *Why we cooperate*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Vogel, David H. V., Mathis Jording, Carola Esser, Peter H. Weiss & Kai Vogeley. 2021. Temporal binding is enhanced in social contexts. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review* 28. 1545–1555.

Vogeley, Kai & Andreas Roepstorff. 2009. Contextualising culture and social cognition. *Trends in Cognitive Science* 13. 511–516.

Vogeley Kai & Albert Newen. 2009. Consciousness of oneself and others in relation to mental disorders. In Stephen J. Wood, Nicholas B. Allen & Christos Pantelis (eds.), *The neuropsychology of mental illness*, 408–413, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vogeley, Kai & Gary Bente. 2010. "Artificial humans": Psychology and neuroscience perspectives on embodiment and nonverbal communication. *Neural Networks* 23. 1077–1090.

Vogeley, Kai. 2018. Communication as fundamental paradigm for psychopathology. In Albert Newen, Leon de Bruin & Shaun Gallagher (eds.). *The Oxford handbook of 4E cognition*. 805–820. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vogeley, Kai. Im Druck. Binding paradox in artificial social realities. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*.

Waisbord, Silvio. 2019. *Communication: A post-discipline*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Watzlawick, Paul, Janet H. Beavin & Don D. Jackson. 1967. *Pragmatics of human communication: A study of interactional patterns, pathologies and paradoxes*. New York: Norton.

Zwaan, Rolf A. & Gabriel A. Radvansky. 1998. Situation models in language comprehension and memory. *Psychological Bulletin* 123. 162–185.

Der Einfluss von Kontrast auf die Verwendung deutscher Personalpronomen und pronominaler Demonstrative

Robert Voigt – Universität zu Köln
rvoigt4@uni-koeln.de

1 Die Verwendung von *er*, *der* und *dieser* im Deutschen

Im Deutschen können Demonstrative der *der/die/das* und *dieser/diese/dieses* Paradigmas pronominal verwendet werden, um eine anaphorische Referenz auszudrücken. In dieser Verwendungsweise ähneln sie den Personalpronomen *er/sie/es*. Trotz dieser Ähnlichkeit scheinen Personalpronomen und pronominal verwendete Demonstrative nicht beliebig austauschbar zu sein. Dies lässt sich anhand der Beispiele (1) und (2) demonstrieren:

(1)   Der Junge ist mit seinem Hund ausgegangen. Er hat dabei immer viel Spaß.
(2)   Der Junge ist mit seinem Hund ausgegangen. Der hat dabei immer viel Spaß.

Aus der psycholinguistischen Literatur ist bekannt, dass Testpersonen in einem Satz wie (1) das ambige Personalpronomen präferiert in Richtung des Jungen auflösen, während sie in Sätzen wie (2) dazu tendieren, den Hund als Antezedens für das Demonstrativ auszuwählen. Fuchs & Schumacher (2020) erklären dieses Muster unter Bezug auf das Konzept der Diskursprominenz aus von Heusinger & Schumacher (2019) dadurch, dass das Demonstrativ *der* weniger prominente Referenten als Antezedens bevorzuge, während *er* tendenziell prominentere Referenten anaphorisch aufgreife (Fuchs & Schumacher 2020: 186–188).

Weniger erforscht sind Unterschiede zwischen dem pronominalen *der* und *dieser*. Die bisherige Forschung zu den beiden Subklassen von Demonstrativen konnte bislang wenige Faktoren finden, die verlässlich Unterschiede in der Verwendung der beiden Demonstrative hervorrufen. Möglicherweise spielen Modalität und Register insofern eine Rolle, als dass *der* eher in informellem oder mündlichem Sprachgebrauch verwendet wird, während Sprecher:innen *dieser* in formelleren oder geschriebenen sprachlichen Kontexten bevorzugen (Graefen 1997, Patil, Bosch & Hinterwimmer 2020). Ebenfalls diskutiert wird, ob *dieser* eine stärkere Präferenz für den letztgenannten Referenten als Antezedens hat, während *der* flexibler ist. Die Forschungsergebnisse hierzu sind allerdings uneindeutig (Zifonun, Hoffmann & Strecker 1997, Patil, Bosch & Hinterwimmer 2020, Patterson & Schumacher 2021, Patterson et al. 2022: 20).

Bisle-Müller (1991) und Ahrenholz (2007) nehmen an, dass *dieser* verwendet werden könne, um einen Referenten kontrastiv aus einer Gruppe ähnlicher Referenten hervorzuheben und identifizierend abzugrenzen, während *der* hierzu nicht oder nur eingeschränkt in der Lage sei. Ein Beispiel für eine solche Verwendung ist in (3) aufgeführt.

(3)   Ich kenne einen Linguistik-Professor und einen Literatur-Professor. Ich rede gern mit dem Linguistik-Professor. Im Gegensatz zu dem Literatur-Professor kann dieser stundenlang über Demonstrative reden.

Um die Hypothese dieser Autoren zu überprüfen, führte ich ein Forced-Choice Experiment durch, in dem Proband:innen in einem within-subjects-Design Mini-Diskurse mit und ohne einen solchen Kontrast präsentiert bekamen. In der kontrastiven Bedingung wurde der anaphorisch aufgegriffene Referent mit anderen Referenten kontrastiert. In der Bedingung ohne Kontrast gab es nur einen Referenten. Die Testpersonen sollten jeweils entscheiden, ob sie den Referenten mit *der* oder *dieser* aufgreifen möchten. Der genaue theoretische Hintergrund sowie Aufbau, Ergebnisse und Diskussion des Experiments sind in Voigt (2021) und kondensiert in

Voigt (eing.) geschildert. Deswegen gehe ich an dieser Stelle nur auf die zentralen Ergebnisse ein: Die Hypothese aus Bisle-Müller (1991) und Ahrenholz (2007) konnte nicht bestätigt werden. Zwar konnte das Demonstrativ *dieser* einen Kontrast ausdrücken und wurde in beiden Bedingungen gleichermaßen häufiger ausgewählt als *der*. Allerdings fand sich kein statistisch signifikanter Unterschied zwischen den Bedingungen. *Der* scheint also ebenfalls Kontrast ausdrücken zu können, was auf einer Linie mit theoretischen Überlegungen aus Bosch & Hinterwimmer (2016: 206–209) liegt, die schreiben, dass *der* möglicherweise einen Kontrast ausdrücken könne und das hierin ein Unterschied zu dem Personalpronomen *er* liegen könnte. Im verbleibenden Teil dieses Beitrags schildere ich ein weiteres Forced-Choice Experiment, in welchem ich untersuche, inwieweit der zweite Teil der Hypothese aus Bosch & Hinterwimmer (2016) zutrifft und in der Kontrastfunktion von *der* (und *dieser*) ein möglicher Unterschied zu dem Personalpronomen *er* vorliegt.

2 Kontrast und die Verwendung von *er*, *der* und *dieser* – eine Pilotstudie

Aufbauend auf den theoretischen Überlegungen aus Bosch & Hinterwimmer (2016) und Schwarz (2015) sowie den Ergebnissen meines ersten Experiments möchte ich in diesem Experiment die Hypothese testen, dass ein Kontrast zwischen dem anaphorisch aufgegriffenen Referenten sowie anderen ähnlichen Referenten, die sich von diesem Referenten hinsichtlich einer wesentlichen Eigenschaft unterscheiden, zu einer erhöhten Verwendung von *der* und *dieser* führt, da diese beiden Demonstrative über eine semantische Kontrastfunktion verfügen. Dahingegen sollte ein solcher Kontrast die Verwendung von *er* reduzieren.

Zu diesem Zweck habe ich ein zweites Forced-Choice Experiment durchgeführt. Die Items aus dem ersten Experiment wurden dabei so modifiziert, dass ich in einem 2x2 Design zwei unabhängige Variablen manipulieren konnte. Die erste Variable war wie in dem vorherigen Experiment der Faktor Kontrast. Testpersonen wurden auch in diesem Experiment Bedingungen mit und ohne Kontrast präsentiert. Die zweite Variable war die Pronomenauswahl. Die Proband:innen konnten entweder zwischen *er* und *der* oder zwischen *er* und *dieser* auswählen. Es handelte sich wieder um ein within-subjects und within-items Design. Ein prototypisches Item ist in (4) aufgeführt. Es gab vier Levels für jedes Item: Kontrast-er/der (4a), Kontrast-er/dieser (4b), Kein-Kontrast (Norm)-er/der (4c) und kein Kontrast (Norm)-er/dieser (4d).

(4)　　a. Für die Renovierung meines Hauses habe ich einen Dachdecker, einen Fliesenleger und einen Elektriker kommen lassen. Ich fand den Dachdecker am besten. Im Gegensatz zu dem Fliesenleger und dem Elektriker war er/der extrem fleißig.
　　　　b. Für die Renovierung meines Hauses habe ich einen Dachdecker, einen Fliesenleger und einen Elektriker kommen lassen. Ich fand den Dachdecker am besten. Im Gegensatz zu dem Fliesenleger und dem Elektriker war er/dieser extrem fleißig.
　　　　c. Für die teure Renovierung meines sehr baufälligen Hauses im Vorort der Stadt habe ich einen Dachdecker kommen lassen. Ich fand den Dachdecker sehr gut. Im Rahmen der Renovierungsarbeiten am Haus war er/der extrem fleißig.
　　　　d. Für die teure Renovierung meines sehr baufälligen Hauses im Vorort der Stadt habe ich einen Dachdecker kommen lassen. Ich fand den Dachdecker sehr gut. Im Rahmen der Renovierungsarbeiten am Haus war er/dieser extrem fleißig.

Trifft die Hypothese zu, sollten die Demonstrative in den Bedingungen mit Kontrast, also (4a) und (4b), statistisch signifikant häufiger verwendet werden als in den Bedingungen ohne Kontrast ((4c) und (4d)). Zudem sollten die Personalpronomen in den kontrastiven Bedingungen signifikant weniger häufig verwendet werden.

Gemäß der vier Bedingungen wurden die insgesamt 17 Items mittels des Latin Square Designs auf vier Listen verteilt und pseudo-randomisiert. Zusätzlich dazu gab es 18 Filler. Die relativ geringe Anzahl an Items und Fillern erklärt sich durch den Pilotcharakter der Studie. Die Listen wurden auf Google Forms implementiert und den 65 Testpersonen online zugeschickt. Neben den experimentellen Fragen wurden auch demographische Informationen erhoben sowie das Einverständnis eingeholt.

Tabelle 1: Pivottabelle der Ergebnisse des Forced-Choice Experiments

Tabelle 1 zeigt die Ergebnisse des Experiments. In der Bedingung mit Kontrast wurde *der* 47 und *er* 227 Mal verwendet. Ohne Kontrast entschieden sich die Testpersonen 23 Mal für *der* und 256 Mal für *er*. Standen *er* und *dieser* zur Auswahl, wurde *dieser* in der Kontrast-Bedingung 68 Mal gewählt und *er* 210 Mal. Ohne Kontrast gab es 53 Mal *dieser* und 221 Mal *er*. Es bleibt also festzuhalten, dass *er* in allen Bedingungen deutlich häufiger verwendet wurde als die Demonstrative. Aufgrund der höheren Flexibilität von Personalpronomen in der Wahl ihres Antezedens (Schumacher, Dangel & Uzun 2016) ist dieser Befund nicht überraschend. Ebenfalls festzuhalten ist, dass *dieser* insgesamt etwas häufiger verwendet wurde als *der*. In dieser Hinsicht repliziert das Experiment die Ergebnisse aus Voigt (2021) und Voigt (eing.). Besonders relevant hinsichtlich der Forschungsfrage ist allerdings die Beobachtung, dass die beiden Demonstrative in den Bedingungen mit Kontrast deutlich häufiger verwendet wurden als in den Bedingungen ohne Kontrast. Im Falle von *dieser* finden wir einen leichten Anstieg von 53 auf 68 Verwendungen. Stärker ist der Effekt für *der*: in den kontrastiven Fällen wurde es mehr als doppelt so häufig ausgewählt (47 Mal) als in denen ohne Kontrast (23 Mal).

Die Modelle für die Inferenzstatistik wurden über R (R Core Team 2022) und brms (Bürkner 2017) berechnet; die Post-hoc Analysen mit emmeans (Lenth 2022). Mittels eines Bayesian Generalized Linear Mixed Models mit maximaler Random Effects Struktur wurden der Haupteffekt des Faktors Kontrast sowie der Interaktionseffekt zwischen den Faktoren Kontrast und Pronomenauswahl berechnet. Es fand sich ein statistisch signifikanter Haupteffekt von Kontrast auf die Antworten der Testpersonen [Estimate: -0,937. Credible Intervall: von -1,75 bis -0,192]. In den kontrastiven Bedingungen wurden die Demonstrative also signifikant häufiger ausgewählt als in den Bedingungen ohne Kontrast bzw. die Personalpronomen signifikant

weniger häufig ausgewählt. Innerhalb der Bedingungen *er/der* und *er/dieser* löste der Faktor Kontrast lediglich in der *er/der* Bedingung einen statistisch signifikanten Unterschied im Antwortverhalten der Testpersonen aus [Estimate: -1,520. Credible Intervall von -2,74 bis -0,565], nicht jedoch in der *er/dieser* Bedingung [Estimate: -0,337. Credible Intervall von -1,33 bis 0,596]. Dennoch ergab die Berechnung des Interaktionseffekts zwischen den Faktoren Kontrast und Pronomenauswahl keine statistisch signifikante Interaktion [Estimate: 1,22. Credible Intervall von -0,08 bis 2,63]. Die Ergebnisse der statistischen Analyse deuten also darauf hin, dass kontrastive Kontexte tatsächlich zu einer häufigeren Verwendung von Demonstrativen führen und dass dieser Effekt für *der* möglicherweise etwas stärker ist als für *dieser*.

Ein weiteres interessantes Ergebnis beider Experimente ist, dass *dieser* in allen Bedingungen häufiger verwendet wurde als *der*. Möglicherweise lässt sich das durch den oben erwähnten Faktor *Modalität* erklären. Die starke Präferenz der Versuchspersonen für *dieser* gegenüber *der* in meinen Experimenten könnte weitere Evidenz dafür liefern, dass die schriftliche Modalität ein Faktor ist, der die pronominale Verwendung von *dieser* begünstigt. Zu beachten ist allerdings, dass sich aus den Resultaten meiner Experimente nicht direkt darauf schließen lässt, da es keine mündliche Vergleichsbedingung gab. Ein weiteres Experiment, in dem der Faktor Modalität neben den anderen beiden Faktoren variiert wird, könnte in diese Richtung aufschlussreich sein. Zudem könnte mittels eines solchen Experimentes überprüft werden, ob nicht doch ein Kontrasteffekt zugunsten von *dieser* vorliegt, der im Schriftlichen allerdings vom stärkeren Effekt der Modalität überdeckt wird.

Auch bezüglich des oben geschilderten Faktors der linearen Reihenfolge liefern meine Experimente Erkenntnisse. In allen kontrastiven Bedingungen ist der Referent, der anaphorisch aufgegriffen wird, nicht der Letztgenannte. Trotzdem scheinen Testpersonen nicht nur kein Problem damit zu haben, diesen Referenten mit *dieser* aufzugreifen, sie präferieren dieses Demonstrativ sogar deutlich vor *der*. Diese Ergebnisse sprechen somit eher gegen eine Präferenz von *dieser* für das letztgenannte Antezedens. Einschränkend muss gesagt werden, dass auch hier wieder ein starker Effekt der Modalität einen schwächeren Effekt der linearen Ordnung überschreiben könnte. Somit wäre ebenfalls hier ein weiteres Experiment aufschlussreich, welches die Faktoren Modalität und lineare Ordnung variiert.

Das wohl verblüffendste Ergebnis des zweiten Experiments liegt jedoch darin, dass das Demonstrativ *der* möglicherweise stärker auf den Faktor Kontrast reagiert hat als das Demonstrativ *dieser*. Dieses Resultat widerspricht nicht nur den Hypothesen aus Bisle-Müller (1991) und Ahrenholz (2007), es lässt sich sogar so deuten, dass es Indizien für die gegenteilige Position liefert: Vielleicht wird *der* sogar präferierter dazu verwendet, einen Kontrast auszudrücken als das Demonstrativ *dieser*. Wenn dies der Fall sein sollte, stellt sich die Frage, warum das erste Experiment keinen solchen Kontrasteffekt zugunsten von *der* gezeigt hat. Möglicherweise ließe sich auch dies durch den Faktor Modalität erklären, der gegebenenfalls so stark ist, dass er im direkten Vergleich zwischen *der* und *dieser* einen möglichen Kontrasteffekt in Richtung von *der* überdeckt. Möglicherweise spielt auch der Faktor *Perspektive* eine Rolle, von dem bekannt ist, dass er die Wahl des Antezedens von Personalpronomen und Demonstrativen im Deutschen und einigen anderen Sprachen beeinflusst (Hinterwimmer, Brocher & Patil 2020, Kaiser & Fedele 2019: 311). Andererseits bleibt zu bedenken, dass die statistische Analyse in dieser Hinsicht uneindeutig ist und sich nicht klar daraus ableiten lässt, ob der Unterschied durch den Kontrast bedingt ist oderdurch andere Faktoren.

Abschließend lässt sich festhalten, dass die beiden Experimente viele neue Fragen aufwerfen, die weitere theoretische und empirische Untersuchungen nach sich ziehen könnten, welche insbesondere die Faktoren Modalität und Perspektive miteinbeziehen.

Literatur

Ahrenholz, Bernt. 2007. *Verweise mit Demonstrativa im gesprochenen Deutsch. Grammatik, Zweitspracherwerb und Deutsch als Fremdsprache*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Bisle-Müller, Hansjörg. 1991. *Artikelwörter im Deutschen. Semantische und pragmatische Aspekte ihrer Verwendung*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Bosch, Peter & Stefan Hinterwimmer. 2016. Anaphoric reference by demonstrative pronouns in German. In search of relevant parameters. In Anke Holler & Kaja Suckow (Hrsg.), *Empirical perspectives on anaphora resolution*, 193–212. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Bürkner, Paul-Christian. 2017. brms: An R Package for Bayesian Multilevel Models Using Stan. *Journal of Statistical Software* 80(1), 1–28.

Fuchs, Melanie & Petra B. Schumacher. 2020. Referential shift potential of demonstrative pronouns – evidence from text continuation. In Ashild Næss, Anna Margetts & Yvonne Treis (Hrsg.), *Demonstratives in discourse*, 185–213. Berlin: Language Science Press.

Graefen, Gabriele. 1997. *Der wissenschaftliche Artikel. Textart und Textorganisation*. Frankfurt am Main: Lang.

von Heusinger, Klaus & Petra B. Schumacher. 2019. Discourse prominence: Definition and application. *Journal of pragmatics* 154. 117–127.

Hinterwimmer, Stefan, Andreas Brocher & Umesh Patil. 2020. Demonstrative pronouns as anti-logophoric pronouns: an experimental investigation. *Dialogue & discourse* 11(2). 110–127.

Lenth, Russel V. 2022. emmeans: Estimated Marginal Means, aka Least-Squares Means. R package version 1.7.4–1.

Patil, Umesh, Peter Bosch & Stefan Hinterwimmer. 2020. Constraints on German *diese* demonstratives: language formality and subject-avoidance. *Glossa: a journal of general linguistics* 5(1). 1–22.

Patterson, Clare & Petra B. Schumacher. 2021. Interpretation preferences in contexts with three antecedents: examining the role of prominence in German pronouns. *Applied Psycholinguistics* 42(6). 1427–1461.

Patterson, Clare, Petra B. Schumacher, Bruno Nicenboim, Johannes Hagen & Andrew Kehler. 2022. A Bayesian approach to German personal and demonstrative pronouns. *Frontiers in Psychology* 12.

R Core Team. 2022. R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.

Schumacher, Petra B., Manuel Dangl & Elyesa Uzun. 2016. Thematic role as prominence cue during pronoun resolution in German. In Anke Holler & Kaja Suckow (Hrsg.), *Empirical*

perspectives on anaphora resolution, 121–147. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Schwarz, Florian. 2015. Topics & situations. Comments on Hinterwimmer. In Patrick Grosz, Pritty Patel-Grosz & Igor Yanovich (Hrsg.), *NELS 40: Proceedings of the semantics workshop on pronouns*, 109–126. Amherst, MA: GLSA Publications.

Voigt, Robert. 2021. *Kontrast als möglicher Einflussfaktor auf die pronominale Verwendung der Demonstrative* der *und* dieser *im Deutschen*. Universität zu Köln: Bachelorarbeit.

Voigt, Robert. Eingereicht. Contrast and the pronominal use of the demonstratives *der* and *dieser* in German. In *Proceedings of ConSOLE30*.

Zifonun, Gisela, Ludger Hoffmann & Bruno Strecker. 1997. *Grammatik der deutschen Sprache*, vol. 1. Berlin: De Gruyter.

***Dieser wiederum* vs. *der junge Professor wiederum*.**
Zum Zusammenspiel referentieller Ausdrücke und *wiederum* in Nacherstposition

Regina Zieleke – Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen
regina.zieleke@uni-tuebingen.de

1 *Wiederum* als Marker für (informations-)strukturellen Kontrast

Der Adverbkonnektor *wiederum* kann sowohl in einer temporalen Lesart als auch kontrastiv verwendet werden. In (1a) lizensiert die Vorfeldstellung erstere (*Klaus feiert erneut Geburtstag*), während die Mittelfeldstellung in (1b) beide Lesarten zulässt. In der Nacherststellung in (1c) wiederum ist die temporale Lesart ausgeschlossen (*Im Gegensatz zu jemand anderes feiert Klaus Geburtstag*).

(1) a. **Wiederum** feiert Klaus Geburtstag.
     b. Klaus feiert **wiederum** Geburtstag.
     c. Klaus **wiederum** feiert Geburtstag.

(1c) lässt sich folgendermaßen erklären: Zum einen haben Adverbkonnektoren in der Nacherstposition allgemein die Funktion, einen Topikwechsel anzuzeigen (vgl. Breindl 2011); zum anderen wird der *wiederum* zugeschriebene Kontrast üblicherweise genau durch einen solchen Topikwechsel definiert. Breindl, Volodina & Waßner (2014) unterscheiden hierbei zwischen einem Topikwechsel mit kontrastiven Topiks in Verbindung mit gegensätzlich zu interpretierenden Kommentaren ("kontrastiver Vergleich", 2014: 522) wie in (2) und einem nicht näher spezifizierten Topikwechsel, "ohne dass damit eine Kontrastierung der Prädikate verbunden ist" ("schwacher Kontrast", Breindl, Volodina & Waßner 2014: 532) wie in (3).

(2) Peter macht heute Überstunden. Klaus **wiederum** feiert Geburtstag.

(3) Anlässlich des 60. Geburtstags gibt es einen großen Kuchen. Der **wiederum** schmeckt köstlich.

Dass ein Kontrast im eigentlichen Sinne in (2) zugänglicher ist als in (3), ist aus meiner Sicht allerdings nicht auf unterschiedliche Subtypen von Kontrast zurückzuführen. Die Funktion des Konnektors ist in beiden Fällen die gleiche: *wiederum* signalisiert, dass es sich beim Topik des Trägerkonnekts (*Klaus*/*der*) um ein anderes handelt als im jeweiligen Bezugskonnekt. Der Unterschied besteht allein darin, *wo* das Trägerkonnekt-Topik verankert ist. In (2) ist das im "Teiltopik-Verhältnis" zum Topik des Bezugskonnekts, aus dem sich per für kontrastive Topiks übliche Implikatur eine vergleichende Lesart einstellt. In (3) handelt es sich um eine anaphorische Wiederaufnahme des bereits im nicht-topikalen Teil des Bezugskonnekts eingeführten Kuchens (entsprechend der "linearen [Topik-]-Progression" nach Daneš 1970).

Diese Eigenschaften sind ganz unabhängig vom Konnektor auch in den asyndetischen Varianten in (4) und (5) vorhanden, weshalb ich *wiederum* als (pragmatischen) Marker für Kontrast auf (informations-)struktureller Ebene analysiere.[1]

---

[1] Dies ist auch für *wiederum* in der Mittelfeldstellung der Fall, dort aber präferiert mit kontrastiven Topiks (vgl. Breindl, Volodina & Waßner 2014). Darüber hinaus fungieren noch weitere Konnektoren als strukturelle Kontrastmarker, wie *dagegen*, *hingegen* oder (eine Lesart von) *aber*. Auch Korrektur, die im Deutschen mit *sondern* markiert wird, ist maßgeblich durch strukturelle Eigenschaften der Konnekte geprägt (vgl. Jasinskaja

(4)   Peter macht heute Überstunden. Klaus feiert Geburtstag.

(5)   Anlässlich des 60. Geburtstags gibt es einen großen Kuchen. Der schmeckt köstlich.

2 Das Zusammenspiel: Referentielle Ausdrücke und *wiederum* in Nacherstposition

Wie (4) und (5) zeigen, wird die Verankerung des Trägerkonnekt-Topiks also unabhängig vom Konnektor durch weitere sprachliche Mittel gesteuert. Als passende Kandidaten fallen hierbei die unterschiedlichen referentiellen Ausdrücke ins Auge, die zur Realisierung der Topikkonstituente im Trägerkonnekt verwendet werden und ebenfalls in Zusammenhang mit der Topikprogression stehen: Eigennamen wie *Klaus* können sowohl auf bereits eingeführte als auch auf diskursneue Referenten verweisen, Demonstrativpronomen wie *der* verweisen auf eingeführte, aktivierte Referenten. Die Eigenschaften der referentiellen Ausdrücke in (2)–(3) stimmen also mit denen von *wiederum*s Funktionsweisen überein und lassen je eine kontrastive Topik-Lesart bzw. eine Topikanhebung-Lesart zu.

Die folgenden Beispiele werfen hierzu jedoch interessante Fragen auf. Wie durch die Indizierung in (6)–(8) angezeigt, soll das jeweilige Trägerkonnekt-Topik mit der nicht-topikalen Konstituente *einen großen Kuchen* im Bezugskonnekt im Sinne einer Topikanhebung wie in (3) koreferieren. Die jeweiligen asyndetischen (a)-Versionen zeigen, dass Personalpronomen, Demonstrativpronomen und definite DPs für diese Funktion prinzipiell in Frage kommen (vgl. auch Givenness-Hierarchie nach Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski 1993). In Kombination mit *wiederum* in Nacherstposition ((b)-Versionen) allerdings ist allein (7b) mit der Konstruktion Demonstrativpronomen + *wiederum* zulässig.

(6)   Klaus bekommt *einen großen Kuchen*$_i$.
     a.   *Er*$_i$ schmeckt fantastisch.
     b.   *Er*$_i$ #**wiederum** schmeckt fantastisch.

(7)   Klaus bekommt *einen großen Kuchen*$_i$.
     a.   *Der*$_i$/*Dieser*$_i$ schmeckt fantastisch.
     b.   *Der*$_i$/*Dieser*$_i$ **wiederum** schmeckt fantastisch.

(8)   Klaus bekommt *einen großen Kuchen*$_i$.
     a.   *Das aufwändige Gepäck*$_i$ schmeckt fantastisch.
     b.   *Das aufwändige Gepäck*$_i$?**wiederum** schmeckt fantastisch.

Die Unverträglichkeit in (6b) ließe sich möglicherweise durch eine allgemeine Präferenz von Personalpronomen nach Proto-Agens-Konstituenten auflösen (vgl. Schumacher, Dangl & Uzun 2016), und deren Widerstreit mit der Topikanhebung erklären. Als Gegenbeleg dienen jedoch neben (6a) Fälle wie (9), in denen die Konstruktion Personalpronomen + *wiederum* völlig unfraglich ist.

(9)   Peter ärgert *Maria*$_i$. *Sie*$_i$ **wiederum** ignoriert ihn einfach.

Der Unterschied zwischen (6b) und (9) besteht in der resultierenden Interpretation: In (9) wird *sie*$_{Maria}$ als kontrastives Topik zu *Peter* interpretiert, woraufhin deren Handlungen

---

2012) und kann auch ohne Konnektor ausgedrückt werden (*Ich fahre nicht nach /BerLIN, ich fahre nach \ROM*).

ebenfalls als kontrastiv verstanden werden. In (6b) lassen die Prädikate das nicht zu. Ähnlich scheint es sich auch mit der zumindest markierten Konstruktion defDP + *wiederum* in (8b) zu verhalten, was folgendes Beispiel stärker verdeutlicht: In der asyndetischen Verbindung in (10a) kann die Topikkonstituente *der junge Professor* sowohl auf *Peter* als auch auf *Max* referieren. Wenn aber wie in (10b) *wiederum* in Nacherstposition hinzukommt, ist *Peter* nicht mehr und *Max* zumindest schwerer als Antezedent zugänglich. Naheliegender ist stattdessen die Interpretation, dass es sich beim jungen Professor um eine völlig andere Person k handelt, und dass deren Vergnügen mit Peters Unterhaltung in Kontrast steht.

(10) Pater$_i$ unterhält sich mit Max$_j$.
   a. *Der junge Professor*$_{i/j}$ hat einen vergnüglichen Abend.
   b. *Der junge Professor*$_{*i/?j/k}$ **wiederum** hat einen vergnüglichen Abend.

Mit anderen Worten wird durch die Konstruktion defDP + *wiederum* eine kontrastive TopikLesart begünstigt, während eine Topikanhebung-Lesart – wenn nicht blockiert – zumindest unzugänglicher wird. Im Fall der Konstruktion Personalpronomen + *wiederum* ist die Topikanhebung-Lesart gänzlich blockiert und die Konstruktion überhaupt nur in kontrastiver Topik-Lesart möglich. Allein die Konstruktion Demonstrativpronomen + *wiederum* scheint zum Ausdruck der Topikanhebung-Lesart geeignet. Die koreferentiellen Interpretationsmöglichkeiten der unterschiedlichen referentiellen Ausdrücke werden in Verbindung mit *wiederum* also eingeschränkt.

Diese Tendenzen lassen sich auch in Korpusdaten beobachten. Abb. 1 zeigt die Verteilung der unterschiedlichen Topikrealisierungen nach Lesart bei 50 Korpusbelegen aus DeReKo mit *wiederum* in Nacherstposition.

Abbildung 1: Verteilung Lesarten von im *wiederum* in Nacherstposition im Korpus

In der Mehrheit der 28 Belege mit kontrastiver Topik-Lesart wird die Topikkonstituente im Trägerkonnekt als definite oder indefinite DP oder als Eigenname realisiert (je 14, 3 und 8 Belege). Die Konstruktion Personalpronomen + *wiederum* tritt im Korpus erwartungsgemäß nicht auf, stattdessen verhalten sich vier der Eigenname + *wiederum*-Konstruktionen ähnlich zu (9), indem der jeweilige Topikreferent Bezugskonnekt bereits vorerwähnt ist.

In den 22 Belegen mit Topikanhebung-Lesart sind dagegen Demonstrativpronomen wie in (7b) deutlich vorherrschend (19 Belege). Auffällig ist hier zudem, dass in den beiden Fällen mit defDP + *wiederum* in Topikanhebung-Lesart zwischen Bezugs- und Trägerkonnekt mehrere (subordinierende) Diskurseinheiten stehen. In einer vergleichbaren Anpassung wird auf diese Art auch (8b) akzeptabler:

(11) Klaus bekommt *einen großen Kuchen*$_i$, ganz viele Geschenke und nette Gratulationen, und es ist für alle ein vergnüglicher Abend.
   Das aufwändige Gebäcke$_i$ **wiederum** schmeckt fantastisch.

3 Fazit

Die Betrachtung der introspektiven Beispiele und Korpusbelege zeigt, dass zwischen *wiederum* in Nacherstposition und verschiedenen Realisierungsmöglichkeiten der Topikkonstituente im Trägerkonnekt eine Verbindung besteht. Obwohl beispielsweise definite DPs und Eigennamen ohne *wiederum* durchaus eine Topikanhebung-Lesart zulassen, wird diese in Verbindung mit *wiederum* in Nacherstposition unzugänglich und stattdessen eine kontrastive Topik-Lesart bevorzugt. Lediglich in Fällen mit mehreren subordinierenden Diskurseinheiten zwischen Bezugs- und Trägerkonnekt sind deskriptive DPs mit *wiederum* als (wieder aufgreifende) Topikanhebung zu interpretieren. Die bevorzugte Realisierung für eine Topikanhebung-Lesart mit *wiederum* sind dagegen Demonstrativpronomen, die ausschließlich auf eingeführte, aktivierte Referenten verweisen können.

Dieses Zusammenspiel referentieller Ausdrücke und *wiederum* in Nacherstposition unterstützt meiner Ansicht die Annahme, dass es sich bei *wiederum* um einen pragmatischen Marker für (informations-)strukturellen Kontrast handelt: Die Funktion des Konnektors ist es, zu signalisieren, dass zwischen Bezugs- und Trägerkonnekt ein Topikwechsel stattfindet, dass zwischen den Konnekten also ein Kontrast auf (informations-)struktureller Ebene besteht. Dieser Kontrast kann im Falle von *wiederum* entweder in Form von kontrastiven Topiks in beiden Konnekten oder als Topikanhebung vorliegen. Die zur Realisierung des Trägerkonnekt-Topiks verwendeten referentiellen Ausdrücke desambiguieren als weiteres sprachliches Mittel auf formaler Ebene zwischen diesen beiden Lesarten.

Literatur

Breindl, Eva. 2011. 'Nach Rom freilich führen viele Wege': Zur Interaktion von Informationsstruktur, Diskursstruktur und Prosodie bei der Besetzung der Nacherstposition. In Gisella Ferraresi (Hrsg.), *Konnektoren im Deutschen und im Sprachvergleich: Beschreibung und grammatische Analyse*, 17–56. Tübingen: Narr.

Breindl, Eva, Anna Volodina & Ulrich Hermann Waßner. 2014. *Handbuch der deutschen Konnektoren. Semantik der deutschen Satzverknüpfer*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Daneš, Frantlšek. 1970. Zur linguistischen Analyse der Textstruktur. *Folia Linguistica* 4(1–2). 72–78.

Gundel, Jeanette K., Nancy Hedberg & Ron Zacharski. 1993. Cognitive status and the form of referring expressions in discourse. *Language* 69(2). 274–307.

Jasinskaja, Katja. 2012. Correction by adversative and additive markers. *Lingua* 122(15). 1899–1918.

Schumacher, Petra B., Manuel Dangl & Elyesa Uzun. 2016. Thematic role as prominence cue during pronoun resultion in German. In Anke Holler & Katja Suckow (Hrsg.), *Empirical perspectives on anaphora* resolution, 213–240. Berlin: De Gruyter.

***Dennoch*s Reise in die linke Peripherie**

Regina Zieleke und Łukasz Jędrzejowski
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen und Universität zu Köln
regina.zieleke@uni-tuebingen.de und l.jedrzejowski@uni-koeln.de

1 Die syntaktischen Positionen von *dennoch*

Dem Handbuch der deutschen Konnektoren (Breindl et al. 2014) zufolge ist *dennoch* ein konzessiver Adverbkonnektor. Demnach liefert die Verknüpfung *p dennoch q* „dem Adressaten die Hintergrundannahme mit, dass ein Sachverhalt von der Art, von der q ist, normalerweise nicht einen Sachverhalt von der Art, von der p ist, nach sich zieht" (2014: 913). Entsprechend liefert (1) die Hintergrundannahme, dass Regen normalerweise nicht den Sachverhalt nach sich ziehen würde, dass wir spazieren gehen.[1]

(1)   Es regnet. **Dennoch** gehen wir spazieren.

Syntaktisch wird *dennoch* als 'konnektintegrierbarer' Adverbkonnektor analysiert (vgl. Pasch et al. 2003). Im Gegensatz zur nicht-integrierbaren Konjunktion *und* beispielsweise, die auf die Koord-Position beschränkt ist, kann *dennoch* innerhalb der eigentlichen Satzstruktur auftreten. Entsprechend kann *dennoch* im Gegenwartsdeutschen in drei syntaktischen Positionen auftreten, wie auch die jeweiligen Korpusbelege zeigen: Vorfeld, siehe (2), Mittelfeld, siehe (3) und die von Pasch et al. (2003: 487) als „Nullstelle" bezeichnete Position außerhalb der eigentlichen Satzstruktur, siehe (4):

(2) Offiziell sind die Teamtreffen freiwillig, **dennoch** stehen sie bei jedem Lehrer so unverrückbar im Kalender wie eine Mathematikstunde.
(Z16/FEB.00699 Die ZEIT, 25.02.2016, S. 65; Nie mehr allein)

(3) Auch Päpste und Könige haben in der Geschichte "Imageprojekte" aus nicht allzu integren Motiven gesponsert. Für viele dieser Projekte sind wir heute **dennoch** dankbar. (Z17/JAN.00202 Die ZEIT, 19.01.2017, S. 18; Moralisch rigoros)

(4) Man hat sich arrangiert. **Dennoch**: Die Krise hat die Internate hart getroffen und viele überrascht. (Z16/FEB.00706 Die ZEIT, 25.02.2016, S. 70; Wo seid ihr, Schüler?)

Diese auch prosodisch bzw. graphematisch abgetrennte Nullstelle muss von der für *dennoch* (im Gegensatz zu bspw. *aber*) ungrammatischen Koord-Position abgegrenzt werden, vgl. (5) (Wöllstein 2010). Ebenfalls ungrammatisch ist *dennoch* in der sogenannten Nacherst-Position zwischen Vorfeldkonstituente und linker Satzklammer (Pasch et al. 2003: 496), siehe (6), und im Nachfeld, siehe (7).

(5) Es regnet, **aber / *dennoch** wir gehen spazieren.
(6) Es regnet. Wir **aber / *dennoch** gehen spazieren.
(7) Es regnet. Wir werden spazieren gehen ***dennoch**.

Im folgenden Beitrag untersuchen wir die syntaktischen Präferenzen des Konnektors *dennoch* für die in Tabelle 1 zusammengefassten Positionsmöglichkeiten. Anhand einer Gegenüberstellung von Daten aus dem 17. und 18. Jh. mit solchen aus dem 21. Jh. wollen wir einerseits einen Beitrag zur Diachronie von *dennoch* leisten (Sektion 2). Ausgehend von der in der Literatur vertretenen Annahme, dass Konnektoren in der Nullstelle als Diskursmarker

---

[1] Die Literatur zu Konzessivität diskutiert intensiv unterschiedliche Annahmen darüber, welcher Art diese Hintergrundannahme ist (konventionelle Implikatur oder Präsupposition, Erwartungsgegensatz oder Inkausalität). Diese Diskussion fällt außerhalb dieses Beitrags, aber siehe Zieleke (2021) für einen Vorschlag.

fungieren, wollen wir darüber hinaus der Frage nachgehen, ob man argumentieren kann, dass sich *dennoch* von einem konzessiven Adverb zu einem 'handlungsprojizierenden' Diskursmarker entwickelt hat (Sektion 3).

Tabelle 1: *Dennoch* und seine syntaktischen Positionen im Gwd.[2]

Nullstelle	Koord	Vorfeld	Nacherst	Mittelfeld	Nachfeld
+	–	+	–	+	–

2 *Dennoch* früher und heute

Nicht viel ist bekannt über die Diachronie von *dennoch*. Grimm & Grimm (1854–1961; Bd. 2, Sp. 1011) gehen weder auf die Herkunft noch auf das Alter von *dennoch* ein. Auch bei Kluge (2021) wird *dennoch* nicht behandelt. Adelung (1801: 1452) beobachtet zwar, dass *thannanoh* schon um das Jahr 800 vorkomme und dass es für *alsdann doch* stehe, allerdings diskutiert er keine ahd. Belege. Breindl et al. (2014: 958) zufolge geht *dennoch* „auf ein anaphorisches *dann + noch* zurück (in den Formen *dannoch, nochdann, jedennoch* und *dennocht* belegt), aus dem Behaghel (1928: 125) die konzessive Bedeutung als 'unter diesen Umständen' ableitet", allerdings gehen die Autor:innen nicht auf das Alter des Konnektors ein.

Im DWDS-Wörterbuch lesen wir, dass *dennoch* erst seit dem 18. Jh. ausschließlich als einschränkendes (also konzessives) Konjunktionaladverb i.S.v. 'trotzdem' verwendet wird. Vor dem 18. Jh. wurde es auch als ein temporales Adverb gebraucht, das sich als 'zu der Zeit noch', 'damals noch', 'jetzt noch' paraphrasieren lässt.[3] Auch wenn die syntaktischen Positionen *dennoch*s in diesen Beschreibungen keine Beachtung finden, lässt die Verwendung als temporales und später konzessives Adverb darauf schließen, dass der Konnektor bereits im 18. Jh. die verschiedenen Positionen innerhalb der deutschen Satzstruktur zulässt.

Um dies zu überprüfen, sehen wir uns zunächst sein Vorkommen im *GerManC*-Korpus an, das einen Zeitraum von 1650 bis 1800 umfasst (vgl. Durrell, Ensslin und Bennett)[4]. 106 Belege mit *dennoch* wurden extrahiert[5] und bezüglich der syntaktischen Position des Konnektors analysiert. Interessanterweise tritt *dennoch* nur im Vorfeld, (8), und im Mittelfeld, (9), auf, wie die folgenden Beispiele illustrieren:

(8) Obgleich die Rose von Jericho keinen Nutzen in der Arztney hat, **dennoch** habe ich sie hierbey mit anführen wollen: sie ist von dem Amomo gäntzlich unterschieden.
(GerManC, GMC/ 156.00001, 1717, Ref.: SCIE_P2_OMD_1717_Materialist)

(9) Wir hatten die gantze Nacht ein gutes Feuer/ und frohren **dennoch** dabey auffs äusserste. (GerManC, GMC/149.00001, 1715, Ref.: NARR_P2_NoD_1715_Africa)

---

[2] Wir beziehen uns in diesem Beitrag ausschließlich auf Verknüpfungen zwischen Sätzen. Verknüpfungen auf niedrigeren syntaktischen Ebenen wie in (i) lassen wir außen vor.

(i) Ohne Zweifel ist es eine Herausforderung, Luthers Geschichte in einfachen Worten und **dennoch** historisch korrekt zu erzählen.
(Z17/JAN.00099 Die ZEIT, 12.01.2017, S. 53; Holt den Mönch vom Klo!)

[3] „dennoch", bereitgestellt durch das Digitale Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, <https://www.dwds.de/wb/dennoch>, abgerufen am 13.09.2022.

[4] GerManC ist ein repräsentatives Korpus des Deutschen von 1650–1800 und umfasst 676.508 Wortformen. Es ist in das Historische Korpus des IDS integriert und verfügbar über COSMAS II, Archiv 'HIST – Archiv der historischen Korpora', vordefinierte Korpora 'gmc'.

[5] Die Suchanfrage "&dennoch" liefert alle morphologischen Formen des Lemmas *dennoch*.

Wir konnten in *GerManC* keine Belege finden, in denen *dennoch* außerhalb der Satzstruktur, also in der Nullstelle, steht. In den meisten analysierten Fällen kommt *dennoch* im Mittelfeld vor (88% der Fälle). Die Verteilung ist in Tabelle 2 zusammengefasst:

Tabelle 2: *Dennoch* **im GerManC Korpus (1650–1800)**

Nullstelle	Coord	Vorfeld[6]	Nacherst	**Mittelfeld**	Nachfeld	Insgesamt
0 (0%)	0 (0%)	18 (17%)	0 (0%)	**88 (83%)**	0 (0%)	106 (100%)

Für das Gegenwartsdeutsche ist mehr über die syntaktischen Präferenzen von *dennoch* bekannt. Ausgehend von Belegen aus dem DeReKo kommen Breindl et al. zu dem Schluss, dass „Vorfeldstellung und Mittelfeldstellung […] sich bei *dennoch* in etwa die Waage [halten]" (2014: 958). In einem Datensatz aus Zieleke (i.E.), sieht die Verteilung jedoch etwas anders aus.

Im DeReKo-Korpus *die Zeit* aus den Jahren 2016 und 2017 wurden je 50 zufällig ausgewählte Belege unter anderem bezüglich der syntaktischen Position analysiert (ibid.). Auch hier finden sich Belege mit *dennoch* in Vorfeld, vgl. (2) oben, und Mittelfeld, vgl. (3), allerdings ist hier nun das Vorfeld mit 69 Belegen (69%) vorherrschend. Darüber hinaus finden wir in diesem aktuelleren Zeitfenster 7 Belege mit *dennoch* in der Nullstelle, vgl. (4). Die Ergebnisse sind in Tabelle 3 zusammengefasst:

Tabelle 3: *Dennoch* **im Zeit-Korpus (2016/2017)**

Nullstelle	Coord	**Vorfeld**	Nacherst	Mittelfeld	Nachfeld	Insgesamt
7 (7%)	0 (0%)	**69 (69%)**	0 (0%)	24 (24%)	0 (0%)	100 (100%)

Der Vergleich dieser beiden Datensätze – eines historischen mit Belegen aus dem 17. und 18. Jh. und eines zeitgenössischen mit Belegen aus dem 21. Jh. – zeigt eine interessante Verschiebung der syntaktischen Präferenzen von *dennoch* vom Mittelfeld zum Vorfeld. Diese 'Reise' des Konnektors in die linke Satzperipherie wird umso deutlicher, bedenken wir die nun mit 7% vorkommende Nullstelle, die gänzlich außerhalb der Satzstruktur liegt.

3 *Dennoch* **in der Nullstelle**

Die Verwendung von *dennoch* in der syntaktisch (und graphematisch/prosodisch) desintegrierten Nullstelle ist für die Frage interessant, ob es sich bei dem Konnektor um einen Diskursmarker handelt. Während einige Ansätze Konnektoren allgemein als Diskursmarker analysieren (z.B. Fraser 1999), sehen andere diese lediglich als potentielle Quelle, aus denen Diskursmarker nur unter bestimmten Umständen „rekrutiert" werden können. So sind lexikalische Ausdrücke wie Konnektoren für Imo (2017) dann Diskursmarker, wenn sie „in Initialposition, oft außerhalb der syntaktischen Struktur eines Satzes bzw. oft nur lose damit verbunden" (also in der Nullstelle) auftreten. In dieser Position, so Imo, erhalten sprachliche Einheiten eine für den Autor definitorische „diskurspragmatische, diskurssemantische und

---

[6] Zu der Kategorie *Vorfeld* zählen wir auch elliptische Fälle wie in (i):

(i) Die Krabatische Rosse sind zwar mager/ klein und schwach anzusehen; **dennoch** aber starck und dauerhafftig/ so/ daß das kleinste und unansehnlichste/ den stärcksten Mann gar leicht und mutig dahinträgt. (GerManC, GMC/092.00001, 1689, Ref.: HUMA_P1_OOD_1689_Crain)

syntaktische Projektionskraft" (Imo 2017: 51). Auch andere Ansätze betonen, dass Diskursmarker sich dadurch auszeichnen, von ihrer syntaktischen Umgebung unabhängig zu sein (vgl. Heine 2013: 1209); im Deutschen lässt sich diese Eigenschaft mit der Nullstelle assoziieren.

Auch wenn wir diejenigen Ansätze vertreten, die Konnektoren allein aufgrund ihrer Funktion, Kohärenzrelationen auszudrücken, als Diskursmarker verstehen, wollen wir dem Gedanken einer potentiellen Entwicklung *dennoch*s zu einem desintegrierten Diskursmarker nachgehen. Wir ergänzen daher unsere Daten mit einer weiteren vergleichenden Korpussuche, dieses Mal ausschließlich mit *dennoch* in der Nullstelle. Da *dennoch* in unseren *GerManC*-Daten nicht in der Nullstelle belegt ist, erweitern wir die historischen Daten auf das gesamte DeReKo-Archiv HIST, das ca. 70.000.000 Wortformen aus dem Zeitraum von 1650 bis 1919 beinhaltet. Für die zeitgenössischen Daten wurde nun das Korpus *N-öffentlich (Neuakquisitionen)* verwendet. In diesem Vergleich interessiert uns ausschließlich die jeweilige Anzahl der bereinigten Treffer[7] in den beiden Zeiträumen.

In den HIST-Korpora finden wir 34 Treffer mit *dennoch* in der Nullstelle.[8] Der früheste Beleg ist aus dem Jahr 1789, siehe (10):

(10) Hymen hätte zur Belohnung Sie im Freuden-Chor umschwebt, Und ein Leben ihr gewebt, Wie es in Kronions Wohnung Hebe mit Alciden lebt. **Dennoch**, ohne je zu wanken, Käm' ihr ganzes Heil auch um, Schlangen ihrer Liebe Ranken Um den hingewelkten Kranken Unablöslich sich herum.
(HK3/E58.00001 Bürger, Gottfried August: Gedichte [Ausgabe 1789], 1789 - Berlin: DIRECTMEDIA Publishing GmbH, 2000, S. 3-248 [S. 103])

Im aktuellen Korpus *N-öffentlich*, das Belege aus den Jahren 2020 und 2021 enthält, finden wir 1.658 Belege mit *dennoch* in der Nullstelle wie in (11):

(11) Ganz so schlimm ist die Lage also nicht. **Dennoch**: Ein lebendiger Kiez ist etwas anderes. (B21/MAR.01587 Berliner Zeitung, 27.03.2021, S. 20; Weder Rom noch Riad)

---

[7] Die in beiden Korpora verwendete Suchanfrage "<sa> /w0 &dennoch /+w1 (, oder „:")" ergibt Treffer für *dennoch* am Satzanfang, gefolgt von einem Komma oder Doppelpunkt. In beiden Datensätzen wurden Dubletten und solche Treffer ausgeschlossen, bei denen ein durch Kommas abgetrennter Einschub *dennoch*s Position im Vorfeld verschleiert hat, wie bspw. in (i):

(i) **Dennoch**, *so Mosa*, gebe es intern keine Diskussion darüber, dass 100 Prozent Bio die Zukunft sein könnte. (FOC21/NOV.00169 FOCUS, 20.11.2021, S. 154; Beziehungsstatus: kompliziert)

[8] Auffällig ist in diesen Daten die Häufigkeit eingebetteter Adverbial- oder Infinitivsätze im Vorfeld. Interessant sind insbesondere Fälle wie (i), bei denen der eingebettete Adverbialsatz selbst ebenfalls konzessiv ist:

(i) Wissen wir nun doch, daß die Ideen, welchen unsere Zeitung das Wort geredet, nicht getötet werden können, wie dies arme Blatt - das ja auch selbst, wenn es heute stirbt, vielleicht nicht allzulange seiner Auferstehung entgegenzuschlummern hat. **Dennoch**, **obwohl** ich diese freudige Gewißheit mit mir nehme **und obwohl** ich in diesem augenblicklichen Untergang der Frauen-Zeitung keinen Untergang sehe für die Prinzipien, denen sie diente, kann ich nicht ohne Wehmut, ja sogar nicht ohne Schmerz dies Abschiedswort schreiben, und darum gestatte man mir, daß […]
(HK4/O22.00001 Otto, Louise: Aufsätze aus der "Frauen-Zeitung": Abschiedswort, Erstdruck: 1850 - Berlin: DIRECTMEDIA Publishing GmbH, 2004, S. 38-334 [S. 332])

4 Ausblick: *Dennoch* auf dem Weg zum Diskursmarker?

Unsere Daten belegen erstmals eine Verschiebung der syntaktischen Präferenzen des Konnektors vom Mittelfeld im 17. und 18. Jh. in die linke Satzperipherie im 21. Jh. mit einer allgemeinen Präferenz für das Vorfeld und einem deutlichen Anstieg der Belege mit *dennoch* in der Nullstelle. Ob sich *dennoch* damit im Laufe der Zeit als Diskursmarker auch im strikten, „handlungsprojizierenden" Sinne nach Imo (2017) etabliert hat, wird sich nur durch zukünftige qualitative Untersuchungen der Daten zeigen können. Einen Hinweis dahingehend liefern allerdings Belege wie in (12):

(12) (Interviewer) Franziska Preuß, Sie stehen nicht gern im Rampenlicht, betonen gern die Teamleistung. **Dennoch**: Wie fühlt es sich an, die beste Deutsche im Weltcup zu sein? (HAZ21/FEB.01374 Hannoversche Allgemeine, 13.02.2021, S. 12; Zusammen vorn angreifen)

Einigen Ansätzen zufolge besteht ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Verwendung von Konnektoren als Diskursmarker und deren Interpretation auf der Sprechaktebene, bei der im Sinne von Sweetser (1990) der Konnektor nicht Propositionen, sondern Sprechakte verknüpft. Für Blühdorn (2017) bspw. sind Diskursmarker Operatoren für Sprechakte, was für Konnektoren mit syntaktischen Auswirkungen einhergeht, bspw. Verbzweitsätze mit Subjunktionen wie *weil* oder *obwohl*. Auch Günthner (2009) argumentiert, dass die Verwendung von *obwohl* mit Verbzweitsätzen einhergeht mit einem Wechsel von einer traditionellen konzessiven Subjunktion wie in (13) zu einem Diskursmarker, der eine Korrektur oder Meinungsverschiedenheit ankündigt wie in (14) (Beispiele in Anlehnung an Günthner 2009: 440/441):

(13) Der hat noch 25 Fehler gefunden, **obwohl** schon Korrektur gelesen war. (propositionale Verknüpfung)
(14) Ich würde so gern mitkommen. **Obwohl**, zehn Stunden Flug, das fände ich doch nicht so gut. (Sprechaktverknüpfung)

Belege wie in (12) sind ebenfalls eindeutig als Verknüpfung auf der Sprechaktebene zu analysieren: Die mit *dennoch* eingeleitete Frage kann hier nicht als Erwartungsgegensatz zu dem im ersten Konnekt beschriebenen Sachverhalt verstanden werden (allein deshalb, dass eine Frage eben auch kein Sachverhalt ist). Die Interpretation ist vielmehr, dass der Interviewer den Sprechakt der Frage ausführt, obwohl er von Franziska Preuß' Bescheidenheit weiß.

Ob eine Interpretation auf der Sprechaktebene auf alle Fälle von *dennoch* in der Nullstelle zutrifft – und ob der Unterschied zwischen propositionaler und Sprechaktverknüpfung ausschlaggebend für den Status als Diskursmarker ist oder schlicht verschiedene Diskurs-markerfunktionen abbildet – wird weitere Forschung zeigen.

Literatur

Adelung, Johann Christoph. 1801. *Grammatisches=kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart, mit beständiger Vergleichung der übrigen Mundarten, besonders aber der Oberdeutschen.* Mit W. Soltau's Beyträgen; revidiert und berichtet von Franz Xaver Schönberger. Theil 1: A–E, Theil 2: F–L, Theil 3: M–Scr, Theil 4: Seb.-Z. Wien: Piechler.

Blühdorn, Hardarik. 2017. Diskursmarker: Pragmatische Funktion und syntaktischer Status. In Hardarik Blühdorn, Arnulf Deppermann, Henrike Helmer & Thomas Spranz-Fogasy (Hrsg.), *Diskursmarker im Deutschen: Reflexionen und Analysen*, 311–336. Göttingen: Verlag für Gesprächsforschung.

Breindl, Eva, Anna Volodina & Ulrich Hermann Waßner. 2014. *Handbuch der deutschen Konnektoren* 2: *Semantik der deutschen Satzverknüpfer*. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Durrell, Martin, Astrid Ensslin & Paul Bennett (Hrsg.). *GerManC. A Historical Corpus of German Newspapers 1650–1800* [Electronic resource].

DWDS – *Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. Das Wortauskunftssystem zur deutschen Sprache in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, hrsg. v. d. Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, <https://www.dwds.de/>, abgerufen am 13.09.2022.

Fraser, Bruce. 1999. What are discourse markers? *Journal of Pragmatics* 31(7). 931–952.

Grimm, Jackob & Wilhelm Grimm. 1854–1961. *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel.

Günthner, Susanne. 2000. From concessive connector to discourse marker: The use of *obwohl* in everyday German interaction. *Topics in English Linguistics* 33. 439–468.

Heine, Bernd. 2013. On discourse markers: Grammaticalization, pragmaticalization, or something else? *Linguistics* 51(6). 1205–1247.

Imo, Wolfgang. 2017. Diskursmarker im gesprochenen und geschriebenen Deutsch. In Hardarik Blühdorn, Arnulf Deppermann, Henrike Helmer & Thomas Spranz-Fogasy (Hrsg.), *Diskursmarker im Deutschen: Reflexionen und Analysen*, 49–72. Göttingen: Verlag für Gesprächsforschung.

Kluge, Friedrich. 2021. *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*. 9., durchgesehen Auflage. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Pasch, Renate, Ursula Brauße, Eva Breindl & Ulrich Hermann Waßner. 2009. *Handbuch der deutschen Konnektoren* 1. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Wöllstein, Angelika. 2010. *Topologisches Satzmodell*. Heidelberg: Winter.

Zieleke, Regina. 2021. The incausality of 'dennoch' and 'trotzdem': Generic contrast. In *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung* 25. 924–938.

Zieleke, Regina. i.E. *Three dimensions of contrast. Evidence from German contrastive discourse markers*. PhD dissertation, University of Cologne.